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ANNALS
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THE NICARAGUA CANAL AND THE MONROE
DOCTRINE.

Lord Salisbury remarked a short time ago, in reply to some Liberal criticism, that he did not make up his foreign policy, he inherited it. Our own Secretaries of State are not so fortunate, for they have inherited, not policies but questions, and most of these are encumbered with estoppels of the past.

As for the American people—they decide these diplomatic questions off hand, as they come up, by instinct. Or to be more exact, two sets of diplomatic instincts seem to pervade our public mind, and it is only on rare occasions that our decisions are unanimous. On the one hand, our Monroe Doctrine impels us to keep the hand of Europe—or of late, more specifically, the paw of the British lion—off the entire American Continent; while at the same time, our inherited dread of entangling foreign alliances often makes us hesitate to act when the crucial moment has arrived.

The people of England and the United States are, indeed, of the same race, and it is true enough—as an editorial writer of the New York *Herald* has lately remarked—that “blood is thicker than water.” Blood is not thicker than land, however, and it is over the latter element that our disputes with Great Britain always seem to arise. We have long become accustomed to look upon the western half of the earth’s surface as ours, while England’s ambition seems to be to dominate the whole. To a certain extent, therefore, we both desire the same thing; and when even blood relations have their heart’s desire set upon the acquisition of a single object, there is apt to be quarreling in the best regulated families.

The case of John Bull versus Uncle Jonathan *in re* Nicaraguan Canal Route is indeed a long and complicated one, and, with the space at my disposal, a bare outline of the issue must suffice.*

Diplomatic questions for the most part have their roots in geography or ethnography. Disputes over boundaries, and controversies about peoples, fill at least three quarters of the nations’ blue books. Both elements enter into the present difficulty.

From the mouth of the San Juan on the Atlantic coast, a natural waterway extends through Nicaragua to within a few miles of the Pacific Ocean. This route of transit between the seas has long been an object of regard by the maritime nations of the west, and on this account Nicaragua’s territory and people have both become subjects of international importance. The land itself is, moreover, divided longitudinally by the Cordillera range of mountains, into two distinct geographic sections. There is the Mosquito coast on the east, densely wooded, rather damp and insalubrious, and only fitted for extractive industry. The trade winds lose the greater part of their moisture in crossing the

* A detailed account of this whole question will be found in the author’s book on “Interoceanic Transit: Its History and Significance,” now on press.

range, however, and the region on the other side, round about the lakes, consisting mostly of plain lands and valleys, is well adapted to sub-tropical economic advance.

Aztec emigrants from Mexico settled in pre-historic times upon this fertile Nicaraguan depression toward the west, and there built up their semi-civilization. Having no immediate use for the lands across the mountains, these primitive Americans left the savages of the eastern seaboard undisturbed, and thus the line of geographic division became even in the early days one of ethnic demarcation as well.

In their search for a westerly route to the Indies, the Spaniards discovered this country from the east, and at once took possession of several points along the shore. Neither the land nor its wild inhabitants offered any attractions to the European gold-seekers, and little attempt was made to colonize the shore. The discovery of the Pacific soon gave rise to voyages of South Sea discovery as well, and it was from the west, therefore, that the rich lands of Nicaragua were finally opened up.

The conquerors made short work of the Aztec colonists they found there, and soon brought the Nicaraguan depression completely under their control. With such riches before them, they ceased to trouble themselves further about the lands they had discovered along the eastern coast, and so they too left the Indian tribes in peace, except for the occasional raids of their slave hunters. The Spanish colonists of the interior must needs have an outlet on the Atlantic, however, not only to facilitate their own export trade with the mother country, but also in order that the still richer products of Peru might find a convenient route of transit to the eastern coast and Spain. They strained a point, therefore, and with some difficulty secured control of the San Juan River. With their immediate necessities thus provided for, the Spaniards pushed their conquest no further, but left the Indians of the eastern coast to their own devices.

Being first upon the scene, Spain was soon able to secure a monopoly of the entire West Indian and Southern American trade. No nation dared yet oppose her openly, but this did not prevent private citizens of rival powers from leaguering themselves together against their common enemies the Spaniards, into what was known as the "Freebooter Republic." After gaining a foothold on an uninhabited island of the West Indies, these buccaneers soon saw that fortune favored their piratical designs along the unoccupied eastern shores of the mainland. They at once cultivated the friendship of the Indians, making common cause with the natives there against their enemies the slave hunters, and thus, in the end, were enabled to establish themselves securely among the lagoons of the Mosquito Shore, on the Bay Islands off the Honduras coast, and in Belize along the eastern shores of Yucatan. From these vantage grounds the freebooters then swept the Spanish Main in their swift-sailing craft, and played havoc with the richly laden homeward-bound galleons of the Spaniards.

The majority of these buccaneers were Englishmen, and Spain accordingly protested vigorously against their acts at the English Court. England avoided the question at first by denying her own subjects and by disavowing their acts. Cromwell came into power soon after, however, and, in accordance with his vigorous foreign policy, he decided to make use of the hardy buccaneers, and so gain a foothold for England in the West Indies. His mind was set on Cuba, but failing in this, his secret expedition secured Jamaica for Great Britain in 1655.

Spain was by this time thoroughly alarmed, and fearing lest the conquests should go further, offered to treat with England now, on the basis of what each had thus far secured. The American treaty was accordingly concluded between the two powers in 1670, whereby it was agreed "that the most serene king of Great Britain, his heirs and successors, shall have, hold, keep, and enjoy forever, with plenary right of

sovereignty, dominion possession and proprietary, all those lands, regions, islands, colonies and places whatsoever, being or situated in the West Indies, or any part of America which the said king of Great Britain or his subjects do at present hold and possess."

Being now herself a West Indian power, the activities of the freebooters were as annoying to England as they had been to Spain before, so she at once set about extirpating the confederacy. Not wishing to proceed against her own countrymen in the matter, England took care to inform her buccaneers of her intention beforehand, advising them moreover, to abandon their piratical raids and settle down along the eastern shore among their Indian friends, as peaceable log-cutters instead. In this way England evidently hoped to continue to "hold and possess" the points of advantage thus far acquired on the mainland, and bring them thus *ex post facto* under the terms of the treaty of 1670.

While the English freebooters were settling their final accounts with the Spanish colonists of the interior before retiring to the coast, another important element was added to the ethnography of the Mosquito Shore. In 1650 a Dutch slave ship, homeward bound from Guinea, was wrecked off the coast, and in the confusion a large body of negroes escaped to the shore. The Indians received them kindly and took them into their tribe. From this strange amalgamation of two such distinct ethnic stocks, a hybrid race—since known as the Mosquito Indians—rapidly grew up, and soon spread itself out along the shore from Cape Gracias à Dios to the Blewfields Lagoon. On their return to the coast in 1688, the English buccaneers also took pains to make friends with the strangers, and soon re-established their authority over the tribe, taking up their permanent abode now among the lagoons of the shore in the capacity of wood-cutters. Wishing to cement their newly formed peaceable connections with their fellow-countrymen of Jamaica, the English then sent Jeremy, the young Mosquito chief, across the Main

with a petition to the governor that he might be taken under the protection of the British crown. The English governor of Jamaica still had his doubt as to the pacific intent of the ex-pirates, and refused to take any official action in Jeremy's behalf. In his private capacity, he did, however, commission the Mosquito chief to bring back fifty warriors and hunt down runaway slaves in Jamaica. An English vessel was placed at Jeremy's disposal, with plenty of rum for the voyage—the contract was faithfully fulfilled on both sides, and on this informal basis the British protectorate over Mosquitoland was established.

In 1739 England was involved in open war with Spain over matters arising from the question of the Austrian Succession, and could thenceforth pursue her policy of further encroachment in America more openly. It was considered useless to attack the Spaniards at home, so the Spanish Main became the centre of this more especial maritime conflict between the two rival powers in the New World. English agents were accordingly sent out from Jamaica, to Belize and Mosquitoland, in order to unite the scattered settlers there, and stir up the natives to a determined revolt against the Spanish colonists of the interior. The protectorate over the Mosquito Shore was now proclaimed in due form, Belize was connected more closely with Mosquitoland by the formal acquisition of the Bay Islands, and definite plans were also laid to extend the British dominion to the Pacific by the seizure of the San Juan and the transit route. Peace being declared at this juncture in Europe, by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, further military operations in Central America were for the time at least suspended. The British agents remained, however, in the capacity of Superintendents of the Shore, and English rule continued to be maintained, as before, from Belize to the Blewfields Lagoon.

The Seven Years' War again abrogated treaty relations between England and Spain in 1756, and in spite of his effort at conciliation, Pitt found Spain taking the side of

France in the American phase of this controversy known as the "French and Indian War." England's navy and her American colonists proved too much for this Franco-Spanish alliance, however, and in the treaty of Paris, 1763, Great Britain was again in a position to dictate terms to her rivals. Spain was obliged to give up Florida to her successful opponent, and compelled also to allow British subjects the right to cut wood all along Central America's eastern sea board. In return for this last favor, England indeed, agreed to demolish the fortifications she had erected along the coast and withdraw her troops; but as she had now acquired by law the right she had thus far been fighting for, force was no longer of any immediate use. Belize was then made an independent British settlement, while Mosquitoland became henceforth a more or less regular adjunct of Jamaica.

At the outbreak of the American Revolutionary struggle Spain again took sides with France, according to the terms of her Bourbon Alliance, made under the pressure of the Seven Years' War. England was therefore the more determined now on completely breaking Spain's power in America by seizing the transit route through Nicaragua, and thus severing the mainland colonies in twain. A powerful expedition was accordingly fitted out in Jamaica, with Captain Polson in command of the troops, and Admiral Nelson—then a young post-captain—in charge of the fleet and transports. The English settlers of the shore at the same time marshaled their Indian allies for the attack, and the whole force then pushed up the San Juan in a body. Everything went well at first, as the Spanish colonists were able to offer but little resistance. Fever, contracted on the coast, soon broke out among the troops, however; Nelson himself was one of the first to be taken down, and before this last unexpected enemy the whole expedition was in the end obliged to retreat with great loss. By this time also the tide had at last begun to turn against England in the

north. Having her own flesh and blood to contend against on this second occasion, Great Britain was forced to submit, and Spanish-America, in spite of the futile part she had played in the struggle, was generously allowed to share in the spoils. In the treaty of Versailles, 1783, Great Britain was reluctantly forced to give up all claims to the Bay Islands and the Mosquito Shore, and rest content henceforth with certain usufructuary rights in Belize. Her settlers, who had at least held their own on the shore, still refused to submit to such terms, however, and there were many in England who supported their claim. The government was nevertheless firm in the matter and, having promised in the treaty of Versailles, felt called upon to keep its word. So in 1786 a supplementary treaty was concluded with Spain, whereby England again agreed to give up the Bay Islands and Mosquitoland, in return for some further usufructuary rights in Belize. The settlers were now forced to retire to Yucatan, though their friends of the opposition still maintained that by abandoning the Mosquito protectorate Great Britain had "hung up her degradation in all the courts of Europe."

With the Spain of Napoleon England was again at war in 1796, and the treaties of 1783 and 1796 were no longer regarded as binding either by the home government or by the settlers in Central America. Finding the Carib Indians of the Island of St. Vincent too much attached to French interests, the West Indian authorities boldly deported them in a body—to the number of four thousand—and, in derogation of Spain's rights, landed them all on the Bay Islands. Infuriated at this fresh act of aggression the Spanish colonists then made a last desperate effort on their own account to drive the English settlers from Belize. The settlers repelled the attack, and under the cover of the guns of a British frigate, they began to extend the boundaries of their settlement far into the interior. The colonists having taken the initiative and instituted the attack, the settlers accordingly announced, that the land of Belize now belonged

to them by the paramount right of conquest and no longer under the treaty of 1786. England, it is true, at the close of the Peninsular war, revived the treaties of 1783 and 1786 *in toto* with the restored Spanish Government; but then the facts of the matter no longer fitted the case, and in this unsatisfactory condition the affair was finally left.

While English colonists, our people paid but little attention to this struggle between Spain and Great Britain for control of the West Indies and Central America; on the one hand because we were still loyal to the mother-land in matters of external politics, and again because our own internal affairs absorbed our entire attention. After we had secured our independence and become the first republic of the New World, the whole Spanish-American question appeared to us in quite a different light. As a young nation we stood for freedom, and, in the early enthusiasm of success, we soon came to regard the entire American Continent as the destined home of the free, and consequently under our protection.

The Spanish-American States to the south of us one by one also freed themselves in time from European control, and modeled their republican institutions after those of the United States. A strong reaction against constitutionalism at the same time set in among the States of eastern Europe. Already Russia, Prussia, Austria, France and Spain had leagued themselves together in their so-called Holy Alliance to crush out liberal ideas. The Czar's government soon after began to encroach upon our northwest territory, and the rumor was spread abroad that the Holy Alliance had determined to restore to Ferdinand of Spain his colonies in America.

George Canning, the English Foreign Secretary, was fearful of the designs of his Continental rivals, both in Europe and in America. As a counter stroke he, therefore, suggested that the United States unite with Great Britain in a joint protest against any further European interference in the affairs of the American Continent. This was precisely

John Quincy Adams' idea, but seeing no reason why England should be made an exception to our national policy, he refused the proffered co-operation, and induced President Monroe to act alone in the matter, along the lines thus laid down. We still admitted Great Britain as at least a silent partner in our Monroe Doctrine, however, for "with existing colonies or dependencies of any European power," we expressly declined to interfere, and thus left England secure in the possessions she had thus far acquired and maintained in America. It was rather the independent Spanish-American States which were henceforth to be under our protection, though these too we left free to develop in their own way.

Spanish-America was naturally enthusiastic over the stand we had taken. The patriot Bolivar accordingly proposed a congress of all independent American States, under the leadership of the United States, to take counsel for their continued safety and prosperity. Adams was then President and he, with his Secretary of State, Henry Clay, were both highly in favor of the plan. Congress, and the people of the United States generally, supported them with enthusiasm, but the Senate was opposed. The Spanish-American States had gone further in the cause of freedom than we had dared to go, as they one and all had by this time abolished the institution of slavery. It was on the program of the Panama Congress, moreover, to recognize the independence of the negro republic of Hayti, and such a proceeding our Senate, as then constituted, could in no way be expected to tolerate. Slavery was already a tender subject in Washington, and the President's forces soon found themselves compelled to give up the contest. Without our hearty co-operation the Panama Congress came to nothing, and, now that the fear of immediate European interference had for the present passed away, Spanish-America was again left to her own erratic devices.

The idea of the Monroe Doctrine was still kept alive, it is true, by the Central American States and a few American

canal enthusiasts, but the great body of the American people were too busy developing their own land to pay much attention to the matter, and the Government of the United States ceased to take any active part in the issue. Great Britain, on the other hand, soon grew jealous of our continued western advance, and determined to parallel us both to the north and to the south, by extending her power through Canada to the western seaboard, and by securing her long-desired control of the route of transit across Central America to the Pacific.

The methods employed by both powers in their advance toward the west were identical. Settlers and frontiersmen of each nation were allowed to go forth into Indian or Spanish-American lands, and there gain rights as squatters. Trouble was sure to arise with the people upon whose territory these settlers encroached, and in every such case the two powerful governments would interfere in behalf of their outraged citizens and thus secure control. Neither party cared to interfere directly, however, with the territorial advance of the other, and so the northwest boundary line was run between Canada and the United States with only jealous grumbling on either side.

England's advance across Canada we were easily able to watch across the boundary line, but to her doings in Central America we paid not the slightest attention. Unnoticed by us, her settlers in Belize extended their boundaries into Guatemala, and renewed their old friendship with the Mosquito Indians. They soon arranged the succession to the crown of Mosquitoland to suit themselves and finally induced one king, Sambo, to appoint, before his death, the English Superintendent of Belize regent of the Mosquito Shore during the minority of the heir-apparent, with the further request that the Church of England and Ireland be established in the land. The English regency being formally inaugurated, the settlers then demanded Nicaragua's recognition of the same, and, to give more color to the request—

with the timely assistance of a British warship—they occupied temporarily the port of the San Juan. Nicaragua refused to recognize the sovereignty thus claimed for Mosquitoland, and, without the aid of the home government, the settlers were unable to press their demands.

Just at this juncture the United States acquired the Californian seaboard through its successful war with Mexico, and our territory thus formed one broad belt stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific, through the very heart of the northern continent. Lord Palmerston now deemed it high time for his government to act officially; for Great Britain and the United States seemed destined henceforth to be rivals on the Pacific as well, and the only adequate route to this western ocean lay across the American Isthmus. The claim of the Belize settlers was accordingly taken up by the British home government and Nicaragua was officially given to understand that the territorial right of the Mosquito king extended to the mouth of the San Juan. Nicaragua again refused to recognize the claim and appealed once more to the United States for aid. We had no knowledge to act upon, however, and before any steps could be taken, an English naval force had seized upon the port of the San Juan itself and compelled Nicaragua, at the point of the bayonet, to abandon forever all right over the mouth of the stream. The Nicaraguan officials were thus forced to give place to an Anglo-Mosquito administration, and the port was now called "Greytown" in honor of Governor Grey, of Jamaica, who had so successfully planned the campaign.

In the meanwhile the discovery of gold in California induced an immense tide of emigration from our eastern States to these rich western lands. The "Great American Desert" was then thought to be practically impassable and capitalists were quick to see that rich profits could be gained by establishing some direct route of transit to the west, more adequate than the toilsome journey in prairie-schooners across the plains, or the perilous sea voyage around the

Horn. With the germs of secession in the air it was also highly important from a political point of view to bind this new western territory more closely to the life of the east by the links of trade and commerce. Thus the eyes of both the people and the government of the United States were suddenly turned toward the long-neglected Isthmus. The government was at first for avoiding the Nicaraguan issue, and, having failed to secure a right of way across Tehuantepec from Mexico, the administration turned to New Grenada and secured from that State a monopoly of transit across the Isthmus of Panama. No European power opposed us here, so we did not hesitate to assert our control and take upon ourselves an exclusive guarantee of the route.

American capitalists were not so cautious as their government, however, and, seeing the advantages the Nicaraguan route afforded for an immediate route of transit to the Pacific, they at once secured concessions on their own account from that all too willing State, sufficient to provide for all present and future contingencies. They soon found England held the key to the situation, however, and so as usual appealed to their government for aid. Polk was then President, but both he and his Secretary of State, Buchanan, were still ignorant of the true nature of the British claim. An agent, Elijah Hise, was accordingly sent out to inquire into the situation, but expressly instructed not to enter into any treaty stipulations with Nicaragua before advising the Washington authorities. Upon his arrival in Nicaragua Hise saw that no time was to be lost if American rights were to be preserved; so throwing aside his instructions, he fell back on the Monroe Doctrine for support, and, in a formal treaty, guaranteed Nicaragua's paramount right of sovereignty from sea to sea over the whole territory she had claimed, and that, too, in the very face of England's adverse possession of Greytown and the entire Mosquito Shore. The nature of this treaty was at once spread abroad through the press, the American people seemed eager for its immediate

enforcement, and, amid this rejuvenated enthusiasm over the Monroe Doctrine, the Polk Administration came to an end without taking any further action in the matter.

Polk's successor, General Taylor, now found himself in a quandary. He had no majority in the Senate, and the press of the opposition was only too eager to trip him up. If he decided to push the Hise treaty through, Taylor felt there was a strong probability of his being led into a war with Great Britain, and, without the united support of the Senate, such a policy he deemed to be fatal. If, on the other hand, he were to disavow Hise's acts, he knew the people would at once be up in arms, accusing him and his administration of pusillanimity before British aggression. On the horns of this dilemma Taylor, or more properly his Secretary of State, John M. Clayton, attempted to avoid both issues by pursuing a midway course.

To this end, another diplomatic agent, E. G. Squier, was sent off at once to Nicaragua, with full power to enter into treaty stipulations with that State, but with definite instructions not to involve the United States "in any entangling alliances or any unnecessary controversy." Squier's task was a well-nigh impossible one. To enforce the contract the canal company had made with Nicaragua meant sure conflict with England, while not to enforce it involved a total abandonment of the American right of way. Squier chose the former alternative, but in a modified form, in the hopes of avoiding any serious outbreak on Great Britain's part. He accordingly accepted the company's contract, and undertook to guarantee the neutrality of the canal route at least from sea to sea, for his government. Then mindful of his instructions, and in the vain hope of neutralizing the issue, Squier had a further clause inserted in both the contract and the treaty, to the effect that his government sought no exclusive control over the canal, and therefore invited all other nations to enter into like treaty arrangements with Nicaragua for the joint guarantee of the route.

By making the canal thus free to all nations, Squier evidently intended to nullify England's claim, and allow American capital to proceed at once with the work.

While he was thus engaged in Nicaragua the English agent Mr. Chatfield—with the aid of a British ship of war—was actively pressing an old claim against Honduras for a debt said to be due to one of Her Majesty's subjects. Now the canal route as then planned, was to terminate on the Pacific in the Bay of Fonseca, which separates the State of Honduras from Nicaragua on the west. In this bay—and directly at the proposed mouth of the canal—lies Tigre Island, belonging to Honduras, and this, Squier understood, was the real object of Chatfield's diplomacy. Hastening to the Honduras capital, in order to checkmate his rival, Squier at once entered into treaty relations with the authorities there, and succeeded in securing for the United States Government the possession of this strategic island. Chatfield, hearing of this *coup*, sent word to the Pacific squadron to meet him off the Bay of Fonseca, and hurried across Honduras to be on hand himself. With a naval force again to support him, Chatfield then seized upon Tigre Island in the name of the crown, as an indemnity for the debt still unpaid. Squier then informed Chatfield that the British were on United States territory, and, receiving no satisfaction from this, he ordered the English to evacuate the island at once, and added that if his request were not complied with within six days, his government would consider it an act of aggression, and proceed accordingly.

In the meantime Abbott Lawrence, our Minister to England, by searching the archives in London, had succeeded in making out a strong historical case against British encroachments in Central America, and was prepared to maintain any application of the Monroe Doctrine his government might decide upon. With the issue thus directly before him, Clayton recognized that his policy of conciliation had failed, and, rather than press the matter to its

logical conclusion, he decided to make what terms he could with Great Britain at once. So he frankly told Lord Palmerston the predicament he was in, and suggested that the immediate controversy between England and the United States be buried, by the two nations co-operating in the construction and control of the canal. There was something inspiring in the idea of these two great nations of the Anglo-Saxon race, working thus in harmony for the peaceful commerce of the world, and Clayton hoped by this stroke, to transform the present indignation of the American people into a spirit of international enthusiasm.

Lord Palmerston scarcely looked for so speedy a recognition of his claims, and of course willingly accepted Clayton's proposals. Sir Henry Bulwer was accordingly dispatched as a special envoy to Washington, to treat with Clayton directly along the lines he had proposed. Bulwer's first request was that Squier and all his acts and treaties be disavowed. This Clayton readily consented to, and thereby made England, for the first time, an acknowledged exception to the Monroe Doctrine. Sir Henry then suggested that the United States and Great Britain henceforth treat directly with each other in regard to canal matters, and no longer indirectly through Nicaragua. In agreeing to this proposition Clayton went further, and formally recognized England's claim to the mouth of the San Juan, which up to this he had strenuously denied.

On this one-sided basis the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was then drawn up. Therein each party agreed never to "obtain or maintain for itself any exclusive control over the said ship canal" nor to "exercise any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito coast, or any part of Central America." In return for these mutual (?) favors, the two powers then arranged to co-operate in the construction and control of this and any future transit-way which might be laid across the isthmus. The treaty was concluded in a hurry, and then pushed through the Senate, by the

supporters of the administration, with extraordinary haste. No Senator seemed to comprehend the true nature of the instrument, though a general feeling prevailed that Great Britain had definitely retreated from her Mosquito protectorate, before a vigorous assertion of American rights.

Having seen his treaty pass safely through the ordeal of the Senate, Sir Henry Bulwer then felt his position to be reasonably secure, and at once dispatched a memorandum to Clayton to the effect that, his government did not "understand the engagements of that convention to apply to Her Majesty's settlement at Honduras or its dependencies." Clayton replied at once that this reservation was distinctly understood by the Senate, and, without troubling himself to lay so trifling a matter before that body, he simply filed Sir Henry Bulwer's note away among the archives of the State Department. Ignorant of the real nature of the convention, and totally unaware of the all important reservation Sir Henry had succeeded in tacking onto the original instrument, the President then proclaimed the treaty on the fifth of July, 1850.

Results now materialized very rapidly. The American Canal Company, still thinking themselves secure in their rights, opened up temporary transit facilities across Nicaragua, and established their headquarters on the outskirts of Greytown. Colonists and adventurers flocked in, and soon a thriving American settlement was established. The British Government, on its part, immediately sent warships to the scene in order to maintain both its Anglo-Mosquito administration at Greytown, and its protectorate over the entire coast as a "dependency" of Honduras. The Americans protested, and all was confusion once more.

President Taylor's death occurred only a week after his promulgation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, and thus the burden of this new dispute fell upon Fillmore's Secretary of State, Daniel Webster. His attempt to straighten matters out along the lines his predecessor had laid down, proved

utterly ineffectual, however, and upon this second failure, Great Britain made her final move in the controversy, by proclaiming the Bay Islands also a colony of the crown, and a dependency of Honduras.

A storm of indignation against the British then broke out in the United States. Congress took the matter up with great vigor, and in the course of the heated discussion which followed, Sir Henry Bulwer's important reservation at last came to light. The Senate was non-plussed at the revelation, and Senator after Senator, who had voted for the treaty, declared he would never had done so, had he understood the true nature of the case. Concerning the Mosquito protectorate there was now little to be said, as Clayton had practically allowed this British claim. The seizure of the Bay Islands, however, being subsequent to the promulgation of the convention, was evidently a flagrant violation of the treaty, and so the Senate declared it to be. England was now openly accused of bad faith, and an immediate abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was demanded. Both powers increased their fleets in the West Indies and a serious crisis seemed imminent. The British had a war in the East on their hands at this time and did not care to enter into fresh complications in the west. Secure in her possessions and with the Clayton-Bulwer treaty still in force, England accordingly bided her time, feeling sure the present excitement would abate. Only one serious outbreak occurred, involving the rights of the two signatory powers. This was in Greytown, and resulted from a quarrel between the American settlers there and the Anglo-Mosquito authorities of the port. An American man-of-war appeared upon the scene and, meeting with no opposition, proceeded to bombard and destroy the town. The British Government still declined to interfere, and the issue soon after took an entirely different turn. Civil war had broken out again in Nicaragua, and in the midst of the struggle, General Walker, the famous American filibuster, landed his little band of adventurers

there, and before long had the affairs of the country completely in his hands. The United States Government was at first disposed to support the rule of the adventurer, and more particularly as British agents were reported to be aiding Costa Rica in opposition to his course. Walker was evidently working entirely in the interests of the slave-holding States, however, as one of his first acts as pseudo-president of Nicaragua, was to re-establish the institution of slavery in that land. This turned the Spanish Americans, regardless of party, against him, and cost him also the undivided support of the government at Washington. So our navy had finally to interfere, and deport the now unpopular Walker from the scenes of his filibustering enterprise.

With the *status quo* established in Central America and the Crimean War fought and won, the original issue between Great Britain and the United States was bound to come up again. This Central American imbroglio had altogether changed the aspect of affairs, however, and neither party was as eager now as before in its claims. Walker had destroyed the last vestiges of transit across Nicaragua, the Panama Railway was already in operation, and there was even talk of constructing lines across the American Desert itself. Thus the Nicaragua Canal once more became a question of the more or less indefinite future, to be dealt with accordingly.

Experience had amply proved to us the futility of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty at all events, and Buchanan, when he became President, fully decided to call upon Congress for its immediate abrogation. With the exception of Greytown, England's territorial interests in Central America were as secure as before, and, with an eye to the future, she was now bent on retaining all the rights over the canal route she had been able to acquire so easily through Clayton's obliging acquiescence. Lord Napier, the British Minister, was equal to the occasion, and, recognizing from

the outset Buchanan's determination, he began at once on a policy of conciliation. He accordingly informed the President that Her Majesty's government had decided to give up the Bay Islands and abandon the Mosquito protectorate forever. A special envoy, Sir William Ouseley, was even then on his way to America, he added, to arrange the matter satisfactorily with Honduras and Nicaragua. In consideration of these facts Lord Napier begged Buchanan not to stir up controversy again by calling for the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty at that time. Buchanan proved himself to be as much of a tyro in diplomacy as Clayton had been before him. He did not ask that England should continue to treat with the United States in the matter. He simply promised that he would not bring the matter up before Congress, as he had intended, but would await the results of Ouseley's mission.

Having thus gained her point so easily England took plenty of time and allowed the question to die out of the minds of even the American people before arranging matters in Central America to suit herself. In settling with Guatemala Great Britain secured a legal title for her settlers over all the land that they had encroached upon, making modern British Honduras some five times the size of the original Belize. The Bay Islands were indeed unreservedly abandoned according to the terms of our demand, but it was in dealing with Nicaragua that England exhibited her best diplomacy. The protectorate over the Mosquito Shore was nominally given up, it is true; but it was so arranged that the Indians were to be left unmolested in a so-called Reserve, covering about the same area as their quondam independent kingdom. Within these limits the Mosquito Indians were to exercise full power of local government, and for ten years the State of Nicaragua was to pay them an annual indemnity. Greytown was, furthermore, constituted a free port, practically beyond Nicaragua's control, but it was provided that certain custom duties should be levied there to meet the

Mosquito indemnity. Finally, in case Nicaragua should attempt to interfere in any way with the autonomy of the Indian Reservation, or should fail to pay the indemnity at the appointed times, Great Britain reserved to herself the right to interfere in behalf of her former allies. To put it briefly, England abandoned her *positive* protectorate with one stroke of the pen and immediately re-established a *negative* protectorate with another, and Nicaragua, left to her own devices, was forced to agree to the terms.

These three treaties were now laid before President Buchanan for approval, and, having presumably studied their contents, he officially declared himself to be *entirely satisfied* with the result. Thus the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was maintained, England lost none of her rights, except her temporary dominion over Tigre and the Bay Islands, and the United States was now formally estopped from further objection to the events of the past.

There the matter rested without further discussion until De Lesseps, in 1879, began his operations in Panama. It was then proposed by the French enthusiast that the powers of Europe undertake a joint international guaranty of this southern route. Now we had already guaranteed the neutrality of the Isthmus of Panama as far back as 1848 and successfully preserved the same, moreover, during all the subsequent years. The American people, basing their opinion on the official surveys of their government, were indeed strongly in favor now of the Nicaraguan route; still they could not well countenance European control over any part of the Isthmus and be consistent. President Hayes therefore boldly declared in a message to Congress that the policy of this government was henceforth for a canal under exclusive American control, and Secretary of State Blaine was further instructed to inform the powers of our new decision. The Panama Canal project, with its international guarantee, was already doomed to failure and the Continental powers consequently did not feel called upon to reply to Blaine's

circular letter. Great Britain took care to draw our attention to the fact, however, that by the terms of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty she must still remain an exception to our policy of exclusive control. Blaine then attempted to refute this claim and went to great lengths in his reply to Lord Granville's note to point out the historical weakness of England's position. Lord Granville answered that he had Buchanan's word for it that we were "entirely satisfied" and that, therefore, the question of British right was no longer open to discussion.

President Arthur next conceived the idea of taking the matter entirely into American hands by having the United States Government construct the canal and control it through the natural right of ownership. To this end Secretary Frelinghuysen secured a treaty with Nicaragua granting us all necessary rights, and on this basis he then appealed to Lord Granville again to abrogate or modify the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. Lord Granville politely but positively declined to entertain any such proposition and Arthur was accordingly unable to mature his plans. President Cleveland withdrew the Frelinghuysen-Zavala treaty from the Senate and the canal project was once more thrown open to private American initiative.

Since then the Maritime Canal Company has made strenuous efforts to push through the construction of the canal on the basis of a governmental guarantee at least. In the face of English objections, resting on existing treaty stipulations, Congress has thus far been loath to take definite action in the matter, and rumor now has it that financial aid is being sought by the American promoters from private parties in England. However this may be, there can be no doubt that the question of American control over the canal route has again reached the critical stage, and the Monroe Doctrine seems likely before long to be tested once more in the case.

In the meantime events have been maturing in Nicaragua

which have exercised an important bearing on the present diplomatic situation. As might have been expected, Nicaragua failed to keep her promises to Great Britain in regard to the Mosquito Reserve. Soon after the signing of the treaty the Nicaraguan authorities began to interfere with the autonomy of the Indians, and the promised indemnity gradually fell into arrears. Great Britain waited long enough to secure a good case and then, in 1881, had the matter laid before the Emperor of Austria for arbitration. The decision was, of course, in her favor, as Nicaragua had certainly violated the terms of the treaty. Nicaragua's right of sovereignty over the Mosquito Indians and their Reserve was now even more explicitly denied by the imperial arbitrator and England was furthermore given express power to interfere in their behalf. Thereupon the English settlers once more openly resumed control over Mosquitoland and continued to rule over the reservation as before in the name of the Mosquito chief.

A number of Americans had by this time established themselves along the shore and were building up a lucrative banana trade with the United States. American influence thus became considerable in the Reserve, but, unfortunately for the diplomatic issues involved, the business interests of these fruit dealers strongly favored the rule of the English settlers. Under the revived Anglo-Mosquito administration, and with the support of the American settlers, Mosquitoland soon became a flourishing State, as the fruit and wood trade began to assume considerable importance. Therewith the jealousy of the Nicaraguans grew accordingly and trouble was bound to break out. The crisis came about in 1893 when Nicaragua and Honduras were engaged in one of those periodical conflicts which have marked the independent history of the Central American States. The forces of Honduras occupied Cape Gracias à Dios and threatened to invade the Reserve. Acting on this excuse Nicaragua marched her troops into the Reservation, pulled down the Mosquito

flag and proclaimed martial law over both Indians and settlers. The British Consul, Mr. Hatch, protested, and both American and English war vessels were sent to restore order. Our ship, the old *Kearsarge*, was wrecked off the coast and the British forces were thus left free to act as they would in behalf of their government. English marines were accordingly landed and a provisional government set up in the interest of the foreign residents of the shore. The Americans were asked to join in, but, in spite of the earnestness of the British request, they wisely refused to become involved. The United States Government then entered a firm protest against this renewed English occupation, and Great Britain deemed it best to comply in this case by withdrawing her forces.

Left to themselves again the foreign residents then combined against Nicaraguan rule, and foolishly attempted to establish a joint government of English and Americans for "business purposes" over the Reserve. Neither the United States nor Great Britain—considering their peculiar relations to each other, and to Nicaragua—could well support such action on the part of their respective citizens, and so Nicaragua was again left free to take such action as she would, against the foreigners. The second crisis came about in July, 1894, with an open conflict between Nicaragua and the settlers. The British Government held entirely aloof this time, so at the request of the Nicaraguan Commissioner, Captain O'Neil, of the United States navy, landed his marines and restored order. The Nicaraguan authorities of the interior then protested against such action on the part of the United States, and in August sent a strong force to the coast and reassumed control over the Reserve. Two Americans and several Englishmen—among the latter Mr. Hatch—were then arrested by the Nicaraguan authorities, carried off to Managua, and subsequently banished from the land.

Our government was thus placed in an anomalous position.

We were bound to support Nicaragua over against Great Britain by the very logic of the case, and yet we had to proceed against her now for violation of the right of certain American citizens. Now Nicaragua we knew was bent upon incorporating the Reserve into her own territory, and in this she had always had our support; but, by the terms of her treaty with England, this could only be done with the consent of the Indians themselves. The United States Government therefore simply demanded that Nicaragua raise the decree of banishment from her citizens, and without seeking further redress, endeavored to persuade the Indians to abandon their British friends and voluntarily incorporate themselves into the Nicaraguan State. American influence on the shore, strange to say, proved strong enough to bring about this result, and on November 20, 1894, the decision was formally made. Having provided for such a contingency in her treaty, England could not now object, though she could never have looked for such a result during the days of her supremacy. Thus for once, and at last, fortune seems to have favored the American side of the question; but in Central America one can never be sure how long existing conditions will prevail, and with Great Britain still to be dealt with, the solution of the problem is yet to come.

England we know has since retaliated by demanding from Nicaragua an indemnity of \$75,000 for Hatch's arrest, and in default of immediate payment, she seized upon, and held temporarily, the town and port of Corinto at the western terminus of the proposed canal.

Our hands were tied in the matter, and our government could not well interfere, as two of Hatch's associates were American citizens for whom we too had demanded redress from Nicaragua on the same grounds. The indemnity was paid in some way, however, and the British have been once more obliged to withdraw.

Thus the question stands to-day, and on the whole we

can say that, thanks to American influence in Mosquitoland, the position of our government over against Great Britain is already considerably improved. The Clayton-Bulwer treaty still stands, it is true, but then England exercises no control now over either end of the canal route, and such dominion was after all the main cause of our former weakness. With the canal route under the control of Nicaragua, we are back again, therefore, on the *status quo* of 1846, and but for the Clayton-Bulwer treaty we could treat with England accordingly on the old basis.

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The long controversy, here outlined, over the control of the Nicaraguan canal route, constitutes but the narrower issue of that larger struggle, which has been going on between Great Britain and the United States ever since the days of our political independence, for dominion of the American Continent. In conclusion it may, therefore, be well, to place this more or less detailed dispute, in its proper diplomatic environment, and show its relation to the larger issue involved.

Our own advance, it must be borne in mind, has been solely toward the west; while the course of England's supremacy has been eastward from the British Isles, as well as toward the west. The eastern water route to the Pacific, is, as we know, already under British control. Beginning with Gibraltar, strategic points mark Great Britain's way through the Mediterranean, past Malta and Cyprus, which are hers, to Egypt and the Suez canal, which are also practically under her control. On the other side, the outlet of the Red Sea is guarded by the two English protectorates of Aden and Somali, and the dependent Island of Perim in the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb. The islands of the Indian Ocean for the most part belong to England; the Indian peninsula, Ceylon, and Burmah form part of the British Empire; while the Straits Settlements, farther on, guard the outlet to the Pacific. The possession of Hong Kong and

her administrative control over the Chinese customs, advance Great Britain's influence to the north, along the eastern shores of Asia; North Borneo gives her a word to say in the affairs of Central Oceanica, and her title to Australia and New Zealand insure her dominion in the southeast.

England's eastern advance has been paralleled, however, by Russia overland; and the Slav has already reached the Pacific. Thus Russia constitutes Great Britain's strong rival in the far East, and since China's late defeat by the Japanese, the *status quo* of the two powers in these parts, has been seriously disturbed. England's Eastern Question, in other words, has also reached a critical stage, and any disturbance of her relations with Russia on the Pacific would react against her all along the line. In such an event, the northern frontier of India would certainly be threatened, the Dardanelles might possibly be opened to Russian fleets, and if France be really Russia's ally, the whole Egyptian controversy including the question of the control of the Suez Canal must necessarily be revived. Such in brief is the condition of affairs in the East, between Great Britain and Russia, the two main powers concerned.

Great Britain's advance toward the west was indeed interrupted for the time by the revolt of her American colonies, but by no means cut short. She still held Canada, and by paralleling our advance toward the Pacific, she has succeeded in the end, in cutting us off from our northwesterly outpost, Alaska. On the western coast of North America, England has the United States, therefore, as her Pacific rival, just as she has been obliged to face Russia along the eastern shores of Asia across the western sea.

But this dominion along the northwest does not tell the whole story of Great Britain's westerly advance toward the Pacific. The Bermuda Islands have long been hers in the Central Atlantic. To the southwest, the Bahamas and the Leeward and Windward Islands enclose the Caribbean Sea; the control of Jamaica has continued English supremacy in

the West Indies; while on either side of the Atlantic outlet of the future interoceanic canal, British Honduras and British Guiana guard the way. It was England's aim, as we know, to force her way directly through the isthmus to the Pacific, and it was fever, and not Spain, which prevented Nelson from accomplishing this object in the early days.

Continuing to be baffled in this last attempt, by the more or less determined attitude of the United States, England has employed her energies to good effect, meanwhile by binding the States of South America—and more particularly those of the west coast—to her commercial supremacy at least, by the bonds of trade and finance. Having reached the Pacific in this way by advancing toward the west as well, Great Britain's natural ambition must be to join the two ends of these lines of her supremacy, and thus encircle the globe. A move in this direction has lately been made toward the Hawaiian Islands, the "halfway-house" of the Pacific; but here again the United States government showed an incipient tendency to interfere, and there the matter stands to-day.

We Americans—chips from the old Anglo-Saxon block—are likewise a land-hungry race, and in our very infancy we declared that the whole Western Hemisphere, with the exception of the then British possessions, and with a nominal regard for Spanish and Portuguese claims, really belonged to us. We already had more land before us than we could conveniently swallow at once, however, and so we contented ourselves with the territory we had already acquired, and such as belonged to our weaker Spanish-American neighbor, allowing the European powers to take what they could of the rest. Great Britain, as we know, availed herself of the opportunity, and, having more experience in land gobbling than we, chose some of the nicest of tid-bits for herself.

We reached the Pacific, moreover, in a roundabout way, and passed over the American Desert, not finding it to our

immediate taste at the time. We then found ourselves, as we supposed, cut off from our western possessions and in endeavoring to hit upon a more suitable route to these parts, we recognized that our old rival barred the way. We at once set up a great hue and cry, but suddenly discovering that our own desert was passable after all, and not so useless as we had fancied it to be, we rested content for the while, being loath to take issue with so powerful an opponent.

Professor Turner now tells us that our American frontier has vanished. Our land is already occupied, and we are hungry again for more. True, we could crowd up a bit, but then Americans never could endure crowded conditions. We believe with Aristotle, that the best form of a democracy is that of an agricultural people, living for the most part away from the towns. Our republican institutions demand room, for it is only when confined that they cease to act, as we expect. Rather than adapt ourselves, therefore, to the more crowded conditions of the old world, we have in every case preferred to acquire more land and spread out as before.

If we may judge from the past history of mankind, this continued land-hunger of ours, is but a proof of our vigorous nationality, and not by any means to be looked upon with moral suspicion. Our nation is still growing, and our desire for Cuba and Hawaii must, therefore, be regarded rather as indications of our vitality. The real difficulty lies in the fact that our desires are beginning to outstrip our means. We know now what it is to be shut in on the north, and at last we seem to be thoroughly aroused against the danger of a like contingency on the south. Up to the present the question of our control over the Isthmus has been theoretical, rather than practical. Gradually, however, we have come to feel a pressing desire not only for the canal itself in the interests of our growing commerce, but also for the control of the route as a strategic necessity, and for the lands round about as sources of further wealth.

We recognize full well, moreover, that we still have Great Britain to deal with in the matter, and are finally preparing to face the issue frankly.

We have no racial quarrel with England. On the contrary, personal relations between Englishmen and Americans are usually cordial. The question has ever been simply and solely one regarding the possession and control of territory. England has forced her way to the east, and we do not object to her dominion there, as the matter does not concern us directly. We do chafe against Great Britain's continued control over parts of this Continent however, and jealously watch her every move in these parts. In one way the advantage is distinctly on our side, for we have but one struggle for supremacy on our hands, while Great Britain has two. It might, therefore, be good politics for us to assert ourselves, if not in conjunction, at least contemporaneously with England's eastern rival, Russia, and thus bring a double pressure to bear against Great Britain at the same time. At any rate, the issue is bound to come sooner or later, if the American nation is to grow, and, if I might risk a prophecy, I should venture to predict that it will be drawn ere long to the south of us, along the proposed route of the Nicaragua Canal.

A show of force is as good as force itself in these days, and force moreover is typified in our time by money as well as arms. England has already demonstrated both these truths again and again in her successful career, and we might do well in this case to learn from our rival. My idea would, therefore, be to let the Clayton-Bulwer treaty stand as it is, and to proceed at once, either as a nation or a government to construct the Nicaragua Canal, with money of our own. What we possess, we would certainly have a right to defend, and though we did not deny any theoretical control England might claim under the terms of the treaty, she would probably find it extremely difficult to assert her supremacy over land and a waterway which belonged exclusively to us. By

owning the majority of the stock of the Suez Canal, England has had little difficulty in maintaining her control of this route. Let us profit by the example, therefore, and establish our own supremacy over America's canal in somewhat the same way.

LINDLEY M. KEASBEY.

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THE ADVANTAGES OF THE NICARAGUA ROUTE.*

The engineering details of the Nicaragua Canal route are contained in reports extending over a series of twenty years, and culminate in the perfected location of 1890. The line has been surveyed and re-surveyed, the most important problems have been passed upon by prominent experts, and it remains to-day, the most feasible route through which ships will pass from the Atlantic to the Pacific.† A discussion of the advantages of the route of the canal as at present located includes a consideration of (1) the Lake of Nicaragua, its advantages to an isthmian canal, and (2) its approaches, natural and artificial.

During the early days of October, in the year 1870, a moderate sized steamer, drawing ten feet of water, left New York harbor, and within a month, anchored in an inland sea within eleven miles of the Pacific Ocean. A sailor going aloft upon the mast of that steamer would, at the height of forty-two feet, have been above the summit of the divide between the vessel and the Pacific, and might have seen the spars of a vessel at anchor in Brito roadstead, the western terminus of the Nicaragua Canal. I was on board the steamer and was forcibly impressed with the feasibility of cutting through that low barrier, of deepening the outlet to the eastward, so as to provide an interoceanic waterway for the fleets of the world. Several years afterward, I was, for one hundred and twelve days, out of sight of all land, trying to reach Narragansett Bay from San Francisco.

Within a distance of twenty miles northward and westward of the place where this steamer was anchored on Lake Nicaragua, is one of the richest regions of the globe.

*Discussion at the Thirtieth Scientific Session of the Academy, November 13, 1895.

† For a description of the route to be followed by the Nicaragua Canal, and for a history of the Maritime Canal Company of Nicaragua, consult pages 137-141 of the monograph on "Inland Waterways: Their Relation to Transportation," by Emory R. Johnson, published as a supplement to the ANNALS, September, 1893.

Three miles from the lake are the indigo plantations of Rivas, the "pilas" or vats for soaking the plants built of the lime with which the locality abounds. The concrete used in constructing these vats is as smooth as porcelain, as hard as marble, and as old as the Spanish conquest, the continued stability of the vats attesting the freedom of the locality from volcanic disturbance. Farther on are the cacao plantations as valuable as they are beautiful; while here and there in the vicinity of the towns are the sugar haciendas and the coffee lands, interspersed with farms devoted to the culture of the plantain, the banana and the orange.

The Central American Cordilleras exist in one unbroken chain the entire length of the isthmus, but at one point, and that point near Rivas, they sink to the lowest elevation on the American Continent, becoming simply hills which skirt the Pacific shore. As the highlands to the westward lose their altitude, the valleys to the eastward gain in extent, forming a basin into which the mountains of Costa Rica and Nicaragua pour the vast amount of water which drains from their lofty sides.

This basin is the Lake of Nicaragua, or Granada. It covers an area one hundred and ten miles long by forty broad; is in places over one hundred fathoms deep; contains a channel from its eastern to its western extremity, capable of floating the largest ships; is only one hundred and ten feet above the ocean; and by reason of its magnitude, is subject to none of those *extreme changes of level so common to all bodies of water situated in the tropics*. Freshets never occur, either in the lake or in the San Juan, for the first sixty-four miles of its course. It is the only river of the tropics not subject to sudden rises. It flows through a narrow valley the greater part of the sixty-four miles, with an average depth to-day of forty feet during the last eighteen miles. It has no large tributary streams swelling its current, and a dam of fifty-two feet is perfectly practicable near the

San Carlos river. With this dam built, continuous lake and river navigation can be secured for one hundred and thirty miles; leaving only forty miles of actual canal and artificial basins. I emphasize this point because one of the objections raised against the Nicaragua route is its length. Every seafaring man will acknowledge that one hundred and thirty miles of smooth water navigation would be preferable to the "northerners" of the Gulf of Mexico, and the tropical calms obtaining north and south of Nicaragua, beyond the trade-wind belt. Commanders of iron vessels also know what advantages there will be in ridding their ships from barnacles.

Lake Nicaragua is a reservoir capable of supplying a uniform and practically inexhaustible amount of water. The gauges of the San Juan showing a flow of over nine hundred million cubic feet per day. The lake is also of great importance, as it divides the canal into two distinct sections, and consequently eliminates any danger from a "block." Vessels will be locked directly up to the lake, where they can remain quietly at anchor in fresh water, loading under the lee of the numerous islands with the products of the country, repairing any damages with timber of the best quality, or provisioning for the coming ocean voyage. The lake is then the great port of the canal and in considering the question of harbors at either terminus, it will be well to remember that they can be limited in size to the accommodation of the few ships which may daily arrive. This is specially true for the Pacific division, for if the weather prove inclement, the outgoing vessels can remain in the lake, and be locked down the sixteen miles whenever desirable.

The outlet of the lake to the eastward is the San Juan River. Sixty-four miles from the lake the river passes between two sharply defined hills. Here, at Ochoa, a dam is to be built, raising the stream to the lake level.

I well remember when Mr. Menocal, the distinguished engineer who has given his life to this work on the isthmus,

informed me several years ago of his fear that the raised waters of the San Juan might overflow by some lateral channel near the dam before they reached the crest of the dam. That fear was well founded, for a small creek was found entering the left bank of the river. The engineering party examined the creek and discovered a break in the hills some two miles above the proposed dam, beyond which lay an extended valley shaped like a huge Y, the left or westerly arm of the Y resting in the hills near the Ochoa creek, its right or easterly arm stretching toward the Atlantic. Was the river to be raised only to waste itself over these miles of swamp, and thus neutralize and destroy the canal? Once more the parties examined the valley, and at the end of three months of perfected labor discovered, that down the western arm of the Y flowed the river San Francisco, almost parallel with the San Juan, but separated from it by a range of hills, while through the eastern arm ran another small stream; the two uniting at a point nine miles from Ochoa. Here, at the stem of the Y, it was perfectly practicable to build an embankment. Thus was made possible a large reduction in the original estimates, for the whole valley of the San Francisco is to be made a submerged basin. The San Juan waters are to be backed around through the San Francisco valley, and the summit level will be made one hundred and fifty-two and one-half miles long instead of one hundred and thirty. Solid natural walls of rock enclose this basin to the northeast. The hills to the east of this artificial basin form the great divide. It is proposed to make a cut through this divide one hundred feet deep and three miles long. The summit level will end with three locks, cut in solid stone near its eastern end. They bring the canal to the ocean level and within nine miles of the Caribbean Sea. This cut through the divide is not a misfortune but an advantage, because the rock obtained from the cut will be needed in constructing the Ochoa dam and the breakwater at Greytown.

The remaining work is simply dredging through a swamp, and out to the deep water off the coast, the restoration of Greytown Harbor having been proved a simple problem, as I prophesied twenty-three years ago it would be.

When the canal is completed the harbor of Greytown will extend to the foot of the hills. Here upon their undulating, healthful sides will be the future city and port. Mounting the three locks, a ship in transit will enter the Descado basin, and after passing through the divide cut, will be in the broad waters of the flooded San Francisco valley, which is practically an extension of the great lake to this point, thence the ship will steam with favoring trade winds up the deepened San Juan and, crossing the lake, will continue, still on the summit level, for fifteen miles past the western shore of the lake, the last five miles being through the Tola basin. This basin covers four thousand acres, and lies within three miles of the coast. From the basin the vessel will be locked down to the level of the Pacific. Such is the route decided upon after years of research. Each year bettering the line physically and financially, until in the opinion of the company it ought to cost not more than \$70,000,000.

The waterway connecting the Atlantic and Pacific should, in some way, be under the supervision of the United States. Our destiny on the Western Hemisphere demands this. Recent indications would seem to show that England will not oppose the control of the canal by America, but will permit her citizens to unite with us in providing the funds necessary to complete the enterprise.

I do not present any definite plan as to its construction. As an American I should much prefer to see it under the control of this country; the manner of such control can be left to the wise discretion of Congress. We, of the Nicaragua Canal companies have spent some \$4,000,000 already in the enterprise, and, with confidence in the future, will keep on with the good work, but we cannot any longer with justice to ourselves, wait for governmental action in this

country, and refuse the offers of money which come to us from Europe. The time has arrived when the leading citizens of every town must put their shoulder to the wheel, and see to it that funds are raised in the United States, unless the people are willing to allow Europeans to have a large minority interest in the canal.

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THE NICARAGUA CANAL, AND THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES.*

The economic influences exerted by such a waterway as the Nicaragua Canal are, in general, two. First, the inter-oceanic canal will give a wider market to our raw materials obtained by agriculture, mining, forestry, and the other extractive industries; second, the waterway will assist American manufactures by cheapening the expense of transportation, thus reducing the costs of raw materials used, and giving the finished goods a wider range of markets. By means of lower costs, American manufacturers will be enabled to compete more successfully both for home and foreign markets. Briefly stated, the general economic effects of the Nicaragua Canal will be to stimulate the production of raw materials and to increase our manufactures. Both of these results will inevitably follow the lessening of the costs of transportation and the extension of the limits within which our raw and finished products are marketable.

In measuring more closely the influences which the Nicaragua Canal will exert upon our economic welfare, it is of assistance to analyze the more important services which this waterway will perform, in providing American industries with a new and efficient highway by water for our domestic commerce, in supplying the foreign trade of the eastern and central parts of the United States with a shorter and more direct route to the countries bordering on the Pacific, and by giving the foreign trade of our own Western States a shorter highway to European ports.

In calculating the effects which the Nicaragua Canal will produce in the development of domestic industry and commerce, it is first to be noted that our industrial situation is

* Discussion at the Thirtieth Scientific Session of the Academy, November 13, 1895.

such, and the waterway is to be so located that its construction will exert a beneficial economic influence upon almost every section of our country. For this reason it becomes a work of national importance. The economic benefits of the Canal accruing, as they will, to the entire country, the construction of the Canal becomes a matter in which the United States as a whole has a direct interest economically, and politically.

It needs but a brief survey of the industrial conditions of the different sections of our country to discover how closely the construction of the Canal is connected with our future economic development. The northeastern part of the United States is our most important manufacturing region. By means of an inter-oceanic canal the finished products of the mills and factories of this region would be given more ready access to the developing markets of our Western States and of the foreign countries bordering upon the Pacific Ocean. In the southern part of the United States the industries are as yet essentially extractive in character. The growing of cotton is still the leading industry of the South, and the South has shown itself capable of producing far beyond the possibilities of marketing. The extractive industries of coal and iron mining are fast developing in the South, and in connection with them manufacturing industry has begun a rapid growth. The South is at present anxious to find wider markets for agricultural products, for her coal and iron, and before long she, as well as the northeastern part of the United States, will feel the need of more extensive domestic and foreign markets for her manufactured goods.

The States of the Pacific Slope are more cut off from the markets in the rest of the United States than are the States of any other section of the country. The far West is the region in which farming, the production of lumber, and the raising of stock are the leading industries. This region has urged more strongly than any other the necessity of connecting the eastern and western parts of the United States by a

highway for commerce such as the Nicaragua Canal would provide, because under the present conditions of transportation, by rail over the mountains, or by the circuitous water route around Cape Horn, the greater portion of her productions are shut out of the best markets for such articles as the West has to sell. The States of the Pacific Slope are anxious to obtain access to the manufacturing regions of the United States and Europe.

There is no other part of the United States, however, that will gain so much by the construction of the Nicaragua Canal as will our Northern States about the Great Lakes and in the upper Mississippi Valley. This is a region of most varied industrial activity. Great agriculturally, it has immense quantities of lumber, and the richest iron mines in our country; while in close proximity to the Lakes lies the most productive part of our bituminous coal fields. As a result of these gifts of nature to this part of the United States, the region is developing with marvelous rapidity in manufacture and in commerce. One need not repeat the story of the growth of Buffalo, Cleveland, and other industrial and commercial cities bordering upon Lake Erie, nor recall the rapid strides which Duluth and Superior are making at the present time. Chicago is the greatest of the Lake cities, and besides being the great centre for the collection of the products of the northwest and for the distribution of the goods which are shipped to the northwest, she is a city with a commerce larger than that of New York, and with manufactures developing so rapidly that she threatens to eclipse Philadelphia as a manufacturing centre. The manufacturing region of the United States is spreading from the northern Atlantic coast westward and southward, and the Trans-Allegheny States are entering upon a complex industrial life.

Such is the present situation of St. Paul, Minneapolis, Chicago, Cleveland, and the other leading cities of the upper Mississippi Valley and the Lake region. The future promises to make their industrial situation even more favorable.

Chicago is at present constructing a drainage canal between Lake Michigan and the Des Plaines River which will throw a sufficient volume of water into that river and the Illinois to make possible the construction of the fourteen-foot waterway between the Great Lakes and the Mississippi River. Obviously the economic services of the Nicaragua Canal will be greatly enhanced by the completion of the Chicago drainage canal; for the natural sequence of the opening of the Chicago drainage canal will be the conversion of the river waterway across Illinois into one having a channel fourteen feet in depth. How favorably will Chicago then be situated for marketing her products! To the east she will have a twenty-foot waterway by the Lakes to Buffalo, and a nine-foot water channel across the State of New York to New York City. To the south she will have a fourteen-foot waterway to New Orleans, from New Orleans an ocean highway to South America and the Pacific States. St. Paul and Minneapolis, to a lesser degree, will share in the good fortune of Chicago and other lake ports. The people of Chicago are well aware of the value which the Nicaragua Canal will be to them, and have begun to take a very lively interest in the promotion of the enterprise.

The influence which the Nicaragua Canal will exert upon our foreign commerce probably appeals more strongly to the average man than does the effect which it will exercise upon domestic industry and domestic trade. All persons are agreed as to the desirability, if not the necessity, of increasing our foreign trade. The time has come, in the economic development of the United States, when industrial advancement requires an increase in our foreign markets. We are now capable of producing far more than can be consumed at home. We have progressed so far in securing command of our rich supplies of raw materials that we are more than able to satisfy our own demands for finished products, and the industrial effort of the present and future should be increasingly devoted to the conversion of these raw materials

into consumable articles to be sold abroad. In other words, we must become more and more a commercial nation trading in foreign markets. The wisest industrial policy for the United States is one that will secure that result. Success in this endeavor will depend upon the same forces that have given ourselves and foreign nations prosperity in the past. The three chief factors in industrial and commercial success and progress are the enterprise and thrift of business men, the provision of adequate facilities for technical and liberal business education, and the establishment of ample facilities for shipping and transportation.

In view of the fact that we ought to secure markets abroad, it is most gratifying to learn from the recent statistics of our commerce, that we are of late succeeding in securing a larger sale for American goods outside of our own country. We have evidently reached a degree of technical development that enables us to compete with foreign countries successfully in several branches of manufacture.

The following statistics show the extent to which the sale of our manufactures abroad has recently increased in importance as compared with the sale of our raw materials.

The report of the Bureau of Statistics, covering the period of 1895 up to October, shows that the value of our exports of manufactures have considerably increased during the first nine months of this year as compared with 1894; while the value of agricultural products exported decreased in amount both for the month of September and for the first nine months of this year as compared with these periods for 1894. The value of our exports of manufactures has increased both in its amount and in its percentage of our total exports. For the first nine months of this year our exports of manufactures were worth \$145,793,586. During these months of 1894 we exported \$133,378,609 worth. The figures for 1895 cover 26.68 per cent of the total value of our exports. In 1894 the percentage was only 23.72 per cent. A part of the decrease in the value of agricultural

products was due to the low price of cotton, wheat and wheat flour; but in several instances there was a decrease both in quantity and value, while in a few cases quantity and value have increased, *e. g.*, fruits and nuts. The articles of manufacture in which there has been the most marked progress are iron and steel products, such as machinery, engines, cars and farm implements; but there are many others showing a significant increase. It is not safe to base conclusions entirely on the basis of the statistics of 1894 and 1895, for those years were not entirely normal. Nevertheless they confirm the indisputable fact that we are rapidly losing our former position of exceptional advantage in the production of agricultural commodities. As the Secretary of Agriculture has recently said: "Competition between the sellers of agricultural products in the markets of the world is becoming more universal and intense from year to year. In wheat the United States must compete for sales with the Argentine Republic, the Russian Empire, Australia, and sometimes with India." In such circumstances the evidence of progress in manufactures is especially gratifying. *Brad-streets* of October 19, 1895, rightly says "the most encouraging features in the exports' statement are in the large shipments of articles of domestic manufacture or production, other than those produced on the farm."

It is also an interesting fact that our exports of mining and forest products show a similar increase this year as compared with last. These figures show that we are becoming less distinctively agricultural in our economic organization, and are beginning to take on a more and more complex industrial activity. This is conclusive evidence of the fact that we must pursue a policy of promoting commerce. The rapid development of the United States industrially calls for a corresponding growth in our commerce.

The amount of foreign commerce which will be affected by the opening of the Nicaragua Canal is estimated to be larger than that now served by the Suez Canal, the most

important ocean-ship waterway ever constructed. The actual amount of tonnage that would have been entirely tributary to the Canal, had it been in existence in 1890, was 4,133,470 tons. The total traffic which the Canal would obtain, basing the estimates upon the statistics of commerce for the years 1889 and 1890, amounts to 8,296,625 tons. If to this estimate be added the normal increase which commerce may be expected to have before the Canal is opened, it is estimated that about 9,000,000 tons will make use of the waterway as soon as it is opened. The present traffic of the Suez Canal is a little over 8,000,000 tons.*

The distances which the opening of the Nicaragua Canal will save to the commerce making use of it, are much greater than those saved by the Suez Canal. The greatest gain in distance made by commerce in using the Suez Canal, is 4481 miles, the amount by which the route between Liverpool and Bombay is shortened. The Nicaragua Canal, on the other hand, will shorten the distance between New York and San Francisco by 10,000 miles. The following table shows how the length of commercial routes will be modified by the Canal:

Table showing distances in statute miles between commercial parts of the world and distances saved by the Nicaragua Canal.

From	Via Cape Horn.	Via Cape of Good Hope.	Via Nicaragua Canal	Distance Saved.
	<i>Miles.</i>	<i>Miles.</i>	<i>Miles.</i>	<i>Miles.</i>
New York to—				
San Francisco,	14,840	. . .	4,760	10,080
Bering Strait,	16,100	. . .	7,882	8,218
Alaska,	15,300	. . .	6,682	8,618
Acapulco,	13,071	. . .	3,122	9,949
Mazatlan,	13,631	. . .	3,682	9,949
Hong-Kong,	18,180	15,201	11,038	4,163
Yokohama,	17,679	16,190	9,363	6,827
Melbourne,	13,502	13,290	10,000	3,290

*The Maritime Canal Company of Nicaragua has made a detailed calculation of the tonnage which will make use of the canal. This was printed in the Senate Report, No. 331, Fifty-third Congress, 2d Session. This report contains much other information.

TABLE—*Continued.*

From	Via Cape Horn.	Via Cape of Good Hope.	Via Nicaragua Canal	Distance Saved
	<i>Miles.</i>	<i>Miles.</i>	<i>Miles.</i>	<i>Miles.</i>
New York to—				
New Zealand,	12,550	14,125	8,680	3,870
Sandwich Islands,	14,230	. . .	6,388	7,842
Callao,	10,689	. . .	3,713	6,976
Guayaquil,	11,471	. . .	3,053	8,418
Valparaiso,	9,750	. . .	4,700	5,050
New Orleans to—				
San Francisco,	15,052	. . .	4,047	11,005
Acapulco,	13,283	. . .	2,409	10,874
Mazatlan,	13,843	. . .	2,969	10,874
Guayaquil,	11,683	. . .	2,340	9,343
Callao,	10,901	. . .	3,000	7,901
Valparaiso,	9,962	. . .	3,987	5,975
Liverpool to—				
San Francisco,	14,690	. . .	7,508	7,182
Acapulco,	11,921	. . .	5,870	7,051
Mazatlan,	13,481	. . .	6,430	7,051
Melbourne,	13,352	13,140	12,748	392
New Zealand,	12,400	13,975	11,349	1,051
Hong-Kong,	18,030	15,051	13,786	1,265
Yokohama,	17,529	16,040	12,111	3,929
Guayaquil,	11,321	. . .	5,890	5,431
Callao,	10,539	. . .	6,461	4,078
Valparaiso,	9,600	. . .	7,448	2,152
Sandwich Islands,	14,080	. . .	9,136	4,944
Spain to Manilla,	16,900	13,951	13,520	431
France to Tonquin,	17,750	15,201	13,887	1,314
Hamburg to—				
Mazatlan,	13,931	. . .	6,880	7,051
Acapulco,	13,371	. . .	6,320	7,051
Fonseca,	11,430	. . .	5,530	5,900
Punta Arenas, Costa Rica,	11,120	. . .	5,515	5,605

It is in the influence which the Nicaragua Canal will exert upon our trade with the countries adjacent to the Pacific Ocean that the waterway will do most to benefit our foreign commerce. These are the countries in whose markets we can most readily increase the sale of the productions of our developing manufactures. They require large

quantities of manufactured goods such as we can supply. At present our foreign trade is chiefly with the ports of the Atlantic, that is with countries having industrial conditions which we are steadily acquiring and have largely attained. The future development of the South American and Oriental countries will inevitably increase the foreign commerce of the Pacific States. The Nicaragua Canal will give us a decided advantage over other nations in the competitive international struggle which is certain to take place to secure this developing trade.*

In considering the economic aspects of the Nicaragua Canal, the question naturally arises, whether the capital required to construct the waterway will prove a good investment. The Suez Canal has proven one of the most profitable enterprises of recent times. In spite of the financial depression of 1893 and 1894 the share holders received 18 per cent in dividends each year. The original shares of the company, issued at 500 francs, now sell for about 3250 francs, in other words, at 550 per cent premium. There is every reason to believe that the Nicaragua Canal ought to prove an equally paying investment. Improved machinery has greatly lessened the cost of construction, and engineering science is now capable of accomplishing much greater results by the same expenditure of capital. The amount of traffic on the Nicaragua Canal will equal or exceed that of the Suez Canal, the cost of administration ought to be less, because the Suez Canal has to contend with the drifting sands of the desert. The present tolls on the Suez Canal are \$1.90 a ton. Most of the traffic which will make use of the Nicaragua Canal can bear a charge of \$2.00 a ton, if such a heavy toll is necessary.

* The industrial and commercial influences which the Nicaragua Canal will exert are set forth in a suggestive way by Professor Lindley M. Keasbey in his monograph, "*Der Nicaragua-Kanal, Geschichte und Beurtheilung des Projekts.*" Consult also the author's monograph on "Inland Waterways: Their Relation to Transportation," chapter xiii of which deals with the "Economic Significance to the United States of the Extension of Inland Waterways," published as a supplement to the ANNALS, September, 1893.

Such are some of the benefits which the opening of the Nicaragua Canal will exert upon our home industries and domestic commerce and upon our trade with foreign nations. In what way, it may be well to ask, can the immediate burdens which the construction of the Canal will place upon the people of the United States be most economically borne? Such a work as this can be carried out only by expending large amounts of capital. The construction of the Canal ought to be carried through as cheaply as possible that the present burden may be made no heavier than is necessary, and that the operation of the Canal in the future may not, because of an over-capitalization, needlessly burden commerce and industry. The Canal will cost less if constructed by the government, or with the assistance of the government's credit given with proper safeguards, than it will cost if constructed by a private company without the help of the government. The United States may safely give a canal company financial support, provided the government controls the stock of the company. The best economic services of the Canal in the future will be subserved by a liberal support of the measure on the part of the government. Whether the United States had better construct the Canal directly or by means of a private company is a question to be settled chiefly upon diplomatic considerations.

The opening of the Nicaragua Canal will give a new route to a large part of the traffic which now moves by rail across the United States. Will the transcontinental railroads suffer because of the completion of the Canal? May they look with favor upon the construction of such a waterway? Although the officials of certain transcontinental railroads have opposed the Canal project, this question is one on which there ought to be no difference of opinion. Such an important waterway as this would benefit rather than injure the present transcontinental lines.

The traffic which would pass through the waterway would be mostly created by itself. The waterway would take from

the railroads a part of the freight that is at present moved by them, but would in return give much more than it took. In fact, I believe the only thing that can place the transcontinental railroads upon a sound business basis is the construction of the Nicaragua Canal. This will develop the region on both sides of the Rocky Mountains; will largely increase the total amount of trade, and make possible the development of a much greater amount of higher grades of traffic which are more advantageously moved by rail than by water. Thus, as the great trunk lines connecting the Atlantic seaboard with the lake ports and the cities of the northwest have found their traffic benefited by the improvement of the Great Lakes, so will the opening of the Nicaragua Canal give to the transcontinental lines a more profitable traffic and do more than anything else can to put those roads upon a sound financial basis.*

This brief outline of the economic influences which the Nicaragua Canal will exert upon the United States, has stated the general economic condition of the different sections of the United States with the purpose of showing that the industrial and commercial benefits of the Canal will be shared by all parts of our country. The good effect which the waterway will have upon our foreign commerce has been indicated. These benefits, it is also claimed, can be secured without doing injury to existing means of transportation, indeed, it is asserted that they will share in the benefits conferred by the Canal. Industrially and commercially our future development is largely conditioned upon the early construction of the Nicaragua Canal.

EMORY R. JOHNSON.

* Cf. chapters v and vi of the monograph on "Inland Waterways: Their Relation to Transportation."

PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACADEMY.

[Continued from p. 965, Vol. IV. of the ANNALS.]

The Twenty-second Scientific Session of the Academy was held February 8, 1894. On that evening President J. Franklin Crowell, of Trinity College, N. C., read a paper on the "Co-operative Study of Political Ethics," which was discussed by Professor F. H. Giddings and others.

The Twenty-third Session was held March 16, 1894. Mr. E. L. Godkin, of New York, editor of the *Nation*, read a paper on "Problems of Municipal Government." The paper was discussed by Mr. E. Kelly, secretary of the City Club of New York, by Dr. L. S. Rowe and other speakers. At the close of the scientific proceedings a reception was tendered to Mr. Godkin.

The Twenty-fourth Session was held April 20, 1894. The speaker of the evening was Dr. John Graham Brooks, who addressed the Academy on "The Future Problem of Charity and the Unemployed."

At the Twenty-fifth Session, held May 11, 1894, the speaker was Mr. Edward Porritt, of Farmington, Conn., who read a paper on the "Break-up of the Old System of Two Parties in the House of Commons."

The liquor problem received the attention of the Academy at its Twenty-sixth Session, held October 25, 1894. Dr. E. R. L. Gould, of Baltimore, whose Report to the Department of Labor on the Gothenburg System of Liquor Traffic is widely known, spoke on the "Liquor Problem and its Scientific Treatment."

The following session (the Twenty-seventh) held on November 27, 1894, was devoted to educational questions. Provost C. C. Harrison, of the University of Pennsylvania, presided. Professor Simon N. Patten read a paper on the "Teaching of Political Economy in the Public Schools."

The paper gave rise to a discussion, which was participated in by Dr. Edward Brooks, Superintendent of Schools, President C. DeGarmo, of Swarthmore College, President George H. Cliff, of the Girls' Normal School, Dr. James Mackenzie, of the Lawrenceville School, Professor George F. James, of New York, Professor J. Monroe Willard and Mrs. J. P. Munford.

The Twenty-eighth Session, held January 30, 1895, was devoted to Uniformity of Law. Frederic J. Stimson, Esq., of Boston, read a paper on "Uniform State Legislation on Subjects of Extra Territorial Effect."

At the Twenty-ninth Session, held March 7, 1895, Professor J. W. Jenks, of Cornell University, discussed "Proportional Representation."

The Thirtieth Session, held November 13, 1895, was devoted to the Nicaragua Canal. Professor L. M. Keasbey, of Bryn Mawr, read a paper on the "Nicaragua Canal and the Monroe Doctrine" which appears in the current number of the ANNALS. The subject was treated from the engineering point of view by Mr. J. W. Miller, of New York, while Dr. Emory R. Johnson spoke of its economic aspects. Their contributions also appear in the current number. Professor L. M. Haupt, of Philadelphia, reinforced Dr. Johnson's remarks in regard to the effect of the Canal on railways, and drew some interesting comparisons from the operations of canals actually in use and in competition with railways.

The following papers were presented to the Academy since the Twenty-first Scientific Session, December 20, 1893:

202. By Professor WM. I. HULL, of Swarthmore College: *Wealth: The Politico-Economic Definition Historically Considered.*

203. By Dr. LEO S. ROWE, Philadelphia: *Some Factors of Municipal Efficiency.*

204. By JAS. M. KERR, Esq., New York City: *Evolution of Private Property in Land.*

205. By Professor RUSSELL H. CURTIS, of the Kent Law School, Chicago: Classification of Law. Printed in the ANNALS, March, 1894.
206. By Mr. U. TAGUCHI, Tokyo: The Economic Association of the Mixed School.
207. By M. V. BALL, M. D., Philadelphia: Theft.
208. By Mrs. S. R. OBERHOLTZER, Norristown, Pa.: School Savings Banks. Printed in the ANNALS, May, 1894.
209. By Dr. MARIETTA KIES, Pittsfield, Mass.: The Woman Suffrage Victory in Colorado.
210. By Mr. ELTWEED POMEROY, Newark, N. J.: The Progressive Charge on Inheritances.
211. By Professor EDW. W. BEMIS, of the University of Chicago: Relation of Labor Organizations to the American Boy and to Trade Instruction. Printed in the ANNALS, September, 1894.
212. By Dr. E. VON HALLE, New York City: A translation of the Idea of Justice in Political Economy by Professor G. SCHMOLLER. Printed in the ANNALS, March, 1894.
213. By Mr. GEO. K. HOLMES, Census Bureau, Washington: A Decade of Mortgages. Printed in the ANNALS, May, 1894.
214. By HENRY W. WILLIAMS, Esq., Baltimore: Money and Bank Credits. Printed in the ANNALS, January, 1895.
215. By Mr. F. W. FETTER, Halle, Germany: A Neglected Factor in the Tariff Problem.
216. By Mr. C. C. SHRIVER, Baltimore: Taxation.
217. By Professor J. B. CLARK, of Amherst College: An Unfinished Study by Dr. Merriam. Printed in the ANNALS, May, 1894.
218. By Dr. H. R. SEAGER, Philadelphia: The Pennsylvania Tax Conference. Printed in the ANNALS, March, 1894.
219. By Dr. EMORY R. JOHNSON, of the University of Pennsylvania: Relation of Taxation to Monopolies. Printed in the ANNALS, March, 1894.
220. By President J. F. CROWELL, of Trinity College, N. C.: The Co-operative Study of Political Ethics.
221. By BUSHROD W. JAMES, Esq., Philadelphia: The Commercial Question and its Future.
222. By CHESTER A. REED, Esq., Boston: Peaceable Boycotting. Printed in the ANNALS, July, 1894.
223. By WM. HORGAN, Esq., Louisville, Ky.: The Attorney in Politics.
224. By R. T. COLBURN, Esq., Elizabeth, N. J.: The Pacific Railway Debts. Printed in the ANNALS, March, 1895.
225. By GAMALIEL BRADFORD, Esq., Boston, Mass.: The Reform of our State Governments. Printed in the ANNALS, May, 1894.

226. By Dr. ERNEST FREUND, Berlin: Labor Information Bureaus.
227. By E. L. GODKIN, Esq., New York: The Problems of Municipal Government. Printed in the ANNALS, May, 1894.
228. By Professor JAMES HARVEY ROBINSON, of the University of Pennsylvania: Translation of the Constitution of Prussia. Printed as a Supplement to the ANNALS, September, 1894.
229. By Dr. EDW. T. DEVINE, Philadelphia: The Economic Function of Woman. Printed in the ANNALS, November, 1894.
230. By Mr. H. T. NEWCOMB, Washington: Reasonable Railway Rates. Printed in the ANNALS, November, 1894.
231. By Professor L. M. KEASBEY, of the University of Colorado: The Tabular Standard.
232. By Professor SIMON N. PATTEN, of the University of Pennsylvania: The Failure of Biologic Sociology. Printed in the ANNALS, May, 1894.
233. By Dr. D. I. GREEN, Hartford, Conn.: Wieser's Natural Value. Printed in the ANNALS, January, 1895.
234. By Rev. Dr. JOHN GRAHAM BROOKS, Cambridge, Mass.: The Future Problem of Charity and the Unemployed. Printed in the ANNALS, July, 1894.
235. By Professor GUSTAV SCHMOLLER, of the University of Berlin; Volkswirtschaft, Volkswirtschaftslehre und Methode.
236. By Professor E. VON BÖHM-BAWERK, Vienna: The Austrian Standard of Value. Printed in the ANNALS, September, 1894.
237. By Miss J. L. BROWNELL, of Bryn Mawr College: The Significance of a Decreasing Birth-Rate. Printed in the ANNALS, July, 1894.
238. By Mr. EDWARD PORRITT, Farmington, Conn.: The Break-up of the English Party System. Printed in the ANNALS, January, 1895.
239. By F. H. COOKE, Esq., New York City: The Evolution of the Modern Stock Corporation.
240. By JOHN A. KERSEY, Esq., Marion, Ind.: The Ethics of Literature.
241. By Mr. H. E. CHAMBERS, Baltimore, Md.: Wealth and Value in Their Ultimate Analysis.
242. By Dr. F. C. CLARK, Berlin: A Neglected Socialist. Printed in the ANNALS, March, 1895.
243. By Mr. D. M. FREDERIKSEN, Chicago: Mortgage Banking in Russia. Printed in the ANNALS, September, 1894.
244. By Mr. S. B. HARDING, Richmond, Ind.: The "Minimum" Principle in the Tariff of 1828. Printed in the ANNALS, July, 1895.
245. By Mr. IRA W. HOWERTH, Chicago: Present Condition of

Sociological Thought in the United States. Printed in the ANNALS, September, 1894.

246. By Professor L. M. KEASBEY, of the University of Colorado: The Concept of Organic Social Value.

247. By Professor S. N. PATTEN, of the University of Pennsylvania: The Beginnings of Utility. Printed in the ANNALS, September, 1894.

248. By S. SOLIS-COHEN, M. D., Philadelphia: Birth-Rate and Increase of Population.

249. By Dr. C. ARNOLD LINDORME, Atlanta, Ga.: A Curious Historical Fact, and (250) Law and Morals.

251. By Mr. T. E. WILLSON, New York City: Science and a Standard of Value.

252. By Dr. EMORY R. JOHNSON, of the University of Pennsylvania: The Improvement of Country Roads in Massachusetts and New York. Printed in the ANNALS, September, 1894.

253. By Mr. S. B. HARDING, Richmond, Ind.: The Opposition in Pennsylvania to the Ratification of the Federal Constitution.

254. By EDMOND KELLY, Esq., New York City: Compulsory Colonization.

255. By Mr. C. R. BOYD, Wytheville, Va.: The Available Banking Margin.

256. By Professor JOHN R. COMMONS, of the University of Indiana: Value of Money.

257. By Professor C. A. TUTTLE, of Wabash College: The New Political Economy.

258. By Mr. SAMUEL MILLIKEN, Philadelphia: The Political Economy of Goldwin Smith.

259. By Mr. McDONALD FURMAN, Ramsey, S. C.: Indians for Indian Commissioners.

260. By Professor WM. CUNNINGHAM, of Cambridge University: Why had Roscher so Little Influence in England? Printed in the ANNALS, November, 1894.

261. By Mr. W. A. WETZEL, Ackermanville, Pa.: Franklin as an Economist.

262. By Dr. J. H. HOLLANDER, Baltimore: Concept of Marginal Rent.

263. By Mr. GEOFFREY DRAGE, London: The Royal Commission of Labor.

264. By Miss HELENA S. DUDLEY, Boston: Relief Work Carried on at the Wells Memorial Institute. Printed in the ANNALS, November, 1894.

265. By Professor F. H. GIDDINGS, of Columbia College: Utility,

Economics and Sociology. Printed in the ANNALS, November, 1894.

266. By Professor S. N. PATTEN, of the University of Pennsylvania: Economics in Elementary Schools. Printed in the ANNALS, January, 1895, and (267). Organic Concept of Society. Printed in the ANNALS, November, 1894.

268. By Dr. J. H. HOLLANDER, Baltimore: Clark's Use of "Rent" and "Profits." Printed in the ANNALS, November, 1894.

269. By Professor R. P. FALKNER, of the University of Pennsylvania: The International Congress of Hygiene and Demography. Printed in the ANNALS, November, 1894.

270. By Mr. JOHN S. DEHART, Jersey City: The Metaphysics of Money.

271. By Mr. H. J. GRANNIS, Duluth, Minn.: Should the United States Senate be Abolished?

272. By JOSEPH G. ROSENGARTEN, Esq., Philadelphia: A translation of How to Save Bimetallism, by the DUC DE NOAILLES. Printed in the ANNALS, January, 1895.

273. By Professor S. N. PATTEN, of the University of Pennsylvania: The Relation of Economics to Sociology. Printed in the ANNALS, January, 1895.

274. By Hon. J. G. BOURINOT, C. M. G., Ottawa, Canada: Elected or Appointed Officials? Printed in the ANNALS, March, 1895.

275. By Dr. S. M. LINDSAY, of the University of Pennsylvania: Sociological Field Work. Printed in the ANNALS, January, 1895.

276. By Professor ALBION W. SMALL, of the University of Chicago: Organic Concept of Society. Printed in the ANNALS, March, 1895.

277. By Professor JEROME DOWD, of Trinity College, N. C.: Political Revolution of the South.

278. By Professor G. ARANGIO RUIZ, of the University of Naples: The Amendments to the Italian Constitution. Printed in the ANNALS, September, 1895.

279. By Mr. G. F. MILTON, Chattanooga, Tenn.: Material Advancement of the Negro.

280. By Mr. C. H. LINCOLN, Philadelphia: Position of the American Representative in Congress. Printed in the ANNALS, July, 1895.

281. By Professor JOHN R. COMMONS, of Indiana University: State Supervision for Cities. Printed in the ANNALS, May, 1895.

282. By OLIVER T. MORTON, Esq., Chicago: The Labor Question in American Politics.

283. By Professor DIODATO LIOY, of the University of Turin: Outline of the Philosophy of Right.

284. By Professor FRANK FETTER, of Cornell University: Exploitation of Theories of Value in the Discussion of the Standard of Deferred Payments. Printed in the ANNALS, May, 1895.

285. By Professor H. H. POWERS, of Smith College: Terminology and the Sociological Conference. Printed in the ANNALS, March, 1895.

286. By Professor H. B. ADAMS, of Johns Hopkins University: The Tenth Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association. Printed in the ANNALS, March, 1895.

287. By Dr. H. R. SEAGER, Philadelphia: The Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association. Printed in the ANNALS, March, 1895.

288. By F. J. STIMSON, Esq., Boston: Uniformity of Legislation. Printed in the ANNALS, May, 1895.

289. By Professor GEO. W. KNIGHT, of the Ohio State University: The Political Science Association of the Central States. Printed in the ANNALS, March, 1895.

290. By Professor J. ALLEN SMITH, of Marietta College: The Multiple Money Standard.

291. By Professor F. H. GIDDINGS, of Columbia College: Sociology and the Abstract Sciences. Printed in the ANNALS, March, 1895.

292. By Dr. HERMAN SCHÖNFELD, of Columbian University: Labor Statistics of Russian Factories.

293. By Mr. J. G. ALGER, Paris: The Vitality of Dynasties.

294. By Mr. W. I. THOMAS, Chicago: Schäffle's Theory of Social Order.

295. By BOLTON HALL, Esq., New York City: The Objection to Interest.

296. By Mr. F. W. SANDERS, Chicago: Spencer's System of Ethics.

297. By B. A. ULRICH, Esq., Chicago: City Government of German Cities.

298. By Professor ALBION W. SMALL, of the University of Chicago: "Social" vs. "Societary." Printed in the ANNALS, May, 1895.

299. By Dr. EMORY R. JOHNSON, of the University of Pennsylvania: Industrial Services of the Railways. Printed in the ANNALS, May, 1895.

300. By Mr. EDW. T. PETERS, Washington: Tests of Stability in the Value of Money, and (301) A Misleading Statement of Gresham's Law.

302. By Mr. R. C. BARNETT, Kansas City, Mo.: Balance of Occupations.

303. By Mr. WM. M. SALTER, Philadelphia: Anarchy or Government in the Industrial Realm.

304. By F. S. BILLINGS, M. D., Grafton, Mass.: The Law of Might and Proprietary Rights.

305. By Dr. A. F. BENTLEY, Baltimore: The Units of Investigation in the Social Sciences. Printed in the ANNALS, May, 1895.

306. By Professor GEORGE H. HAYNES, of the Worcester Polytechnic Institute: Representation in New England Legislatures. Printed in the ANNALS, September, 1895.

307. By Dr. C. W. MACFARLANE, Philadelphia: Economic Theory in America Prior to 1776. Printed in the ANNALS, July, 1895.

308. By Professor T. N. CARVER, of Oberlin College: The Ethical Basis of Distribution and Its Application to Taxation. Printed in the ANNALS, July, 1895.

309. By Professor MARY S. BARNES, of the Leland Stanford Jr. University: History, A Definition and a Forecast. Printed in the ANNALS, July, 1895.

310. By Dr. GEORG SIMMEL, of the University of Berlin: The Problem of Sociology. Printed in the ANNALS, November, 1895.

311. By B. A. ULRICH, Esq., Chicago: A System of Municipal Government Suited to the Cities of the United States.

312. By Professor WM. C. MOREY, of the University of Rochester: Sources of American Federalism. Printed in the ANNALS, September, 1895.

313. By Mr. O. W. ZIEGLER, Baltimore: An Attempt at a True Social Statistic.

314. By Mr. L. I. GILDERSLEEVE, Beaver, Pa.: Initial Factors in the Politico-Social Problem.

315. By Mr. ARTHUR KITSON, Philadelphia: An Invariable Monetary Unit.

316. By Professor LOUIS WUARIN, of the University of Geneva: Recent Political Experiments in the Swiss Democracy. Printed in the ANNALS, November, 1895.

317. By Mr. H. T. ROOT, Grand Haven, Mich.: Marriage and Divorce.

318. By Professor J. W. JENKS, of Cornell University: The Social Basis of Proportional Representation. Printed in the ANNALS, November, 1895.

319. By Professor W. M. DANIELS, of Princeton College: The Formulation of Gresham's Law. Printed in the ANNALS, September, 1895.

320. By Mr. W. LODIAN, Calcutta: Kossuth on American Politics.

321. By Professor EMORY R. JOHNSON, of the University of Penn-

sylvania: Railway Departments for the Relief and Insurance of Employes. Printed in the ANNALS, November, 1895.

322. By Mr. S. E. MOFFETT, San Francisco: The California Railroad Commission. Printed in the ANNALS, November, 1895.

323. By Mr. E. R. BUCKLEY, Madison Wis: The Custody of State Funds. Printed in the ANNALS, November, 1895.

324. By W. F. WILLOUGHBY, Esq., Washington: The Musée social. Printed in the current number of the ANNALS.

325. By Professor G. FIAMINGO, of the University of Rome: Individual Determinism and Social Science.

326. By Rev. FRANK CRANE, Omaha: The Principles of Democracy Applied to Wealth.

327. By Professor J. M. VINCENT: A translation of the Constitution of Belgium.

BRIEFER COMMUNICATIONS.

THE MUSÉE SOCIAL IN PARIS.

Under present conditions, it is not so much the lack of material as the difficulty of obtaining access to that already in existence that is the greatest obstacle in the way of accurate and satisfactory studies of actual economic conditions and institutions. Here, as in few other fields of research, the ordinary library can be utilized to little advantage. One can find there what has already been written upon a subject, but for purposes of strictly original research, it is scarcely worth a visit. The class of material that should be consulted either is not there at all, or, if possessed, is of such a nature as to defy ordinary cataloguing methods. This material consists of government reports relating to questions of industry and labor, proceedings of labor and social congresses and conventions, the constitutions and reports of private organizations and institutions such as trade-unions, co-operative societies, mutual aid funds, etc., the files of economic and statistical periodicals, the published proceedings of statistical and other kindred societies, which include the results of original research, etc.

The readers of the ANNALS cannot fail to be interested in a brief description of the *Musée Social*, an institution recently organized in Paris, which is, without doubt, the most remarkable effort that has been made to supply this deficiency on the part of ordinary libraries, and to render available the real sources of information concerning economic conditions and institutions.

The *Musée* owes its creation directly to the organization of sections of social economy in connection with recent international expositions. The first exposition which had such a section was that of 1867 at Paris. Le Play, the eminent economist, was directed, on that occasion, to organize a section to embrace "all documents on subjects relating to efforts to ameliorate the physical and moral condition of the population." The central feature of this section was the creation of the famous New Order of Recompenses (*Nouvel Ordre de Récompenses*) "in favor of persons, or establishments, or localities, which by the organization of special institutions had developed the

feeling of harmony among all those who co-operate in the work of production and had assured to the workingmen material, moral and intellectual advantages."* This exposition, in which over six hundred of the most important industrial establishments of the world took part, is recognized throughout France to constitute the point of departure in the history of the modern study of social conditions.

At the exposition of Paris in 1889, the scope of the section of social economy was still further enlarged. At this exposition, there was assembled a vast quantity of documents of an original character, such as the constitutions of societies, the reports of operations of workingmen's institutions, models of workingmen's houses, statistics of old age pension and relief funds, exhibits of co-operative societies, proceedings of congresses, etc. All of this material has been digested and presented in a magnificent series of reports, each relating to a particular subject, than which, it is safe to say, there is no more valuable series of documents concerning social problems in the world.†

It was to perpetuate this work, to prevent the dispersion of these valuable documents and exhibits, and to render permanent what was until then an occasional exhibition, that the Count de Chambrun, by his generous donation of over 1,700,000 francs created the *Musée Social*. The *Musée* was not formerly inaugurated until March 25, 1895, though organized prior to that date. The *Musée Social*, then, is a privately endowed, but public institution, whose object in the language of its constitution, is "to place gratuitously at the disposition of the public documents with collateral information, models,

* *Exposition Universelle de 1867 à Paris: Jury Special, Nouvel Ordre de Récompenses. Rapport par M. Alfred Le Roux.* Paris, 1867.

† *Exposition Universelle Internationale de 1889 à Paris. Rapports du Jury International publiés sous la Direction de M. Alfred Picard.*

Groupe de l'Economie Sociale. "Rapport Général" par M. Léon Say.

Section I. "*Remunération du travail*" par M. Ch. Larollée. Section II. "*Participation aux bénéfices, Associations Co-opératives de production*," par M. Charles Robert. Section III. "*Syndicats professionnels*," par M. Goffinou. Section IV. "*Apprentissage*," par M. Ch. Lucas. Section V. "*Sociétés de secours mutuels*," par M. Louis Fontaine. Section VI. "*Caisses de retraites et rentes viagères*," par M. Louis Fontaine. Section VII. "*Assurances contre, les accidents et sur la vie*," par M. L. Caubert. Section VIII. "*Caisses d'épargne*," par M. de Foville. Section IX. "*Associations Co-opératives de consommations*," par M. Raffalovich. Section X. "*Associations Co-opératives de Crédit*," par M. A. Courtois. Section XI. "*Habitations ouvrières*," par M. G. Picot. Section XII. "*Cercles d'ouvriers, Récréations et jeux*," par M. E. O. Lami. Section XIII. "*Hygiène sociale*," par M. Emile Neuman. Section XIV. "*Institutions patronales*," par M. Cheysson. Section XV. "*Grande et petite industrie, Grande et petite culture*," par M. Emile Chevallier. Section XVI. "*Intervention économique des pouvoirs publics*," par M. Léon Donnât.

constitutions, plans, etc., of institutions and organizations which have for their object and result the amelioration of the moral and material situation of the laboring classes."

To carry out these aims, the management of the *Musée* has decided upon the following lines of action: *First*, the collection of a library to contain (1) files as nearly complete as possible of all government publications relating in any way to industry and labor of every country, such as copies of laws relating to labor, reports of parliamentary or other official investigations, reports of bureaus of statistics, inspectors of mines and factories, boards of arbitration, etc.; (2) reports of labor organizations, especially the meetings of national associations, of co-operative enterprises, relief funds, etc.; (3) reports of proceedings of conventions and congresses in relation to social questions; (4) files of the publications of economic and statistical associations, and of economic and statistical periodicals and reviews, and, (5) the more important books in all languages relating to labor and social questions in their practical aspects.

Secondly, the *Musée* is more than a library. It is a laboratory in the broadest sense of the word. At its central quarters it has all of its material carefully arranged according to subject-matter. But as any system of cataloguing is not entirely satisfactory, the work of the *Musée* has been organized in sections, at the head of each of which is a specialist whose duties are to familiarize himself with not only the material in the possession of the *Musée*, but with the whole literature of his subject, in order that he can personally assist any one desiring to make use of the facilities of the *Musée*. Every facility for research is also provided in the way of private desk room, stationery, etc., as the library is devised not so much for casual consultation as for those desiring to make prolonged and detailed investigations. The officials, moreover, are always at the disposition of the public for the answering of communications asking assistance and advice concerning the mode of organization of any institution or work.

Thirdly, the *Musée* will, from time to time, as the occasion seems propitious, organize special missions in France and in foreign countries to inquire into labor subjects of present practical importance. In the autumn of 1895, two such missions were organized. The first was composed of four persons, who under the supervision of M. Paul de Rousiers, the author of "*La Question ouvrière en Angleterre*," visited England for the purpose of making an investigation and report upon trade-unions.

The second mission, at the head of which was Professor G. Blondel, had for its object the study of the agrarian question in Germany,

with especial reference to agrarian socialism and the efforts of the government to improve the condition of the agricultural classes.

These investigations are by no means mere cursory examinations in order to gain personal impressions, but represent detailed inquiries such as would be undertaken by an official bureau. Thus, for example, in the case of the latter mission, which represents an investigation of a problem of great interest at the present time in Germany, the Commission first visited the valleys of the Inn and Danube in order to study peasant associations and conditions in lower Bavaria. Westphalia and Hanover were next visited in order to observe the intimate life of the peasants in that part of Germany which more than any other has preserved the old Saxon customs, and where the fact that the conveyance of property is still influenced by ancient traditions assures to the inhabitants a situation superior to that of their neighbors. The study of small properties being completed, the Commission then visited the region of large estates situated west of the Oder. Here, the organization of the large Silesian domains and the attempts made by the Prussian Government to reconstitute, by means of the "*Reten Güter*" a middle class among the peasants of the East, were objects of especially careful investigation, a work in which the Commission was greatly aided by the assistance of the Minister of Agriculture at Berlin. Next, the Commission, thanks to the assistance of the President of the Commission for the Colonization of Interior Germany, visited and were able to study in detail the villages created by the Prussian Government in the effort to transfer to the peasants the lands formerly belonging to the Polish nobility. Throughout this investigation every effort was made to come into immediate contact with the peasants themselves, to observe upon the spot the operations of the various institutions which play so important a part in the life of the people, to study the effect of the system of insurance laws upon the agricultural population, the workings of agricultural credit associations, etc.

The activity of the *Musée* outside of France, however, has not been limited to the organization of these two missions. Following the policy of being represented at all the more important labor and social congresses and conventions, the *Musée* has been officially represented at the International Co-operative Congress of London, the Statistical Congress at Berne, the Congress of Actuaries at Brussels, the Congress of People's Banks at Bologne, the Congress in Relation to Workingmen's Houses at Bordeaux, the Trade-Union Congress at Cardiff, the Socialist Congress at Breslau and the National Congress of Corporations at Limoges

Fourthly, the *Musée* will issue two series of publications for the purpose of making known to the public the more important results of its work. The first of these will consist of a series of volumes issued from time to time, under the title of *Bibliothèque du Musée Social* which will give the results of its missions and other material representing the results of original research. The second series will consist of more frequent bulletins or "*Circulaires*" as they will be called for the publication of material of a strictly documentary character. It will be in no sense a review for contributed articles. The chief features of its contents will be yearly bibliographical notes concerning economic publications, official or otherwise, and résumés of social legislation in each country written by its special correspondents, special bibliographical notes concerning particular subjects, notices regarding conventions, congresses, etc., and reprints of important laws, or other documents.

Finally, the *Musée* will adopt every other available method for the advancement of the study of social and economic conditions. Among these will be the holding of conferences, and the offering of money prizes for the best work on assigned subjects. Two such competitions have already been opened, one on "The Benefits of the Principles of Association for the Workingmen," and the other on "Profit Sharing," the prize in each case being \$5000 for the best work. The contest is open to all competitors, whatever the nationality or language used.

The *Musée*, then, is in its nature a central bureau of information, or a kind of international bureau of labor. It should be distinctly understood that the field of the *Musée's* activity is by no means limited to France. On the other hand, it believes that the field of its greatest usefulness will be the making known to each nation the institutions, publications, and experiences of other countries. The better to do this the *Musée* has appointed a special correspondent for each country, for in no other way could it hope to keep in touch with social movements in each or to obtain official and other publications that should be in its possession.

Concerning the usefulness of this institution the writer has already had a practical demonstration. Though the *Musée* was at that time but in the process of organization, he found the assistance of those at its head invaluable to him in the prosecution of an official investigation that he was making in the fall of 1894 for the United States Department of Labor in France and other European countries. There were placed at his disposal documents that he could not have obtained elsewhere; authorities and sources of information were indicated to him; and, above all, he was aided by

practical advice concerning the methods by which the information for which he was in search could best be obtained.

W. F. WILLOUGHBY.

*Special Correspondent of the Musée Social in America.**

THE HISTORY OF A MUNICIPAL CHARTER IN KENTUCKY.

In 1890, the Constitutional Convention after a session of eight months and considerable outside agitation submitted the results of its labors to the people who adopted the new Constitution by a large majority. At an adjourned session which lasted nearly four weeks, the Convention made some slight alterations of form. The Constitution was then formally promulgated. One of the longest articles is devoted to the regulation of municipalities. Towns and cities are divided into six classes. Cities having over one hundred thousand inhabitants are not permitted to maintain a tax-rate for purposes exceeding one dollar and fifty cents on the hundred dollars. In this the tax for schools and sinking funds is not included. In other words, a special and additional tax for educational purposes and for paying off debts existing before 1891 may be imposed. The present tax for school purposes in the city is thirty-three cents on the hundred dollars and the sinking fund tax varies from forty to eighty cents. Hence, until the bonded debt of the city has been discharged, these Constitutional limitations will be of little value. No new debt can be created or liability incurred by the city, "in any manner or for any purpose, to any amount exceeding, in any year, the income and revenue provided for such year, without the assent of two-thirds of the voters thereof voting at an election to be held for that purpose." Only one election may be held during any one year for any purpose and that must be in November. Whenever any new debt is created, a provision must be made at the same time for a tax to pay the interest and a part of the principal each year. Last year it was proposed to increase the bonded debt by one million dollars for park purposes. The proposal received a majority of two-thirds of the votes cast on that subject, but not two-thirds of all the votes cast in the same election for certain officers and now the courts must decide whether the votes cast for the bonds were sufficient.

Excepting members of the two boards constituting the General Council, nearly all important officers, including the Mayor, Police Judge, Treasurer, Tax Receiver, etc., are elected for four years.

*The address of the *Musée* is 5 rue Las-Cases, Paris, and that of the American Bureau is 1505 Twelfth street, N. W., Washington, D. C.

The members of the General Council are elected every two years by the voters of the whole city, but members of the lower board must be residents and voters of their several wards. City and State elections are held in odd years. Hence city and county elections, which are purely local in their effect, are alternately coincident with and separated from State elections and both, being held only in odd years, are kept entirely distinct from national elections. The Mayor's term, which is fixed at four years, may seem long, but the evils of frequent elections were so apparent in the past that there was but little to be said against the increase from three years. He is not re-eligible for the succeeding term.

Under the Constitution no officer's term or salary may be increased during the time for which he was elected; no invalid or unauthorized contract can be made valid or be extended; the Legislature cannot grant the use of the streets to any corporation without the consent of the General Council; no franchise or privilege can be given away gratuitously by the city; the duration of the grant is limited to twenty years, and must be sold, with reasonable restrictions and limitations, to the highest bidder at public auction.

After the adoption of the Constitution, the Mayor of the city, by the authority of the General Council, appointed a Commission of three persons to draft a charter. Mr. R. W. Knott, then one of the editors of the *Courier-Journal*; Mr. M. Cary Peter, a prominent merchant; and Edward J. McDermott, a lawyer, were selected. In this difficult task the Commission was heartily aided by the Mayor, the press, the Board of Trade, and the Commercial Club.

The Commissioners endeavored to place the public schools under the control of a small board of trustees, and to compel them to select the teachers mainly by competitive educational tests. The effort to destroy in this way, the patronage of the trustees was of little avail. The Commission also made the attempt to abolish the fee-system in the Police Department. It was said that sometimes poor but innocent persons were arrested by unscrupulous officers merely for an extra fee of two or three dollars. The better class of policemen favored the change, but politicians in the Legislature were easily persuaded to block such innovations. Reforms were also attempted in the licensing and supervision of saloons, but the Committee of the Liquor-Dealers' Association and their attorney did not favor the changes recommended. The provisions offered by the Commission were so modified by the Legislature as to make them of little value.

To make places for a few needy, but influential politicians, the city members of the Legislature inserted provisions which created

several new offices, namely: (1) a Live Stock Inspector and several deputies; and (2) a Bond Recorder, whose duty it is to take such bonds, in criminal cases, as Magistrates and the City Clerk ought to take. Other offices which the Commission in its draft had tried to regulate fairly and fully, were modified as to the term, salary or duties to suit the convenience or taste of the incumbents.

The charter in its amended form was vetoed by Governor John Young Brown on the ground of these unnecessary changes in the draft of the Commission, but mainly because he regarded the provision which allowed merchants and manufacturers to pay a license tax based on their sales, in lieu of an ad valorem tax on their property, as unconstitutional. The Charter was then freed from the features objectionable to him and approved by him July 1, 1893.

At the succeeding session of the Legislature in the beginning of 1894—before the Charter was a year old—six wholly unnecessary amendments were passed. In every instance the object of these amendments might have been accomplished by ordinances which the General Council was authorized to enact. The people knew little or nothing about these changes. As Louisville is the only city of the first-class, its organic law will for a long time be the sport or tool of factions in the State Legislature.

By the Charter the legislative department is given the broadest power. The General Council can pass any ordinance not expressly forbidden by the Constitution or the statutes of the State. No ordinance is allowed to pass both boards the same evening. This gives the citizens time to learn of important and oftentimes doubtful changes in the law. All ordinances in force must be collected by the City Attorney and printed for the public every two years. Those not published in this way expire by limitation. This prevents the resurrection, now and then, of obsolete ordinances which were found useless or were not supported by public opinion. While the Council, because it holds the purse-strings, has a check upon the Mayor and his subordinates, it has very limited executive functions. No contract that involves the expenditure of more than \$2000, is valid unless approved by the General Council; and it must approve, before payment, all claims for work done or materials furnished by the city. At the beginning of each year it receives and considers the full and exact reports, estimates and recommendations of the Mayor and his cabinet, and then supplies the funds necessary to carry on the work of the departments for the ensuing year. All important appointments by the Mayor must be approved by the Board of Aldermen, and, if seven out of the twelve oppose removal within thirty days of the notice of the same they may prevent the Mayor

from removing his appointees. The General Council elects the Assessor, the City Attorney, the Sinking Fund Commissioner, and a few other less important officers.

The Mayor is the most powerful factor in the government during the four years of his term. He has charge of all executive work, and his responsibility is made clear to the people. He appoints the Comptroller, who is his Finance Minister; the three members of the Board of Public Works; the three members of the Board of Public Safety; the City Buyer; and a few minor officers. The Board of Public Works has charge of all streets, alleys, sewers, cisterns, public buildings, etc. The parks are managed by a separate Board of six men, elected on a general ticket by the voters of the city. The Board of Public Safety has charge of the police and fire service, the City Hospital, the Almshouse, etc. These branches of the city government are conducted, to a moderate degree, on the plans recommended by civil service reformers. Members of the executive boards receive an annual salary of \$2500, but may engage in other business. They are responsible only to the Mayor, and he is responsible to the public for their work. They and the Comptroller are allowed to sit in the General Council and take part in the debates, but do not vote. The Comptroller keeps all contracts and vouchers. His books show the state of the city's liabilities and finances.

The public schools are managed by fourteen trustees, seven of whom are elected in their several districts each year. The city is compelled to levy a tax of not less than thirty-three cents on the hundred dollars each year for the schools, and this sum is added to the city's proportionate share of the school-fund raised by State taxation. The trustees elect all officers of the Board, all professors of the High School, the Manual Training School, the Normal School for Teachers, the Commercial Class School and also the principals and teachers of the ward schools. Because of the large number of trustees, responsibility is divided, and too much room is left for favoritism in the distribution of patronage. The teachers in the schools are not selected entirely or even mainly by an educational test. Still the schools, on the whole, are well managed. Many men connected with their administration are able and upright, and most zealous in the discharge of their duties.

No fees are allowed in the Police Court, which tries offenders for violation of ordinances, and which holds an examining court for offences against the statutes of the State. Petty offenders are no longer compelled to pay costs heavier than their fines. Liquor licenses are granted by a License Board consisting of the Judge of

the Police Court, who is elected by the people; the chairman of the Board of Public Safety, who is appointed by the Mayor; and the chairman of the Sinking Fund Commission, elected by the Commission, who in their turn are elected by the General Council. The local license fee is \$150, and a bond to keep an orderly house is required of all saloon keepers. Protests by citizens against the granting of licenses are carefully heard by the Board.

One of the most interesting questions which arose in the framing of the Charter concerned the subject of taxation. Under the new Constitution, as held by our Court of Appeals in the case of *Levi et al. v. City of Louisville*,* the personal property of manufacturers, merchants, and traders, must be assessed and taxed according to the fair cash value of their property. The Charter prepared by the Commission was so drawn as to substitute a system of license-taxes in lieu of ad valorem taxes. The former were based upon the volume of business done, or the amount of sales made, by traders, merchants and manufacturers because it was thought that the amount of sales could not well be concealed and that most business men would rather over-state than under-state their business. The Governor, however, held that the Constitution imperatively required the taxation of all property according to its value, and hence his veto followed. Subsequently the Charter was so amended as to conform to his views, for the most part, and he then signed it. After it became a law, the General Council of the city, thinking it ruinous to tax traders, merchants and manufacturers of all kinds according to the cash value of their property, and thinking that the Charter even as changed to suit the Governor's opinion allowed them a discretion in the matter, passed an ordinance which provided that the classes mentioned should be taxed only according to the volume of their business. There was no doubt that the citizens at large much preferred the license system. Some property owners, insisted that the taxation of personal property in stores and factories by a license-system based on the sales of the owners was unfair to the owners of real estate and consequently they took the question to the courts. One of the judges of the Circuit Court in Louisville held that the Constitution allowed either system; another held that the Legislature had no discretion in the matter. The Court of Appeals on May 4, 1895, in the case mentioned above, decided that the city, under the language of the Constitution, could tax property only by the ad valorem system according to its fair cash value. In 1894, before the decision had been rendered, the city took the

* 16th Kentucky Law Reporter, 872, May 4, 1895.

precaution to assess all real estate and personal property according to the ad valorem system, but it nevertheless taxed merchants and manufacturers only according to the amount of their business by a system of licenses based on sales. After the decision of the Court of Appeals, the General Council had new tax-bills made out on the basis of the old assessment; and credited on the new bills the amount paid by merchants and manufacturers on the previous assessment. It appears that the city will get more taxes from the merchants under the ad valorem system than it would have gotten under the license system; but it is not improbable that hereafter our manufacturers and merchants may be seriously affected. The experience of other cities would seem to indicate that this system will lead to general undervaluations. Personal property is so easily concealed that any attempt to assess it at its fair value, will always cause much of it to be hidden away and perjury to be committed.

The new Charter of Louisville while not perfect, would give satisfaction, perhaps, if it were efficiently executed. The General Council of Louisville has been composed of a majority of men totally unfit for such places and only a minority thoroughly familiar with the city's affairs and able and willing to render it good service. During the last two years there have been unseemly wrangles between members of the General Council and the executive boards. It was said that some members of the General Council were constantly trying to use their power in obstructing claims and contracts and the payment of salaries, in order to compel the granting of favors to them or their friends in the making of appointments and in the letting of profitable contracts. Several times during the last two years corruption of the worst form has been discovered in the General Council. The public were for a time moved to action, but such things are very soon forgotten or fail to arouse the citizens to consistent, and persevering efforts for reform. At the last election in November only a few of the old members of the General Council were nominated by the Democratic party and in their places a really excellent set of men were offered. They were all defeated, however, by the Republican ticket which could boast five or six good names, but was, in the main, composed of obscure, inexperienced men. How good municipal government can be obtained when members of the General Council are elected, in this way, and on other than municipal issues, passes comprehension.

To sum up the experience of Louisville in a very few words it may be said: First, there is a need of the more definite assertion of the right, on the part of private citizens, to appeal to the courts, to punish any officer who neglects his duty, or to stop any unauthorized

expenditure of money or to prevent the creation of any unauthorized obligation; secondly, it would seem that a State Constitution should contain a few general limitations on the rights and powers of municipalities; that each city be permitted to frame its own charter, and to submit it to a popular vote; that after its approval by the people, it should be subject to the approval and acceptance of the Legislature for the protection of the general interests of the State; and that thereafter it should not be changed except by the vote of the people themselves. The Charter thus made and approved by the citizens, should contain only a few general regulations, a mere framework; all legislation necessary for the proper conduct of the municipality, being provided by ordinances passed by the General Council of the city. In other words, the Legislature of the State ought not to be permitted to regulate municipal affairs except so far as they concern matters of more general and State concern. Under such circumstances each city would have as good a Charter and as good a government as it deserved or as it really wanted. Its laws or ordinances would then be made by representatives chosen by its own voters and directly responsible to them alone. If good municipal government cannot be obtained in this way by universal suffrage and home-rule, then universal suffrage should be curtailed. The remedy for the abuses of municipal government is not to be obtained in the State Capitol but in the City Hall or at the city polls.

EDWARD J. McDERMOTT.

Louisville, Ky.

VACATION COURSE OF THE VEREIN FÜR SOCIAL POLITIK.

The two weeks' vacation course in economics and social politics which was concluded in Berlin on the twelfth of October, apparently proved a success, in every respect. Strictly speaking, the undertaking was not an experiment; what has previously been done in this direction was pointed out by Professor Schmoller in the ANNALS for September, 1895. It will suffice to recall here that the courses of this year were, in part, intended to replace those planned by the Evangelical Social Congress and that the somewhat similar effort of this organization in 1893 can be regarded as the immediate forerunner of the present enterprise.

The *Verein für Social Politik*, would seem to be better fitted for the work than its predecessor. It is bound to no party, sect or program, but seeks merely to unite in common effort those who believe in the necessity of social reform and strive to promote its attainment.

while holding fast to the principles of the present organization of society. Hitherto the association has worked upon public opinion and participated in the movement for better legislation chiefly through the biennial meetings at which living problems were discussed on the basis of carefully collected material, and through a long series of scientific investigations and reports which have been prepared by its members and published under its imprint since 1873. Thus the vacation course is a new tool in the equipment of the association, by of which it can extend its activities to wider fields, with which it may strive to broaden and deepen the general knowledge of facts essential to sound judgment upon social questions, and through which its representatives will be able to gain that more active and personal influence which usually accompanies the relation of lecturer to hearer and is almost inherent in it.

Who and what the hearers were, will best appear from an analysis of the list of those who attended the courses. Early in the first week 490 persons had been registered, 256 of these being residents of Berlin or its suburbs. In the second week, partly it is supposed because the three Berlin professors, Schmoller, Wagner and Sering were to lecture, and partly because the lectures of the preceding week had served to advertise the course, the attendance increased to 791 (a number not reached, to be sure, at all lectures), over two-thirds of the new visitors coming from Berlin or the immediate neighborhood. Of the 300 non-residents registered the greater number, were Germans, although there were enough foreigners, some fifty in all, many of them students of political science, to vary the Teutonic aspect of the audience. Among them were Russians, Austrians, Poles, Hungarians, Frenchmen, Italians, Danes, Armenians and Americans, (twelve). Classifying according to calling, one finds 49 clergymen; lawyers (*juristen*) of various sorts, many of them state officials, or about to become such, 181, university students from various faculties, 113; teachers 25; merchants, 19; physicians, 18; journalists, 12; *rentiers*, 13; active military officers, 13; retired officers, 8; manufacturers and factory owners, 12; land, estate or house owners (*Gutsbesitzer*, etc.), 11. A still more detailed examination of the list reveals the names of a number of privy and governmental councillors, and of others from the higher official circles. The business world was represented by the general manager of the Krupp Works and the secretary of the Central Union of German Industrialists, as well as a number of secretaries to Chambers of Commerce; the army, by active and retired generals, colonels and majors; and the universities, by members from all grades of the corps of instruction. Among the 160 women attending, twenty odd were teachers,

four authors, a somewhat larger number students. The remainder came partly from professional families, the wives and daughters of the Berlin faculty being strongly represented. There were also present representatives of other circles of Berlin and provincial society, among them some known to be strongly in sympathy with Social Democracy, and others active in the general movement for opening more of the economic field to their fellow country women.

From this it will be seen that the hearers were predominantly from the higher classes—who, by reason of ability, wealth, office or birth, were in possession of social station and presumably of education and culture considerably above the average. The courses filled each week-day of the fortnight from nine in the morning till six at night, while seven evenings were devoted to discussions presided over by one or another of the lecturing professors. Attendance upon all these exercises, or even upon a part of the lectures, was conditioned upon an independent control of time and a power of temporarily laying aside the usual calling not generally exercised by the masses in industry and trade.

But the *Verein für Social Politik* had not intended to give a "popular" course. This was evident in the explicitly worded program as well as in the subjects chosen by the several professors and the method in which they were treated. The task here assumed was not the entertainment or enlightenment of active minds from the masses. Nor was it provision of that opportunity for improving general education or for help toward broader culture which University Extension offers in the United States and England, partly as substitute for, partly as complement to, the work of colleges. It was, to be sure, the task of diffusing among groups partly without the pale of the universities the results of scientific research and reflection, but only those of economic science and the purpose of the undertaking was the practical one of winning influential circles to the cause of reform—in the higher sense of the word, a political purpose. Hence the character of the audience was deemed a matter for congratulation as well as its number and the attention, industry and interest which the members exhibited. The number of clergymen, which was small compared to the hundreds who had listened to the courses of the Evangelical Social Congress two years before, was disappointing, the more so as the need for fuller and more exact economic knowledge among the clergy is only too evident. On the other hand, the large representation from the bureaucracy, especially of younger officials, was all the more welcome. Without the help, sooner or later, of the

bureaucracy, Germans seem to think it difficult to achieve anything of the nature of the reforms advocated by the Association for Social Politics. At all events, ends can be reached far more easily and quickly when the officials are for a measure rather than indifferent or opposed to it. Partly through such relations and influence as may be expected to result from this and succeeding vacation courses is it hoped to secure the adherence of the younger officials to the policy of social reform before they become too thoroughly imbued with the conservatism more or less characteristic of their calling.

Restricted as they were to six hours each, the lecturers adopted of necessity so condensed and concise a treatment that it is here impracticable to attempt, by further condensation, to report in detail upon the substance of their discourses. In the course of the fortnight nearly all the important economic questions attracting contemporary German thought were treated by specialists upon each subject. Agriculture and the great series of problems connected with it, the Labor Question and the Compulsory Insurance of Laborers against Sickness and Old Age, Industry, Money, Population, Colonies, Emigration, Commercial Policy, Taxation, Private Property and Economic Freedom, the History and Criticism of Socialism, the Division of Labor, Social Struggles and the Development of Social Classes—the bare recital of the themes sufficiently suggests the wealth and variety of material presented. So far as questions of method and tendencies incidentally arose, the views expressed were those of the ethical, realistic and inductive school of economic science, the majority of whose foremost German representatives were to be found among the lecturers. And wherever the nature of his subject permitted, the lecturer paved the way for his final propositions in the direction of reform by an historical introduction and a description of present conditions as complete and detailed as was possible within the limits of his time. As a series, therefore, the lectures constituted a general picture of German economic phenomena, of the processes of their origin, of the defects and the merits of present organization such as could be otherwise gained, by the foreigner, at least, only at the expense of long study and great pains. To Germans also, the series brought much that was new and valuable. For the trained economist it may have been merely the opportunity of listening to teachers not yet heard or of hearing the results of researches hitherto not published. For the practical man it was often the scientific co-ordination of facts known to him singly from his daily experience. For many others it was the first introduction to the realm of economic discussion. Whether and to what extent the ulterior purposes of the association have been advanced

are questions best left to the future, although here also the prospect for eventually favorable answers seems most flattering.

To what may this work ultimately lead? The result of this first and somewhat experimental effort having been so reassuring in point of attendance, it is highly probable that similar courses will be given later, both in Berlin and elsewhere, under the auspices of the association. Although nothing as yet seems definitely decided, it is not unlikely that lecture courses in economics and social politics will shortly be held in several of the larger cities. It has also been proposed, in some cases, to lessen the number of subjects discussed, to hold at least some of the courses in the evening so as to make them more accessible to the employed classes, and, lastly, to endeavor to attract artisans, clerks and laboring men by an adaptation of themes and treatment. One great hindrance, of course, to marked success among the laborers is their adherence to the Social Democratic party and their loyalty to the peculiar economic doctrines of the Social Democratic faith. As far as Berlin is concerned there is no apparent reason why the Evangelical Social Congress should discontinue the work it began in 1893. On the contrary, the Congress could very well hold courses in alternate years in Berlin, since the biennial meetings of the association render it inexpedient that courses should be held in the capital city under the latter's auspices oftener than once in two years. In the case of other university towns, the obvious procedure would be to leave the initiative, to the professor of economics, most actively interested in the work of the association in that locality. Upon him would fall, too, the task of arranging the courses and securing the services of such colleagues as might be willing to devote time and energy to the dissemination of economic knowledge and the advocacy of humane social policy. The sacrifices caused by such work are considerable, while the honorarium which the association is able to offer is hardly more than nominal. The scholars who lecture at Berlin have unmistakably evinced their earnestness and public spirit by willingly taking the trouble and giving the time which the preparation of the course and participation in it involved.

R. M. B.

University of Berlin.

EDITORIAL.

At a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Academy, held October 23, 1895, Dr. Edmund J. James presented his resignation as Chairman of the Committee on Publication and Editor of the ANNALS. He stated that his future residence in Chicago* would, in his opinion, make it impossible for him to give that careful and continuous attention to the publications of the Academy which they demand. The subject was referred to a sub-committee, with instructions to report at a subsequent meeting of the Executive Committee.

At a later meeting, held November 15, 1895, the sub-committee reported the following recommendations, which, after due consideration, were unanimously adopted: "That Dr. James' resignation as Chairman of the Publication Committee and Editor of the ANNALS be accepted, but that he be requested to continue as one of the Associate Editors; that Dr. Roland P. Falkner be chosen Chairman of the Publication Committee and Editor of the ANNALS, to succeed Dr. James; and that Dr. Emory R. Johnson be selected to succeed Dr. James Harvey Robinson, whose resignation had also been received some time since."

The foregoing announcement from the records of the Executive Committee of the Academy will explain the changes in the editorial management of the ANNALS which take effect with the present number. Although compelled by change of residence to resign the managing editorship, Dr. James retains his full sympathy for the work and will continue as Associate Editor to take an advisory part in the policy of the ANNALS, even though it may be at the cost of considerable personal inconvenience. At a moment when the editorial responsibilities for the publications of the Academy fall upon other shoulders, it seems opportune to recall the services which Dr. James has rendered the ANNALS in the past, as well as to make a statement in behalf of the new management.

It was six years ago that Professor James conceived the idea of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, of which he was justly made the President. It is not too much to say that

* See p. 78, of the present number of the ANNALS.

during those six years he has sustained its work in every particular, and that a large measure of its success is due to his efforts. Of what has here been accomplished, especially in reference to the publications, we shall speak later.

Professor James was eminently qualified for the work which he assumed. With a keen insight into scientific problems, he had already given evidence of a practical sagacity which sought always for a concrete embodiment of the views he held. This must be clear to those who survey the list of his published writings which accompanies the personal note of this issue. Nor have these writings remained without practical result.

His pamphlet on *The Relation of the Municipality to the Gas Supply* grew out of an address delivered before the Social Science Association of Philadelphia, at a critical period in the history of the city gas works, when a large combination of private capital was trying to secure possession of the city plant. The address was generally considered to have settled the question in favor of city ownership in Philadelphia. In its subsequent form, as published by the American Economic Association, it contributed very decidedly toward strengthening public sentiment in favor of the ownership and control of lighting plants by municipalities.

The various addresses on the subject of forestry, delivered in the interest of the Pennsylvania Forestry Association, have contributed to the advance of the movement for the protection and extension of our forests. In like manner in essays on the transportation question Professor James anticipated by the discussion of the Zone Tariff System, the era of cheaper passenger fares on our railways, as well as the sounder view which now begins to prevail of the relation of canals and waterways to our railway system. When the history of the movement for better government of our cities comes to be written, it will be seen that Professor James contributed in large measure to the advance of this movement.

But it is particularly in the field of education that Professor James has impressed his views upon various important movements. In the light of subsequent developments, his papers and addresses, in which these results were foreshadowed, acquire an increased interest. It would occupy us too long to enumerate the actual results which can be traced to these efforts. It is sufficient to say that Professor James has concerned himself with such questions as the place of kindergartens in the public school system, the teaching of pedagogics in universities, the function of commercial education, the relation of the different classes of secondary schools to one another, and the education of adults, especially University Extension.

The fertility of practical expedient, and the breadth of sympathy for all forward movements which have characterized Professor James' career, have stood the American Academy of Political and Social Science in good stead throughout its existence. An unceasing interest devoted to the various aspects of its work has secured for the Academy an unusual measure of success. No one knows this better than those who, like the present editor, have been intimately associated with him in the work. No institution depends for its success upon a single individual, and the writer would be the last to undervalue the self-sacrificing labors of a group of enthusiastic specialists who have labored for its success, nor the cordial co-operation of writers all over the United States who have taken part in its publications. Yet, however numerous the workers, they must have a chief. In the work of the Academy, where he has occupied at the same time the position of president and editor of the publications, Professor James has been the directing spirit.

During his editorship the ANNALS has been changed from a quarterly to a bimonthly periodical, while the numbers have been steadily increased in size. The policy of publishing as supplements longer papers than could find a place in the ANNALS has been strenuously pushed by Professor James, and at the present time the number of these publications is quite large and has been notably enriched by the supplement which accompanies the present issue. The leading papers published in the ANNALS are reprinted in separate form, and as pamphlets secure a circulation and attention which they would not attain as articles of a periodical. To Professor James is due the consistent maintenance of this policy. To his initiative is also to be ascribed the establishment of the interesting departments of sociological and municipal government notes, whose success has amply justified the wisdom of his foresight.

The present editor discharges a debt of gratitude in rendering this account of the services of Dr. James to the publications of the Academy. He feels that the policy of these publications has been laid upon firm foundations. The constructive work has in large part been accomplished. It remains for those who follow to build a structure worthy of the foundation.

And now a word in behalf of the present editorial board. Our readers will have noticed that Dr. Emory R. Johnson has replaced Dr. James Harvey Robinson as associate editor. We part with Dr. Robinson with regret, for his services in the past have been of great value. His removal to New York, and his duties in his new position had rendered it impossible for him to retain his position as associate editor. Dr. Emory R. Johnson needs no introduction to the

readers of the ANNALS and the editor congratulates himself that he is to have associated with him in the active management of the publications a man who has already given so many proofs of his zeal and ability.

The reorganized editorial board propose to follow in the future the policy which in the past has brought so much success to our publications. Radical changes of policy are not contemplated by them and are not to be expected. They earnestly hope for some improvement in detail. They aim to make the ANNALS not only a picture of the activities of the Academy, and a repository for scientific papers, but so far as possible a complete record of current fact and discussion which is of interest to the students of political and social science. In this spirit they hope to inaugurate a current bibliography which will call the attention of our readers to the most important publications as they appear. This feature will not replace the book reviews and notes but will be in addition to it. In the same spirit it will be the aim of the reorganized board to extend and enrich the department of notes so that in time nothing which merits the attention of students of political and social science shall escape notice.

To accomplish these purposes they need the support of members of the Academy and other scholars. They bespeak for themselves the same cordial sympathy and assistance which has been granted their predecessors. Without it they must needs fail. With it they trust that they shall be able to assume the responsibilities which have been placed on their shoulders, and acquit themselves with credit in the functions to which the Academy has called them.

ROLAND P. FALKNER.

PERSONAL NOTES

AMERICA.

Chicago University.—Dr. Edmund J. James, President of the Academy, leaves the University of Pennsylvania for the University of Chicago, February 1, 1896. In the University of Pennsylvania Dr. James was Professor of Public Finance and Administration in the Department of Finance and Economy (Wharton School), and Professor of Political and Social Science in the Graduate Faculty (Department of Philosophy). In the University of Chicago he will be Professor of Public Administration in the Department of Political Science, and Director of the University Extension Department.

Edmund James James was born May 21, 1855, at Jacksonville, Morgan County, Ill. He was prepared for college in the High School Department of the Illinois State Normal School, at Normal, Ill., from which he graduated in June, 1873.

He entered college at the Northwestern University at Evanston, Ill., in the autumn of 1873. Having been appointed Recorder on the United States Lake Survey he joined (May 1, 1874) the party of Engineer Terry, engaged on the upper St. Lawrence and the lower part of Lake Ontario. At the end of the season he entered Harvard College, matriculating November 2, 1874.

In July, 1875, he went to Europe to study political economy. He matriculated at the University of Halle, October 16, 1875, and after spending four semesters at that institution—during which time he attended lectures also at Berlin and Leipsic—he graduated from Halle in August, 1877, taking the degrees of M. A. and Ph.D.

On his return home in the autumn of 1877 he was appointed principal of the Public High School, in Evanston, Ill., from January 1, 1878. In June, 1879, he resigned this position to accept the principalship of the High School Department of the Illinois State Normal School at Normal, Ill., beginning work in September of that year. He resigned this position at Christmas time, 1882, in order to continue his studies in Europe, which he pursued during the summer semester of 1883 at various German universities.

On July 3, 1883, he was elected Professor of Public Finance and Administration in the Wharton School of Finance and Economy, University of Pennsylvania, to begin work the following September. Since 1886 he has had practical charge of this department. Under

his influence its corps of instructors was largely increased, the subjects of instruction multiplied, and its curriculum extended from two years to four, changes which were followed by a large increase in the number of students. It was owing to his personal efforts that instruction in statistics, journalism, sociology, transportation, municipal government, jurisprudence, and politics was added to the work in history, economics, and finance. During this period the Wharton School of Finance and Economy became not only a successful department for higher commercial education, but also one of the leading centres for the study of economics and politics in the United States.

Shortly after going to the University of Pennsylvania, Professor James was also appointed December 12, 1883, Professor of Political and Social Science in the Graduate Faculty (Department of Philosophy), and from January, 1884, to January, 1888, was Secretary of this Faculty. While Secretary he proposed the regulations which with few changes, have remained the rules governing graduate study in the University until the present. He was also the first instructor of the Faculty to introduce the seminary method of instruction which has become such a marked feature of all advanced work in the University. He was in Europe on leave of absence during the academic year 1888-89.

On April 8, 1891, he was elected President of the American Society for the Extension of University Teaching, an association organized to promote the introduction and development of University Extension methods of instruction throughout the United States. He held this position until September 1, 1895, during which time the work of the society was greatly extended and strengthened. The number of lecture courses rose from 42 in 1890-91 to 126 in 1894-95; while the number in attendance increased from 7400 to 20,000.

While at the University Professor James declined various calls to other institutions either as president or professor. He was offered the presidency of two leading western State universities. He was also offered an Assistant Professorship in Political Economy at Harvard in 1890 and the head Professorship of Political Science at the University of Chicago in 1892. He was appointed delegate from the University of Pennsylvania to the tercentenary celebration of Trinity College, Dublin, in 1892, and to the bicentennial of the University of Halle in 1894.

Professor James is an active member of various societies and associations of a scientific and practical character. He has been a member of the National Educational Association since 1879. He was elected a member of the National Council of Education in 1884 and has delivered addresses before the association on "College Education for

Business Men," "University Extension" and "Normal School Education."

He was chosen a member of the American Philosophical Society, April 18, 1884.

Since September, 1885 he has been a member of the American Association for the Advancement of Science; since 1891 a Fellow of that body. He was Vice-President and Chairman of Section I in 1891, and has read papers at its sessions on "The Share of Labor in Distribution," "Manual Training in the Public Schools" and "The Farmer and Taxation."

Since 1885 he has been a member of the American Social Science Association; was Secretary of the Department of Social Economy, 1887-88, and one of the directors of the association for the years 1890-92. He has read papers on "The Bullitt Bill Charter of Philadelphia," "Schools of Political and Social Science," "The Single Tax Theory."

As one of the early members (1883) of the Public Education Association of Philadelphia he delivered addresses before that body on "Financial and Administrative Aspects of Public Education," "The Need of Reorganization in Our Public School System," etc., and has been for two years past Chairman of the Executive Committee of that body.

He was one of the founders of the American Economic Association in 1885, and, as Chairman of the Committee on Organization, reported the plan which has proved so successful in practice. He was for some time Vice-President and has been a frequent contributor to its series of publications.

Having been much interested in the movement for the preservation and better management of our forests, he was one of the original members (1886) of the Pennsylvania Forestry Association and of the Council of that body. He delivered addresses before the association on "The Relation of the State to our Forests," "The Economic Significance of Our Forests," etc.

He was actively concerned in the organization of the Pennsylvania College Association in 1887, which was subsequently converted into the Association of Colleges and Preparatory Schools in the Middle States and Maryland. He delivered addresses at its sessions on "The American University," "University Extension," and "The American College," and was for some time treasurer of the association.

He was one of the founders of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, and, at the first meeting for formal organization December 14, 1889, was elected President, an office to which he has since been annually re-elected.

He was one of the first to take part in the recent movement for the improvement of city politics in the United States; was one of the organizers of the Municipal League of Philadelphia (out of which the National Association of Municipal Leagues has grown) and served as its first president from December 1, 1891.

Professor James' contributions to the literature of the subjects in which he has been interested have been numerous.

With Dr. Charles DeGarmo, President of Swarthmore College, he founded the *Illinois School Journal*, now the *Public School Journal*, one of the most influential educational periodicals in the West. As editor of this magazine for two years, 1881-82, he contributed many papers to the current discussion of the time, relating to the pedagogical and administrative aspects of public education.

As editor of the *ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE* he has for the past five years directed the policy of this periodical. Under his direction it has expanded from a quarterly to a bimonthly with numerous supplements, and has grown steadily and rapidly in scope and influence.

In addition to the work on the above periodicals, Professor James was one of the leading contributors to the "Cyclopædia of Political Science, Political Economy and United States History," edited by John J. Lalor, Chicago, 1882-84. (Referred to below as Lalor's *Cyclopædia*.)

LIST OF PUBLISHED PAPERS.

A. Monographs and Longer Papers.

1. "*Studien über den Amerikanischen Zolltarif: Seine Entwicklung und seinen Einfluss auf die Volkswirtschaft.*" Pp. 80. Jena, 1877.

2. "*Aims and Methods of Latin Teaching in Our Public Schools.*" Educational Newsgleaner, Chicago, September, 1880.

3. "*Banks of Issuc.*" Lalor's "Cyclopædia." Vol. I. Chicago, 1881.

4. "*Customs Duties.*" Ibid.

5. "*Relation of Academic to Professional Work in Normal Schools.*" Education. Boston, 1882.

6. "*Latin Teaching in the Public Schools.*" Four Papers in *Illinois School Journal*. Vol. I. Normal, 1881-82.

7. "*Epochs in the History of Pedagogics.*" Three papers. Ibid.

8. "*National Aid to Education.*" Four papers. Ibid. Vol. II, 1882-83.

9. "*Das Studium der Staatswissenschaften in Amerika.*" Conrad's *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik*, N. F. VII Band. Jena, 1883.

10. "*Emigration and Immigration.*" Lalor's "Cyclopædia." Vol. II. Chicago, 1883.
11. "*Compulsory Education.*" Ibid.
12. "*Machinery: Its Social and Economical Effects.*" Ibid.
13. "*Exercise.*" Ibid.
14. "*Factory Laws.*" Ibid.
15. "*Science of Finance.*" Ibid.
16. "*Labor.*" Ibid.
17. "*Insurance.*" Ibid.
18. "*The Higher Education of Teachers at the University of Jena.*" New England Journal of Education. Boston, December 6 and 13, 1883.
19. "*Distribution of the Surplus Revenue.*" Philadelphia Press, Dec. 7, 1883.
20. "*History of Political Economy.*" Lalor's "Cyclopædia." Vol. III. Chicago, 1884.
21. "*The Classical Question in Germany.*" Popular Science Monthly, January, 1884. (Reprinted at Boston, 1884, as Appendix to Pamphlet on Greek Question, by Charles Francis Adams.)
22. "*Gindeley's History of the Thirty Years' War.*" The Press, Philadelphia, 1884.
23. "*Rise of the Modern Laborer.*" MacNeil's "Labor Question." Pp. 65. Boston, 1885.
24. "*The Public Economy of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.*" Wharton School Annals of Political Science. No. I. Pp. 34. Philadelphia, 1885.
25. "*Outline of a Proposed School of Political and Social Science.*" Philadelphia Social Science Association. Pp. 24. Philadelphia, 1885.
26. "*The Relation of the Modern Municipality to the Gas Supply: with Special Reference to the Gas Question in Philadelphia.*" Philadelphia Social Science Association. Pp. 38. Philadelphia, 1886.
27. "*National Aid to Popular Education.*" Andover Review. Boston, March, 1886.
28. "*The Relation of the Modern Municipality to the Gas Supply.*" (Revised and enlarged edition of No. 26.) Pp. 69. American Economic Association. May and July, 1886.
29. "*The Kindergarten and the Public School.*" Sub-Primary School Society. Pp. 24. Philadelphia, 1886.
30. "*Chairs of Pedagogics in Our Universities.*" Philadelphia Social Science Association. Pp. 46. Philadelphia, 1887.
31. "*The Legal Tender Decisions.*" Pp. 31. American Economic Association, 1887.

32. "*The Agitation for Federal Regulation of Railways.*" American Economic Association. Pp. 50. July, 1887.

33. "*Socialists and Anarchists in the United States.*" Our Day, Boston, Feb. 1888.

34. "*The Degree of Ph. D. in Germany.*" Andover Review, Boston, June, 1888.

35. "*The Government in Its Relation to Forests.*" Department of Agriculture Forestry Division. Bulletin No. 2. Pp. 16. Washington, D. C., 1889.

36. "*The Canal and the Railway.*" Pp. 57. American Economic Association, 1890.

37. "*The Federal Constitution of Germany.*" Publications of University of Pennsylvania. Political Economy and Public Law Series. No. 7. Pp. 43. Philadelphia, 1890.

38. "*The Federal Constitution of Switzerland.*" Publications of University of Pennsylvania. Political Economy and Public Law Series. No. 8. Pp. 46. Philadelphia, 1890. Nos. 37 and 38 were reprinted in "*The Convention Manual of the Sixth New York State Constitutional Convention,*" Part 2, Vol. III, Foreign Constitutions, Albany, N. Y., 1894.

39. "*Needed Improvements in Our Transportation System.*" Manufacturer, Philadelphia, Nov. 1, 1890.

40. "*The Education of Business Men.*" American Bankers' Association. Pp. 26. New York, Jan., 1891. Second edition same year.

41. "*Reform in Railroad Passenger Fares.*" Quarterly Journal of Economics, Boston, January, 1891.

42. "*Economic and Social Aspects of Public Education.*" American Institute of Instruction. Pp. 35. Boston, July, 1891.

43. "*The Farmer and Taxation.*" American Association for the Advancement of Science. Pp. 27. Salem, Mass., 1891.

44. "*The University Extension Lecturer.*" Two Papers in University Extension. Philadelphia, Dec., 1891; Jan., 1892. Reprinted as separate papers. Pp. 22.

45. "*A Plea for the Establishment of a Commercial High School.*" American Bankers' Association. Pp. 17. New York, 1892. New edition. 1893.

46. "*Some General Considerations Concerning University Extension.*" Introduction to the "University Extension Handbook." Second Edition. Philadelphia, 1893.

47. "*Education of Business Men in Europe.*" Report of an examination of European Commercial Schools. American Bankers' Association. Pp. viii, 232. New York, 1893.

48. "*Philadelphia's Need of a Commercial High School.*" Pp. 24. Educational Club, Philadelphia, 1894.

49. "*A Neglected Incident in the Life of Dr. Franklin.*" The Nation, New York, April 18, 1895.

50. "*A Model City Charter.*" Address before the National Conference for Good City Government, at Minneapolis. National Municipal League, Philadelphia, 1895.

B. Briefer Papers and Reviews.

Of these the following are the most important:—

1. "*German Universities.*" The Tripod, Evanston, October 25 and November 25, 1877.

2. "*The Modern Languages.*" Educational Weekly, Chicago, 1878.

3. "*The Spelling Reform.*" Ibid, 1879.

4. "*History of the National Debt.*" Bloomington Pantagraph, January, 1881.

5. "*What is a German University.*" Illinois School Journal, Normal, September, 1881.

6. "*Municipal Economy in Prussia.*" The Nation, New York, October 23, 1881.

7. "*Walker's Money, Trade and Industry.*" The American Critic, Chicago, 1882.

8. "*The Lecture and the Recitation System of Instruction.*" Illinois School Journal, Normal, January, 1882.

9. "*German Student Life.*" Ibid., March, 1882.

10. "*Correlation of Studies.*" Ibid., August, 1882.

11. "*Some Thoughts on the New Education.*" Two papers in Illinois School Journal. Vol. II., Normal, 1882-83.

12. "*The Chinese Question.*" The Nation, New York, April 20, 1882.

13. "*State Ownership of Railroads in Italy.*" Ibid., April 27, 1882.

14. "*Political Economy in German Universities.*" Ibid., September 28, 1882. Reprinted in L'Atheuæum belge. Brussels, November 1, 1882.

15. "*New Education.*" Northwestern Christian Advocate, Chicago, February, 1883.

16. "*The Public High School.*" Ibid, 1883.

17. "*Comparative Methods in Finance.*" Bankers' Magazine, April, 1884.

18. "*Prince Bismarck.*" The American, Philadelphia, August, 16, 1884.

19. "*A New Work on Political Economy.*" Bankers' Magazine, August, 1884.

20. "*Atkinson's Distribution of Products.*" *The Nation*. New York, March 19, 1885.
21. "*The Need of Organization in Our Educational Field.*" *Christian Advocate*, New York, June 25, 1885.
22. "*Recent Books on Political Economy.*" *The American*, Philadelphia, October 31, 1885.
23. "*Recent Progress in Political Economy.*" *Science*, New York, November 6, 1885.
24. "*Recent Land Legislation in England.*" *Ibid.*, November 20, 1885.
25. "*Payne's Science of Education.*" *Christian Union*. New York, 1886.
26. "*The State as an Economic Factor.*" *Science*, New York, May 28, 1886. Reprinted in separate form.
27. "*Paulsen's History of Higher Education in Germany.*" *The American*, Philadelphia, November 13, 1886.
28. "*Teaching as a Profession.*" *Ibid.*, March 5, 1887.
29. "*Adams' Public Debts.*" *Ibid.*, May 21, 1887.
30. Introduction to Ingram's "*History of Political Economy.*" New York, 1888.
31. "*Constitutional Position of Prussia in the German Empire.*" *The Nation*, New York, April 26, 1888.
32. "*State Interference.*" *The Chautauquan*, June, 1888.
33. "*University Instruction in Bavaria.*" *The American*, Philadelphia, January 26, 1889.
34. "*The Great Educational Need of Philadelphia.*" *Red and Blue*, Philadelphia, November 1, 1889.
35. "*The Study of Politics and Business at the University of Pennsylvania.*" *Ibid.*, November 15, 1889.
36. "*Sax's Grundlegung der Theoretischen Staatswirthschaft.*" *Political Science Quarterly*, New York, March, 1890.
37. "*An Academy of Political and Social Science.*" *Manufacturer*, Philadelphia, April 1, 1890.
38. "*Economic and Social Aspects of Public Education.*" *New England Journal of Education*, Boston, July 16, 1890.
39. "*The Austrian Zone Tariff System.*" *ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY*, October, 1890.
40. "*The Coming Teacher.*" *Manufacturer*, Philadelphia, May 16, 1891.
41. "*University Extension.*" *Book News*, Philadelphia, May, 1891.
42. "*University Extension in the United States.*" *Our Day*, Boston, February, 1892.

43. Introduction to "*City Government of Philadelphia*." Wharton School of Finance and Economy, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 1893.

44. "*A New Career for College Men*." Review of Reviews, New York, June, 1893.

45. Introduction to Brinley's "*Handbook for Voters*." Philadelphia, 1891.

46. "*Shaw's Municipal Government in Great Britain*." The Bookman, New York, May, 1895.

47. "*The Income Tax*." The Citizen, Philadelphia, June, 1895.

48. "*Some Considerations on Our System of Education*." Ibid. September, 1895.

Amherst.—The chair of Political Economy, at Amherst, was filled May, 1895, by the appointment of Dr. James Walter Crook to the position of Assistant Professor. He was born December 21, 1859, at Bewdley, Northumberland County, Ontario, Canada, and received his early education in the public schools of his native place and of Manistee, Mich. From thence he went to Oberlin where he attended the Academy and 1887-91 the College, receiving the A. B. degree in 1891. He taught history at Oberlin College in 1891-92 and went the following year for graduate study in economics to the University of Wisconsin. In 1893 he received a fellowship at this institution and spent the year 1893-94 at the University of Berlin. In 1894 he was appointed fellow at Columbia College, and took, in May, 1895, his examination for the degree of Ph.D. He was then appointed to lecture on public finance during the present year in the absence of Professor Seligman, but resigned this post to accept the position at Amherst. He has written:

"*Land Transfers*." Wisconsin Ægis, May, 1893.

Catholic University of America.—The Hon. Carroll D. Wright has been appointed Lecturer on Political Economy in the newly organized Department of Philosophy in the Catholic University of America at Washington, D. C. He was born July 25, 1840, at Dunbarton, Merri-mac County, N. H., and received his education in the public schools of Washington, N. H., and Reading, Mass., and the academies of Alstead, N. H., Washington, N. H., and Chester, Vt.

He was a teacher in the public schools in Langdon, N. H., Chester, Vt., Swanzey and Troy, N. H.; he was Assistant Principal of Mt. Cæsar Seminary in Swanzey in 1869, and Principal of the Select High School in Troy, N. H., in 1869. He was Chief of the Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics of Labor from June, 1873, until September, 1885; Supervisor of the Federal Census for Massachusetts, 1885, and Commissioner of Public Records of Massachusetts, 1885. He was appointed

United States Commissioner of Labor January, 1885, and still holds that position; under special act of Congress he has been in charge of the Eleventh Census since October, 1893.

In 1883 Tufts College, Mass., conferred upon him the honorary degree of A. M., and in 1894 he received the degree of LL.D. from Wesleyan University, Middletown, Conn. He has been an active contributor to the work of many learned societies. He is connected with the following organizations: President of the National Association of Officials of Bureaus of Labor Statistics in the United States; President of the American Association for the Promotion of Profit-sharing; Vice-President of the American Social Science Association and the American Statistical Association; Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science; Honorary Fellow of the Royal Statistical Society; member of the American Economic Association; American Historical Association; New England Historical and Genealogical Society; American Academy of Political and Social Science, International Statistical Institute; Comité permanent, International Congrès des Accidents du Travail, Paris; Société internationale des Études pratiques d'Économie sociale, Paris; Committee of Patronage, Congrès international des Habitations à Bon Marché, Paris; Société d'Encouragement pour l'Industrie nationale, Paris; British Economic Association, London; Société d'Études sociales et politiques; Société impériale des Amis d'Histoire naturelle, d'Anthropologie et d'Ethnographie, Moscow; Essex Institute, Salem, Mass.; American Antiquarian Society, Worcester, Mass., State Historical Society of Wisconsin.

Mr. Wright is the editor of a large number of statistical reports of the highest value for the study of social conditions in the United States. In his reports he has always proceeded on the principle of furnishing as complete an analysis as possible of statistical tables. As Chief of the Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics of Labor he furnished ten volumes on the census enumerations of Massachusetts, which are noteworthy for their wealth of statistical detail, and fourteen Annual Reports. In the mass of valuable material we can only mention investigations on wages (1885), drunkenness (1879-81), divorces (1880), working girls (1884), corporations (1878).

As United States Commissioner of Labor Mr. Wright has published nine annual reports of which, perhaps, the most important are the investigations into Railroad Labor (1889); Cost of Production (1890-91), and Building and Loan Associations (1893). He has also caused the publication of eight special reports of great value. The collection of data for the Senate reports on prices and wages was conducted by the Department of Labor. Mr. Wright was a member of

the United States Strike Commission which has recently made a report on the Chicago strike of June-July, 1894. The following is a list of Mr. Wright's publications:

"*The Massachusetts Census of 1875 and Its Lessons.*" An address delivered before the American Social Science Association at Saratoga, N. Y., September 6, 1877. Boston Journal, September 6, 1877.

"*Religion in Politics.*" Reading (Mass.) News and Chronicle, September 12, 1877.

"*Labor, Pauperism and Crime.*" An address delivered before the Conference of Charities at Cincinnati, Ohio, May 23, 1878. Pp. 16. Boston.

"*The Results of the Massachusetts Public School System.*" A paper prepared for the Forty-second Annual Report of the Massachusetts Board of Education. Pp. 23. Boston, 1879.

"*History of Reading, Mass.*" Prepared in collaboration with Hiram Barrus. Drake's "History of Middlesex County, Mass." Pp. 19. Boston, 1879.

"*The Relation of Political Economy to the Labor Question.*" The first of a course of lectures upon "Phases of the Labor Question Ethically Considered," delivered at the Lowell Institute, Boston, December, 1879. Pp. 53. Boston, 1882. "*Ethics in the Labor Question,*" based on the above. The Catholic University Bulletin. Pp. 12. Washington, 1895.

"*The Census: Its Methods and Aims.*" International Review, New York, October, 1880.

"*The Industries of the Last Hundred Years.*" Prepared in collaboration with Horace G. Wadlin. "Memorial History of Boston." Pp. 26. Boston, 1881.

"*James A. Garfield: A Memorial Address.*" Delivered at Old South Church, Reading, Mass., September 26, 1881. Pp. 36. Boston.

"*Dedication of the Shedd Free Library.*" An address delivered at Washington, N. H., December 21, 1881. Pp. 20. Washington, N. H., 1882.

"*The Social, Commercial and Manufacturing Statistics of the City of Boston.*" Pp. 259. Boston, 1882.

"*Practical Elements of the Labor Question.*" International Review, New York, January, 1882.

"*Wages, Prices and Profits.*" Princeton Review, New York, July, 1882.

"*The Factory System as an Element in Civilization.*" An address delivered before the American Social Science Association at Saratoga, N. Y., September 8, 1882. Journal of Social Science, May, 1883.

"*Anniversary of the Battle of Opequan.*" An address delivered at

Winchester, Va., September 19, 1883. "Souvenir of the Shenandoah Valley." Pp. 12. Boston, 1883.

"*Report on the Factory System.*" Reports of the Tenth Census. Pp. 78. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1884. Also Johnson's "Universal Cyclopedia." Vol. III.

"*The Scientific Basis of Tariff Legislation.*" An address delivered before the American Social Science Association at Saratoga, N. Y., September 10, 1884. Journal of Social Science, December, 1884. Also published in "The National Revenues," by Albert Shaw, Ph.D., Chicago, 1888.

"*An Analysis of the Population of the City of Boston, as Shown in the State Census of May, 1885.*" Pp. 17. Boston, 1885.

"*The Progress of Manufactures.*" Gately's "World's Progress." Boston, 1885.

"*History of Inventions and Discoveries, Processes in Manufactures.*" Ibid.

"*The Pulpit and Social Reforms.*" Unitarian Review and Religious Magazine, Boston, March, 1886.

"*Popular Instruction in Social Science.*" Opening address delivered before the American Social Science Association at Saratoga, N. Y., September 6, 1886. Journal of Social Science, June, 1887.

"*The Present Actual Condition of the Workingman.*" An address delivered before the National Conference of Unitarian Churches at Saratoga, N. Y., September 23, 1886. Pp. 12. Boston, 1887.

"*Industrial Necessities.*" Forum, November, 1886.

"*An Historical Sketch of the Knights of Labor.*" Quarterly Journal of the Economics, January, 1887.

"*The Study of Statistics in Colleges.*" A paper read before the joint session of the American Historical Association and the American Economic Association at Harvard University, May 24, 1887. Pp. 24. Publications of the American Economic Association. Vol. III, No. 1, September, 1888.

"*Problems of the Census.*" Opening address before the American Social Science Association at Saratoga, N. Y., September 5, 1887. Journal of Social Science, November, 1887.

"*The Growth and Purposes of Bureaus of Statistics of Labor.*" An address delivered before the American Social Science Association at Saratoga, N. Y., September 3, 1888. Journal of Social Science, December, 1888.

"*Die Organisation der arbeitsstatistischen Aemter in den Vereinigten Staaten.*" Archiv für soziale Gesetzgebung und Statistik, Tübingen, 1888.

"*Immigration.*" Boston Globe, September 9, 1888.

"*How a Census is Taken.*" North American Review, June, 1889.

"*A School of Economics.*" Ethical Record, Philadelphia, January, 1890.

"*The Study of Statistics in Italian Universities.*" Publications of the American Statistical Association. New Series, No. X. Vol. XI, June, 1890.

"*Social and Industrial Progress.*" Christian Register, Boston, November 27, 1890.

"*Society and the Tramp.*" An address delivered before the Charity Organization Society of Baltimore, December 9, 1890. State Charities Record, New York, December, 1890.

"*Population in the Year 1900.*" Independent, New York, January 1, 1891.

"*Multiplicity of Paying Occupations.*" New York Tribune, February 1, 1891.

"*The Relation of Invention to Labor.*" An address delivered at the Patent Centennial, Washington, D. C., April 8, 1891. Pp. 36. Proceedings of the Celebration of the Beginning of the Second Century of the American Patent System. Washington, 1892.

"*The American Patent System.*" Independent, New York, April 9, 1891.

"*The Influence of Inventions Upon Labor.*" Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper, April 11, 1891.

"*A Basis for Statistics of Cost of Production.*" Pp. 21. Publications of the American Statistical Association. New Series, No. XIV, Vol. II, June, 1891.

"*The Value of Statistics.*" Popular Science Monthly, New York, August, 1891.

"*Marriage and Divorce.*" An address delivered before the National Conference of the Unitarian Churches at Saratoga, N. Y., September 23, 1891. Pp. 23. Lend a Hand Monthly Extra, Boston, November, 1891.

"*Lessons from the Census.*" I and II. Popular Science Monthly, October and November, 1891.

"*A Great Statistical Investigation.*" North American Review, December, 1891.

"*The Unemployed.*" Social Economist, December, 1891.

"*The Evolution of Wage Statistics.*" Quarterly Journal of Economics, January, 1892.

"*Our Population and Its Distribution.*" Popular Science Monthly, January, 1892.

"*Urban Population.*" Ibid. February 1892.

"*Social Statistics of Cities.*" Ibid. March, 1892.

"*Rapid Transit.*" Ibid. April, 1892.

"*Does the Factory Increase Immorality?*" Forum, May, 1892.

"*The Working of the United States Department of Labor.*" Cosmopolitan Magazine, June, 1892.

"*Why are Women Paid Less than Men.*" Forum, July, 1892.

"*Families and Dwellings.*" Popular Science Monthly, August, 1892.

"*Our Native and Foreign-born Population.*" Ibid. October, 1892.

"*The Relation of Economic Conditions to the Causes of Crime.*" A paper read at the Annual Congress of the National Prison Association of the United States, at Baltimore, December 5, 1892. Proceedings of the Annual Congress of the National Prison Association of the United States. Pittsburg, 1893. Pp. 22. Also ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY, May, 1893.

"*Compulsory Arbitration an Impossible Remedy.*" Forum, May, 1893.

"*What is a Patent?*" Youth's Companion, Boston, June 22, 1893.

"*The Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers.*" Quarterly Journal of Economics, July, 1893.

"*Cheaper Living and the Rise of Wages.*" Forum, October, 1893.

"*The Value and Influence of Labor Statistics.*" Engineering Magazine, November, 1893.

"*The Relations of Employer and Workman.*" An address delivered before the Eighth Annual Convention of the National Association of Builders, at Boston, February 14, 1894. Official Report of the Convention, Boston, 1894.

"*The Census of Sex, Marriage and Divorce.*" Forum, June, 1894.

"*The Limitations and Difficulties of Statistics.*" Yale Review, New Haven, August, 1894.

"*Distinction Between Compulsory and Voluntary Arbitration.*" An address delivered at the Congress on Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration, held at Chicago, November 13, 1894. Pp. 5. Chicago.

"*May a Man Conduct His Business as He Pleases?*" Forum, December, 1894.

"*The Significance of Recent Labor Troubles in America.*" International Journal of Ethics, Philadelphia, January, 1895.

"*The History of Cotton and Woolen Manufactures in the United States.*" "A National History of American Manufactures." Boston, 1895. (In press.)

"*The Settlement of Labor Controversies on Railroads.*" An address delivered before the Young Men's Democratic Club of Massachusetts, at Boston, March 15, 1895. Printed in the Boston Herald and Boston Journal of March 16, 1895. Also printed in Employer and Employed, July, 1895.

"*Steps Toward Government Control of Railroads.*" Forum, February, 1895.

"*The Chicago Strike.*" Publications of the American Economic Association. Vol. IX, Nos. V and VI.

"*Have We Equality of Opportunity?*" Forum, May 1895.

"*The Industrial Evolution of the United States.*" 1p. 362. Meadville, Pa., 1895.

"*Contributions of the United States Government to Social Science.*" American Journal of Sociology, Chicago, November, 1895.

Chicago University.—Mr. Ralph C. H. Catterall has been advanced to the position of Tutor in History at the University of Chicago. He was born March 29, 1866, at Bolton, England, and received his early education in the public schools of Fall River, Mass.; Mahanoy City, Pa.; Lebanon, Pa., and at the Keystone Academy, Factoryville, Pa. He studied at Bucknell University, Lewisburg, Pa., where, in 1891, he received the degree of A. B. He then went to Harvard, where, in 1892, he received the degree of A. B. In the fall term of 1892 and 1893 he was Instructor at Bucknell University. In 1892 he began post-graduate study at Chicago University, receiving, in 1894, an appointment as Reader in History.

Colorado College.—Dr. Francis Walker has been appointed Instructor in Political Science at Colorado College, Colorado Springs, Colo. The son of President Francis A. Walker, he was born at Washington, D. C., December 27, 1870. He received his education in the public schools of Boston and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where, in 1892, he received the degree of B. S. He was appointed, 1893, University Fellow in Political Science* at Columbia College, New York, where he spent the years 1893-94 in residence. That institution granted him the degree of M. A. in 1893 and Ph.D in 1895.† During the year 1894-95 Mr. Walker was connected with the Massachusetts Board on the Unemployed as a special investigator on Public Works. In the report of that Commission he wrote the chapters, "Relief on Public Works" and "Conditions of Employment on Public Works." He has also written :

"*Double Taxation in the United States.*" Columbia College Series, Vol. V, No. 1, 1895.

Indiana State University.—Dr. Amos S. Hershey was appointed, August 1, 1895, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Indiana State University at Bloomington, Ind. He was born July 11, 1867, at Hockersville, Dauphin County, Pa. His early education was

* ANNALS, Vol. iv, p. 467, November, 1893.

† *Ibid.* Vol. vi, p. 301, September, 1895.

received in the public school of his native place and at the State Normal Schools at Kutztown and Millersville, Pa. He entered Bucknell University at Lewisburg, Pa., in 1887, but left in the following year to continue his studies at Harvard, where, in 1892, he received the degree of A. B. In the same year he went to Heidelberg, where, in 1894, he received the degree of Ph.D. The year 1894-95 Dr. Hershey spent in Paris at the École libre des Sciences politiques and the Sorbonne. He has written:

"Die Kontrolle über die Gesetzgebung in den Vereinigten Staaten von Nord Amerika und deren Gliedern." Pp. 71. Heidelberg, 1894.

Smith College.—Mr. John Franklin Crowell has been appointed Professor of Political Economy at Smith College, Northampton, Mass. He was born November 1, 1857, at York, Pa., and received his early education at the public school of Hall, Pa., and at Union Seminary, New Berlin, Pa. He entered Dartmouth College, but at the close of the Freshman year went to Yale, where three years later, 1883, he received the degree of A. B. He continued two years in post graduate study at Yale. He then became Principal of the Schuylkill Seminary, Reading, Pa., and the following year occupied a similar position in an academy at Fredericksburg, Pa. In 1887 he was appointed President of Trinity College, N. C., and Professor of Economics and Social Science.

Professor Crowell is a member of the Council of the Academy, and member of other learned societies. He has written:

"Numbers, an Educational Problem." Pp. 21.

"The Employment of Children." Andover Review, 1887.

"A Program of Progress: An Open Letter to the General Assembly of North Carolina." Durham, 1891.

"The North Carolina Railroad Commission Law." Railroad, Gazette, March, 1891.

"The Drift of Railroad Legislation in Georgia." Ibid., August 14, 1891.

"The Study of Economic and Social Science in University, College and Academy." Regent's Bulletin, No. 9, August, 1892. University of the State of New York.

"Taxation in the American Colonies; New Jersey." Durham, N. C., 1893.

"Report of the State Railroad Commission of North Carolina." Railroad Gazette, February 17, 1893.

"The Supreme Court Decision in the South Carolina Tax Cases." Ibid., May 5, 1893.

"State Institutions in State Constitutions." Regent's Bulletin, August, 1893, Albany, N. Y.

"*The Education of Poor Boys.*" Nashville (Tenn.) Advocate, August, 1893.

"*Social Methods and Services of the Church.*" Durham, November, 1894.

University of Wisconsin.—The name of Mr. S. E. Sparling is to be added to the list of fellows of the University of Wisconsin. Mr. Sparling has been appointed Fellow in Public Administration and is charged in the present year with instruction in that subject.

AUSTRIA.

Vienna.—Dr. Ferdinand Schmid has recently become Privatdozent for Statistics at the University of Vienna. He was born at Troppau, in Austrian Silesia, on August 18, 1862, and received his early education in the gymnasium of his native town. He attended the University of Vienna from 1880 to 1884 and secured, in 1885, the degree of Doctor juris. He was attached to the financial administration of Lower Austria from 1885 to 1886 and entered in the latter part of 1886 the office of the Statistical Central Commission. In 1894 he became the Director of the Statistical Department of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Government at Sarajevo. This position he resigned in May, 1895, to enter again into the service of the Statistical Central Commission. In that office he has had the supervision especially of the educational statistics, having edited the annual official statistical reports of the Commission as well as special volumes on the general public schools and the disbursements for public education. Besides numerous shorter articles in various economic journals, Dr. Schmid has published the following :

"*Die Finanzstrafjustiz auf dem Gebiete der direkten Steuern in Oesterreich und ihre Ergebnisse während der Jahre 1873-1885.*" Statistische Monatschrift, 1887.

"*Statistische Studien über die Entwicklung der österreichischen Gewerkgewerkschaften, mit besonderer Rücksicht auf die Wiener Gewerkgewerkschaften.*" Ibid, 1888.

"*Wirksamkeit der Gewerkgewerkschaften und ihre Fortbildung.*" Ibid, 1889.

"*Die Standesregister in Oesterreich.*" Ibid, 1889.

"*Die italienische Enquete über die wohlthätigen Stiftungen.*" Ibid, 1887.

"*Die überseeische österreichische Auswanderung in den Jahren 1887 und 1888.*" Ibid, 1890.

"*Ueber Statistik und Verwaltungsrecht der Stiftungen.*" Ibid, 1890.

"*Die statistische Ergebnisse der Reichsrathswahlen im Jahre, 1891.*" Ibid, 1891.

"*Statistik der Wassergenossenschaften in den im Reichsrathe vertretenen Königreiche und Länder.*" Ibid, 1892.

"*Kirchen Statistik.*" Ibid, 1895.

"*Der neue Gesetzentwurf betreffend die Gewerbegerichte.*" Archiv für sociale Gesetzgebung Vol. III.

"*Der neue Reichsgesetz betreffend die Gewerbegerichte.*" Ibid, Vol. IV.

"*Die neue socialpolitische Vorlagen der österreichischen Regierung.*" Ibid, Vol. V.

BELGIUM.

Liege.—Dr. Ernest Mahaim was appointed May 25, 1895, Extraordinary Professor at the State University at Liège. He was born April 27, 1865, at Mornignies, province of Hainault, Belgium. He received his early education at the Athénée Royal at Liège, in which city he pursued his university studies. From 1882 to 1884 he attended the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters, and 1884 to 1886 the Faculty of Law. He has received the following doctorates: in law, 1886; in political and administrative sciences, 1887, and the special doctorate in public and administrative law, 1891. In 1887–88 Dr. Mahaim studied at the University of Berlin, and in 1888 at Vienna. The following winter he spent at the école de Droit and École libre des Sciences politiques at Paris. In 1889 he spent four months in England visiting the Universities of Cambridge and Oxford. In 1890 Dr. Mahaim was admitted to practice law before the Court of Appeal of Liege and continued such practice until 1892, when he was appointed Chargé de Cours at the University. Dr. Mahaim is a member of the Société d'Études sociales et politiques, the Verein für Sozialpolitik and the British Economic Association. In addition to contributions to the Economic Journal and La Riforma Sociale, he has written:

"*Le combat pour le eroit.*" Revue de Belgique, 15 December, 1884.

"*La question de la protection internationale des travailleurs.*" Revue d'Economie politique, 1888.

"*L'enseignement de l'Économie politique dans les universités de Berlin et de Vicnne.*" Revue de Belgique, 15 February and 15 April, 1889.

"*La Reforme de l'enseignement supérieur et les sciences sociales.*" (Jointly with G. Hulin, now professor at Ghent). Liège, 1889.

"*Etudes sur l'association professionnelle.*" (Dissertation for special doctorate). Liège, 1891.

"*Les Syndicats professionnels.*" Bruxelles, 1893 (has been translated into Russian).

"*La paix sociale.*" Revue d'Economie politique, July, 1891

"*Emile de Laveleye.*" Ibid., January, 1892.

"*La politique commerciale de la Belgique.*" Vol. XLIX. Schriften des Vereins für Sozialpolitik entitled, "*Die Handelspolitik der wichtigeren Kulturstaaten in den letzten Jahrzehnten.*" Leipzig, 1891.

"*L'objet de l'Économie politique de ses methodes d'investigation.*" Liège, 1891.

At the same time M. E. Van der Smissen, Chargé de Cours at the University of Liège, was promoted to the grade of Extraordinary Professor. He was born January 18, 1865, at Alost, province of Flanders, Belgium, where he obtained his early education. From 1879 to 1883 he was at school at Brussels from whence he went in 1884 to Louvain for university study. At the University of Louvain he obtained, in 1886, the Doctorate of Political Science and Administration and in 1887 that of Laws. In the latter year he returned to Brussels and was admitted to practice before the Court of Appeals of Brussels. On the 7th of April, 1892, he was appointed Chargé de Cours at the University of Liège, and, on the same day, was appointed Adjunct Secretary of the Superior Council of Labor. In November, 1892, he was appointed a Secretary of the International Monetary Conference at Brussels. Dr. Van der Smissen is a member of the Société belge d'Economie sociale, the Société internationale d'Economie sociale of Paris, and the Société d'Etudes sociales et politiques. His published works are:

"*L'Irlande economique et sociale en 1889.*" Revue generale, Bruxelles, June, 1889.

"*La séparation des pouvoirs sous l'ancien regime belge.*" Report to the Archæological Congress at Charleroi, 1888.

"*L'encyclic de la paix sociale.*" Magasin litteraire. Ghent, 1891.

"*Le contrat de travail,*" 1re étude. Revue du monde catholique, 1891.

"*Le contrat de travail,*" 2me étude. "*Les Accidents.*" Ibid., 1892.

"*Les lois de Malthus.*" Revue des questions scientifiques, October, 1891.

"*De l'influence des doctrines de l'Économie politique classique sur le socialisme scientifique.*" Ibid., July, 1892.

"*Conférence monétaire internationale, Bruxelles, 1892. Procès-verbaux.*" Revue sociale et politique, Bruxelles, 1893.

"*La population, les causes de ses progrès et les obstacles qui en arrêtent l'essor.*" (Ouvrage couronné par l'Académie des Sciences morales et politiques.) Pp. 561. Paris et Bruxelles, 1893.

"*La question monétaire envisagée du point de vue théorique.*" *Revue des questions scientifiques*, January, 1894.

"*La question monétaire et la crise agricole en Belgique.*" Bruxelles, 1894. (Jointly with MM. Thiebaud and Julin).

ITALY.

Naples—The eminent publicist Ruggiero Bonghi died at Naples October 22, 1895. Born of well-to-do parents in Naples, March 20, 1828, he enjoyed an excellent education in the schools and university of his native city. His studies were chiefly philological and classical. At the age of twenty he published translations from Plato. In 1848 he was attached to the Neapolitan embassy at Rome. He returned on the news of the Bourbon reaction into Tuscany, and later into Piedmont, where for a number of years he devoted himself to literary and philosophical studies. In 1859 he was appointed Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pavia. On the overthrow of the Bourbons he returned to Naples in a like capacity, but devoted himself also to politics and the formation of a moderate constitutional party. He occupied successively the chair of Greek Literature at Rome, and that of Ancient History at Milan and at Rome. He was Minister of Public Education under the Minghetti ministry. In 1888 he received the degree of D. C. L. *honoris causæ* from the University of Oxford. Bonghi's writings were voluminous, and we can mention here only those of a political or historical nature:

"*La questione ecclesiastica.*" Milan, 1867.

"*I partiti politici nel Parlamento italiano.*" Florence, 1868.

"*Storia della finanza italiana dal 1864 al 1868.*" Florence, 1868.

"*L'alleanza prussiana e l'acquisto della Venezia.*" Florence, 1870.

"*Fratelli, Papi e Re. Discussione tre.*" Naples, 1873.

"*L'istruzione popolare in Italia.*" Milan, 1874.

"*Il segreto dell'urna.*" Florence, 1874.

"*Discorsi e saggi sulla pubblica istruzione.*" Florence, 1876.

"*Pio IX. ed il Papa futuro.*" Milan, 1877.

"*Il Conclave e l'elezione del pontefice.*" Milan, 1878.

"*Leone XIII. et l'Italia.*" Milan, 1878.

"*Il Congresso di Berlino e la crisi d'Orient.*" Milan, 1878.

"*Ritratti contemporanei, Cavour, Bismarck, Thiers.*" Milan, 1878.

"*Disraeli e Gladstone, ritratti contemporanei.*" Milan, 1881.

"*Leone XIII. e il Governo italiano.*" Rome, 1882.

"*Storia di Roma.*" Milan, 1885.

"*Leone XIII. studii.*" 1885.

"*Arnaldo di Brescia, studio.*" 1885.

"*Storia di Roma scritta per le scuole secondarie.*" Naples, 1885.

"*Il Conte di Cavour e il concetto di libertà.*" Pisa, 1885.

"*La perequazione fondiaria.*" Turin, 1885.

BOOK DEPARTMENT

NOTES.

THE THIRD EDITION OF Professor Marshall's "*Principles of Economics*,"* following four years after the second and five after the first, shows many important changes and revisions tending in the same general direction as those introduced into the second edition. Starting with a desire to break as little as possible with the past and to justify by the most generous construction of their writings, the economic theories of such of his predecessors as Ricardo and John Stuart Mill, Professor Marshall has been gradually impelled by the force of friendly criticism and of a more independent analysis of economic phenomena to abandon certain artificial distinctions borrowed from the past and to turn over to the iconoclasts of the present the cherished theories of the classical system. These changes are most conspicuous in the historical and critical notes, which show traces of more careful revision than any part of the text. As examples may be cited the changes in this edition in the "Note on the Doctrine of the Wages-fund," (pp. 618-23). The references to Adam Smith and Ricardo, which exonerated them from adherence to the wages-fund theory in its "vulgar form" have been omitted. Moreover, the statement that Mill's fourth fundamental proposition regarding capital "expresses his meaning badly," no longer appears. In addition there is a decided change in the whole tone of the note, which no longer explains the wages-fund theory by reference to "careless phrases" of the classical writers, but shows its true connection with the peculiar industrial conditions that existed in England at the time it was formulated. A second change is one of arrangement, and consists in the more careful marshaling of the author's material about the "central problems of distribution and exchange," through the restatement of his theories of normal demand and normal supply which were before taken for granted in the Sixth Book. This is sure to make Marshall's own theory of the ultimate factors determining value more intelligible to the ordinary reader and accounts in large part for the addition of fifty-three pages to the size of the volume.

**Principles of Economics*. By ALFRED MARSHALL. Vol. I, Third Edition, Pp. xxxi, 823. Price, \$3.00 London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895. Reviewed in Vol. i, p. 332, of the ANNALS.

It would require too much space to enumerate all the minor changes, carefully summarized in the Preface, which appear in this third edition. Important sections of the book have been rewritten, the Notes have been entirely revised and brought down to date in their literary references, and the chapters on Capital and Income (Book II), have been thrown together, and the meaning of the term Social Capital has been expanded so as to include nearly all forms of accumulated wealth, while the term Trade Capital has been retained to refer to the instruments of production, etc., of the ordinary definition. Finally no pains have been spared to make the text as a whole clearer, in part by omitting the discussions of minor points, which in previous editions tended to obscure the broad outlines of Marshall's own theory.

As to the substance of the book, Marshall still adheres to the same general method of approaching industrial phenomena that he employed five years ago, and no important concession has been made to his critics. He still regards demand and supply as of equal importance in determining value and the shares which go to the different groups in society having a claim on the product. In his treatment of the causes which determine the "supply of labor," notwithstanding the fact that he asserts in the table of contents (Book IV, Chapter I, § 2), that "although labor is sometimes its own reward, we may regard its supply as governed by the price that is to be got for it," he still hesitates in the body of the work to come out squarely with the statement that economic considerations determine the rate at which population increases, which Wieser describes as a "monstrous idea," but which yet seems absolutely essential to the system of economics which Marshall represents. If the supply of labor is determined by extra-economic considerations such as habits, social institutions, etc., what becomes of the assertion, "its supply is governed by the price that is to be got for it," or in fact of the whole theory of the equilibrium of demand and supply as worked out by Professor Marshall? The most obvious reply to this question is that the habits and social institutions alluded to are themselves the resultants of past balancings of pleasures against pains, of utilities against disutilities. This point at least merits further elaboration than it has received at Professor Marshall's hands.

In conclusion, we have noted one slight error in citation. On page 263, Miss Brownell is referred to as Mr. Brownell, and thus one important contribution which woman has made to economics is wrongly attributed to grasping man.

STUDENTS OF OUR tariff history who are unfamiliar with Italian will welcome an English translation of Rabbeno's "Essays on the American Commercial Policy,"* which were extensively reviewed in the ANNALS in November, 1893.

The translation is the work of a "translation's bureau" in London, and though on the whole satisfactory, in places shows signs of carelessness. For example, on page 389, we are told that if "we accustomed ourselves to food which could be produced at a cheaper rate, not only would it be possible for this globe to maintain a larger population, but it would diminish rents in this way also that, all land not being forced to produce the same crops, and each piece of ground being devoted to the products to which it was most suited, difference of fertility would become less marked." Again, on page 110, commenting on the claim of American Protectionists that a sentiment in favor of protection was one of the causes of the adoption of the constitution, Rabbeno is made to say: "But this is a risky assertion indeed, because if it is true that when the constitution was drawn up there were numerous demands for protection for the manufactures, on the other hand we must observe that if such demands were so prevalent as to determine the formation of the federal constitution, they would have prevailed also in the First Congress of the United States," etc. Other sentences might be quoted equally awkward in construction and blind in meaning, which lessen the force of Rabbeno's ideas in their English dress. In spite of these defects the translation is accurate and that is more than can be said for most previous attempts to do Italian economics into English.

Professor Rabbeno's book naturally addresses itself to an English reading public and its scholarly character entitles the translation to a wider circulation in this country than the original could ever have enjoyed in Europe.

A VERY HANDY summary† of the English Factory Acts and of the growth of the factory system has recently been added to the Social Questions of To-day series. In six chapters Mr. Cooke-Taylor, himself a Royal Factory Inspector, describes the early controversy over the attitude which the government ought to assume toward the newly arisen factories, the acts passed from 1802 to 1891, by the British Parliament designed to protect factory hands and determine

**The American Commercial Policy*. Three Historical Essays. By UGO RABBENO. Pp. xxix, 414. Price, \$3.25. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

†*The Factory System and the Factory Acts*. By R. W. COOKE-TAYLOR, F. R. S. Pp. viii, 184. Price, 2 s., 6 d. London: Methuen & Co., 1894.

the conditions of factory labor and forecasts the future development of factory legislation. The author writes from full knowledge of his subject and his conclusions are both sound and suggestive.

HUGO BILGRAM believes that the government should do a general banking business. In his "Study of the Money Question,"* he advocates a monetary system involving the issue by the government of credit money to individuals on real estate or other security. He would have no restrictions whatever placed upon the volume of money that might be thus issued, as he believes that the law of demand and supply would be a sufficient regulator. The unit of value may be gold or any other substance. Mr. Bilgram gives no more than the outline of his system and considers only a few of the objections likely to be urged against it. Inasmuch as the issue of money is left to the discretion of individuals, he recognizes the possible dangers of over-issue and inflation, and to avoid these he attempts to demolish the quantity theory of money, insisting that the purchasing power of his credit money, irrespective of the volume, would always coincide with that of gold or the unit of value. In order that the government may not be embarrassed by a lack of gold with which to redeem the credit money when presented for redemption, Mr. Bilgram introduces the element of delay, immediate redemption in gold not being essential. This system will have the advantage, according to Mr. Bilgram, of monetizing all wealth in times of scarcity. He fails to discuss the fact that practically all wealth is now monetized through the agency of banks, and gives no good reason for believing that the government can safely be made a wholesale and retail dealer in credit.

MR. CROCKER'S LITTLE book on "The Causes of Hard Times"† is an emphatic statement of the doctrine that general over-production of commodities is possible. The book is clear in style and should be examined by students who are not satisfied with the classical statement with regard to panics and production. Mr. Crocker thinks that the most prominent feature of a panic is an excessive capacity of production, meaning by this that in periods of depression many commodities cannot be sold for prices equal to the cost of production. This condition, he thinks, arises from the excessive

* *A Study of the Money Question.* By HUGO BILGRAM. Pp. 35. Price, 15 cents. New York: The Humboldt Publishing Company, 1895.

† *The Causes of Hard Times.* By URIEL H. CROCKER. Pp. 114. Price, 50 cents. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1895.

amount of machinery now employed in income-producing investments, resulting from the increase in capital and saving. The remedy for hard times, therefore, lies in measures to increase the demand, and if panics are to be prevented production must be so regulated or restricted that it shall never exceed the demand. Evidently Mr. Crocker means by over-production under-consumption, but, he does not put any emphasis upon the causes which affect consumption or demand, and so lead up to industrial disturbances. He assumes that the mischief is all caused by the increase of commodities offered for exchange, and gives no consideration to the causes which influence the consuming power of a community. This is a radical defect in a book which is really marked by some acute reasoning, although marred by evidences of a rather narrow and captious spirit.

THERE IS CERTAINLY great need of a competent treatise on the rights of labor under the law, and Mr. Cogley's book on the "Law of Strikes, Lock-outs and Labor Organizations,"* although far from being a satisfactory treatise, will prove useful to lawyers and to students. It discusses at considerable length the common law with regard to strikes, boycotts and blacklisting, and quotes freely from recent decisions in both State and federal courts. While the book is full of information, it is not well arranged, lacks perspicacity, and is diffusive where it ought to be compact. It makes, however, a fairly useful companion volume for the compilation of the labor laws of the United States printed as a committee report of the House of Representatives in 1892.

ONE OF THE SMALLEST and best pamphlets provoked by the recent silver agitation is Mason A. Green's "Are We Losing the West?"† "It is time," he says in the introduction, "to make a confession. The Eastern and Western States no longer break the bread of friendship together." Mr. Green believes that a new Mason and Dixon's line, running north and south, has been drawn, and he points out some reasons for fear that the people living on the different sides will soon be hopelessly distrustful and suspicious of each other. He discusses the currency question as a national or social issue with much

* *The Law of Strikes, Lock-outs and Labor Organizations.* By THOMAS S. COGLEY. Pp. 377. Washington, D. C.: W. H. Lowdermilk & Co., 1894.

† *Are We Losing the West?* By MASON A. GREEN. Pp. 31. Price, 10 cents. Boston: Charles E. Brown & Co., 1895.

shrewdness, although it would be easy for a monometallist to find big gaps in his argument.

Numerous books have been published purporting to describe the forms and technicalities of modern business, and all of them doubtless serve some good purpose, but Mr. Eaton's work* on banking, securities, etc., is the most helpful thing of the sort that we have seen. It is designed to be a text-book, and aims not to discuss the theories of banking so much as to describe the practical methods by which business is done in banks, stock exchanges and railroad and insurance offices. The book contains fac-simile illustrations of bonds, coupons, foreign and domestic drafts, certificates of deposit, etc. In the hands of a good instructor it can be made helpful to students, but it lacks scientific arrangement and is over-crowded with details that possess little significance or importance. What is really needed in this line is a book that will explain the domestic and foreign exchange business done in this country with the thoroughness that marks George Clare's "The A B C of Foreign Exchanges."† Mr. Clare aims to make the reader understand the whys and wherefores of intricate transactions and at the same time gives him abundant information. Mr. Eaton's book is full of facts and definitions, but there is a dearth of explanation.

With the growing interest in social problems and reforms we must expect to be deluged with much so-called sociological literature which will attempt to justify and support partisan reform measures by clothing them in a quasi-scientific garb that may unfortunately deceive the unwary. Of all abused terms none have suffered more than "Applied or Practical Christian Sociology." Rev. Dr. Wilbur F. Crafts has just published his course of five lectures delivered this year at Princeton Theological Seminary and other places in a book entitled "Practical Christian Sociology."‡ It would be an almost useless expenditure of energy to catalogue the mass of heterogeneous matter that has been thrown together within the covers of this book.

* *Banking, Securities, Transportation, Insurance and Foreign Trade. A Text-book for Schools and Colleges.* By SEYMOUR EATON. Pp. 208. Phila.: P. W. Ziegler & Co.

† *The A B C of the Foreign Exchanges. A Practical Guide.* By GEORGE CLARE. Pp. 160. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1893.

‡ *Practical Christian Sociology.* A Series of Special Lectures before Princeton Theological Seminary and Marietta College, with Supplemental Notes and Appendices. By Rev. WILBUR F. CRAFTS, Ph. D., with an introduction by JOSEPH COOK, LL. D. Pp. 524. Price, \$1.50. New York: Funk & Wagnall's Company, 1895.

First comes a chart of "full-orbed Christianity," then a poem in verse, then Joseph Cook's introduction of four pages mainly consisting of a biographical sketch of Dr. Crafts, then a mixture of comments about the lectures, quotations about sociology and the Christian idea of God and the world, the author's preface and the author's introduction. A syllabus of the lectures covers the next four pages; then just preceding the text of the first lecture (the same is true also of the four lectures that follow), there is a leaf, on one side of which are a number of quotations, selected evidently because each one usually contains the word social, society or Christianity, and on the other side four small cuts of well-known social reformers. We then find 210 pages devoted to the text of the five lectures, with the exception of a few pages following the report of each lecture which give review questions and themes suggested for debate, discussion and investigation by churches, women's clubs, ministers' meetings, conferences, etc. Some field work in the way of visiting institutions, getting acquainted with labor organizations and becoming familiar with actual conditions generally, is outlined. The suggestions in the pages thus appended are decidedly more useful and valuable than anything to be found in the lectures themselves. The notes referred to throughout the text of the lectures are printed in 117 pages of small type, which constitutes the first appendix. They are much less useful in this form than if they had accompanied the text at the foot of their respective pages; as a rule they add little to the discussion, though in some cases the references to the literature will be welcomed in spite of its partisan, uncritical and often misleading character. This remark is also true of the so-called "brief reading course in practical Christian sociology," given at the close of the book. It is hard to conceive of any justification for the printing of part second of the appendix, which purports to give the chronological data of human progress, etc. We might, perhaps, make exception of Mr. Carroll D. Wright's interesting letter on divorce and the list of questions for a ballot on current reforms. So much for the contents of the book; its whole make-up is unsatisfactory from either a student's or general reader's point of view.

It is open, however, to still severer criticism. To say that it is unscientific is to put it altogether too mildly, it is scarcely less than vicious. There is no attempt to marshal facts or study social phenomena in a fair spirit; it is quite evident throughout that facts have been gathered to support preconceived opinions. The whole book is scarcely more than a collection of opinions, a piece of special-pleading. To claim for it the title sociology, is to degrade still further a much abused word. The book might have been

more truthfully called "A Christian View of Some Present Social Problems." It can lay no claims to more than a shallow discussion of social problems from a partisan and bigoted standpoint, hence its title is misleading. It represents just that type of prejudiced inquiry that usually blocks all true progress in social knowledge and defeats any real social reform. If that is the sort of sociology demanded by the theological seminaries, the old order of things when theological dogma reigned supreme is still preferable, but we must doubtless pass through dark valleys before we can hope to reach the mountain heights.

SOME TIME AGO the editor of one of our leading periodicals attempted to connect the prevalence of bad English in our schools with the disuse into which the Bible had fallen in so many families. That the Bible is not read as much to-day as a generation ago, is probably true. But attempts are being made to render the study of the Bible more interesting and more profitable. The most recent book,* written with this purpose, presents "the New Testament sources for the history of the Apostolic Age" in chronological order. It is assumed that the Epistles and Book of Revelations are genuine writings of that age and in the notes the probable date of each is discussed. The work is done well, and forms a convenient introduction to farther study. The translation followed is that of the edition of 1881.

PROFESSOR MYERS HAS added to his long list of histories a new volume on Greece.† This is written for older students and represents a distinct advance over any of his previous text-books. It is well illustrated, supplied with plenty of maps and select bibliographies, together with a pronouncing vocabulary, and thus makes a very attractive introduction to the study of Greek history. It is to be regretted that so much space, relatively, has been given to the political history of Greece and so little—only one-seventh of the whole—to the art, literature and philosophy which have been the chief contributions of Greece to later civilization, and to which Greece owes her place in history. The bibliographical notes are as a rule satisfactory, but we notice the entire omission of one important work, Blummer's "Home Life of the Ancient Greeks," and

* *The Records and Letters of the Apostolic Age.* By ERNEST DEWITT BURTON. Pp. xix, 238. Price, \$1.50. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1895.

† *A History of Greece for Colleges and High Schools.* By PHILIP VAN HESS MYERS, L. H. D. Pp. xiii, 577. Price, \$1.40. Boston: Ginn & Co., 1895.

we regret the absence of comment on some of the titles. Yet, when the author does comment, he is not always happy in his characterizations; *e. g.* Mahaffy is too careless a historian to deserve such high praise as is accorded him (p. 558) for his scholarship.

THE SECOND VOLUME of Holm's "History of Greece,"* confirms the favorable impression produced by the first. Many of the pages, it is true, are little more than mere congeries of facts, dates and figures wholly lacking in literary form. But this is emphatically a short history, and compression is carried to the utmost limit, while no important fact is intentionally neglected. That the author does not lack the ability to write a far more readable history is shown by numerous passages. In fact, we have frequently wished in reading the book that he had not held himself so rigidly to his self-imposed limitations. The plan is the same as in the first volume; facts based on trustworthy records are carefully distinguished from later additions or the inferences of modern scholars.

The period covered is a brilliant one, beginning with the Persian and ending with the Peloponnesian wars. Through his independent study of the sources Holm has reached some conclusions very different from those generally accepted. Especially is this true in regard to the aims of Aristides, Themistocles and Pericles. His summary accounts of the various sides of Greek civilization are excellent. But the most satisfactory portions of the book are the critical notes which form about one-fourth of the volume. The analysis of authorities is masterly; the bibliographical references are sufficiently full and thoroughly up to date. No scholar can afford to neglect Holm's work.

IN ITS SECOND edition, Altmann and Bernheim's "*Ausgewählte Urkunden*"† has been enlarged by one-half. The six divisions are the same as in the old edition; Staatsgewalt und Reichsverfassung im allgemeinen, Reich und Kirche, Ständische Verhältnisse, Heereswesen, Gesichtswesen, Territorien und Städten. Finanzwesen is again excluded. Five documents have been omitted and eighty-three new ones added; of these additions almost half are under the last division.

* *The History of Greece from its Commencement to the Close of the Independence of the Greek Nation.* BY ADOLPH HOLM. In four volumes, Vol. II. The Fifth Century, B. C. Pp. xvi, 535. Price, \$2.50. New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

† *Ausgewählte Urkunden zur Erläuterung der Verfassungsgeschichte Deutschlands im Mittelalter.* VON W. ALTMANN UND E. BERNHEIM. V. II, Auflage. Pp. x, 405. Price, 6.60 Marks. Berlin, 1895.

The bibliographical note for each document, given in the first edition, is omitted and a general reference made to the second edition of Schröder's "*Rechtsgeschichte*."

A few sources of great importance have been omitted, but this is justified in most cases by the fact that they are not, technically speaking, *Urkunden*. This edition is indispensable to the teacher or student of German constitutional history. For the benefit of those who are not familiar with the book, it may be well to add that the original text, whether in Latin or German, is given of each document.

THE STUDY OF physical geography in secondary schools has received merited attention since the appearance of the report of the Conference of the Committee of Ten. An elementary text-book * upon this subject has just been published by Professor Tarr, of Cornell, which is decidedly the best book of the kind that has yet appeared. The first part of the book deals with the air and discusses the earth as the planet of atmosphere; the distribution of temperature; general circulation of the atmosphere; streams; moisture; weather; geographical distribution of animals and plants. In the second part, three chapters are devoted to the ocean and in the third part, which comprises more than half the book, the land is discussed. The treatment throughout is thoroughly in accord with the most advanced ideas in regard to geographical study. The physiographic forces are clearly described. The results which these forces have brought about in the formation of man's environment are depicted and the relationship between that environment and man is briefly stated. At the close of the book a very good chapter is devoted to suggestions to teachers, in which a plea is made for the larger use of investigation on the part of students. This elementary treatise was written by the author from the manuscript of a larger work, which he promises to publish within a year. This larger work will be one well adapted for the use of classes in college and will do much to advance the pursuit of geography as a branch of collegiate instruction.

STUDENTS OF ECONOMIC problems, wishing to investigate the subject of present transportation on the Great Lakes, or wishing to find out what problems are connected with the future development of that

* *Elementary Physical Geography*. By R. S. TARR. Pp. xxxi, 488. Price, \$1.50. New York and London: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

transportation, will find the Report of the International Deep Waterways Convention a veritable mine of information.* The papers presented at the International Deep Waterways Convention and the discussion which there took place, comprises all that is known at present in regard to the economic and technical problems involved in connecting the Great Lakes with the ocean, by means of the Lake Ship Canal. Among the more interesting questions discussed at the convention, was the influence which the opening of the Chicago Drainage Canal will have upon lake levels. It was concluded that these, together with other causes, will compel the government to regulate the level of the lakes. The opinion of the convention was divided in regard to the feasibility of navigating the lakes and the ocean with the same vessel. Alexander McDougall, the manufacturer of the whaleback lake steamers and a man whose vessels are in use upon the ocean, is of the opinion that the navigation of the lakes and the canal that may be built, connecting the lakes with the ocean, will be carried on in vessels not adapted for ocean voyages. In other words, he believes that the cargoes will be trans-shipped at the lake ports. The purpose of the Deep Waterways Convention was educational. In the wide distribution of its report, it will do much to achieve that purpose.

THE NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE has just published, in a volume of over 500 pages, the proceedings of the second National Conference for Good City Government, held at Minneapolis, December 8, and 10, 1894, and of the first annual meeting of the National Municipal League, which was at the same time the third National Conference for Good City Government, held at Cleveland, May 29, 30, 31, 1895.† The volume gives an exceedingly interesting picture of the condition of the American municipalities at the present time. At the meeting of 1894, emphasis was naturally laid upon the cities of the Northwest, Minneapolis, St. Paul and Milwaukee.

Of papers of a more general character, the most important was that by Professor Edmund J. James, on the "Elements of a Model City Charter." In his address, Professor James points out the peculiar conditions of municipal government in the United States and shows

* *Proceedings of the First Annual Convention of the International Deep Waterways Association, held at Cleveland, September 24 to 26, 1895.* Prepared for publication by FRANK A. FLOWER. Pp. 465. Price, free, with postage prepaid by receiver. Published by the International Deep Waterways Association, Toronto, 1895.

† Copies of this publication may be obtained from the Secretary of the National Municipal League, Mr. Clinton Rogers Woodruff, 514 Walnut street, Philadelphia. Price, \$1.25, paper, and \$1.50 in cloth.

that we are the only country in which the experiment of governing large cities on the basis of universal suffrage is being made; he furthermore dwells on the advantages of concentration of power in the mayor and executive heads of departments; the bicameral legislature as in harmony with American political ideas; and the consistent application of civil service principles in local administration. In the proceedings of the Conference for 1895 a far greater number of cities was represented. We find papers on Buffalo, Jersey City, and Washington, representing the East; Louisville, Chattanooga, New Orleans, the South; Detroit, the Northwest; Cincinnati, Columbus, Pittsburgh and Allegheny, Omaha, Denver, San Francisco, Portland and Seattle, the West. By thus bringing together the municipal experience of such widely different sections of the country, the value of any general conclusions drawn therefrom is greatly increased.

The fact, furthermore, that the reports at this Conference dealt mainly with the middle-sized cities, which have been almost entirely neglected in recent discussions, adds another element of interest to this volume. From these reports the conclusion may fairly be drawn that, while the conditions of government in these cities are by no means satisfactory, they do not show the full measure of abuses to be found in the larger cities. There seems to be a general consensus of opinion that they are fairly well governed.

"THE REPORT ON the Chicago Strike,"* by the Commission appointed by President Cleveland in July, 1894, is a document of considerable value to the student of the labor question. The report is of less value than the material on which it is based, which comprises a history of the American Railway Union, of the General Managers Association, the Pullman strike, the sympathetic strike by the employes of railroads centring in Chicago, and some 700 pages of testimony from railway men, railway managers, strikers and newspaper reporters. The conclusions and recommendations of the Commission, which occupy only a small part of the volume, are of little consequence compared with the evidence and opinions submitted by the persons directly concerned in this disastrous conflict between capital and labor.

SINCE THE PREPARATION of Professor Wuarin's paper upon "Recent Experiments in the Swiss Democracy," which appeared in the November ANNALS, a new illustration of the curious working of the

* *Report on the Chicago Strike of June-July, 1894.* By the UNITED STATES STRIKE COMMISSION, with appendices containing testimony, proceedings, and recommendations. Pp. 681. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1895.

initiative has come to light. In the Canton of Zurich a popular initiative has been projected for the abolition of vivisection. The cantonal government is unfavorable to the proposal and makes a counter proposal of a revision of the laws relating to cruelty to animals. The government is willing to restrict vivisection to purposes of scientific research and instruction, limiting it to the authorities of the university or their assistants, but fears that its complete abolition would seriously injure if not extinguish all researches into bacteriology for which their medical and veterinary schools have a constant need.

AN ARDENT ENGLISH protectionist has brought together under the title "*Perils to British Trade*,"* some good and some bad arguments in favor of his favorite policy. The aim of the book is to show that Great Britain is in a desperate economic condition which threatens ruin to her laboring population, that this condition has been brought about by her blind adherence to a free-trade policy and that the remedy for her ills is the formation of an Imperial Union to consist of the United Kingdom and all the British colonies and to be protected from the competition of the outside world by high tariffs. The style of the book is quite unscientific and the author has failed to make out as strong a case against free trade as a more ingenious writer might have done on the basis of English experience.

THE NEW BULLETIN of the Department of Labor which has been announced for several months has made its appearance. The first number is dated November, 1895, and it will be issued in future every other month. Its editorial management is in the hands of Commissioner of Labor Hon. Carroll D. Wright and chief clerk, Mr. Owen W. Weaver.

This first number makes a very respectable contribution of 111 pages to matters of current interest touching the labor question. A brief introduction tells how the bulletin idea originated and was embodied in a bill prepared by Hon. L. E. McGann, Chairman of the House Committee on Labor in the last Congress, and how it received the authorization of Congress. The plan for its publication covers five regular departments. First, a liberal portion of each issue will be occupied with the results of original investigations conducted by the Department or its agents; second, a digest of foreign labor reports; third, a digest of State reports; fourth, the reproduction, immediately

* *Perils to British Trade*. By EDWIN BURGIS. Pp. 251. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1895.

after their passage, of new laws that affect the interests of the working people whenever such are enacted by State Legislatures or Congress; also the reproduction of the decisions of courts interpreting labor laws or passing upon any subject which involves the relations of employer and employe; attention likewise will be called to any other matters pertaining to law which may be of concern and value to the industrial interests of the country and which might not be obtained without expense or trouble from other sources; fifth, a miscellaneous department, in which brief statements of fact or paragraphs of interest may find a place.

The first number adhering to the above general program devotes sixteen pages to a discussion of strikes and lock-outs in the United States from January 1, 1881, to June 30, 1894; then follows twenty-three pages devoted to the same subject in Great Britain, Ireland, France, Italy and Austria in recent years. An article by Mr. George K. Holmes on "Private and Public Debt in the United States," and a digest of the recent labor reports of Connecticut, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, and Wisconsin, comes next in order. In conclusion there is a digest of Miss Collet's monograph on the "Employment of Women and Girls in England and Wales,"* an article on "Employer and Employe under the Common Law," by V. H. Olmsted and S. D. Fessenden and notes on some foreign labor bureaus.

The Bulletin, as a whole, promises to be an exceedingly useful addition to our governmental reports.

WITH THE VOLUME for 1894, the "Statistical Year-Book of Canada"† enters upon the tenth year of its existence and usefulness. As in former years the book is divided into two parts, "the record" and "the abstract." The record contains a compend of much information which will be invaluable to the student of economic and political science. The present volume has among its new chapters one giving a history and description of the railways of Canada and another containing an account of Canada's trade relations with the United States. "The record" contains the statistical information usually to be found in a year book. The treatment of the several subjects, however, is both descriptive and statistical. The material regarding "trade and commerce" and "railways and canals" is especially full, one hundred pages being devoted to these two chapters.

* See ANNALS for November, 1895, for note on the same, Sociological Notes, p. 210.

† *The Statistical Year-Book of Canada for 1894* Issued by the Department of Agriculture. Pp. 1134. Government Printing Bureau, Ottawa, 1895.

DR. J. H. HOLLANDER made good use of his vacation in England last summer by unearthing two important sets of Ricardo's letters which English economists had given up for lost. The first consists of a series of twenty-four letters written from 1820 to 1823, addressed to Ricardo's intimate friend, Hutches Trower, Esq., a Surrey country gentleman. Twenty-two of these were written by Ricardo himself and the other two by his son-in-law, Anthony Austin. These last describe the sudden illness and unexpected death of the economist. The second set, found, strangely enough, safely filed away in the British Museum, consists of the missing correspondence with J. R. McCulloch from 1816 to 1823. This includes forty-five numbers, among which are a letter from Malthus and the original of James Mill's letter announcing Ricardo's death. It will be noticed that these letters supplement very completely the correspondence with Malthus which has already been published and thus throw much interesting light upon the personality, political activity and economic thinking of Ricardo during the last years of his life. The Trower letters are to be published soon by the British Economic Association, while the American Economic Association is going to bring out the McCulloch correspondence together with several single letters of Ricardo to Bentham and others. Students of Ricardo will regret the necessity of separating these two sets of letters which belong to the same period and must help to mutually explain each other. The arrangement is explained by the hesitancy manifested by the British Economic Association about bringing out both sets of letters at once.

REVIEWS.

The Life and Letters of Edward A. Freeman, D. C. L., LL. D.

By W. R. W. STEPHENS, B. D., Dean of Winchester. Two Vols., Pp. 435, 499. Price, \$7.00 London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

The personality of the late Professor Freeman was even more remarkable than his undoubted merits as a historian, and Dean Stephens in his life of the deceased professor has wisely allowed that personality to be manifested through the medium of Freeman's most characteristic letters. Every one who came in contact with him, was struck by the mixture of ferocity and gentleness, of sound learning and occasional faddishness, of sturdy independence and helpless reliance on others, which made up a personality always impressive, but not always congenial or sociable. No man loved or

admired his friends with greater heartiness, no man ever took more unreasonable dislikes or antipathies to individuals, no man who has striven to be impartial has ever shown himself more prejudiced and biased in certain directions. When the history of English historiography during the last fifty years comes to be written, Freeman will doubtless fill a large and important place. But the range of his activity was not confined to the writing of history; he was a keen politician, an ardent sympathizer with the small nationalities in southeastern Europe, which the nineteenth century has seen on the road towards independence, and he made himself known to the vast majority of his fellow countrymen who do not read history, by his uncompromising opposition to the favorite sport of England, fox-hunting. A skillful and active journalist and an excellent lecturer and public speaker, Freeman united a ready pen to a fearless voice in the service of the various causes to which his life was devoted. The ardor of his character made him apt to advocate unpopular views with exaggerated fervor, but his courage in defending what he believed to be right, won for him the respect even of his opponents. This strong personality is excellently displayed in his correspondence and Dean Stephens has done well to restrict his own part as biographer to occasional comments on Freeman's letters, and to brief descriptions of the chief stages in his uneventful life. All who have ever received or read letters from Professor Freeman knew that a rich treat was in store for them when they heard that the historian's family had decided to allow the publication of a collection of his letters. It has often been said that the electric telegraph and cheap postal facilities have killed the art of letter-writing, but the publication of the correspondence of James Russell Lowell and of Professor Freeman, effectually disproves this accusation against the greatest of modern conveniences. In their graceful humor, in their absolute revelation of himself, in the interest of their contents and in the raciness of their style, Freeman's letters present a perfect picture of the writer with all his strength and weakness, his originality of thought and innate prejudices.

Although Freeman, the man, is shown by these volumes to be a more interesting figure than Freeman, the historian, it is by his historical work, that he is generally known in this country, and it is for light on his methods of work as a historian that Dean Stephens' volumes will naturally be studied. It is always necessary in estimating the writings of any historian to study his private character, his up-bringing and points of view, in order to discount the work of the writer by a knowledge of his personality. To read Macaulay's "History of England", for instance, without a knowledge of Macau-

lay's political views, simply misguides the student of English history, although it need not detract from the pleasure of the general reader; and in almost every instance, the critical value of the study of history is only to be obtained when the natural bias and the mental attitude of the author have been thoroughly ascertained. Modern scientific historians endeavor as far as possible to eliminate the personal equation in doing their work, and what may be called the objective type of historian is now esteemed above his subjective rival who endeavors not only to relate the history of the course of events, but to convince his readers of the correctness of his own point of view. This ideal is however modern, and until quite recently historians made no effort to keep their personal prejudices out of their writings. Freeman is one of the most subjective of historians. Although the period which he treated did not lend itself to the service of modern political parties as did the period embraced in Macaulay's work, Freeman's mind and nature made him essentially a partisan, and he took sides heartily in the political struggles of the eleventh century and never concealed his admiration for his heroes or his contempt and dislike for their enemies. It is this which makes it especially necessary to obtain a correct view of Freeman's character. He stamped his personality so thoroughly on his books that without a knowledge of that personality, the keynote to his writings is lost. A study of his life and correspondence is therefore particularly necessary in Freeman's case and students of any of his writings must first make themselves familiar with the man if they would derive real benefit from his books. His virtues and faults as a historian were his virtues and faults as a man; his wide knowledge, his accuracy of quotation, his frank partisanship and his vivid realization of past events, his prejudices and his hearty admiration for justice, righteousness and true greatness were characteristic of the man as they were characteristic of the historian. In order then to understand the historian, a full knowledge of the man must be sought, and both Dean Stephens and Mr. Freeman's family and friends deserve most hearty thanks for permitting to be frankly disclosed the nature of the man as exhibited in his letters to his admirers and the public.

The most obvious point in Freeman's life which distinguishes it from that of other English historians is that he was possessed of a sufficient income on which to live without practicing any profession. Like the other bright and shining lights of the Oxford historical school, Bishop Stubbs and Bishop Creighton, Mr. S. R. Gardiner and Mr. J. R. Green, Freeman was not educated at one of the great English schools and was thus, perhaps, the better fitted to fall under

the magic influence of the most ancient, most beautiful and most historic of universities. Ever a loyal son of Trinity College and of Oxford, he was affected like Stubbs and Green and Gardiner and Creighton by the sense of familiarity with bygone ages in the life of the nation which residence at Oxford always inspires into the man with a taste for history, and after obtaining a fellowship he was soon drawn into the line of work for which his intellect and nature were best adapted. His career after leaving Oxford was not eventful; he stood for Parliament and was defeated; he wrote many articles for the *Saturday Review*; he traveled about a great deal, lecturing, attending meetings of archaeological societies and visiting scenes of historic events; and in his later years, when the desire for active teaching had almost left him, he reached the goal of one of his earlier ambitions and was appointed Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford. Exempted by the possession of a competence from struggling for a livelihood, he was able to pass his life in comfort as an English country gentleman. Happy in his domestic relations, his private life was marked by no great sorrows or violent emotions, and he enjoyed the leisure which every scholar yearns for, but which few obtain. Nor was his life marked by the strenuous intellectual and religious struggles which sometimes make the lives of quiet recluses as fascinating as the adventures of soldiers and travelers; untroubled by the tiresome introspection and unaffected by the religious controversies which rent the heart and mind of another famous scholar of Trinity College, Oxford, John Henry Newman, he was enabled to pursue his life's work without let or hindrance. The epochs in his life are marked by the regular production of his books and no man ever worked under more favorable circumstances. Freeman's correspondence, then, must be studied simply and purely for the information that it gives of his character and methods of work, and not for romantic events or a record of intellectual development.

His faith and ideals as a historian are to be found in his published works and no additional light is thrown upon them by the publication of his letters. In his Rede lecture on "The Unity of History," in his "Lectures to American Audiences," in his "Methods of Historical Study" and elsewhere, Freeman stated his attitude as a teacher and writer of history with such distinctness that it need not be dwelt upon in this connection, but his methods of work are not so generally known. Like Carlyle, he refused to work in great public libraries. Dean Stephens explains this reluctance as proceeding from natural shyness, but whatever may be the cause, the fact must always seem strange to workers in the field of history. Only a man

studying a period in the remote past, for which material is scanty, can attempt to dispense with the use of the great public and private collections of books and manuscripts, and only a man of comparative wealth can afford to purchase all the books he may require upon his special subject. The reluctance to work himself in libraries and great collections was partly made up in Freeman's case by the willingness of his friends to look up information for him and many of his letters contain playful requests for assistance of this sort and cordial thanks for help rendered. In his avoidance of research in libraries and in his refusal to seek after manuscript material, Freeman cannot be commended, and a modern writer of history who should dare to follow his example in this respect, would speedily find himself taken to task by the critics. But characteristic as was Freeman's fault in avoiding public libraries, it was perhaps more than counterbalanced by his characteristic virtue of visiting and seeing with his own eyes the actual sites of the events he described. A considerable portion of his working years was invariably taken up by his travels, and his journeys were made, not in search of recreation, but with definite relation to the work on which he chanced to be engaged. The gospel which he preached to future historians was most important in this respect. What he preached, he practiced. And English historical writers of the present day are expected by their readers to have visited the scenes which they describe and not to take their topography from guide books or atlases. Every reader of the "History of the Norman Conquest," will remember how its pages are illumined with vivid descriptions of historic castles, ancient cities and famous battlefields, and many were the important rectifications in the received narratives, which Freeman was enabled to make from his personal inspection of the places he described. Like his friend, Mr. J. R. Green, Freeman found the face of the land and the remains of ancient buildings the most valuable of documents for the understanding and interpretation of historical events, and his method of personal visits and intelligent examination of the ground, remains as an example to be imitated, even as his avoidance of libraries deserves to be reprobated. In addition to this characteristic side of his method, Freeman had another great merit which is constantly illustrated in his letters. "Always verify your quotations," said the venerable President of Magdalen College, Oxford, Dr. Routh, when he was asked by an undergraduate to give some advice which might aid him in life, and Freeman laid equal stress upon the importance of absolute and scholarly accuracy. Frequent are the allusions in his letters to this prime duty of a historian and every quotation used by him in any of his books, and

every allusion made was always carefully verified in proof by his daughters or by himself. Would that more historians followed Freeman in this respect, for such accuracy is a real boon to the conscientious student and cannot hurt that ubiquitous and troublesome person, the general reader.

To an American reader, the most interesting of Freeman's letters will naturally be those published in the second volume, which were written during his visit to the United States, in 1881-82. His intention in crossing the Atlantic was to visit his son Edgar Freeman, who had married an American lady and settled in Virginia. But the journey was made profitable as well as pleasant by the delivery of courses of lectures in the principal American cities and universities. Freeman's comments on America and Americans are racy, like every thing he wrote, and although abounding in evidence of the violent prejudices which formed the weak side of his character, are striking, and often shrewdly observant. "This would be a grand land," he writes from New Haven, Conn., on December 4, 1881, "if only every Irishman would kill a negro and be hanged for it. I find this sentiment generally approved—sometimes with a qualification that they want Irish and negroes for servants, not being able to get any other. This looks like the ancient human weakness of craving for a subject race. 'Tis grievous that the fine, old, Puritan New Englanders should be all going westward, and Irishmen buying the land." (Vol. II, p. 242,) "I think I get on mightily with all folk here," he writes on another occasion, "save railway folk, who are simply brutal, and often black to boot. But the freed nigger seems to have a fancy generally for making us feel our Aryan inferiority—I am sure 'twas a mistake making them citizens. I feel a creep when I think that one of these great black apes may (in theory) be President. Surely treat your horse kindly; but don't make him consul." (Vol. II, p. 236.) In one passage in the letter written from New Haven which has already been quoted, Freeman sums up the things which he disliked in America, and surprisingly few and trivial they seem to be, excepting, perhaps the last in the list. "I have held forth at Boston, Ithaca, Baltimore and here," he writes. "They are wonderful folk to listen, but 'tis very hard to get them to cheer or laugh, which is discouraging. On the whole, I don't count this land any stranger than Scotland, hardly so much. But there are some *Illaudabilia Americæ* for a new Giraldus to set down.

"First. They give you no drink water in your bedroom.

"Second. They sit with the door of the room open.

"Third. They eat their meat raw, which they call *rare*.

"Fourth. They call one Professor and Doctor. I was called *Colonel* at Baltimore, which was a pleasing variety, but only in the dark.

"Fifth. Their roads, even in the towns, are worse than any in Swampshire. I tell them that I can't see the difference between Republicans and Democrats, but that I support any party that will take away the mud. How can there be purity of elections, when you have to go through such slush to get to the polls?" (Vol. II, p. 243.) The evidence of his letters proves that Freeman thoroughly enjoyed his visit to America. He rejoiced in Rhode Island, which he called his "pet little State, matching Uri on the other side"; he admired New Haven, "which, bating the lack of old things, is the prettiest town one ever saw"; he humorously delighted in Vassar College, where he likened "the chatter of many girls at dinner in hall to the chirruping of seventy-two thousand grass-hoppers"; he lost his patience with "a she-antiquary who would talk about *Septimus Severus*", and he made a bad pun with regard to a municipal election in Philadelphia, in which he took much interest, by quoting from Virgil, "*Procumbit humi bos*," a pun only intelligible to those who pronounce Latin after the old-fashion.

Delightful as is the whole mass of correspondence in which Freeman reveals himself, published in the two volumes edited by Dean Stephens, an even greater treat is promised in the preface, where it is announced that, at some future date, the correspondence which passed between Freeman and J. R. Green will be issued in a separate volume. It is somewhat of a shock to find how small a place Green fills in the volumes under review but doubtless the omission will be more than made up in the promised work. Freeman and Green stand together in the minds of men and probably will stand together to all time as the first masters of style, who laid before the English speaking world an animated and accurate record of the growth and early development of the English people and the Norman monarchy. It would be invidious to compare the two friends; Green, perhaps, had not Freeman's instinct for accuracy or the wide range of historical erudition, which enabled him to make his points clear by comparisons and contrasts; but on the other hand, Freeman could not boast of Green's exquisite lucidity of style or his feelings for the organic unity of town and province and nation. The promised volume of correspondence will doubtless throw more light upon the historical methods of the late Regius Professor and will presumably give much welcome knowledge of the personal character and habits of mind of the author of the "Short History of the English People." It will certainly show the greatness of the debt which both of them owe to the most famous historian of the Oxford historical school,

the master of them both in wide learning and scientific capacity. Dr. William Stubbs, the present Bishop of Oxford. Freeman rejoiced when appointed to his chair at Oxford at becoming the successor of Stubbs and the following Oxford epigram describes the admiration which the author of the "History of the Norman Conquest" felt for the yet more famous author of "The Constitutional History of England:"

"See, ladling butter from alternate tubs,
Stubbs butters Freeman, Freeman butters Stubbs."

At present, gratitude to the Dean of Winchester for the care and trouble he has taken in editing and arranging "The Life and Letters of Edward A. Freeman" is heightened by a lively expectation of future pleasures to be enjoyed in the perusal of the correspondence between Freeman and Green. It remains to be added, that the publishers' share in the production of the book is entirely creditable; that portraits are given of Freeman at different ages; and that the index supplied is, what should never have been allowed in the case of so unwearied and painstaking an index-maker as Professor Freeman, entirely inadequate.

H. MORSE STEPHENS.

Études et portraits politiques. Par NUMA DROZ, Ancien Président de la Confédération Suisse. Pp. 519. Geneva: Ch. Eggimann et Cie. Paris: Felix Alcan, 1895.

No man is so well qualified to pronounce an opinion on Swiss political institutions as M. Droz. At once a scholar and a statesman, he combines with a naturally sound judgment an extraordinary amount of actual experience, for he served as a member of the Federal Council or executive body of the Confederation almost a score of years, and left it the most distinguished public man in the country. Students of the Swiss government will therefore welcome the collection of his essays which has just appeared. These essays were first published as magazine articles at sundry times during the last fifteen years, and they deal with a variety of subjects—historical, political and biographical. Six of them, or one-half of the whole number, are discussions of the political institutions of the Confederation and were written for the most part in consequence of changes, or proposed changes, in the Constitution. Two of the six treat of the organization and method of election of the Federal Council, and in these as elsewhere M. Droz shows that he is a conservative in the true sense; that is, he feels the delicacy of the

present adjustment of forces, and dreads radical changes that would involve serious modifications of the political system before a new equilibrium could be produced. For this reason he deprecates the plan for the election of the Federal Council by the people, an opinion in which careful observers of the Swiss government would generally concur.

Of even greater interest to foreigners are the views of M. Droz on the subject of the Referendum and the Initiative. On this point his feelings have undergone a good deal of alteration, as may be seen by reading the essays written in 1882, 1885, 1894, and 1895. At first he had a strong admiration for the Referendum, but after long experience of its actual working, he became impressed with its defects, and the abuse of which it was susceptible, and although he is still of the opinion that it has done on the whole more good than harm, he now speaks of it without enthusiasm. To the Initiative for partial amendments to the Constitution, at least in its present form, he is, and since the matter was first seriously mooted always has been, decidedly opposed. The Referendum can at the worst only hinder progress by preventing the enactment of needed laws, but the Initiative is capable of being used to accomplish positive harm, and M. Droz thinks that it presents a constant danger to the tranquillity and prosperity of the nation. Perhaps this feeling, which he tells us is very widespread, is increased at the present moment by the fact that Switzerland seems to be passing through one of its periodical conditions of unrest. About once a decade, the people become discontented with the government, but instead of showing it as in other countries by putting the opposition into office, they re-elect the old representatives and give vent to their spite by voting down the laws these men have prepared. Such a method of rebuking the party in power is perhaps quite as sensible as any other, but it is peculiarly discouraging to the members of the government.

Three of the essays are memoirs of Federal Councillors, who have died, and in the course of these M. Droz throws a great deal of light on current politics, and gives us a glimpse of the relations of the Federal Councillors to each other. One of the memoirs, that of the Landammann Heer, also places vividly before us the condition of the cantons with *Landsgemeinde*,—those pure democracies, conducted on aristocratic principles. It is very striking how the young Heer, who was a member of one of the old and wealthy families in his canton, was educated with a deliberate view to political life, and how naturally his fellow-citizens took it for granted that he would hold public offices as soon as he was old enough to do so.

It is impossible in a review of this length to give an idea of the contents of all the essays, but no student of the Swiss government should fail to read them for himself.

A. LAWRENCE LOWELL.

Outlines of English Industrial History. By W. CUNNINGHAM, D.D. and ELLEN A. MCARTHUR. Pp. xii, 274. Price, \$1.50. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

To compress into ten brief chapters a clear and straightforward account of English industrial history is a task as difficult, as the need for its performance is urgent. It would be ungracious to criticise harshly the first essay in this field, were it not that criticism may point out mistakes in method and arrangement of material which may be corrected in a later edition. At the very outset the authors of the book under review, do violence to the logical instincts of the economic reader by considering the character of the "immigrants to Britain" in advance of the "physical conditions" which help to explain the immigrations and constitute the chief factor in the subsequent industrial development. What is said about the "physical conditions" in the second chapter, moreover, seems strangely lacking in perspective. Mineral wealth is taken up before anything is said of the agricultural resources of the country, and tin, lead, coal and iron are treated as if they had contributed about equal shares to English prosperity. Finally, the isolated situation of the Island and the facilities afforded to the development of commerce are considered at the very close of the chapter. The result of this treatment is to give the uninstructed reader a most erroneous impression as to the relative importance of nature's different contributions to England's greatness. One need not subscribe to the statement, so frequently made, that English prosperity has depended at different epochs solely upon the three factors, wool, coal and iron, to find fault with a treatment which puts these upon a level with wheat, tin and lead.

The chapters on "Manors" and "Towns" are the best in the book and have borrowed largely from the first volume of Ashley's "English Economic History," but even here the narrative is uneven and important links are left to the imagination of the reader. No satisfactory explanation is offered of the reasons which led to the decay of the Merchant and Craft Gilds and so few details are given concerning these institutions that their real character remains a matter of mystery.

Beginning with chapter six, we have the unqualified adoption of the topical method and are able to see most clearly the weakness of this form of arrangement in a book which aims at nothing, if not to furnish an outline sketch of English industrial history. In one section of ten pages we are whirled along under the title, "the food supply," from the agricultural migrations and changes following the Black Death (1349) to the Corn Law agitation following the Napoleonic wars and resulting in the introduction of free trade in 1846. Confusion and false notions as to the real sequences of things are the natural consequence. Subsequent sections and chapters are nearly as bad. Under the titles, "Money, Credit and Finance," "Agriculture," and "Labor and Capital," we have short chapters on these subjects each one of which covers a period of from two to four centuries. To expect a student to get any definite idea of the course of the industrial development of the country as a whole from the perusal of these pages is a dream which any attempt to use it as a text-book quickly dispels. For convenience in grouping together facts in a hand-book, the topical method certainly possesses substantial advantages, but when the object is to give a brief sketch of a particular department or period of history no system of arrangement could be worse chosen for the purpose.

One more defect in the book before us is that it seems to take for granted a great deal of knowledge on the part of the reader about the subject of which it treats. It does not always give the essential facts, but instead proceeds at once to the question of interpreting the facts. For example in the account given of the craft guilds the question as to whether the apprentices were well or ill treated is discussed (pp.65-66), although no account whatever has been given of the apprentice system or why it grew up in connection with the guilds. This would be excusable in a book designed for specialists, but in an elementary treatise, which claims for itself only the merits of a compilation, it is a serious fault.

The field of industrial history is broad and it is always a serious question in an elementary work what to leave out. If our authors had not attempted to push their narrative into the period of modern industrial processes no fault could have been found with them. But as a matter of fact the history of some institutions (*e.g.* the Corn Laws) is followed down to the middle of our own century, and in the chapter on "Labor and Capital" an attempt is made to describe the industrial changes which resulted from the application of steam and machinery to industry. This seems to justify us in considering the period covered as extending down to 1850. If this was the intention of the authors they have done but scant justice to the events

which happened during the last hundred years of which they treat, and which raised England from the position of a second-rate power to that of the first country of the world. But enough of fault-finding. The "Outlines of English Industrial History" is the only work of the kind we have and with all its defects will supply the need which many teachers of political economy feel of something to serve as an antidote for too much and too dogmatic economic theory.

HENRY R. SEAGER.

Benjamin Franklin as an Economist. By W. A. WETZEL, A.M.
Pp. 58. Price, 50 cents. Johns Hopkins University Studies in
Historical and Political Science. September, 1895. Baltimore.

The purpose of this monograph is to show that "Franklin is the first American who deserves to be dignified by the title economist." Briefly, clearly, and, as we think, successfully, the author proves his proposition. It is to be regretted that the monograph is not more exhaustive and that it lacks continuity. There is, however, no other equally brief and convenient résumé of the subject.

Mr. Wetzel has subdivided his subject into twelve chapters; the first being on the "Economic Works of Franklin," in which their titles and the essential character of each are indicated. In the second, on "Paper Money and Interest," the citations show Franklin's ideas of the nature of money and of interest; the conclusions drawn by the author being that Franklin believed first, that "money as a coin may have a value higher than its bullion value," and, too, that natural interest is determined by "the rent of so much land as the money lent will buy." The third chapter on "Wages," with scanty reference to Franklin's ideas, concludes with: "it would be idle to look for a scientific law of wages in Franklin's writings," and that the theory of wages which Franklin held was that "high wages are not inconsistent with a large foreign trade."

The fourth chapter on "Population" denies to Franklin the first formulation of that law which later was more elaborately worked out by Ricardo, and also denies that Franklin's work suggested the work of Malthus, particularly the "Essay on Population." Mr. Wetzel's unwillingness to believe that Malthus based this portion of his work on any prior work of Franklin's is, however, somewhat diminished in value by the author's statement that "inasmuch as Malthus in the interval between the appearance of the first and the second edition of his work made himself familiar with "Franklin's writings on population, one is led to believe that the influence of

Franklin may be seen in Malthus' preventive check to the increase of population." The conclusions which the author draws from Franklin's ideas of population, are, first, that population will increase as the means of gaining a living increase; second, that a high standard of living serves to prolong single life and thus acts as a check to the increase of population; and, third, that the people are adjusted among the different countries according to the comparative well-being of mankind.

In the fifth chapter on "Value," Mr. Wetzel prints in parallel columns quotations from Franklin's monograph on "The Nature and Necessity of a Paper Currency," 1729; and from Petty's "Essay on Taxes and Contributions," written in 1662. Because of the likeness between the passages quoted, Mr. Wetzel concludes that "Franklin, who lived in London in 1724, must have known of Petty's work," and, therefore, that it is incorrect to call Franklin "the father of the labor theory of value." From his exceedingly brief examination of Franklin's ideas of value, the author states Franklin's idea of the subject to be that, "the value of an article is determined by the amount of labor necessary to produce the food consumed in making the article."

The sixth chapter on "Agriculture," briefer than any of the others, is also least satisfactory. It is not enough to say that "Franklin estimated very highly the value of agriculture in his economic system." It would be more in accord with Franklin's ideas to say that he put agriculture at the centre of his economic system. No portion of Franklin's works is greater than his writings on agriculture, in his correspondence; in his pamphlets and papers, and in his speeches. When Franklin lived, America was agricultural. The monograph is seriously defective in its attempt to state Franklin's ideas of agriculture as an economic factor in life; he and Jefferson were the two Americans of the eighteenth century who founded all their ideas of social, political and educational affairs on agriculture. In spite of these facts, the author devotes more of his monograph to manufactures than to agriculture. His conclusion in regard to Franklin's position as to the value of agriculture is, undoubtedly, the true one, that "while manufactures are advantageous, only agriculture is truly productive." It is to be regretted that the author who has so judiciously though briefly represented Franklin's economic ideas on other subjects, should have treated his ideas on agriculture so scantily. After citing from the works of Franklin, he draws his conclusion of Franklin's ideas on manufactures that they "will naturally spring up in a country as the country becomes ripe for them."

The eighth chapter on "Free Trade" reaches the conclusion that "free trade with the world will give the greatest return at the least expense," and the chapter on "Taxation" that "wherever practicable, state revenues should be raised by direct taxes." The chapters remaining on "Franklin and the Physiocrats" and on "Franklin and the English Philosophers," enter into the theories of the state, and Franklin's association with Quesnay, Nemours, Du Bourg, Turgot, Lord Kames, Hume and Adam Smith. These are interesting chapters and lead the reader to conclude that in this group of eminent thinkers, Franklin was not the least, and possibly, in some respects the greatest. The author's conclusions are, that "Franklin was a man who understood thoroughly the working of certain economic principles." He represents Franklin as participating in, and perhaps as leading "the reaction of the eighteenth century against artificial conditions of life;" that "Franklin was more than a man of expedients," and that "he had some knowledge of economic science as it had been developed up to his time." The monograph concludes with a brief bibliography.

The work which Mr. Wetzel has done is timely, highly creditable and suggestive, and will be welcomed by all who are interested in the dominating ideas of the eighteenth century. It is to be hoped that the author will develop his subject and enlarge his monograph into a treatise worthy of the theme. His present work points to him as the person to continue it.

FRANCIS N. THORPE.

Sir William Petty, a Study in English Economic Literature. By WILSON LLOYD BEVAN. Pp. 105. Price, 75 cents. Publications of the American Economic Association. Vol. IX, No. 4, August, 1894. New York: Macmillan & Co.

The Life of Sir William Petty; chiefly derived from Private Documents hitherto Unpublished. By Lord EDMOND FITZMAURICE. London: John Murray, 1895.

Until very recently Petty's current reputation fell as far short of his deserts as the estimate of his contemporaries had been in excess of his merits. Pepys found him "one of the most rational men that ever he heard speak with a tongue," and Evelyn so admired his "wisdom in council and prudent matters of state," that were he a prince he would have made Petty his "second counsellor at least." Nevertheless, Petty received, until the publication of Dr. Ingram's articles, but slight attention in Great Britain. A careful

reprint of his "Political Arithmetic" was indeed issued by Edward Arber, antiquarian, and a slovenly reprint of his "Essays" by Henry Morley, litterateur. To English economists, however, the greater portion of his writings remained, for aught that appears, substantially unknown. Within the past year Dr. Bevan's economic "Study" of Petty has been followed by Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice's more political "Life," and we now have abundant opportunity to know Petty as a man. But so long as our direct knowledge of Petty as economist and statistician continues to be based, for the most part, upon excerpts selected by the unhistorical McCulloch, his writings must still fail of that appreciation to which their extent, their acuteness, and their cogency indubitably entitle them.

Petty was born in 1623, the son of a poor clothier, and died in 1687, the recipient, by his own calculation, of an income of 12,000 pounds, due to his own efforts. He was a precocious child, a born mathematician and mechanic. At fifteen he was in France, learning French, talking Latin with Jesuit fathers, and already playing the merchant of "pittiful brass things with cool'd glasse in them instead of diamonds and rubies." And always hereafter even when apparently most absorbed in scientific experiments, he remained throughout his life, the strenuous man of business. Having studied medicine at Utrecht, Leyden, Amsterdam, and Paris, he became, in 1650, Professor of Anatomy at Oxford, where he was an animating spirit of that little group of "natural philosophers" whose subsequent union with their fellows in London produced the Royal Society. In 1654 he went to Ireland as physician to the Lord Lieutenant and the army. There he executed, in thirteen months, a cadestral survey of a large part of the kingdom, dabbling incidentally in Cromwellian land-debentures and laying the foundation of his much-prized fortune. Returning to London, he won the King's favor at the Restoration, became a charter member of the Royal Society, and wrote and published his remarkable "Treatise of Taxes and Contributions." To trace his life during the next quarter of a century would require more space than can be afforded. He resided much in Ireland, improving his estates, he tried in vain to bring about the erection of a royal statistical bureau under his own direction, and he wrote, "as a sample of the Political Arithmetic" he had "long aimed at," nearly a score of semi-statistical pamphlets. Some of them were published at the time, some were first printed after his death, and some still slumber in manuscript.

Lord Fitzmaurice's "Life of Petty" consists of two principal parts, separated by a chapter on "Political Arithmetic." In the

first part are described Petty's early life, his pre-restoration activity in Ireland—including a rather lengthy account of the various "surveys" and "settlements" of that unhappy island between 1641 and 1660,—his parliamentary dispute with Sankey, his experiments with the "double bottomed" ship, his struggle with the farmers of the Irish revenue, and his marriage. Here Lord Fitzmaurice writes chiefly from sources already well known: from Aubrey, Pepys, Evelyn and the *Athenæ Oxonienses*, from Ward's "Professors of Gresham College" and Hardinge, from a dozen of Petty's letters printed in Boyle's works and elsewhere, and from Petty's curious autobiographic will. Relatively little that is new appears. The latter part of the "Life," on the contrary, brings to light a large share of Petty's voluminous correspondence with Sir Robert Southwell and several unprinted letters to Lady Petty. The author supplies occasional connecting links, which fail sometimes to accomplish their purpose. Taken by itself, however, the correspondence proves Petty a surprisingly good letter writer, even for the seventeenth century, and his letters suffer neither in point, wit, nor style, when thus compared with the rather hurried writing of his descendant. They reveal many little traits of character, not all of them amiable; they give color and vivacity to the picture.

The economic interest of Lord Fitzmaurice's book centres in the seventh chapter—"Political Arithmetic." Upon Dr. Bevan's somewhat scrappy analysis of Petty's economic notions, this chapter seems to me a distinct improvement. Yet I cannot help feeling that the whole is colored by the biographers' preconceived notions. Lord Fitzmaurice is, apparently, one of those fortunate men who, in Justin McCarthy's significant phrase, "know political economy" with all the finality with which they "know" Euclid or *Persicos odi*. Of the political phases of Petty's life and times his knowledge is, so far as I can judge, quite adequate. But a somewhat fuller acquaintance with the industrial conditions following the Restoration, and somewhat wider reading of other economic writers of the same period, might have helped to a more definite estimate of Petty's relative merits, and must have resulted, I fancy, in a higher appreciation of the unique "Observations upon the Bills of Mortality", than is displayed. Taken all in all, however, the "Life of Sir William Petty" remains, in spite of occasional inaccuracies and somewhat careless printing, the most satisfactory source of information available concerning a writer who was, perhaps, the ablest of English economists before Hume.

CHARLES H. HULL.

The History of Currency, 1252-1894. Being an Account of the Gold and Silver Moneys and Monetary Standards of Europe and America, together with an Examination of the Effects of Currency and Exchange Phenomena on Commercial and National Progress and Well-being. By W. A. SHAW. [Second Edition.] Pp. xxx, 437. Price, \$3.50. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. London: Wilson & Milne, 1896.

If we are to allow ourselves to be influenced, as some writers seem to intimate, in our judgment as to the theoretical soundness and practicability of bimetallism, by a mere show of hands or count of "great heads," then the advocates of a single standard can undoubtedly cite a larger number of the great economists who have pronounced opinions adverse to bimetallism than the defenders of a double standard can in its favor. Sir William Petty, John Locke and Sir Isaac Newton, Adam Smith and David Ricardo, Bagehot, Jevons and Cairnes, writers whose authority and dominating influence is pre-eminent in the history of the economic and monetary sciences, have all declared against the bimetallic standard as an exchange medium. A government or governments, they maintain, cannot, by mere legislative decree, work successfully a double standard either within a nation or within the territories of the leading industrial nations leagued together expressly for this purpose. Still further the leading statistical experts who have made investigations into the history of the actual workings of bimetallism have come to equally hostile conclusions. Among them are notably, Lord Liverpool and Robert Giffen of England, Adolph Soetbeer of Germany, and Laughlin, Wells, Taussig and Atkinson, of the United States. To the names of this latter class of authorities we must now add that of Mr. W. A. Shaw's, of England, who gives us this substantial volume on the "History of Currency" from 1252 to 1894, which shows exceedingly careful work and extended research. "The verdict of history" says Mr. Shaw "on the great problem of the nineteenth century—Bimetallism—is clear and crushing, and final, and against the evidence of history no gainsaying of theory ought for a moment to stand."

The work before us traces in a very painstaking manner the various, almost bewildering fluctuations of the gold and silver values as they affected corresponding changes in the currencies of the leading industrial nations of Europe from the middle of the thirteenth century down to the closing of the Indian mints in 1894. Mr. Shaw confines his labors strictly to the history of metallic currencies and standards. He does not venture in any way to treat the paper currencies of the first French Republic, of the United States and of

Austria. The history of modern currencies begins, according to Mr. Shaw, in the Italian peninsula in 1252, when the Florentine mints began coining gold florins. Previous to that date, for two centuries anyway, the yellow metal had, for all practical purposes, gone entirely out of use as a monetary medium and the basis of the currencies of the various nations of mediæval Europe was silver. Beginning with Italy he follows the endlessly winding and criss-crossing changes in the mint and market values and ratios of silver and gold in the German States, France, Spain, Holland and Belgium, England, the United States and India. He divides his work into three general periods: (1) From the Commencement of Gold Coinage to the Discovery of America; (2) From the Discovery of America to the End of the First Cycle of the Influence of the Metals of the New World on European Currencies, 1660; (3) From the End of the First Cycle to the Present Day. He treats each nation separately in each period. Numerous statistical tables and charts showing the movements of the values of the precious metals in each country, accompanying his narrative. Six extended appendices, giving a large amount of minute technical information in regard to the coins and coinage laws of Florence, Venice, Spain, The Netherlands, Germany, Austria and Prussia, and France constitute one of the most valuable portions of this volume.

The purpose of this work, Mr. Shaw tells us, is "first and foremost to illustrate a question of principle by the aid of historic test and application; secondly, to furnish for the use of historical students an elementary hand-book of the currencies of the most important European States." Among those who will read this volume carefully there will probably be little or no question that he accomplishes his first purpose in a most striking and convincing manner. But we doubt very much whether the same verdict will be as generally accorded his efforts to attain to the second object. It may with some propriety be called a hand-book of the currencies for monetary experts and specialists in the history of metallic currencies; but the author has wholly misjudged the average student's capacity and character if he believes or hopes that he will have the courage and persistence to follow his meagre narrative of currency changes covering a period of almost six centuries and a half, mastering the multitudinous details of ratios and coinage regulations. Mr. Shaw is too brief, too succinct to be at all interesting to the ordinary reader and student. The novice and those addicted to much indulgence in *a priori* theory will not care to push their weary way through these three hundred pages bristling with formidable figures, statistical tables and illustrated charts—especially will they hang

back if they perceive soon after they enter upon their reading that conclusions subversive of their own preconceived notions greet them with exasperating frequency. It will only be the serious, painstaking advanced student who has an overweening enthusiasm for dry details who will and can profit by Mr. Shaw's valuable work. For the latter it will prove a veritable gold mine.

To those interested in the great question of the free coinage of silver by the United States Government at the ratio of 16 to 1, and to those desirous of seeing international bimetallism inaugurated by the chief industrial nations of the world this work contains some startling conclusions. If there is one argument the bimetallist banks on and iterates and reiterates at all times and seasons, it is the compensatory or equalizing effect of the metallic standard, and his stock example has always been the results of the bimetallic law of France lasting from 1803 to 1873 in restraining the fluctuations in the relative values of gold and silver, particularly during the great gold discoveries of the middle of the century. The claim that the action of France gave the world "a fixed and steady ratio" during this period, he declares to be wholly "fallacious." "At no point of time during the present century has the actual market ratio, dependent on the commercial value of silver, corresponded with the French ratio of $15\frac{1}{2}$, and at no point of time has France been free from the disastrous influence of that want of correspondence between the legal and the commercial ratio. The opposite notion, which prevails and finds expression in the ephemeral bimetallic literature of to-day, is simply due to ignorance." (p. 178.) This uncompromising statement Mr. Shaw backs up by an array of figures and a colored chart of the variations that will make the most obdurate advocate of free coinage and international bimetallism pause.

FRANK I. HERRIOTT.

Statistics and Sociology. (*Science of Statistics*, Part I.) By RICHMOND MAYO-SMITH. Pp. 400. Price, \$3.00. New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

Professor Mayo-Smith's long expected work on statistics is sure to take front rank in the literature of the subject in the English language. It is not a book of statistical references, but is rather a work devoted to the interpretation of statistical data. Thus it fills the place corresponding in foreign literature to such works as those of Block* and von Mayr,† which in our literature has thus far been

* "*Traité de statistique.*"

† "*Die Gesetzmässigkeit in Gesellschaftsleben.*"

vacant. Scattered through the *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society* and in the works of Farr, Newsholme and Longstaff will be found many of the materials upon which such a systematic treatment as that of Professor Mayo-Smith could be built up, but we have hitherto been without a comprehensive summing up of the facts disclosed by statistics in regard to the sociological aspects of population. This constitutes the significance of the present work. The success which greeted Professor Mayo-Smith's earlier sketch, "Statistics and Economics," will doubtless be accorded in still greater measure to his more ambitious effort. The situation of our statistical literature is such that even a poor performance in this field would be of importance. A work which has the scholarly character of the present volume can count upon an assured success.

In his introductory chapter the author discusses the relation of statistics to sociology under the pertinent title "Statistics in the Service of Sociology." The latter science is for him the study of social organization. He cannot conceal the fact that sociologists are far from any agreement as to the essential elements of social organization, but he has the conviction that the majority have gone too far afield in their search. The result is inevitably an ill-digested, unasorted mass of fact, from whose classification no order or system can be obtained. Thus the sociologist is overwhelmed by his material, and unless he exercises some principle of selection involves his science in his own shipwreck. The phenomena which he has to study are the relations and interaction of social groups with and upon each other. Social groups constitute population, and it is only in the analysis of population that they can be studied.

Population can be studied under the aspects of its structure in demographic social and ethnographic classes, its physical environment, its social environment, and the interaction of these upon one another. "Such is the field of sociology, large, indeed, but perfectly well defined."* It follows as a matter of course that the all important instrument in such investigation is to be found in statistics without whose aid sociology wanders off into vague descriptive efforts, and builds up systems on analogies more or less fanciful. It lacks the concrete basis of fact without which inductive science is a misnomer.

As the instrument of sociology statistics is of the utmost importance and a preliminary investigation of its criteria† becomes essential. The brief statement of the main elements of statistical method with its pitfalls and inaccuracies is admirable as far as it

* Page 7.

† Chapter II.

goes. Whatever opinion may be held of Professor Mayo-Smith as a sociologist his competence as a statistician is beyond dispute. Intimately connected with the discussion of statistical method in general is the author's exposition of the plan followed throughout the work. He discusses, the "sociological purpose" of the inquiry, the available "statistical data," the "scientific tests" of the accuracy, and appropriateness of the figures commonly used and concludes with a "reflective analysis" of the results obtained. This formal arrangement is rigidly adhered to in each chapter which follows.

Having thus characterized somewhat in detail the author's general attitude it is perhaps unnecessary to follow him through the treatment of the remaining chapters. He brings us an abundance of concrete facts skillfully woven together in a compact narrative. His work now falls into several books which correspond to the divisions made in the introduction. The first (pp. 36-177) treats of the demographic features of population, sex, age, conjugal condition, births, marriages, deaths and sickness. This is the most satisfactory portion of the work, for the whole field of demographic research is carefully covered, and an acute analysis of the data and conclusions based upon them is given. Statisticians will note with satisfaction the prominence given to the factor social condition in the explanation of phenomena too often carelessly ascribed to climatic and other physical causes. The second book (pp. 181-288) treats of social features of population. The title seems hardly well chosen for a division which includes in addition to families, dwellings, education, religious confessions and occupations, chapters on the infirm and dependent, on suicide and on crime. In the third book on ethnographic features, are treated race, nationality and migrations. The concluding fourth book discusses physical environment, relation of population to the territory which it inhabits, and social environment, the size of communities and the concentration of population in cities. This enumeration of subjects must serve as an indication of the specific contents of the book. To do equal justice to all parts it would require far more space than the limits of a review allow, should we attempt to summarize the contents for those unfamiliar with statistical research. To others the titles of chapters will give a sufficient clue to their contents.

Our exposition of the plan and contents of the work leads us to certain general critical observations, which appear especially important in view of the place which Professor Mayo-Smith's work seems destined to take in our statistical literature.

We cannot feel that the general tone of the introduction is happy,

for it will satisfy neither sociologist nor statistician. While the author declines to discuss the question whether statistics is the whole of sociology or merely a science of method, he ignores his disclaimer and treats statistics as if it were the science of sociology. This general attitude will embarrass him when he puts out his second volume, "Statistics and Economics." The attempt, should he make it, to master economic life, as he has tried to master social life, by the aid of statistics, will have far less chance of success. He will then appear to have two sciences of statistics, one sociological, the other economic in its content. This confusion is the inevitable result of attempting to treat statistics as a science of objective fact. Formulations of the "object" of statistical research err in vagueness or in narrowness. In the first case they embrace unrelated fields of research, in the second case they fail to embrace many phenomena which the formulation should include. The only unambiguous attitude toward the science of statistics is that it is essentially a science of method.

We would not wish to appear as threshing over old straw and feel it necessary to define further the purport of the foregoing criticism. It is not in any sense to depreciate the value of such a work as that of Professor Mayo-Smith. On the contrary we believe that it has a greater usefulness than such a work as that of Meitzen, which treats exclusively of statistical method, and is only vaguely comprehensible to the general reader. The latter and the student of economics will gain more insight into statistical method from Professor Mayo-Smith's book than from Meitzen. The writer has been firmly convinced by experience that the only practicable way of teaching statistics is to take it up on its objective or concrete side rather than its methodological or abstract side.

The distinction is not, however, without a difference. There is a fundamental and an important difference of *emphasis*. If the work in question had treated the method as the essential point in statistical science, the author would have rearranged his chapters, and had he treated his data as exemplifications of statistical method, interesting for their own sake, it is true, but not necessarily intimately organically connected, he would have avoided any semblance of quarrel with the sociologists. As it is they may justly claim that his work is not well rounded, and that it is incomplete. The relative proportion of one chapter to another, depends rather on the wealth of statistical material, than on their organic connection, while the factor of social condition, so justly emphasized by the author, receives a scanty treatment at his hands. The sociologist would undoubtedly demand that the questions of income and the like,

which characterize the social position of the wage-earner, should find a treatment in this book rather than in the promised second part. If we may anticipate the contents of the second part from what we have before us we may foresee a like difficulty between the author and the economists.

A second criticism concerns the rigid formalism of the book, which is partly an outcome of the author's attitude toward sociology. Each chapter is divided into four heads—sociological purpose, statistical data, scientific tests and reflective analysis. Such a formal method need not shock the statistician, but he would naturally apply to it the maxim, that each column in a table should always contain the same thing and serve a distinct purpose. Two of the author's categories, sociological purpose and reflective analysis, run into one another continually. If the first is long in any chapter, the second is short. Unless he borrows materials from his reflective analysis, the author's sociological purpose can usually be summarized as follows: The purpose of this chapter is to find out the facts. The term sociological purpose at the heading of each chapter has an aspect of profundity which is totally belied by its contents. Nor can it be discerned that the author has always distinctly separated his scientific tests from the exposition of the statistical data. To have the value which the author ascribes to it* such a formal arrangement should be adhered to not on the surface only, but in the real body of the treatment.

A third criticism pertains to the statistical material upon which conclusions are based. In many chapters it is drawn exclusively from foreign sources. The author shows a wide acquaintance with the results of research in foreign lands, which shall not be contested. The statistician knows that where material relating to the United States is not given it is often because satisfactory data are not available. Yet the general reader of an American book looks for such data and does not know that they do not exist. In many cases, however, statistical data relating to the United States, or at least a part of it, might have been introduced where we find no clue to our home conditions. In view of a popular statement so often repeated that it is generally believed, that conditions in the United States are altogether different from those in European countries, the omission of American data becomes a serious defect.

It will be observed that our criticisms have thus far touched only upon the general features of the work. Taking each chapter by itself, considering it apart from the entire work, it must be said

* Page vi.

that Professor Mayo-Smith's work has been well done. It is closely reasoned when there is occasion for analysis. The main statistical facts are presented without greatly encumbering the text with tabular matter, and in such a way as to leave no doubt as to their proper interpretation. Viewed by the topics considered, there is little criticism to be made except for a certain awkwardness of presentation which results from the author's formal division of his material. It may be said that Professor Mayo-Smith has executed better than he planned. In the treatment of special topics the statistician will recognize with pleasure his skillful analysis of the material presented, and his eminently sane and cautious conclusions. It is the best praise which can be allowed to a statistician, that he does not overvalue the significance of his materials, and this can be accorded to Professor Mayo-Smith in the fullest sense.

ROLAND P. FALKNER.

Vergil in the Middle Ages. By DOMENICO COMPARETTI. Translated by E. F. L. BENECKE. Pp. xvi, 376. Price, \$2.50. New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

In the first part of this work, "the Vergil of Literary Tradition," Professor Comparetti traces the poet's popularity from the best days of the Empire down through the Middle Ages. He brings out forcibly the importance of "the grammatical, rhetorical and erudite elements," in the *Æneid* in preserving Vergil's fame during the period of decadence. He then shows to what extent the scholastic traditions survived in the Middle Ages and how far Vergil's reputation was affected by his supposed prophecy of Christ (in the Fourth Eclogue). After setting forth the various uses to which the poet was put in the Middle Ages, he concludes with an analysis of the Vergil of the Divine Comedy and of the Dolopathos. This section is considerably longer than the second and contains several excellent chapters, analyzing various tendencies of mediæval thought. Especially good are the essays on "Christianity and the Middle Ages," "grammatical and rhetorical studies in the Middle Ages," and "clerical conception of antiquity in the Middle Ages." The two chapters on Dante will be read with keen interest.

But the first part of the book is really subsidiary to the second, "the Vergil of popular legend." Previous writers had almost entirely neglected to trace back the literary tradition, and consequently their works on Vergil, the magician, lacked completeness. The popular legends can be explained only when one understands how

Vergil was regarded by scholars. In the literary traditions we find the seeds which grew up later as the conception of a mighty wizard, who protected the city of Naples from all evils. The tales are very naïve, the bronze fly, the bronze horse, the bronze statue with bent bow, the palladium in a narrow-necked bottle; but they are instructive in a study of the mediæval intellect. The author shows how the legends originated at Naples, were transferred in part to Rome, and thence entered into the popular literatures of all western Europe.

The whole volume is of great interest. Many apparent inconsistencies are explained; for example, the frequent association, in renaissance art, of Vergil with David, Isaiah and the other prophets and his connection with the "Bocca della Verità." The illustrations are drawn from a wide range of reading; and the whole has been carefully analyzed and reproduced in an exceptionally clear and interesting form. In fact, the work in Italian has long enjoyed a recognition justly due to its many merits.

The translation is accurate and easy in style, (too easy occasionally, see *c. g.*, p. 361). It has been made from the proof sheets of the second edition, so that it "has the advantage of the author's latest revision." But we venture to say that his revision is not very thorough, as we find unchanged some references which, although in place at the time the book was first published, should now be altered to later and more scholarly editions. The greatest fault of the work is the lack of an index. The volume contains a wealth of information and of references to many important topics, but we have not even head-lines to guide us in a search for any particular subject. This is peculiarly exasperating in a book which might be valuable to a careful student.

DANA C. MUNRO.

Histoire des institutions monarchiques dans le royaume latin de Jerusalem, 1099-1291. Par GASTON DODU. Pp. xiv., 381. Paris: Hachette et Cie. 1894.

In the six chapters of this work, M. Dodu describes the geographical and political conditions of the kingdom, the character of the Latin monarchy; the military service; the financial organization; the judicial power; and the relations existing between the king and the clergy.

According to the author's views, the king was restricted at every point in the exercise of his powers. As political and military chief he was dependent on the good-will of the barons. In judicial

matters he merely presided over and announced the decisions of a court of the barons. He was always in financial straits. His income, which should have been large, if we consider its extensive sources, was constantly depleted by concessions to individuals and orders, in order to obtain their aid. Each new body of crusaders might prove a source of weakness to the cause as their good-will had to be bought by new concessions, and these were always permanent. The monarch was frequently at strife with the clergy, because the latter were attempting to carry out the Gregorian program.

Most of these statements are undoubtedly accurate. M. Dodu's work nevertheless is open to grave criticism. The period which we wish to understand is that before the capture of Jerusalem in 1187. After that the kingdom was never powerful; the kings were, for the most part, mere figure-heads. Jerusalem was recovered only for a brief period by the diplomatic successes of Frederic II. The last hundred years have little interest in a study of the causes of the downfall of the kingdom. Now the source on which our author mainly relies for the interpretation of the attributes of the monarch is the work of Jean d'Ibelin. This author wrote about 1255, and does not himself profess to give an exact picture of the conditions which existed before that time. He had been at war with Frederic II, and had an interest in belittling the power of the king, as had also the other authors of the time who furnish almost all the material which M. Dodu has used. It is very easy to point out errors in Jean d'Ibelin's book; *e. g.*, his account of the coronation of the kings, the fiefs of the clergy, etc. Now, can we trust this author when he describes the powers of the king? M. Dodu has done so, although he admits that the chroniclers contradict d'Ibelin in other matters. A thirteenth century author, with a decided reason for prejudice, is an unsatisfactory authority for the twelfth century. Similarly, M. Dodu follows William of Tyre too implicitly for the events of the early years of the kingdom. The learned bishop is an excellent authority for the events of his own time, but should not be trusted for the previous decades, for which we have better contemporary sources.

Outside of his own subject M. Dodu is careless. References in some cases are multiplied with no reason and lay the author open to uncharitable criticism. Giesebrecht's "*Geschichte der deutschen Kaiserzeit*" ends in 1180,* but is quoted on page 154 for the reign of Frederic II.

The introduction (pp. 1-72) is a summary of the sources for this work, with a select bibliography of secondary works. It is well done

* This was written before the publication of the sixth volume.

and is the most useful bibliography of the subject available. The volume is adequately indexed and has an appendix containing genealogical tables for the different kings.

DANA C. MUNRO.

A History of Slavery and Serfdom. By JOHN KELLS INGRAM, LL. D.
Pp. 285. Price, \$1.60. London: Adam and Charles Black; New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

The volume before us contains in an expanded form, Dr. Ingram's article on slavery in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*. Being written for the general reader, its aim is to present "such broad views and general ideas in relation to the history of slavery as ought to be a part of the mental furniture of all educated persons."

In the introductory chapter which is perhaps the best in the book, Dr. Ingram discusses slavery as a step in the development of civilization. As we examine the history of civilization we find that slavery marks a distinct advance on the condition preceding it. In the hunter period the savage kills his conquered enemy. In the pastoral state slavery is not found, but when an agricultural state is reached we again find this institution. Slavery had its "natural and appropriate place" in the military states of antiquity. As the existence of these states was necessary to human development, we must recognize the institution as a "necessary step in human progress." Slavery, says the author, discharged important offices in "the later social evolution—first, by enabling military action to prevail with a degree of intensity and continuity requisite for the system of incorporation by conquest which was its final destination; and secondly, by forcing the captives, who with their descendants came to form the majority of the population in the conquering community, to a life of industry, in spite of the antipathy to regular and sustained labor which is deeply rooted in human nature, especially in the earlier stages of the social movement when *insouciance* is so common a trait, and irresponsibility is hailed as a welcome relief. . . . Nowhere has productive industry developed itself in the form of voluntary effort."

The introduction is followed by chapters on slavery in ancient Greece and Rome and chapters dealing respectively with the transition to serfdom and its abolition. These four chapters are well written and bring together a great deal of information on slavery and serfdom. The main facts, however, as might perhaps be expected, are such as ought to be familiar to persons who are well read in history.

The next three chapters are devoted to the growth and decadence of negro slavery, which, says our author, was "politically, as well as morally a monstrous aberration and never produced anything but evil." What is said about the abolition of slavery in the United States cannot fail to be of interest to us as coming from a distinguished and unprejudiced foreigner. Of course the facts are so familiar as to need no rehearsal but some of his comments may be noticed. The author's view of the bearing of reconstruction on the question of slavery is expressed as follows: "The reconstruction was essential to secure the great objects in view; and even those who believe with the writer of these lines, that the Union in its present dimensions cannot long continue to exist, may rejoice at its full re-establishment, as having been necessary for the liberation and subsequent protection of the whole black population and the guidance of the South to a social system based on free labor." The position of the negroes of America is not finally determined, in Dr. Ingram's opinion. He refers to the well-known strained relations at present existing in our Southern States, and the only solution for the difficulties of our position seems to him to be the oft-advocated emigration of the colored population, which should not, however, be forced upon them. We are inclined to dispute this proposition as well as the one about the early dissolution of the Union, but space does not allow a discussion of these topics.

In the last chapter of the book the author discusses slavery in Russia and the Mohammedan East. The slavery which existed in Russia until quite recently, and which still exists in the Mohammedan countries is of a much milder type than the African slavery of America. It is in these countries slavery of the household not of the field. The slave is in a sense a member of the family, is affectionately treated and is not regarded as degraded. The fact that one has been a slave is no hindrance to his rising to the highest social position. Such slavery can be looked upon with a kind of toleration and with a confidence that with an advance in civilization it will pass away. Back of it, however, and supporting it is the slave trade, "with its systematic man-hunting, which . . . is still the curse of Africa." The present problem, then, before the leading nations of the world is the encouragement of the abolition of slavery in Eastern countries and the doing of all in their power to suppress the existing trade. Efforts have long been made in this direction and a naval blockade has been maintained on the east coast of Africa. This has been only partially successful. Dr. Ingram thinks that the slave trade is likely to continue until those parts of Africa most affected have been pierced by European railways and telegraph

lines. However, a resolute effort on the part of the Powers might hasten the extinction of this hateful traffic.

On the whole, Dr. Ingram's book is a very successful attempt to condense into one volume the leading facts about slavery. It stands alone in English literature and will be correspondingly useful to students of social phenomena. An excellent bibliography accompanies the work, but it is without an index, an omission which is a reproach alike to author and publisher.

JOHN HAYNES.

The Origin and Development of the United States Senate. By CLARA HANNAH KERR, Ph. D. Pp. 197. Ithaca, N. Y. Andrus & Church, 1895.

In this monograph, Dr. Kerr describes the development of the Senate from the time when a second house was proposed in the Convention of 1787, to the present day. She has given special attention to the way in which the Senate has exercised its constitutional powers and the manner in which it has deviated from the purpose of the framers of our Constitution. The work shows signs of careful study, and is a valuable addition to the constantly growing literature bearing upon our institutional history.

In dealing with the choice of senators, the question whether or not the governor of a State may "make appointments to fill vacancies caused by the expiration of terms of office" is briefly discussed and it is stated that "in 1879 and 1885, it was held that the governor had the right to make appointments in such cases." Whether the Senate voted on any case which would make a valid precedent is not stated, but the fact that a decision to the contrary has since been made by the Senate in the case of claimants for seats in the Fifty-third Congress would seem to throw doubt on the matter. The omission of any reference to these recent and important cases, which occupied much time and drew forth several able constitutional arguments, is a serious and surprising fault in the present monograph.

The author considers it an important departure from the original intention regarding the election of senators "that the question of the choice of a senator enters into the elections to the State legislature and that candidates are pledged in advance to vote for particular persons for senator," and says that the election in many cases is "practically direct." The statement that these elections are even in a limited number of cases "practically direct" cannot be accepted as accurate. The very fact that there is a growing demand that the election of senators be made direct by constitutional amendment

proves that they are not so under our present system. The fact is that the present method has the advantages neither of an indirect choice nor of a direct election and with its complicated machinery is an effective instrument in the hands of the professional politician.

The author gives nearly ten pages to the discussion of the ways in which debate is limited, and the proposals which have been made for more effective measures. As early as 1840, Clay proposed the introduction of the previous question to overcome the abuse which the minority had made of the unlimited privilege of debate. Since then the so-called courtesy of the Senate has been repeatedly and grossly abused, and as Dr. Kerr says "has raised in the minds of the people a very general contempt for the body." The only way in which the Senate can proceed to a vote on a question is by unanimous consent. Dr. Kerr quotes without comment the suggestion of Judge Cooley made during the pendency of the bill to repeal the Sherman Silver Act in 1893, that "members of the majority should make the proper motions looking to a definite and final action on the pending measure and the presiding officer should recognize them; since only in that way can the inalienable right of the Senate to express its will be exercised." These words of Judge Cooley cover the whole case and deserve the most emphatic endorsement. Our author thinks there is no probability of a change in the rules.

One of the strongest and most interesting portions of the monograph is that part of the chapter on the Senate as an executive body which treats of its relations to the appointments of the President. Dr. Kerr quotes from Hamilton his description of what all must agree is the only legitimate and constitutional exercise of the power of confirmation. "It will be the office of the President," said Hamilton, "to *nominate*, and with the advice and consent of the Senate to *appoint*. There will of course, be no exertion of *choice* on the part of the Senators. They may defeat one *choice* of the Executive and oblige him to make another, but they cannot themselves *choose*—they can only ratify or reject the choice of the President." Instead of this sound practice it has become "a fixed rule that a nomination would be rejected if the Senator of the state concerned declared it to be unfit and finally on the mere ground that the nomination was personally obnoxious to him." In this and other ways the freedom of nomination has passed from the President to the various Senators and members of Congress, and the Executive must now first obtain the approval of the Senators from the state in which the appointment is to be made. To such a pass have matters gone that one-third of the working time of Senators was said, by Garfield, to be occupied in the distribution of patronage.

This forces Senators to neglect their legislative duties and tempts them to make their support of an administration dependent upon getting appointments for their friends. This change is truly characterized by our author as a usurpation on the part of the Senate.

In addition to the topics we have mentioned the discussions of party caucuses, of secret sessions, of the treaty-making power and of impeachments contained in the monograph are worthy of particular attention.

JOHN HAYNES.

NOTES ON MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT.

[This department of the *ANNALS* will endeavor to place before the members of the Academy matters of interest which serve to illustrate the municipal activity of the larger cities of Europe and America. Among the contributors are James W. Pryor, Esq., Secretary City Club, New York City; Sylvester Baxter, Esq., *Boston Herald*, Boston; Samuel B. Capen, Esq., President Municipal League, Boston; A. L. Crocker, Esq., President Board of Trade, Minneapolis; Victor Rosewater, Ph. D., *Omaha Bee*, Omaha; Professor John Henry Gray, Chairman Committee on Municipal Affairs, Civic Federation, Chicago; Jerome H. Raymond, Ph. D., University of Wisconsin; F. L. Siddons, Esq., Washington, D. C.; Donald B. MacLaurin, Esq., President Civic Federation, Detroit, Mich.; Professor A. C. Richardson, Buffalo, N. Y.; M. B. May, Esq., Cincinnati, Ohio; W. B. Spencer, Esq., New Orleans; William H. Parry, Esq., Comptroller City of Seattle, Wash.]

AMERICAN CITIES.

Street Railways in the United States.

The 1895 edition of "American Street Railway Investments," contains much valuable information concerning the development of street railway systems during the year from May 1, 1894, to May 1, 1895.* One very general fact which the history of the last year emphasizes is the process of street railway consolidation in all the larger cities of the United States. Owing to the fact that the electric motor system has been very generally introduced, the changes within the last year have not been of the importance of the two preceding years. In Boston, for instance, the last year shows but very little change, owing to the fact that in the central portions of the city, the narrowness of the streets and the congested condition of traffic will not permit of the extension of street railway lines. In Chicago, the present year stands in direct contrast with the remarkable prosperity of all street railway lines during the period of the World's Fair. In New York City, the surface roads have been encroaching very seriously upon the traffic of the elevated lines. The introduction of the improved cable system along the lines of the Sixth and Third Avenue Elevated has reduced the gross earnings of the Manhattan Elevated by nearly one million dollars. The surface lines of the same streets show a corresponding increase of earnings. The experience of New York City seems to prove that, unless some means of reaching elevated roads other than stair climbing, can be

* "American Street Railway Investments," a supplement to the *Street Railway Journal*, Edw. E. Higgins, editor, Havemeyer Building, 26 Courtlandt street, New York City.

provided, the increased rapidity which new motive powers has made possible on surface lines, will permanently affect the position of the former.

New York.—The recent sale of a street railway franchise in New York City illustrates very well the operation of the new street railway law. This act, as passed in 1886, and amended 1891, provides for the sale at public auction of all street railway franchises and prescribes as a minimum return to the city, 3 per cent of the gross receipts during the first five years, and 5 per cent thereafter. In the sale of the right to operate a line thirteen and one-half miles in length in the suburban sections of the city, the Third Avenue and the Traction Companies were lively bidders for the franchise. The highest bidder was the Third Avenue Company, to which the franchise was awarded.

The terms agreed upon are as follows: In addition to the 3 per cent of the gross receipts during the first five years, and the 5 per cent thereafter, which the law prescribes as a minimum, the company agrees to pay 38½ per cent of its gross receipts into the city treasury. Also a bonus of \$250,000. In order to protect the city and to assure the payment of this large percentage, the Comptroller required the company to execute a bond for \$500,000 at the time of sale. These, however, are not the only conditions which have been attached to the granting of the franchise. The ordinances empowering the Comptroller to receive bids in accordance with the Act of 1891, contains the additional stipulations: First, that the fare over the entire line shall not exceed five cents and, in case branch roads are constructed, free transfers must be issued. Secondly, that no overhead trolley system shall be constructed south of 162d street; though north of that line, overhead trolleys are permitted for the period of ten years. Thirdly, the companies are required to keep the street between the tracks and two feet beyond the rail on each side, clean and free from dirt and snow. Fourthly, that they shall pave the streets between the rails and two feet on each side, to conform in all respects to the paving in other portions of the said streets. Fifth, the cars are to be properly and sufficiently heated during cold weather on pain of penalty of ten dollars per day for each car not so heated.

*The Recent Elections in New York City.**

When the county convention of the Good Government Clubs met upon the twenty-eighth of August of this year, the leaders of the Committee of Seventy were not in the city, and no general movement

* Communication of James W. Pryor, Esq.

for concerted action against Tammany Hall had been proposed. That convention adjourned, leaving in the hands of an executive committee the task of continuing preparations for the approaching campaign. After nearly a month of preparatory work, the committee called another convention. At this meeting, on the thirtieth of September, a majority of the committee presented a report recommending adjournment after appointing a committee to confer with all organizations opposed to Tammany Hall with a view to agreeing upon a ticket. The minority of the committee, however, presented a report advocating the nomination of a ticket without any attempt to confer with organizations known to be not entirely in harmony with the principles of the Good Government Clubs, and insisting that such conference could result only in a ticket designed in part, at least, to strengthen the political machines. The minority report prevailed; and the convention nominated candidates for eight of the ten places which were to be filled at the election. The following day Dr. Parkhurst sent a telegram to Mr. Charles Stewart Smith, chairman of the committee on political reform of the Chamber of Commerce, condemning the action of the Good Government Convention, and declaring that it was necessary for the Chamber of Commerce to take action. The Chamber of Commerce met on Thursday, the third of October; and out of this meeting grew the Committee of Fifty. This committee proceeded, through a sub-committee of five appointed by its executive committee, to undertake the task of bringing about a union against Tammany Hall. On Monday, the seventh of October, this committee of five had succeeded, through a series of conferences, in making up a ticket, which, with slight modifications, was nominated that evening by the adjourned conventions of the Republicans and the State Democracy. The convention of the Good Government Clubs met on the following day, and, after a long debate, decided not to support this fusion ticket but to keep its own ticket in the field. The campaign which followed cannot be detailed here. The division which thus took place in the ranks of the sincere friends of good city government is probably unprecedented in the history of municipal reform movements in this country. The Committee of Fifty, representing much of the intelligence and wealth of the community, contended that the one necessary thing was to defeat Tammany Hall, while the Good Government Clubs, as represented in the convention, held that a victory of Tammany through a sacrifice of the principles which the clubs had always declared to be essential would be a defeat rather than a victory. An address was issued by the Good Government Campaign Committee, on the thirteenth of October, in which the dangers of compromise with regular party organizations were

pointed out, especially with reference to division of offices. The Committee of Fifty also issued an address upon the nineteenth of October, in which the necessity of the union of all anti-Tammany forces, no matter what their party affiliations, was pointed out.

Upon the lines thus indicated, the argument between the friends of the respective tickets proceeded. The Good Government Committee pointed out that at two successive county conventions the Good Government Clubs had adopted platforms declaring that the clubs would support "for municipal and county offices only such candidates as represent our principles, and whose characters and careers inspire confidence in the sincerity of their professions;" and that it was, therefore, impossible to support a ticket which, like the fusion ticket, was in part made up for the purpose of strengthening the national parties in city politics, and of placing important patronage in the hands of politicians for political purposes. It is true that no concealment was made of the fact that the Republicans nominated the fusion candidate for County Clerk with the distinct understanding that he was to enjoy the considerable patronage of the office, and that the State Democracy representatives on the ticket were named by the machine of that organization. Four of the fusion candidates were also upon the Good Government ticket. The other candidates upon that ticket were undoubtedly superior to the corresponding candidates upon the fusion ticket. The Good Government ticket as a whole was generally admitted to be above criticism. Tammany elected its entire ticket by pluralities varying from 18,000 to 24,000. The Good Government ticket received but a small vote, although it is probable that the actual number was considerably greater than the one thousand six hundred returned. In the course of the campaign, some seven or eight of the twenty Good Government Clubs repudiated the action of the convention in nominating and in keeping the ticket in the field; and several of these clubs went so far as to endorse the fusion ticket.

The result of the election is not the "return of Tammany to power," fear of which was expressed before the fifth of November. The election gives to Tammany the offices of Register and County Clerk, both of which have been filled by Tammany men for a number of years, and eight judgeships, of which four are new and the remainder are now filled by Tammany men except so far as the Governor has appointed men to fill vacancies.

An interesting feature of the election was the new party-column blanket ballot, used this year for the first time. While the actual voting was greatly facilitated in comparison with the election of last year, when each voter was compelled to select from about twenty

official ballots, the objections made to the party-column ballot when it was under discussion proved serious in the actual process of election. The contention that the ballot would greatly discourage independent voting, and would tend in various ways to disfranchise the elector, was amply sustained by the result. In respect to the supreme court judgeships, about ten thousand ballots were declared defective in this city.

Mayor Strong has recently appointed a new board of Park Commissioners, in place of the commissioners who recently resigned, after serving a short time. The new appointments are excellent, and the board can be counted upon to serve the public faithfully and intelligently.

Philadelphia.—On Monday, November 11, 1895, the Senate Investigating Committee held its first session. This committee was appointed in pursuance of a resolution adopted by the State Senate to obtain such information as might be useful to the end that proper legislation "may be enacted to remedy and prevent such abuses as may be found to exist in the legislation and government of cities of the first class." Inasmuch as Philadelphia is the only city of the first class, the object of the resolution was directed toward the investigation of local affairs. At the outset, the effect of the resolution and the purpose of the committee were blocked by the refusal of the lower house to appropriate the funds necessary to carry on the investigation. In order to make the investigation possible, the Citizen's Municipal Association guaranteed to furnish the \$20,000 asked for. As a result, this association has been collecting evidence, and the attorneys for the committee are in fact the attorneys of the association. At the opening session, Mr. Freedley, of the counsel for the committee, stated that the field of inquiry would be divided into an investigation; first, as to municipal contracts; and, secondly, as to municipal wrongs. He laid particular stress upon the former, claiming that there was distinct evidence that municipal contracts were not enforced in the same spirit as the contracts of private associations.

The attention of the committee will for some time to come be directed to the making and enforcement of contracts relating to highways.

The recent experience of the city of Philadelphia with the street railway companies illustrates very clearly the general method of dealing with this service in the United States. The consolidation of the three great companies referred to in the November ANNALS, is now an accomplished fact. With the enormous capital at their disposal, together with the economy which unified management and

control must make possible, the opportunities for improved service as well as increased payments by the companies to the city, were such as they had never been before. At this point, however, the comparative helplessness of the city became apparent. In granting the franchises, no adequate right of regulation was reserved, and absolutely no mention of any future control over the rates of fare.

One of the first acts of the newly consolidated company was to abolish the transfer system, to fix single fares at five cents, and to issue exchange tickets for eight cents. The City Council sent a petition requesting the directors not to make this change, but this was disregarded. The increased rates will weigh most heavily upon the class least able to bear them. By far the largest majority of the laboring classes who, living in the extreme northern or southern sections of the city, are compelled to travel long distances, will find the increase of three cents per trip a considerable addition to their expense accounts. It has been calculated that the increase in the price of exchange tickets will, if the traffic continues as at present, increase the receipts of the company by nearly \$2,500,000, and that upon the income of those earning less than \$10 per week the increased rates will be equivalent to an income tax of about 3 6-10 per cent. It remains to be seen whether this addition of three cents will so influence the traffic as to compel the companies to return to the former condition. It is perfectly possible for the city, in the exercise of its police power, so to hamper the company as to make some concession on their part necessary. The indirect effect of arousing public opinion to the importance of the problem of public transportation may not be altogether fruitless.

This action of the companies has sufficiently aroused public sentiment to compel Councils to make an investigation as to the relation between the city and the companies. Whatever may be the practical result of this investigation, the fact that it will lead to a more definite recognition and formulation of the rights and powers of the city and the obligation of the companies, will represent a distinctive gain in local administrative relations. The investigation which has been placed in the hands of a sub-committee of the Law Committee of Councils, has submitted to the City Solicitor a series of questions which practically cover the field. They ask, first, for the conditions attached to the charters and ordinances under which the various companies operate. Second, the powers of the city of Philadelphia under the law, through police power and under the conditions attached to charters and ordinances as to hours of employment; frequency of service; regulation of fares; removal of poles

and wires; fenders, and protection of motormen from exposure. Third, the remedies of the city in the enforcement of conditions and the prevention of further infraction. Fourth, the proper remedy of the city for the removal of unused tracks. Fifth, the legal relations of consolidated and constituent companies of the city. The answer to these questions, coming from authoritative sources, will do much to prepare the way for a definite adjustment of the relation between our cities and street railway companies, when, as must necessarily be the case, they are passed upon by the courts.

The Director of Public Works has made an important statement with regard to the gas works of the city, the occasion of which was a proposition made by a private company to furnish gas in certain sections of the city for fuel purposes, at the rate of 70 cents per thousand cubic feet. The Director, in opposing this encroachment upon the domain of municipal activity, states that if Councils will provide the necessary money for the plant, the city will be able to furnish fuel gas at less than 70 cents and still make a profit. It is certain that if Councils adopts the policy of granting such rights to private companies, the problem of making the city gas works a profitable investment will become an increasingly difficult one. Inasmuch as the city will be able to offer the same, if not greater advantages than private companies, there seems to be no adequate reason for thus weakening the position of the city's works.

The ninth annual report of the Citizen's Municipal Association of Philadelphia, shows the possibilities of public benefits which associations such as this are in a position to confer upon the community. During the year, April 1894-95, the Association has been active in its endeavor to maintain a strict supervision of municipal contracts and in maintaining a watchful supervision over the granting of municipal franchises. In three different cases it has been the means of forcing upon public attention abuses which might otherwise have escaped notice. The first was in the case of the Queen Lane reservoir, which was shown to be defective in construction and unfit for the purposes for which it was intended. In the second, the Association was the means of forcing upon the attention of Councils the circumstances under which valuable franchises had been granted, and finally, when the State Senate investigation into municipal conditions of Philadelphia was in danger of falling to the ground for lack of funds, the Association came forward with a guarantee of \$20,000, for the purposes of the committee.

Brooklyn.—The rapidity with which the work of consolidating companies enjoying municipal franchises is proceeding, is shown by the recent union of the Brooklyn gas companies. The new

company has been organized with a capital of \$30,000,000. Fortunately for the city sufficient power is given to the public authorities to take advantage of the increased facilities which this consolidation makes possible. Under an act passed in 1895,* municipal authorities are authorized to contract for the lighting of streets for a period not exceeding fifteen years; such contract to be made at public sale, and to provide for progressive reduction in price. The interesting principle contained in the act, is, that in such contracts for public lighting, there shall be a provision that "during the term therein specified, the corporation party thereto, may and shall supply gas to the inhabitants of such city at prices lower than those now or then charged therein by such corporation party thereto, and progressively lower for each year of such term." In the awarding of contracts, the schedule of rates for private consumption is to be taken into account in determining the relative merits of different offers.

San Francisco.†—There seems to be a general demand for a new charter. Up to the present time the city has not been able to avail itself fully of the new constitutional provisions adopted in 1880, which gave to the city the power to frame its own charter. As originally framed, the constitutional provision gave to all cities with a population exceeding 100,000 the power to call a local constitutional convention, to consist of fifteen freeholders, whose duty "it shall be, within ninety days after such election, to prepare and propose a charter for such city," and "within not less than thirty days after its publication, such charter shall be submitted to the qualified electors of such city, at a general or special election." If adopted by a majority of the qualified electors, it is then submitted to the State Legislature for approval or rejection. When approved by a majority of the members of each House, it becomes the charter of the city.

Subsequent amendments to the State Constitution have extended this privilege to cities with a population of over 3500. In 1880, 1883 and 1887, San Francisco made an attempt to avail itself of the provisions, but in each case, the charter as drafted was rejected by the people. As a result, the condition of the city's government, at the present time, is anything but satisfactory. The constitution forbids special city legislation, but the division of the cities into classes makes it possible to pass what, in its effect, is special legislation as regards San Francisco. The question of the extent of the power of the Legislature introduces an element of uncertainty into the situation, which is extremely harmful. City officials must keep a sharp lookout on the doings of the Legislature at Sacramento and

* Known as the Wray Act. Chapter 300. Laws of New York, 1895.

† Based on the communication of L. T. Milliken, Esq.

when legislation affecting San Francisco is enacted, doubt as to the constitutionality of the measures very often exists. For instance, at the last session an act was passed regulating primary elections, and providing for a board of election commissioners for the city and county of San Francisco. The decision of the Supreme Court is being awaited to decide as to its constitutionality. Another question, which has introduced an element of uncertainty into the administration of the city, has been as to the exact relations existing between the city and county of San Francisco, which were made co-terminous by the Consolidation Act of 1856. Recently the Board of Supervisors levied a tax for city and county purposes. One item of considerable importance was for a new city hall. The Mayor attempted to veto the levy, but in view of the uncertainty of his powers, the question will have to be passed upon by the Supreme Court. San Francisco thus offers an excellent illustration of the administrative chaos to which constant legislative interference must necessarily lead.

Cincinnati*—Cincinnati will begin the new year with an increase of population and territory. In 1893 the Legislature passed an act allowing the people of Cincinnati and contiguous municipal corporations to vote on the question of annexation, and in 1894 the electors by an overwhelming majority decided to annex to the city the municipalities of Avondale, Clifton, Riverside, Linwood and Westwood. The report of the Annexation Commissioners which has been approved by the Court of Common Pleas shows that the assessment of the city will be increased by some ten million dollars and a population of over sixteen thousand added to the city.

This annexation will necessitate the formation of new wards and will add many new members to the Board of Legislature (City Council), and the Board of Education. As these suburbs were the home mainly of merchants and families of comfortable incomes, a very desirable addition has been made to the citizen body which it is hoped will show its effect in the personnel of the governing authorities.

The annexation of the five largest contiguous corporations of Hamilton County, suggests the advisability of making the city co-extensive with the county, and in all probability some legislation to that end will be attempted by the new Legislature which convenes in January, 1896.

The Cincinnati Municipal Civil Service Reform Association, which was reorganized last year, is taking active measures to secure

* Communication of M. B. May, Esq.

favorable legislation for the reform of the local civil service. At a recent meeting of the Executive Committee, a sub-committee was appointed to act with similar committees in Cleveland and other large cities with the view to drafting suitable bills to be presented to the next Legislature.

New Orleans.*—The campaign for municipal reform in New Orleans was fairly begun this month by the organization of the "Citizens' League." This movement is an outgrowth of the agitation that has been carried on during the past two years by the Bailot Reform League, which has taken the active lead in the reformation of the defective election and registration laws now on the statute books. In view of the fact that our State and municipal elections take place at the same time, and the fact that the city "*ring*" has shown a complete disregard of every interest of the city, it was deemed expedient to merge the issue of honest elections and suffrage laws with that of good city government. The result of this amalgamation has been beneficial to both causes, so that it is now confidently believed that the ring will be overthrown at the approaching election in April.

The "Citizens' League" is organized on strictly non-partisan lines, and is pledged to the reformation of election and registration laws; an absolutely clean municipal ticket; the enactment of a new city charter, embracing as a prominent feature, civil service reform in all departments; and the revision of the criminal procedure of our courts with a view to the speedy and impartial trial of criminals. The belief of the organizers of the League is that if any permanent reform is to be secured, it must be based on the enactment of laws that will secure to each citizen the opportunity to record his preference in elections with the assurance that it will receive due effect. It is the common experience of all, that under present conditions it is impossible to prevail upon many citizens of the so-called "better element" to actively participate in political affairs. Appreciating the importance of the present opportunity, the League will endeavor to effect at one time the most essential reforms in the organization and administration of the municipal affairs of this city. The many abuses to be corrected will give it ample work during the time intervening before the election in April, and the industry and patriotism of its members will be taxed to the utmost in completing the work of organization and in preparing for the vast work on hand.

Thus far the results have been most encouraging. It was found

*Communication of Walker B. Spencer, Esq.

easy to enlist the most influential citizens, and many who were never known to engage actively in political affairs have taken posts requiring untiring exertions.

In order to better carry out its schemes of reform, the League has established commissions, composed of the most eminent men in the city, to whom have been referred the preparation of the legislation necessary to the above mentioned reforms. In the meantime the main body itself will devote its energies to the conduct of the campaign proper.

At present almost a majority of its City Council is under indictment for bribery, and it is momentarily expected that the present grand jury will find true bills against quite a number in addition. The indictment of these men, however, has never suggested to the Mayor the propriety of suspending them from office, as he has a right to do. The only commendable feature about the councilmanic corruption is that it is so open and flagrant that conviction is sure, once a trial is had; but the interminable delays and technical obstacles that our criminal procedure enables them to interpose has thus far saved most of them from the penitentiary. Unfortunately we cannot even boast that the stern hand of the law is felt only in the Council Chamber. The Mayor was tried by the courts for malfeasance in office, and many were of the opinion that he should have been removed, except, unfortunately, the three judges who sat in the case. He was so elated over his "vindication" that he has asked Councils to appropriate \$5000 to pay his counsel, which was promptly complied with. In view of the fact that two of the three judges owed their positions directly to him, the public at large does not view this vindication in the same light. These indictments have led to further revelations. A prominent banker and financier, the purchaser of a most valuable street railway franchise embracing some fifty miles of street railways, was indicted for perjury in connection with his testimony before the grand jury in relation to that transaction. His high standing and his vehement protestations of innocence induced many to believe he had been greatly wronged. He demanded a speedy trial, and was accommodated, and to his great surprise as promptly convicted. Soon after the community was startled by his confession of guilt, and the implication of another prominent man of affairs, who had been the successful purchaser of the lighting, drainage and garbage franchises.

Washington*—The present form of government of the District of Columbia is just about twenty-one years old, and in framing it, so

*Communication of F. L. Siddons, Esq.

it is claimed, the attempt was made to establish its true or constitutional relations to the national government. Perhaps it will not be amiss to outline in a very brief way the salient features of the District government.

To begin with, it is absolutely non-representative, its 300,000 inhabitants, more or less, having no voice or part in its administration. Congress is its legislature and a board of three Commissioners, appointed or designated by the President, constitutes the local executive authority. Its judges are appointed by the President, and their tenure is for life. The majority has been appointed from without the District and learn our law in the process of expounding it.

The national government contributes 50 per cent of the total cost of running the local government, and the remaining 50 per cent is raised by taxing the people and property of the District. And here we reach the first municipal reproach and the most important one.

Our system of taxation, if it can be so dignified, is antiquated in the extreme and possesses all those vices that make a system unjust and oppressive. Real estate, meaning land only; improvements, meaning buildings of all kinds on land, and personal property are the supposed subjects of taxation. Licenses to carry on various occupations are another source of revenue.

Let us take the first mentioned subject of taxation—real estate. From the very foundation of Washington as the seat of the Federal Government, speculation in real estate has been its bane. Visitors to the District as they gaze at the noble pile composing the Capitol often wonder why it faces east when so small and comparatively unimportant a part of the District lies in that direction, and when the view is so much finer both of the city and surrounding country in the opposite direction. Speculation in real estate during the early days of the city's life, did it. The Capitol was built facing the east because it was believed and intended that the city would grow in that direction, but the land speculator was at work and holding the land lying east of the Capitol at outrageously high prices, the legitimate investor was driven west of the building for his home site. In this instance the speculators deservedly suffered but they found a foothold here, and here they have remained ever since.

Land held for speculative purposes is assessed at a fraction of its real value and this is true also relatively speaking of the more valuable business and residential properties. The land on which the small home stands is assessed generally at very near its true value, and thus it is that the home-owner pays the bulk of the tax on land,

while acres of desirable home sites are held out of use by those who do not bear their just share of taxation, and who quietly wait until the community shall increase there. And so with improvements. Large office buildings and business houses of all kinds with unusual income producing powers are assessed at from 35 to 55 per cent of their value, while humble homes everywhere are assessed at from 65 per cent to beyond their real value.

The personal property tax is worse than a failure. After repeated attempts to assess and collect it fairly without the slightest success, it has now become practically a dead letter, and its repeal is yearly recommended by the assessor and District Commissioners. A considerable revenue is collected from liquor licenses and licenses on a number of small occupations, which as to the latter, at least, in simple justice should not be imposed.

Like the real estate speculator, the corporations of the District escape with little taxation. The great street railway companies that have secured the most valuable franchises without compensation to the District, are but slightly taxed, and the lighting monopolies are likewise favored. Indeed it would be difficult to find a city in the country where corporate aggression is held less in check than at the national capital.

As was said before the system of taxation prevailing in the District is the first and most serious municipal reproach, but no effort is being made to remove it, and none is likely to be while the powers that now control District legislation remain in the ascendancy. And this they are likely to do so long as the people of Washington are denied the means of making known their grievances and themselves correcting them by the ordinary means that in enlightened political communities are at the disposal of the inhabitants.

Omaha*—The late local campaign in the city of Omaha was fought out on the lines of reform, and resulted in the defeat of the reform element. Strengthened by the decision in the Police Commission case previously described, and in complete possession of the machinery of the municipality, and the Republican party, the A. P. A. faction nominated a ticket composed largely of members of the combine in control of the city government. Three Councilmen were nominated for promotion to other offices, the City Clerk was renominated, the deputy of the Comptroller, to whose neglect of duty the late \$30,000 treasury defalcation is in part ascribed, was nominated for the Comptrollership, while the president of the new Police Commission headed the ticket as the candidate for Mayor.

* Communication of Victor Rosewater, Ph. D., Omaha.

Opposed to this A. P. A. Republican aggregation was the ticket nominated by the Citizens' Reform League, and endorsed by the Democrats and in part by the Populists. The reform Council and School Board tickets were composed entirely of representative business and professional men, and the reform campaign was conducted on a platform of retrenchment and economy. For three or four city offices there were third candidates in the field, but they played no important part in the result.

The campaign was short and sharp. The machine appeared to be too strongly entrenched, and the outcome was the election of the entire A. P. A. city ticket with the exception of two candidates for the city Council. The newly elected officers assume their duties January first, when they will be confronted with a financial problem that will tax their abilities to the utmost.

FOREIGN CITIES.

London.—The County Council has again taken up the question of the relation of the metropolis to the city of London, and more especially the Livery Companies. These companies, as was pointed out in speaking of the Royal Commission Report are the legal successors to the mediæval guilds. They have, however, entirely lost their significance as trade organizations and represent nothing more than social and benevolent associations which have inherited important property rights formerly belonging to the city's guilds. The County Council wishes if possible to restrain the companies from alienating their property and to ensure the dedication of this property to objects of public utility. The Royal Commission which inquired into this subject made recommendations of the same character, but Parliament has not as yet acted thereon. As the annual income of these companies exceeds three and one-half million dollars, the possibility of public improvements through the use of this sum is considerable.

Berlin.—The development of municipal savings banks within the last few years has acquired an importance which gives to them very respectable standing as compared with other public and private banking institutions. The German cities have taken hold of this question with an energy and vigor characteristic of other departments of the administration. The annual report of the Berlin Savings Bank for the fiscal year 1894-95, gives some extremely interesting facts showing the progress of this institution. On the thirty-first of March, 1895, the total deposits amounted to \$40,000,000 representing an increase of nearly \$3,000,000 over the preceding year.

This increase was due not so much to the larger average deposits, but rather to an increase in the number of depositors. The report shows that while in 1894 there were 484,363, in 1895 the number had increased to 509,732. The number of payments during the year reached 526,292. Of these 178,960 were from 25 cents to \$5, and 162,212 from \$5 to \$15. The total cash capital of the bank is at present somewhat over \$44,000,000; the annual net profits about \$275,000 (1,112,306 marks). There has been considerable difference of opinion as to whether the institution should so increase the rate of interest as to divide the profits among depositors. At present the surplus is devoted to works of public utility. The city authorities have done everything to facilitate and encourage the increase in the number of depositors. At present there are seventy-six receiving offices in different portions of the city.

Vienna.—The position of the capital cities in the general political system has been one of the most difficult administrative problems with which European States have had to deal. England, France, Germany, and Austria have made the attempt to reconcile the principle of local self-government with the supervision which the state must necessarily exercise when questions of national concern are at stake. With the extension of the suffrage, this problem has been becoming increasingly important and complicated. In direct contrast with our American States, we find that in Europe, the great centres of population have been selected as the seat of the central government. In some cases, it is true, selection as the capital city has been the primary cause of rapid growth. In Italy, for instance, the change from Florence to Rome marks the commercial decline of the former and the rapid development of the latter. Within recent years we find a marked tendency toward decentralization, resulting in greater local independence for the capital cities. In the Austrian system, however, this tendency seems to be less marked than in England and Germany.

Recent events in the municipal history of Vienna illustrate the position which the capital cities of Europe occupy in the general political system and at the same time offer some interesting facts as to the development of political and social life in that city. It may be well to give first; the circumstances which led to the peculiar form of government under which Vienna is at present being administered. For some time past the Anti-Semitic party has been gaining strength in municipal elections. As to the cause of this movement, some difference of opinion exists. It is undoubtedly a fact that the Liberal party, which had for some time past been in the ascendancy, especially in the Municipal Council, had dissatisfied the

electoral body by its lack of positive policy in social legislation. This feeling was further strengthened by the fact that in national politics this party had adopted an attitude of conciliation and compromise toward the non-German population of the Empire. One of the fundamental principles of the Anti-Semitic party in both Germany and Austria has been the preservation of what they have termed the distinctively German institutions and national sentiment. In this they have been largely supported by the Conservatives, particularly by the extreme right wing of that party. These facts tended undoubtedly to favor the growth of the more radical elements. As regards the local conditions in Vienna, however, there are certain fundamental economic facts which will tend to explain the surprising growth of the Anti-Semites. From a commercial point of view, the city has never recovered from the disastrous panic of 1873. During the last ten years the struggle for existence among the artisan classes, which is so largely represented in the Viennese population, has been becoming more and more keen. Those industries which lend themselves more particularly to production on a small scale, have formed one of the most important factors in the industrial development of the city. The production of fancy goods of various kinds, toys, leather goods, fans, etc., occupied large classes of the population. Within recent years industry on a large scale has seriously endangered the economic position of these classes. In addition the extraordinary industrial progress of Germany has reduced the importance of Vienna as a great commercial centre. As a result, we find the spirit of discontent rapidly gaining ground, and obtaining expression in an adherence to the party which offers a definite and positive social program, advocates legislation tending to improve the condition of the artisan class, and singling out the Jews as a commercially successful class, makes the attack upon them the centre of political agitation. The leaders in this movement have time and again asserted that it is an economic and not a religious crusade that they are conducting.

Under the circumstances, it is natural that this party, like the Social Democracy in Germany, should have been able to group about itself the discontented element of the population. At the recent municipal elections, held early in November, the Anti-Semitic party was returned to the Municipal Council with ninety-two out of a total of one hundred and thirty-eight members. This large majority seems all the more remarkable when we stop to consider that universal suffrage is not a part of the Austrian system. The electors are divided into three classes: First, those paying a municipal tax of at least 200 florins; secondly, those paying between 30 and 200

florins; and thirdly, all others, that is, those paying more than five and less than thirty florins, together with those of the professional classes who do not come within the other class groups. The age requirement is twenty-five years. Under this system, over 70 per cent of the adult males are excluded from the franchise. In a total population of nearly one and one-half millions, there are but 60,000 electors. Each class elects one-third of the members of the Council. Of the total electors about $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent constitute the first class; 24 per cent the second; $68\frac{1}{2}$ per cent the third class. Under such circumstances, it would seem that the wealth of the community held the balance of power. Sufficient influence, however, seems to have been brought to bear upon the second and third classes and a certain percentage of the first class, to return the Anti-Semites with a two-thirds majority. Under the form of government, the Municipal Council elects the Mayor, whose election, however, is subject to the confirmation of the Emperor. Soon after the first meeting of the new Council, Dr. Lueger, the leader of the Anti-Semitic party, who is also the leader of the national organization, was elected Mayor by a large majority. The consent of the Emperor was withheld and, at a new election, to which the Council proceeded, their former choice was re-affirmed. The municipal code applicable to Vienna* gives the central government power to dissolve the Council and to carry on the government of the city by means of a State Commission. The government immediately made use of this right, dissolved the Council and has placed a Government Commissioner, with fifteen assistants, at the head of the administration of the city. It is important to note the fact that, the supervision over the cities of the Austrian Empire is generally purely administrative. In cases of this kind, however, a legislative element also enters, so there is a combination of administrative and legislative control. The dissolution of the Council and the institution of the Imperial Commission constitute ministerial acts for which the ministers of the crown are responsible to the Imperial Diet. The action of the ministry in this case has been sustained by that body.

In the course of a few weeks the electors of the city will be given another opportunity to elect a Municipal Council, but it is also tolerably certain that the central government will not recede from its position in refusing its assent to the election of a representative of the Anti-Semitic party to the position of Mayor.

As to the question of justification for this extreme form of govern-

* The Municipal Code, § 46, provides that in case the government finds it necessary to dissolve the Municipal Council, a new election shall be provided for within four weeks.

mental interference in local affairs, it must be remembered that in these capital cities far more than merely local interests are concerned. Even as regards interests which, in provincial cities are of purely local importance, such as, for instance, street making, lighting, and the like, the state, owing to the fact that central political authorities are often dependent upon the efficiency of such local service for the proper discharge of their functions, has a distinct interest in the character of municipal services. This necessity of central control becomes all the stronger when we consider functions of more general concern, such as police, and all legislation for the public safety. It is necessary that the central government should at all times be able to assure itself of freedom from interference due to local disturbances. Another fact, which it is important to note in this connection is that, owing to the concentration of the national political life in these cities and the great influence which they exercise on the political opinions of the nation, it becomes a matter of national importance that the municipal administration should not become a machine for purely political purposes. It is impossible to separate local from national politics in the political life of these centres. When, therefore, the local legislature has become of a character to endanger the public interests of the state, there seems to be every reason for an assertion of central authority. In Paris, where the Municipal Council is apt to take a *doctrinaire* and extremely radical view of local affairs and is often tempted to use its powers for purposes of agitation on national subjects, the state has reserved to itself the power of strict control over the execution of the decisions of the Council. It is, of course, an open question whether this assertion of central authority, such as in Vienna at the present time, can give anything more than temporary relief. If the state refuses to allow the municipality to settle these issues in its own way, it must be prepared to undertake the permanent administration of its capital city.

The experience of American cities has been limited to the assertion of legislative authority in questions of administration. Fortunately, the division of political parties in the United States is along lines which do not, as a rule, call for extraordinary measures, no matter which of the parties happens to be in control. From the point of view of a satisfactory division of powers between state and municipality, the outcome of the struggle in Vienna offers questions of more than local interest.

SOCIOLOGICAL NOTES.

[The editor of this department is glad to receive notes on all topics of interest to sociologists and persons working along sociological lines in the broadest acceptance of the term. It is not the purpose of these columns to define the boundaries of sociology, but rather to group in one place for the convenience of members of the Academy available bits of information on the subject that would otherwise be scattered throughout various departments of the ANNALS. The usefulness of this department will naturally depend largely on the measure of co-operation accorded the editor by other members of the Academy.]

Among those who have already indicated their interest and willingness to contribute are such well-known workers along sociological lines as Professor F. H. Giddings (Columbia College), Professor W. F. Willeox (Cornell University), Dr. John Graham Brooks (Cambridge, Mass.), Dr. E. R. Gould (Chicago University), Mr. John Korten (Boston), Hon. Carroll D. Wright (Washington, D. C.), Professor E. Cheysson (Paris), Mr. Robert D. McGonnigle (Pittsburg, Pa.), President John H. Finley (Knox College), Professor D. R. Dewey (Boston), Rev. Dr. L. T. Chamberlain (New York), Dr. Wm. H. Tolman (New York), Dr. D. I. Green (Hartford), Mr. Robert Donald (London), Prof. Giuseppe Fiamingo (Rome), Dr. Georg Simmel (Berlin), Professor Dr. Georg v. Mayr (Strassburg), Miss Emily Green Balch (Jamaica Plains, Mass.), Miss M. E. Richmond (Baltimore, Md.), and others.

Labor Question.—“*Company Stores*” in the *Pennsylvania Mining Districts*. Great reforms are usually the result of peculiar and unexpected combinations of forces. Years of agitation to secure better sanitary conditions, good light and ventilation in the machine workshops of this country and of England, accomplished little, compared with the almost instantaneous change that took place through the introduction of the electric traveling trains. The moment that this became a necessity in the workshop, great changes in the construction of buildings was at once imperative and, with these changes, instigated by the employers’ interests, came the very improvements in the way of large and spacious workrooms, filled with adequate light and good air that the previous labor reform agitation had failed to secure. A somewhat similar result of no mean significance has just materialized in the mining districts of Western Pennsylvania and bids fair to extend throughout the country and afford some solution of the vexed and much-debated question of the miners’ difficulties in connection with company stores. These stores are known in the miners’ dialect as “pluck-me” stores, and in the Pittsburgh district, and doubtless elsewhere, they have been the instruments through which grievous wrongs were inflicted on coal miners. The system is doubtless familiar to most students of the labor question. It has worked to the injury of the coal miners in three distinct ways. In the first place, it has limited the output of the individual miners and thus diminished

their earnings. In order that every possible dollar of earnings shown on the pay-roll may go through the store, it was necessary to limit the earnings of each miner to that amount which his needs required him to draw from the store for the necessities of life. Otherwise, when pay day came, there would be a cash balance due him and a consequent loss of profit on a corresponding amount of store goods. The limitation of earnings was easily accomplished by introducing three miners, where there was full work for two, or two miners, where there was full work for only one. Supposing that a miner could dig three tons of coal a day, at seventy cents a ton, his daily wages would be \$2.10. The "pluck-me" system would at once crowd the mine, so that the miner could get wagons for only one and a half tons per day, thus causing the reduction in his wages of at least a dollar as compared with the results of full work. In the second place, this system having unfairly reduced the miners' output, further wrongs him by bringing about a reduction in the rate per ton for mining. The mines of the district having a capacity for producing more coal than the market will take, found it necessary, on account of fierce competition between the coal operators, to underbid each other to an extent that many of them filled their orders at cost and sometimes, even below cost, looking to their "pluck-me" stores for the chance to make a profit of at least ten cents per ton. If all the mines had been operated in connection with the "pluck-me" system, this state of affairs might have gone on until competition reduced the profits in the stores to *nil*, or, at least, have caused so great a measure of wrong to the miners, that they would have openly resisted further aggressions on the part of the stores. Indeed, it is remarkable that the miners patiently endured the store grievances and bore the burden of the competition in the open market as long as they did. The remedy came, however, from an unexpected source. Those operators who did not have a store system were first forced to the wall and their profit taken away while their competitors were able to hold out longer because of their stores. Those operators, therefore, without stores at once espoused the cause of the miners and declared war on the store system.

The third grievance of the miner is the very familiar one that, in addition to reducing his output and the price per ton for mining, it then unfairly taxes his scanty earnings by forcing him to pay extortionate prices for the goods that he consumes.

At the Convention of Western Pennsylvania Railroad Miners, held in Pittsburgh, May 29, 1889, resolutions condemning the store system, were adopted, but no effectual results were accomplished until the

General Convention of Miners and Operators, held in Pittsburgh, October 12, 1895, when through the assistance and indeed on the initiative of certain of the operators, a definite agreement was made whereby a differential of five cents per ton in the cost of digging coal was granted to those operators who will abolish stores and pay cash. This is the most practical step that has ever been taken by miners of the Pittsburgh coal district and it is likely to have abiding results. Henceforth operators with stores are required to pay sixty-nine cents a ton for mining, while those without stores are asked to pay but sixty-four cents per ton. This arrangement goes into effect January 1, 1896. The new arrangement leads to the correction of other evils to which the miners have in the past been subject. For example, a mine working in this region, which has no limit of weight on wagons, or which has no check-weighman, or which uses screens not uniform in size with the screens of the district, or which pays in anything but cash, pays twenty cents per ton more for mining than the mines at which there is no limit as to weight of wagons, or whose screens are uniform, and which allow check-weighmen on the tippie and pays earnings in cash.

Mr. William P. De Armit, the President of the New York and Cleveland Gas Coal Company of Pittsburgh, himself a coal operator, has been largely influential in bringing about these reforms which have been of benefit to both employer and employed. For at least eleven years he has been calling attention to these evils and urging action looking to their remedy, on both operators and miners. His little pamphlet, entitled, "The 'Pluck-me' Store," embodies an address which he delivered at the Convention of Miners in May, 1889, and was printed in the various languages used by the miners of Ohio, Pennsylvania, Indiana and Illinois and at least 170,000 copies were distributed in this region and doubtless contributed largely to the present outlook for the satisfactory settlement of the controversy of long standing. The abolishment of the evils referred to will constitute a greater gain to the miners than anything which has been obtained by them or for them, through their organizations, within the past twenty-five years and it is rather curious that this result has been due to an entirely unexpected combination of business forces and that it should have come largely through the persistent agitation of the coal operator, rather than through the miners' organizations or their leaders.

Theory of Social Forces.—Those readers of the ANNALS who have followed the interesting controversy between Professor Simon N. Patten and Professor Franklin H. Giddings, which was published in these pages about a year ago as a result of the appearance in print

of Patten's "Failure of Biologic Sociology,"* and Giddings' "Theory of Sociology"† will be glad to know that Professor Patten has put his views in more systematic shape in the monograph which is sent as a supplement to this number of the ANNALS. Here Professor Patten develops much more fully and clearly some of the more suggestive points touched upon in the former discussion, all of which should be re-read in the present connection. Professor Giddings' forthcoming volume on the "Principles of Sociology" is announced for publication on January 15. It contains in the parts bearing on this discussion a much fuller statement of his position.

It will be found that Professor Patten approaches the problem of social evolution from a fresh and original point of view. Heretofore it has been customary for those who study social problems from the biologic side to take for granted the general truth and sufficiency of the theory of evolution, without seeking to inquire just how and why the evolutionary process assumed has taken place. Dr. Patten lays great stress on the influence that the social environment has had in determining the direction of such evolution. As he well says: "The problem of evolution may be studied either through the examination of developed organisms, or through an examination of those elements in the environment that have given the direction to the evolution. The former study is inductive and historical; the latter is deductive and its conclusions are in the form of causal laws."

Briefly outlined, Dr. Patten's social theories rest upon the assumption that the progressive development of organic life on this planet, has been in its later phases the result of the development of a more and more refined mental organism, the parts of which have been in turn the "requisites for survival," as the organism adapted itself to increasingly complex environments.

The monograph is divided into four parts, which treat respectively of, "The Influence of the Environment," "Race Psychology," "Knowledge and Belief," and "A Social Commonwealth." It is to the latter section perhaps that the readers' attention will be chiefly drawn. In his discussion of a social commonwealth, Dr. Patten makes many original and suggestive observations concerning the part which race ideals and beliefs may play in social progress. The social commonwealth is a picture of a society developing under "normal," conditions; a picture not in harmony with society as we know it, because real society has, in Dr. Patten's opinion, been

* ANNALS, Vol. iv, p. 919, May, 1894, also issued as Publication No. 121.

† Supplement to ANNALS, Vol. v, July, 1894.

forced out of the channel of "normal" development on account of the lack of correspondence between the social forces and social environment.

Incidental to the discussion of the social commonwealth, Dr. Patten suggests a basis for a progressive theory of morals and religion which will recommend itself to the wide circle of readers interested in the religious discussions of the day. Still more significant is his discussion of the æsthetic feelings as social forces. They have not been regarded heretofore in any such striking way by the social philosopher, but in his chapters on "City Life" and the part that a healthy development of æsthetic feelings might play in socialization of various kinds, where the gratification or satisfaction of these feelings can be had only through group action, there are many suggestions to the social reformer which are capable of wide application in general public education.

Negro Problem.—Mr. Booker T. Washington, of the Tuskegee (Ala.) Normal and Industrial Institute, has made himself one of the leading authorities in the United States on the question of negro education. Clark Howell, the editor of the *Atlanta Constitution*, in writing to the editor of the New York *World* spoke of Mr. Washington's address at the opening of the Atlanta Cotton States and International Exposition as one of the most notable speeches ever delivered to a Southern audience. He goes on to say, "it was an epoch-making talk and marks distinctively the turning point in the progress of the negro race, and its effect in bringing about a perfect understanding between the whites and blacks of the South, will be immediate. The address was a revelation. It was the first time that a negro orator had appeared on a similar occasion before a Southern audience." The chief characteristics of Mr. Washington's remarks were a full recognition of that economic conflict and the relative economic strength of the antagonistic elements in this race problem, that is at the basis of the whole controversy. With admirable clearness he succeeded in bringing some pertinent facts respecting the negro out of the halo of pure sentiment, and in making them contribute to a most satisfactory theory regarding the negro's further progress, which must find acceptance at the hands of the black man as well as of the white man. Perhaps, however, the most striking fact brought out in this connection was that the brightest outlook for the negro, provided he attains to some measure of industrial efficiency, is in the Southern States. Notwithstanding our boasted sentiments respecting him in the North and the plentiful supply of contempt which we often shower on his so-called oppressors in the South, the white people of the South stand to-day

more ready to give him the chance to show any merit that he may possess along the lines of business and industry, than do we of the North. They are more accustomed to him as a factor in their lives and are less afraid of coming into personal contact with him, which fact hampers him quite considerably in his industrial development in the North. The spirit of Mr. Washington's entire address may be inferred from the following paragraph:

"The wisest among my race understand that the agitation of questions of social equality is the extremest folly and that progress in the enjoyment of all the privileges that will come to us, must be the result of severe and constant struggle, rather than of artificial forcing. No race that has anything to contribute to the markets of the world, is long in any degree ostracised. It is important and right that all privileges of the law be ours, but it is vastly more important that we be prepared for the exercises of these privileges. The opportunity to earn a dollar in a factory, just now is worth infinitely more than the opportunity to spend a dollar in an opera house."*

The school at Tuskegee has just completed its fourteenth year of work. It stands for all that was good in the ideas developed by General Armstrong at Hampton Institute; indeed, both it and its principal are worthy representatives of the beneficent influence of the mother institution. Over 800 boys and girls, representing seventeen States and one Territory, were in attendance during the past year. The average age for pupils was eighteen and a half years and none found admittance under fourteen years. Sixty-six instructors, all of them of the colored race, are employed in the teaching force. In addition to the ordinary subjects of elementary education, instruction is given in twenty-two industries and every opportunity is afforded for the student to apply his political knowledge on the place, and gain the practical experience that will fit him for industrial life.

The buildings have been largely constructed by the labor of the students and the whole property of the school is now valued at over \$215,000. It stands as one of the greatest boons to the unfortunate black man of the Great Black Belt of the South and is in every way making its life felt, not only on the students who come within its walls, but on the community in which it is located.

Charities.—*Conventions of State and Public Officers.* It is an indication of the spread of the principles of the newer charity, which

* Copies of Mr. Washington's address, which is not long, may be had in pamphlet form, by application, enclosing stamps, to him at Tuskegee, Ala.

has become much more educational in its character than the older methods—which were altogether too much restricted to mere almsgiving—that now in almost all our States, we have organizations under one name or another, of the leading public officers who have to do with the administration of public institutions and public finances. Most of these associations hold annual conventions within their respective State borders. On these occasions, the majority of the County Commissioners, Overseers of the Poor, or other similar officers under other names, meet together to discuss problems of management administration, and to view from a general standpoint some of the economic and social questions in connection with the dependent classes.

The Association of the Directors of the Poor and Charities of Pennsylvania held its Twenty-first Annual Session in Philadelphia, October 15 to 17, inclusive. Very interesting reports upon almshouses, institutions, etc., were presented. Preventive work was given a very prominent place in many of the discussions. Papers on preventive work of the future, as it relates to the children of the poor; on the cases of prevention of pauperism; on married imbeciles and feeble-minded persons, what to do with them and how to prevent their propagation; on the distribution of pauperism, etc., were read and discussed. Mr. R. D. McGonnigle, of Pittsburgh, who has so long and ably held the position of corresponding secretary, was elected president. The next meeting will be held in Pittsburgh.

The Twenty-fifth Annual Convention of the County Officers of the Poor of the State of New York was held at Ogdensburg in June. The Fifth Ohio Conference of Charities and Corrections was held at Delaware, in October. The Wisconsin State Conference of Charities and Corrections was held in Milwaukee, in February, 1895. The Fourth Indiana Conference of Charities and Corrections was held at Fort Wayne, in October, 1895. The Twenty-first Michigan Convention of the Superintendents of the Poor and the Union Association was held at Flint, in December, 1895, and the Fourth Minnesota State Conference of Charities and Corrections was held at Faribault, in October.

Some little account of each of these conferences, with the exception of the Michigan Convention, may be found in the November number of the *Charities Review** and in most cases the names of the secretaries of the respective associations are given. Almost all of them publish proceedings, containing the papers and discussions, which in many cases are valuable sources of information for students of these

* Published for the Charity Organization Society of the State of New York at Galesburg, Ill.

topics. These proceedings, as a rule, can be obtained by application to the various secretaries, by enclosing a proper number of stamps.

National Conference of Charities and Corrections.—The members of the National Conference of Charities and Corrections will henceforth, in accordance with a special arrangement made by their Executive Committee, receive regularly as part of the publications of that body, the *Charities Review*, which is published primarily for the Charity Organization Society of New York, and is at the same time the most valuable special publication in its line issued in this country. In addition to its general features, it will in the future give special attention to matters pertaining to the work of the National Conference.

Child-Helping Societies in Massachusetts.—It is part of the policy of those engaged in the best scientific charity work at the present time, to have frequent conferences between societies, individuals, and organizations, in any given locality, engaged in a similar line of work. These are always useful, if in no other way, at least in bringing the workers in more sympathetic contact with each other and increasing their knowledge of what each, individually, is doing. Discussions also often lead to more united and persistent efforts on the part of all concerned.

A still further opportunity for helpfulness consists in the publication, under the auspices of such conference organizations, of papers and prepared reports bearing directly on the line of work in question. The Conference of Child-Helping Societies in Massachusetts, of which Miss Emily Greene Balch is secretary, has just issued a "Manual for Use in Cases of Juvenile Offenders and Other Minors in Massachusetts," which Miss Balch prepared at the request of the conference. It contains a summary of all the legal aspects of treating juvenile offenders and minors. This material is arranged in a convenient form for ready reference, and the whole pamphlet is written in language easily understood by those not acquainted with technical legal terms, but contains also frequent references to the law and judicial decisions in the State of Massachusetts bearing on this topic.

Cooper Union Labor Bureau, New York City.—For a long time it was the wish of Peter Cooper that there might be some kind of labor bureau or exchange at the Cooper Institute, as well as some kind of loan association for workingmen. The latter wish was realized a few years ago in the organization of the Birkbeck Company, and the former, October 7, when the Cooper Union Labor Bureau was opened at Room 15. This Bureau exists for the purpose of affording facilities for securing work, if the applicant can give a satisfactory

character and business reference. The references are as carefully investigated by the Bureau as by an individual business man, and, if satisfactory, the man is placed on the available list. Applications are coming in from large employers of labor, and a position on the available list is in direct line of securing a position. From the survey of the entire field, men with some physical disability, which unfit them for active work but does not prevent them from filling a special position, provided their references are satisfactory, can be placed. The Labor Bureau is not a charity, but is a business enterprise. Only applicants with references, which have been verified by a conscientious investigation, will be recommended to employers. The idle, vicious or physically incapable, will be severely let alone by the Bureau, to be dealt with by other agencies. The Bureau will scrupulously avoid giving charity, but will be at the service of the charitable. To employers desiring good men, the Bureau will save time in searching for them, expense in advertising, and trouble in determining their fitness and character. To employes, the Bureau will save time and money in looking for a position, and in trying vainly to secure it for themselves. To the general public, the Bureau will be of advantage in saving men from being the recipients of charity through forced idleness, and will relieve the community to that extent of the necessity of giving charity. The Bureau does not undertake to provide employment, but only to afford facilities for so doing. For the more efficient conduct of the work, the following rules and regulations have been adopted:

1. Every person applying to be registered shall fill up correctly a printed form to be obtained on personal application to the Superintendent at the Bureau.
2. Every person applying to be registered shall take his place in rotation, and any person not behaving in a proper manner will be excluded at the discretion of the Superintendent.
3. Every person who has been registered shall, as soon as possible after obtaining employment, fill in and send to the Superintendent at the Labor Bureau, the printed form provided for that purpose.
4. The names of all persons who have been registered will remain on the register for Fourteen Days only (Sundays and Holidays not counting), unless such persons on the Fourteenth Day after registration give notice that they are still out of employment and resident in New York, such notice to be repeated on every succeeding Fourteenth Day that they remain out of employment.
5. The Bureau does not undertake to find employment, but only to afford facilities for so doing.
6. That in the selection of men to be employed by the City, preference will be given as follows:
 - (a) Married men, with families.
 - (b) Married men, without families.
 - (c) Single men.
7. If employment be offered, the Superintendent will afford those registered an opportunity of applying for it, according to fitness, by rotation, but employers

may select from the register any one whom they consider specially suitable for their employment.

8. No employer will be provided with employes in case of a strike, nor will any employe on strike be eligible for registration.

9. All employers engaging labor through the agency of the Bureau are expected to pay the wages usually paid in their respective trades.

10. All references will be carefully and conscientiously examined, and no applicant will be recommended for a position unless his references are satisfactory in every particular to the Superintendent

11. ~~12.~~ No applicant shall be registered unless he shall have resided for at least six months in New York City.

12. No fee shall be charged for registration, or for securing employes.

13. Office hours are from 9 a. m. to 5 p. m.

14. This Labor Bureau is open for men who are seeking employment, and for those who are seeking the services of men.

The Tramp Question in Hartford, Conn.—The police department in Hartford has been in the habit of lodging all persons who applied, sometimes stowing away as many as sixty or seventy on one night in the prisoners' cells. During October and November of 1895 the usual number of these lodgers ranged from fifteen to twenty per night. They were largely acknowledged to be ordinary tramps, although under the State law that vocation is a State's prison offence. The Board of Police Commissioners, however, took a new stand on November 24, and instructed the Chief of Police to have all tramps arrested and brought before the courts. Those applicants claiming residence in Connecticut are to be charged with vagrancy, and those without residence made to answer to the charge of being tramps. As a result of this activity in enforcing the law, application for free lodging in Hartford has almost entirely ceased, and but few tramps apply for help at the office of the Charity Organization Society. The police court judge frequently relaxes the severity of the law by giving the prisoner the privilege of leaving the town. The public often defeats the terrorizing character of the law by giving money to those who appeal for a dime to save themselves from arrest. It remains to be seen whether the laxity of the police court judges, and this indiscriminate giving on the part of the public, will eventually undermine the good effects of the law. At present, however, Hartford seems to be marked by the tramp fraternity as one of the towns to be avoided.

Popular Banks in Italy.—Professor Guiseppe Fiamingo, of Rome, has recently called attention to the rather remarkable development of the co-operative banks in Italy.* The greatest progress in the co-operative movement in England has been chiefly along the line of co-operative societies for the consumption of produced goods,

* In the columns of *Le Siecle*, Paris.

that is, consumers' societies. In France the greatest success has been obtained along the line of producing co-operative societies. In Italy and also in Germany it has been rather the co-operative banks that have attained the greatest success. This has been due in part to the initiative along this line taken by Schultze-Delitsch in Germany, and Luigi Luzzatti, in Italy. In Italy, in spite of the economic crisis, the little popular banks have continued to increase and flourish when larger credit organizations have failed. They have helped the larger merchants and agriculturalists, as well as the smaller ones and the working men. In 1893, their clientele numbered 368,193 persons. Of this number, 24,116 were large agriculturalists and 88,000 smaller holders; 17,000 peasants; 92,000 smaller merchants; 29,000 working men and 69,000 officials and employes. From 1864, the date when the first popular bank was established, to 1870, their number increased steadily. In 1870, it was 50; in 1881, they numbered 171, and from 1881 to 1887, their increase was still more rapid, so that in the latter year they numbered 608 and possessed a capital of 104,000,000 liras. The increase for the following years, in spite of the severe times, steadily continued, for example, in 1888, 652; 1889, 672; 1890, 694; 1894, 720, with a capital of 115,000,000 liras. In this latter year they received on deposit 372,000,000 liras and discounted paper, aggregating in amount 214,000,000 liras.

School Savings Banks.—The statistics of this movement in the State of New Jersey, up to June 1, 1895, have been recently published by Mrs. S. L. Oberholtzer, 1905 Tioga street, Philadelphia, from whom any information as to how to institute school savings banks may be obtained. Other literature on the subject will be supplied by application to the same source.

Since January 1, 1894, it would seem from this recent report that these savings banks have been instituted in thirty-nine school-houses in New Jersey, covering six towns or cities. All but ten of these banks, however, date in their foundation from some time since January 6, 1895, and thus are of very recent origin. The number of children registered in these schools is 13,230, and, in a relatively short time, over 6700 depositors were actually enrolled. The total deposits amounted to \$8,638.01, of which only \$489.10 had been drawn on the date of this report.

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POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE.

THE MULTIPLE MONEY STANDARD.*

I. THE RELATION OF MONEY TO INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY.

The money problem has arisen as a result of the development of modern industrial society. Under the new economic organization money has a vastly more important and, in some respects, an entirely new function to perform. If we go back to the time when there was but little trade and commerce and that mainly local, when division of labor in the modern sense did not exist, we can see that the mechanism of exchange was then relatively of much less importance than it is now. Prices had but little industrial significance and production was carried on for the most part independently of money. But with the reorganization of society on the basis of division of labor, prices have come to sustain an entirely new and a vital relation to production. The industrial motive is no longer expressed in terms of

*The writer desires to acknowledge his indebtedness to Professor Henry C. Adams, of the University of Michigan, for many valuable suggestions, which have largely determined the character of this paper.

the concrete products of labor. We now think of the results of all economic processes in terms of the monetary unit. Money has become the one universal agency of production whose function it is to secure the co-ordination of the various industrial forces of our highly complex society.

Just what is involved in the money problem does not seem to be fully appreciated even by many who have made the subject a special study. There ought at least to be substantial unanimity of opinion as to the general aims and purposes of a monetary scheme, if not as to the practical means of working it out. But such is by no means the case. This is illustrated by the controversy between the gold monometallists on the one hand and the bimetallists on the other. It would be a mistake to suppose that the essential difference between these two monetary schools is one of mere practical detail. Their controversy is more fundamental than this and its true explanation is to be found in the different conceptions from which they start and in the different results at which they aim.

The bimetallists appear to have the clearer conception of what the money function in modern society is. They are right in maintaining that stability of general prices is essential to healthy industrial activity. But as a rule they lay too much stress upon the debtor and creditor relation. They seem to think that the existence of a large volume of indebtedness constitutes the chief argument for stable general prices.

There is, however, a much more important aspect of the question, usually either ignored or but imperfectly recognized, namely, the new relation which money sustains to the industrial forces of society. Formerly, one in thinking of wealth had in mind the concrete things which he produced and he himself largely consumed. He did not then have to convert the product of his labor into money in order to satisfy his wants. With the great bulk of production money had nothing whatever to do. But with the

development of trade and commerce, the introduction of the factory system and the specialization of industry, money came to be related to economic activity in a way that was entirely new. As a rule one consumes now nothing that he produces. The entire product of his labor must pass through the money form. We labor now not for the sake of the concrete product but to secure the money to which it corresponds. The industrial motive in primitive economic society rested on a commodity basis. In the present industrial organization it rests upon a money basis. To get this fact in all its bearings is to understand the new and vital function which money performs in our modern industrial life.

The most obvious function which money performs is that of a medium of exchange. As general purchasing power it circulates throughout industrial society, compensating each part for its contribution to the social well-being. So long as society has not reached a high state of industrial development this is the only purely social function which it performs. Alterations in general prices were a matter of but little consequence so long as men thought of the results of all industrial undertakings in terms of the concrete products. But when the abstract came to be substituted for the concrete conception of wealth, general prices became a matter of great importance. As a necessary consequence of this transition from the concrete to the abstract conception of wealth, money came to be the co-ordinating arrangement of industrial society. Upon it devolved the function of controlling industrial activities and directing them to the satisfaction of industrial wants.

Economic development has been marked by an ever increasing degree of interdependence between the units of industrial society. Productive processes no longer begin and end for the most part with the individual. From a loose aggregation of approximately self-sufficient units, industrial society has become practically organic. Production

has become a truly social function—social in the sense that the individual no longer produces for himself, but for society at large.

With this change in the relation of the individual to production, which involved the substitution of the abstract for the concrete conception of wealth, the abnormal symptoms of modern industrial society appeared. The spasmodic character of modern industry, the continually recurring periods of excessive activity followed by depression are due to the fact that the monetary system is not adapted to the work which, under the new and highly complex economic organization, it is called upon to perform.

So long as the results of production presented themselves to the minds of producers in their concrete forms, a rise or fall in general prices was not necessarily a seriously disturbing influence. But in the new organization of industry, general prices have a much closer and more vital relation to economic life. Society has become so complex, industry so specialized, the number of commodities so large, that a change in the level of general prices is not easily or quickly seen. Each producer looking at prices from his own particular point of view and seeing but a small part of the industrial field is conscious of only such changes in prices as affect those commodities in which he is immediately interested. A rise or fall in the price of his particular commodity is obvious to him, but not so the rise or fall in general prices which may accompany it and of which it may be a part. What he sees to have taken place is an increase or decrease in the money value of his product, and this he naturally interprets as an industrial advantage or disadvantage. And this conclusion is in the main correct. The fact that the change in the price of his particular commodity is merely a part of a general price movement does not indicate that his actual return is neither increased nor diminished. Industrial development has resulted in a differentiation of society into the wage-receiving class on the one hand and the capital-owning

classes on the other. Wages, rent, interest and profits have all come to be expressed in terms of money. The money value of the first three of these factors possesses a certain degree of stability or inertia, partly by reason of the fact that a change in the purchasing power of money is not readily seen and partly, especially in the case of interest and rent, as the result of time contracts. What remains of the total social income after these elements are deducted goes to the entrepreneur as profits. Now every change in general prices alters the distribution of the product between these several classes. A rise in prices has the effect of increasing the share of the entrepreneur. As a result of this partly real, partly fictitious increase in the entrepreneur's income, business becomes abnormally active, takes on a speculative character, and usually this upward movement of general prices comes to an end with the collapse of all speculative enterprises and the general prostration of industry. On the other hand a fall in general prices by diminishing the share of the entrepreneur weakens the industrial motive and leads to an actual decrease in production.

There is a disposition on the part of many students of economics to take a purely one-sided view of general prices. They look upon them as an effect and not as a cause. They seek to account for a rise or fall in general prices in the same way that they would explain a rise or fall in the price of any particular commodity. They appeal to supply and demand as an adequate explanation of the convulsive character of modern industry. They fail to see that while this does explain the price movement of any particular commodity, it is no explanation of a general price movement. It is only by ridding our minds of the abstract notion of wealth, which has become almost an inseparable part of all our thinking on economic matters, that we can see production as it really is. Disregarding entirely the money form through which commodities pass, we can see that the supply of a commodity is the quantity of that commodity in the market, while the

demand for it is the quantity of other things offered in exchange for it. But when we look at production in the aggregate the total supply and the total demand are one and the same thing and we would expect uniform general prices as the natural result.

But the fact that general prices do vary shows that this balance between the total supply and the total demand is not maintained. If goods were exchanged directly for other goods, without the intervention of money, there could be no such economic disturbances as panics and industrial depressions. Commodities, however, are not exchanged directly for commodities. The producer first converts them into general purchasing power. When no exchange medium exists the effective demand cannot exceed the supply; but when money comes into use one may buy more than he sells or sell more than he buys.

The individual does not ordinarily bring into the market all the purchasing power which he can command, but only so much of it as he can use with profit. Purchasing power is expressed in terms of the established unit of value, and business men act on the assumption that a given quantity of it will purchase the same amount of satisfaction one time with another. It is the only thing with which custom has associated the idea of unchanging value and it is natural that men should ascribe fluctuations in the price of a commodity to changes in its value, rather than to alterations in the value of that in which by common consent the prices of all things are expressed. Industrial activity having for its immediate purpose to secure not goods but money, the success of an industry is measured not by the resulting product, but by the units of purchasing power into which it can be converted.

While the individual may buy more than he sells or sell more than he buys, such is not true of industrial society as a whole. The aggregate purchases and sales must in the latter case be equal. General prices depend on the relation

between the aggregate purchasing power brought into the market, *i. e.*, the demand and the aggregate supply. No demand for goods that is accompanied by corresponding supply has any effect on general prices, since it does not disturb the relation existing between the aggregate supply and the aggregate demand. Rising general prices mean that for some reason people are more anxious to buy than to sell and consequently are bringing into the market a relatively larger quantity of purchasing power. Under normal conditions the demand is equal to the supply and there can be neither a rise nor a fall of general prices. The demand can be made to outweigh the supply only through the introduction of a speculative element into exchange.

With the extension of the market and the increased complexity of industry we should naturally expect a closer correspondence between supply and demand. The effect of developing and extending the economic organization of society should be greater certainty and regularity in production. Why is it that this result has not been realized? The explanation must be sought in the medium of exchange—in the machinery through which the various industrial forces are brought into relation with each other.

Our exchange medium, as now organized, is simply a commodity, whose value like that of any other commodity, is regulated by supply and demand. Using the term money in its broadest sense to include every kind of general purchasing power, we may say that the supply of commodities is the demand for money, while the demand for commodities is the supply of money.

As long as men thought of wealth in its concrete form there was a direct relation between supply and demand. The aggregate demand balanced the aggregate supply and production was therefore regular. But when the concrete gave way to the abstract conception of wealth, this direct immediate relation became an indirect mediate one. Under the old economic organization, the relation between the

aggregate supply of commodities and the aggregate demand was one of equality, and may be expressed by the following equation:

Total supply of commodities = Total demand for commodities.

Under the new organization of industry the relation between supply and demand takes this form:

Total supply of commodities = Total demand for money.

Total demand for commodities = Total supply of money.

But,

Total demand for money $>$, $=$, $<$ Total supply of money.

It follows, then, that

$$\left. \begin{array}{c} \text{Total supply} \\ \text{of} \\ \text{commodities} \end{array} \right\} : \left\{ \begin{array}{c} \text{Total demand} \\ \text{for} \\ \text{commodities} \end{array} \right\} = \left\{ \begin{array}{c} \text{Total de-} \\ \text{mand for} \\ \text{money} \end{array} \right\} : \left\{ \begin{array}{c} \text{Total sup-} \\ \text{ply of} \\ \text{money} \end{array} \right\}$$

The above statement of the problem presents plainly to the mind the fact that fluctuations in the value of money are the cause of the paroxysms of modern industry. It is evident that every change in the value of gold must disturb the existing relations between supply and demand. If gold rises in value, or what is the same thing, the total demand for money becomes greater than the supply, the total demand for commodities is correspondingly diminished, and a fall in general prices ensues. If gold falls in value, the result is an increased demand for commodities and a rise in general prices. A gradual and prolonged fall in the value of gold means a condition of industry in which the demand for commodities is continually exceeding the supply. This is a period of speculation and abnormal activity in industry. If, on the other hand, gold is undergoing gradual appreciation, the demand for commodities is continually falling below the supply, and we have glutted markets and falling prices. This means industrial depression. Any change in the value of gold involves of necessity an opposite change in the money value of commodities generally. The line which represents the movement of general prices is but the

inverted image of that which shows the fluctuations in the value of gold.

The solution of the money question clearly lies in the direction of a broadening of the monetary basis. The circulating medium must be relieved of its absolute dependence on a single commodity. The movement of the civilized world toward gold monometallism is a backward and not a forward step. It has narrowed the monetary basis and thereby increased fluctuations in general prices at the very time when the economic organization of society had become such that stable general prices were absolutely essential to healthy industrial life.

An automatic regulation of general prices and through prices of the aggregate demand is an essential feature of any monetary system that meets the requirements of modern industrial society.

II. TWO CONCEPTIONS OF A STANDARD OF VALUE.

The two general questions which present themselves at the outset are: (1) What do we mean by a standard of value? (2) What kind of a circulating medium will most nearly approximate in value the theoretically perfect standard? All would agree that the ideal standard is one which always has exactly the same value; but as to what is meant by always having the same value, there are two distinct and fundamentally different notions which tend, in their influence on the practical side of the money question, toward widely different results.

The gold monometallists stand for one conception of a standard; the bimetallicists and paper money advocates for another. The former tell us that the ideal standard is one which represents the product of a constant quantity of labor;* the latter say that it is a constant quantity of

* See Adam Smith, "Wealth of Nations," Book 1, Cap. xi; Ricardo's Works, Cap. iii; D. A. Wells, "Recent Economic Changes," p. 225; John Stuart Mill, "Principles of Political Economy," Book 3, Cap. xv.

commodity.* If labor were upon an average equally productive one time with another, these two conceptions, though theoretically different, would lead to results practically the same. But when the productive power of labor is being greatly augmented this distinction becomes one of great practical importance. If the unit of value represents a constant quantity of labor it would correspond to a continually increasing quantity of commodity—that is, the purchasing power of money would increase in the same ratio as the efficiency of labor.

But does not this conception of a standard overlook the fact that the value of labor depends on its productive power? If, for example, within a given period the general efficiency of labor should be doubled, the monometallists would say that general prices should fall one-half, because commodities are now being produced at one-half their former labor cost. They assume that the value of a given quantity of the average labor of one period is equivalent to that of a corresponding quantity of the average labor of any other period.

They would, however, insist on taking not quantity alone but efficiency also into account in estimating the value of present labor. Here they would recognize the fact that the value of labor depends on what it produces; but in converting the labor of one time into terms of the labor of another time, they would consider only its quantity and take no account of its efficiency.

This conception of a standard they do not seem to have taken the pains clearly to define. The idea which they everywhere keep in the foreground is that they are opposed to inflation, depreciation and dishonest money; and one would conclude from this general statement of their position that they have the same notion of a standard as that enter-

* John Stuart Mill, "Principles of Political Economy," Book 3, Cap. i; Jevons, "Money and the Mechanism of Exchange," Cap. iii; E. Benjamin Andrews, "An Honest Dollar," Publications of the American Economic Association, Vol. iv, p. 404.

tained by the bimetallic and the paper money schools—that the controversy is merely as to the means to be employed and that the end which each has in view is the same. But a careful examination of the arguments by which some of the leading gold monometallists seek to defend and justify the single gold standard, brings to light their real conception which is entirely different. Their attempt to account for a fall in general prices by the introduction of new methods of production illustrates what they mean by uniform value. According to their way of looking at it, every step in industrial progress should be accompanied by a fall in prices commensurate with the increased productive power of labor. Everything should fall in price to the extent that the efficiency of the labor employed in its production is increased, while nothing should ever rise in price unless its labor cost has actually increased. They would claim that the tendency of industrial progress is to lower the value of the product, and unless the aggregate production is increased by an amount corresponding to the increased efficiency of labor, then the total product, though largely augmented, has yet actually decreased in value.

If this conception of a standard is right, it is impossible to increase the value of the aggregate product without extending the hours of labor and for a like reason any shortening of the hours of labor means a corresponding reduction in the value of the product. It would follow, then, that though the average individual now has more wants and those wants are better supplied than they were, say two or three generations ago, yet the means by which they are satisfied would represent less value, inasmuch as they are produced by a smaller quantity of labor.

Now it seems that it is this very conception of a standard on which the arguments of some of the leading supporters of gold monometallism are based, and it is against the application of this standard to the relations of debtor and creditor that those who oppose the single gold standard

protest. They fail to see any foundation for the implied assumption of gold monometallists that the creditor, as between himself and the debtor, is the exclusive cause of, and therefore entitled to all the benefits derived from industrial progress. They say that in his capacity of creditor he not only has no right to the whole of such increase in product as between himself and his debtor, but that he is plainly entitled to no part of it. They ascribe the development of industry to general social causes, which raise the grade of labor and augment its value as they enlarge its product. As this is a social product, it is a benefit which rightly accrues to every one in so far as he is a producer, and to this product no class as such can lay any claim. Hence, they arrive at the conclusion that falling prices mean an appreciating and an unjust standard.

Those who defend the single standard would admit that a fall in prices, which cannot be accounted for by diminished cost of production, is unjust to the debtor. But even if we accept the cost of production theory of value, how do we know that the fall in prices has not been greater than the increase in the general efficiency of labor? That cost of production has been cheapened no one would deny. But when it is claimed that the universal and continuous decline in gold prices during the last twenty years is accounted for by the increased efficiency of labor, one cannot help feeling that this explanation is not adequate. How much has industrial development added to the efficiency of labor? This question cannot be answered, but it is possible that the introduction of labor-saving machinery and methods has not kept pace with the decline in general prices. But even if there were a theoretical justification for the monometallist's conception of a standard, it would have no practical value, since there is no way in which the theoretical and the actual standard could be compared. It is obvious that the average efficiency of labor is a thing which in the extremely complex organization of modern industry is

absolutely incapable of even approximate measurement. The elements which enter into it are so diverse, so constantly changing, so intangible that no means could be devised by which the expenditure of social effort could be measured. And inasmuch as industrial progress is not measurable, it cannot safely be appealed to in defence of falling prices. It becomes a convenient instrument in the hands of those who wish to justify declining prices for explaining any fall in prices, no matter how great it may be.

The gold monometallists point to the improved condition of the wage-earning classes as proof that the increase in the purchasing power of gold has been attended with good results. But is there any evidence tending to show that this is in any considerable degree the effect of falling prices? The fact is the upward movement of wages has been brought about by causes more deep-seated and permanent, and the beneficent operation of these forces the fall of prices has retarded rather than helped.

The efficiency of labor furnishes a limit beyond which the appreciation of money, be it ever so great, cannot lift wages. A rise in the value of money, if out of proportion to the increase in the efficiency of labor, would of necessity involve a fall in money wages. On the other hand, it could not account for a rise in money wages. It is evident then that the appreciation of money cannot explain all the increase in wages. An excess remains over which must be ascribed to some more potent cause which would account for the entire increase in wages as easily as for a part of it.

Two other money standards, the marginal utility* and the total utility standard,† have been suggested. They both assume that there may be a general decline in marginal utilities—that each increment of the aggregate product has less want-satisfying power than the preceding one. Total

* See the paper on "The Theory of Final Utility in Its Relation to Money," by Dr. L. S. Merriam, *ANNALS*, Vol. iii, p. 483, January, 1893.

† "The Total Utility Standard of Deferred Payments," by Prof. E. A. Ross, *ANNALS*, Vol. iv, p. 425, November, 1893.

value according to the marginal utility standard is equal to total wealth multiplied by the utility of the last increment. The total utility standard on the other hand would make total value the sum of the utilities of the various increments. The one view maintains that the value of all preceding increments falls *pari passu* with the utility of the last increment and that general prices should register the general rise or fall of marginal utilities. The other view holds that a decline in marginal utilities lowers the value of only the last increment of the aggregate product—that a general fall in marginal utilities cannot cause a fall in the total value, though it does prevent total value from increasing as rapidly as total wealth. It would demand a fall in general prices very much less than the decline in marginal utilities. With each new increment of wealth a slight fall in general prices would be required in order that the money value of the total wealth might be increased by an amount corresponding to the diminished utility of the added product. Under the marginal utility standard as under the labor standard of the monometallists there might be a fall in total value along with great increase in total wealth.

From a practical point of view both the marginal utility and the total utility standards are open to the same objection as the gold standard. Even admitting that marginal utility does fall with the increase in wealth, there is no way in which this fall can be measured. They are also to be condemned along with the gold standard on the ground that they contemplate a continuous decline in general prices.

This question of standard is one that cannot be settled by reference to any preconceived theory of value. It is not simply a question as to what is theoretically just as between the debtor and creditor. These are not the only persons interested nor are they interested only as debtors and creditors. There is a general social interest that cannot be ignored in a discussion of this matter. Money serves as a standard of deferred payments, but this is by no means its most important

function. As a medium of exchange, the results of all economic processes are expressed in terms of it. This last function of money was discussed in the preceding section and the conclusion was reached that stable general prices are essential to normal industrial activity. Any monetary system which seeks to realize either rising or falling general prices must of necessity result in disaster. The general social and industrial effects of rising or falling prices are an evil, the far-reaching results of which it would be difficult to exaggerate. Besides, a monetary system which seeks to realize either rising or falling general prices is arbitrary inasmuch as there is no means of determining whether or not the actual standard conforms to the theoretical one.

III. GOLD AN UNSTABLE COMMODITY.

To defend the gold standard successfully it must be shown not only that it is more stable in value than any other commodity but that it is more so than any practicable combination of other commodities. Without going into statistics it is safe to say that the tendency in the case of nearly all commodities is toward greater steadiness of value. The machinery of commerce is becoming so efficient that in the case of a great many things the whole demand has access to the whole supply, and by the whole demand is meant a demand not exclusively for present consumption, but for a period extending more or less into the future, while the whole supply in so far as it influences the present price is not exclusively an actual present supply but in a large measure an anticipated one. The influences which tend toward more stable prices are then (1) those which give the market a place extension and (2) those which give it a time extension. The effect of these two causes on prices is becoming more and more important with the extension of civilization, the development of cheap and quick transportation and the adoption of more scientific methods of production.

In the case of many commodities a great rise in price is out of the question, because of the fact that there are others similar in character, which can satisfy the given want almost equally well, and which will, if the first rises much in price, be substituted for it. The number of which this is true is continually increasing. We now have groups of commodities which may be used thus interchangeably, one commodity of which cannot rise very high without taking the others along with it. We thus have an effective restraint upon excessive rise in price in the fact that we can dispense with the article or supply the want to which it ministers from some other source. In other words, a demand for a given commodity is not an unconditional demand for that one commodity, but a demand for it within a certain price limit and beyond which it becomes a demand for something else.

An excessive fall in price may be prevented in the same way. If a commodity can satisfy some want of a lower grade than that to which it is usually applied, a fall in price may open up for it a new demand, which before did not exist.

In a more primitive state of society these limits to price fluctuation can hardly be said to exist; the first of these presupposes a plurality of commodities capable of satisfying a single want; the second, a single commodity capable of satisfying a plurality of wants. As the number and variety of commodities increase, the demand comes more and more to be conditional—to depend on price—and the margin of price fluctuation is correspondingly narrowed.

Gold, however, is not a commodity in which the tendency is toward greater steadiness of value.* Those checks upon fluctuation, which exist in the case of a great many things, are here conspicuously absent. Aside from its money

*For evidence to prove that the value of gold has undergone extensive changes, see Jevons, "Money and the Mechanism of Exchange," Cap. xxv; Simon Newcomb, "The Standard of Value," *North American Review*, Vol. 129.

function, there is no great industrial want that gold supplies. Its use in the arts is founded almost exclusively on the taste for display and ornamentation. The demand for it here is largely due to the fact that it is costly. While this furnishes no adequate protection against a fall in the value of gold, it is conceivable that with increasing wealth and the means of more effectually gratifying the taste for display, it might be a potent factor in raising its value.

The money demand for gold is subject to great alterations due to the alternate expansions and contractions of credit. A general extension of credit tends to lessen the money demand for gold, and there being no supplementary demand which can come in and take its place when this is withdrawn, there will result a fall in the value of gold which will continue as long as the demand for it is being lessened through the substitution of credit. There is no point at which its fall in value would be effectually brought to a stop by the opening up of a new demand, or at least such point is so far below its normal money value as to be practically non-existent.

When gold has begun to depreciate the tendency is always toward still greater depreciation and more extended credit. Each addition to the volume of credit brings about a still farther decline in the value of gold, which in turn leads to a still farther extension of credit. The possible depreciation of gold under these circumstances appears to reach a limit only at that point beyond which the credit system cannot be extended without breaking down.

Just as there may be an unhealthy expansion, so it may be followed by an abnormal and violent contraction of credit in which the market value of gold is carried as far and even much farther above what may be called its normal value than in the prior period of extended credit it sank below it. In a time like this all those devices for supplementing the work of gold as money are distrusted. What is wanted is that which the law has made a legal tender. If gold is the

sole legal tender, there is a greatly increased and a pressing demand for it. But it is a demand essentially unlike that for anything else. In the case of many commodities we can discontinue their use when they rise in price, or we may substitute others for them. The demand for gold on the other hand is a demand, the failure to supply which means financial ruin; moreover, it is a demand that we can supply with nothing except gold. The more intense the demand for it the greater the tendency to hoard it and the less the supply.* The automatic check upon the rise in the price of gold is the limitation of the demand through the bankruptcy of the debtor class, which this state of things tends rapidly to bring about.

To understand the influence of credit on the value of gold it is only necessary to think of all credit transactions as sales of gold for future delivery. As long as prices are stable, and the purchasing power of money does not change, there is no motive for using credit for speculative purposes. Contracts for the future delivery of gold are not entered into with the expectation of making a profit by a fall in its value. But when prices are rising, credit transactions take on a speculative character; "short sellers" of gold (buyers of goods on credit) expect to make a profit by its depreciation, and therefore make their sales for future delivery as large as possible. The panic comes when the commercial world begins to realize that the short sellers of gold have sold more than they can deliver.

Looking at it in this light, is there any great benefit to be expected from the change which is being made throughout the civilized world to gold monometallism? The object, we are told, is a safe and stable currency; but how this result can be accomplished by narrowing the basis of money and reducing the possible volume of that which constitutes the legal tender it is difficult to see. The natural and legitimate

* "Commonplace Fallacies Concerning Money," by Emile de Laveleye, in the *Contemporary Review*, Vol. 40.

effect of such legislation would seem to be to give to speculative forces a much greater influence over the standard of value.

It is generally assumed that the periodic rise and fall of general prices—the period of abnormal credit and speculation and the period of industrial depression are to be expected under any monetary system whatever. All these commercial and industrial evils are charged up to the abuse of the credit system, while the gold standard is held blameless in the matter. The truth is, however, that while the abuse of credit is a contributory cause of the rise of general prices, the abnormal expansion of credit is itself an effect which must be ascribed to the gold standard. The very fact that gold is subject to such fluctuations in market value, no matter what the cause may be, shows that it is not a good standard.

The problem seems to be not how to continue the monetary system permanently and for all time to come on a gold basis, but how to make commodities generally the basis of the circulating medium. There is no reason why a considerable number of commodities cannot be combined in such a way as to secure a standard of practically uniform value. On the basis of these commodities the circulating medium should be issued just as the paper money under the gold standard is based on gold. If a scheme can be devised which recognizes and gives full force to the principle of redeemability, then we would have a monetary system which credit could no longer seriously disturb. Practically the standard would be represented by the great mass of commodities. This being the case, a rise of general prices would be out of the question, as a rise in the price of one commodity would of necessity be balanced by a fall in the price of others.

In this direction, it seems, lies the possibility of effecting great improvements in the present monetary system.*

*"The Standard of Value," by Simon Newcomb, in *North American Review*, Vol. 122.

IV. THE COMPOSITE GOLD AND SILVER STANDARD.

Is it possible to secure redeemability for a paper money issued on the basis of a composite standard? The nature of the problem here involved may best be presented by an illustration of this standard in its simplest form. For this purpose it is necessary to take only the familiar money commodities, gold and silver.

The idea which seems to underlie all existing monetary systems is this; that in order to use both metals as money it is necessary to establish a legal ratio between them and keep their market value in practical conformity to the ratio thus established. But no way has been devised of securing this result. No nation acting alone has been able to keep the market values of gold and silver from departing from their established coinage values, and it may be doubted whether it could be done even by the concerted action of all the leading commercial nations. Any such scheme, if its adoption could be brought about, would discourage the production of the costlier metal and possibly result in its ultimate disappearance from the monetary system.

But two money commodities do not require that there should be two kinds of money. For a composite standard it is not necessary that any ratio should be established between the component metals. Instead of declaring by law that 23.2 grains of fine gold shall be equivalent in value to 371.25 grains of fine silver, it is only necessary to make c grains of gold plus d grains of silver the unit of value. The unit in this case is neither c grains of gold nor is it d grains of silver, but the sum of these.

If the quantities of gold and silver thus taken are such that they are together worth a dollar, then the new composite unit is just equal in value to the former gold unit. The paper dollar which is issued on the basis of this new standard is an order for c grains of gold plus d grains of silver.

The proportion in which the two metals are combined in the standard would depend on the relative importance which we wish to give to gold and silver. If 23.2 grains of fine gold were equal in value to 464 grains of fine silver, we might take as our new bimetallic standard *11.6 grains of fine gold plus 232 grains of fine silver*.

Under this scheme a single bimetallic standard would take the place of the separate gold and silver standards which we now have. The law would merely define the quantities of gold and silver together forming the standard, but would in no way attempt to control their relative value. In this way it is possible to retain both gold and silver as the basis of a monetary system, since no matter how great a change in the relative value of the two metals may take place, there is no more inducement for the one metal to be withdrawn than for the other. Their relative money value would be determined by their relative commodity value and both would be available for monetary uses alike.

The paper money issued on the basis of this standard would differ from the present gold and silver certificates in that it would rest upon both gold and silver and not upon one metal alone. Every note would call for both gold and silver in the standard proportion. The coinage of gold and silver would be discontinued and bimetallic notes would form the entire circulating medium. The present subsidiary coinage might, however, be retained as more convenient than a fractional paper money and in that case no fractional bimetallic currency would be necessary.

The redeemability of the paper money thus issued could be secured as readily and effectively as in the case of that issued on the basis of a single commodity. There are three ways in which this might be done :

1. Redeemability might be secured by delivering to the party presenting the notes, gold and silver in the quantities and proportions called for in the notes. Under this plan each note is an order for a definite amount of each metal.

The gold and silver kept on hand for the purpose of redeeming notes could easily be composed of pieces of such size and character as to make the redemption of notes as easy a matter as under the present system.

2. The government might reserve the right of redeeming in either gold or silver at its own option—the amount of either metal which it is required to give in exchange for its notes being that quantity which has a market value equal to the aggregate value of the gold and silver which the notes represent.

3. Redemption might be secured as in the way last mentioned except that the option might be left to the holder of the notes.

The last two methods proposed are somewhat more complicated than the first. Under the first method no account would have to be taken of the market value of either metal; but under the second and third methods the market ratio between the two metals would have to be known. Each note here calls for a constant quantity of either metal and such additional quantity of the same metal as is equal in value to the metal for which it is substituted.

To find the amount of gold or silver to be given in exchange for the notes, it is only necessary to ascertain the quantity of gold or silver corresponding in value to the bimetallic standard and multiply this by the amount of notes expressed in dollars. To illustrate: Assuming that the bimetallic standard is 11.6 grains of fine gold + 232 grains of fine silver, and that the market ratio of gold to silver is 22 to 1, then by an easy arithmetical calculation we find that 232 grains of silver is equal in value to 10.54 grains of gold, and that 11.6 grains of gold is equal in value to 255.2 grains of silver. The bimetallic dollar then would be equal in value to 22.14 grains of fine gold or 487.2 grains of fine silver. The person presenting \$10,000 in bimetallic notes would be entitled to have them redeemed at his option in either 461.25 ounces of fine gold or 10,150 ounces of fine silver.

It might be objected to the first method that not every one would desire gold and silver in the standard proportion, and that a provision requiring their acceptance in the redemption of notes in that proportion would in a measure interfere with the operation of the principle of redeemability. The same objection might be urged against the second method. The third seems not to be open to any objection of this kind. Redeemability here would seem to be about as complete as under any scheme it is possible to devise. It might be proper to make the minimum amount which would be redeemed large enough to save unnecessary trouble and expense.

In some such way as this it seems that the results which bimetallism has in view may be realized. This scheme would not be open to the main objection to bimetallism, namely, the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of maintaining a parity between the two metals. It would, however, furnish a currency securely based on both gold and silver. Neither metal would be withdrawn from this use, since its value here would always conform to its value in the market. The difference is that under bimetallism we would have **two** kinds of money, while here we would have only one.

The object in both cases is to secure a more stable currency. The bimetallist proposes to accomplish this by tying the two metals together in such a manner that they can only fluctuate together. But under the scheme above described this result can be secured by taking a standard, the value of which is a mean of the values of gold and silver. This mean value is the fundamental idea in the composite standard.

The convertibility of the circulating medium into either of the money commodities in the way above described would prevent the money values of gold and silver from falling below their commodity values; to prevent, on the other hand, the money values of gold and silver from rising above their commodity values, it is only necessary that either

commodity should be convertible into money at its money or standard value. Referring to the above illustration, any one having 461.25 ounces of gold, or 10,150 ounces of silver, should be allowed to deposit it with the government and receive therefor \$10,000 in bimetallic notes.*

V. THE TABULAR STANDARD.

The purpose of combining two or more commodities in the standard is to secure for it greater steadiness of value. In the composite gold and silver standard described in the last section, the fluctuations in the value of one metal would in a measure neutralize those of the other. Gold and silver, however, are commodities closely related, and for this reason are more likely to fluctuate in the same than in opposite directions. They constitute by themselves a distinct commodity group, and have little or nothing in common with the great mass of commodities for which they serve as a standard.

A composite standard would be less liable to vary if the commodities entering into it belonged to different groups, and were thus more nearly independent of each other. It would also possess greater stability if it embraced a larger number of commodities. The chances that the fluctuations in one direction will be neutralized by those in the other are directly proportionate to the number of commodities constituting the standard. If a considerable number of commodities were judiciously selected and combined in the right proportion, they would form a standard that for all practical purposes might be considered invariable.

This is the principle of the tabular standard of value which has been advocated by many eminent economists as a means of preventing some of the evils now attendant upon alterations in the value of the circulating medium. The essential features of this scheme are: (1) The separation of

* See "Remedies for the Fluctuation of General Prices," by Professor Alfred Marshall, in the *Contemporary Review* for March, 1887.

the functions of money; (2) the retention of gold or silver or both, or paper money as the circulating medium and the temporary standard of value in terms of which all prices are expressed; (3) the adoption of a table of, say, fifty or one hundred commodities which shall be the permanent standard of value.

The prices of all the commodities in this table are officially determined from time to time, and their average or mean price is known as the total index number. The variations in the index number from time to time show the fluctuations in the purchasing power of money. Every contract calling for the future payment of money is subject to revision in conformity with the tabular standard when it becomes due. The amount required to be paid is found by comparing the index number at the time the obligation is created with the index number at the time it is paid. More or less money than the contract calls for must be paid according as the index number in the latter case is greater or less than in the former. If the index number has doubled, the money value of the obligation has also doubled; if the index number has diminished by one-half, the money value of the obligation has suffered a like reduction. If the index number was 100 at the time the debt was created, and 125 at the time it became due, it would indicate that \$125 had, when the debt became due, only the same purchasing power that \$100 had when it was incurred and, therefore, for every \$100 called for in the contract the debtor should return \$125. If, on the other hand, the index number had varied from 125 when the debt was created to 80, when it fell due, the debt could be extinguished by repaying \$66.66+ for every \$100 borrowed.

The adoption of this standard would prevent alterations in the purchasing power of money from seriously disturbing the relations between debtors and creditors, and would give to industry a steadiness and security to which we can not hope to attain under the present system. Under this

scheme there might be a general rise or fall of prices, but such alterations in general prices would not be attended with the disastrous results that now follow. Long time contracts could be made in terms of money without danger of the obligation of the one being increased or the claim of the other diminished.*

The inconvenient feature of this scheme is that the real standard is not incorporated in the monetary system. The change in the price of a commodity may be due to an alteration in the value of the commodity itself or to a change in the value of the monetary unit. If the commodity has risen in price, it may mean that it has actually increased in value or that the monetary unit has fallen in value. In like manner a fall in price may mean a fall in the value of the commodity or an increase in the purchasing power of money. It may even have risen or fallen in value without any corresponding change in price, which would be the case where the circulating medium and the commodity in question had experienced corresponding alterations in value. A rise in price might even accompany an actual fall in the value of the commodity, while a fall in price might mean an increase in value. If the commodity in question and money had both increased or decreased in value, but the increase or decrease in the value of the latter had been greater, the commodity would have fallen or risen in price while having actually increased or decreased in value. The record of the price of a commodity from day to day would not indicate the changes in value which that commodity had undergone in relation to other commodities.

What this scheme lacks is simplicity and directness. The price indicates only one relation, that of the commodity to the circulating medium—while another relation—that of the circulating medium to the tabular standard—must be taken

* Referring to a similar scheme of Joseph Lowe (1822), and that of Poulett Scrope (1833), Professor Jevons has already indicated how it might be carried into practice. See "Money and the Mechanism of Exchange," Cap. xxv.

into account before we can tell what, if any, have been the changes in value. The price must be corrected by referring it to the index number. The question then arises, is it not possible to combine these two relations to incorporate the tabular standard in the monetary system and make it the monetary unit as well as the standard of value? If such be possible, we could secure the results which the tabular standard would bring about without separating the functions of money. The price of a commodity would then indicate not only its relation to the monetary unit, but to the standard of value as well.

VI. THE MULTIPLE MONEY STANDARD.

Let us assume that the commodities selected for the multiple standard are *corn, wheat, cotton, oats, silver and gold*, and that these six commodities constitute 20 per cent of the total value of the annual product. The assumed price, quantity and value of each of these commodities are given in the following table :

Commodity.	Quantity.	Wholesale price.	Wholesale value.
Corn, . .	1,600,000,000 bushels,	\$0.50 per bushel,	\$800,000,000
Wheat, .	500,000,000 "	1.00 " "	500,000,000
Cotton, .	3,500,000,000 pounds,	.10 " pound,	350,000,000
Oats, . .	625,000,000 bushels,	.40 " bushel,	250,000,000
Silver, .	70,000,000 ounces,	1.00 " ounce,	70,000,000
Gold, . .	1,450,676 "	20.68 " "	30,000,000
Total,			\$2,000,000,000

In what proportion should these commodities be combined in the standard? The purpose of this standard is to secure as the basis of the unit of value the largest practicable mass of commodities. It follows then that each commodity should enter into the standard in the ratio of its importance. To assign to corn only the same rank in the standard as to gold, would ignore the fact that the former product is worth more than twenty-six times as much as the

latter. It would be an unwarranted discrimination in favor of gold and against corn, and would allow a comparatively unimportant product to influence in an unreasonable degree the value of the standard.

Taking such quantities of these commodities in the ratio of their relative importance, as shall have an aggregate value according to the gold standard of \$100,000, the new \$100,000, multiple standard would be made up as follows :

Quantity of commodity in standard.	Price.	Value.
80,000 bushels corn,	\$0.50 per bushel,	\$40,000
25,000 " wheat,	1.00 " "	25,000
175,000 pounds cotton,10 " pound,	17,500
31,250 bushels oats,40 " bushel,	12,500
3,500 ounces silver,	1.00 " ounce,	3,500
72.5 " gold,	20.68 " "	1,500
Standard,		\$100,000

For the present it is assumed that we have a circulating medium which conforms in value to and which therefore gives all prices in terms of this standard. How such a circulating medium can be secured will be explained in the following section.

The law adopting the above standard does not attempt to fix the relative values of the several commodities composing it. All that it does is to declare what quantities of these commodities shall have an aggregate money value of \$100,000, just as the law now says that 23.2 grains of fine gold shall constitute a dollar. The prices of the standard commodities and consequently the value of the standard quantity of each commodity may change, but while these several items may change relatively to each other to any extent whatever, their sum total is always \$100,000. It is clear that all the standard commodities cannot rise or fall in price at the same time. Suppose, for instance, that corn under the new standard falls in price to forty-two and one-half cents per bushel and that the relative values of the other standard commodities have not changed, 80,000 bushels of

corn is now worth only \$34,000, but the other items in the standard have gained in value what the 80,000 bushels of corn has lost. The aggregate value of the standard quantities of wheat, cotton, oats, silver and gold has increased from \$60,000 to \$66,000, an aggregate gain of 10 per cent; and since their relative values have not changed, the price of each has risen 10 per cent. The total value of the standard is now distributed among the standard commodities as follows:

Quantity of commodity in standard.	Price in terms of the multiple standard.	Value in terms of the multiple standard.
80,000 bushels corn,	\$0.425 per bushel,	\$ 34,000
25,000 " wheat,	1.10 " "	27,500
175,000 pounds cotton,11 " pound,	19,250
31,250 bushels oats,44 " bushel,	13,750
3,500 ounces silver,	1.10 " ounce,	3,850
72.5 " gold,	22.75 " "	1,650
Total,		<hr/> \$100,000

A rise or fall in the price of one of the standard commodities would always involve, though in a much less degree, a fall or rise in the price of all the other standard commodities. While the fall in the price of corn in the case supposed was 15 per cent, or from fifty cents per bushel to forty-two and one-half cents per bushel as measured by the multiple standard, its fall, as compared with gold, would have been 22.8 per cent, or from fifty cents per bushel to 38.6 cents per bushel. For the same reason a rise in the price of a standard commodity would be less when measured by this standard than when compared with any single commodity standard. The multiple standard reduces the fluctuations of all the component commodities. To understand how it does this we have only to remember that the gold price of gold is constant, and that, if corn for instance were our standard commodity, the price of corn would fluctuate as little as that of gold does under the gold standard. Each commodity in the standard is compared with a unit of value of which it forms a part and

to the extent that it enters into the standard, just to that extent are its fluctuations in price diminished.

The decrease of price fluctuations from this cause is greatest when there are but few commodities in the standard. The effect varies from a complete elimination of fluctuations where the commodity forms all of the standard, to practically nothing where the commodity constitutes a very small part of the standard. With a very large number of commodities in the standard the effect on the prices of the unimportant commodities would be slight, but in the case of the great staple commodities which form a large part of the total product, price fluctuations would be confined within a much narrower range. Under this standard an increase in the quantity of commodities would mean an increase in the money value of the total product.

As explained above a fall in the price of corn to forty-two and one-half cents would necessitate a 10 per cent rise in the price of all the other standard commodities. If then the quantities of these six commodities are the same under the new prices as under the old, their aggregate money value, although their prices have changed, has suffered no change whatever. Prices cannot be altered in such a way as to affect the aggregate value of these products. The aggregate value can be increased or diminished only by increasing or diminishing the quantity of product.

A fall in the price of corn from fifty cents to forty-two and one-half cents per bushel, while the relative prices of the other standard products have not changed would indicate that there had been an increased production of corn. And, since the total value of these six commodities would, as we have seen, remain the same only on the assumption that there had been no increase in the quantity of any of them, the fall in the price of corn would indicate an increase in the value of the total product to the extent of the value of that part of the corn crop in excess of 1,600,000,000 bushels. If instead of a fall there had been a rise in the price of corn, the

relative price of the other commodities remaining unchanged, it would indicate in so far as it was due to a diminished supply, that there had been a diminution in the total value of the standard commodities to the extent of the decrease in the supply of corn. A fall in the price of a commodity cannot lower the total value of the standard products unless along with the fall in price had gone a decrease in the quantity of that commodity. On the other hand a rise in the price of a standard commodity could not raise the total value of the standard commodities unless the rise in price had been accompanied by an increase in quantity.

If all commodities entered into the standard in the ratio of their importance, an increase or decrease in their total money value would mean an increase or decrease in quantity. Practically the same result could be obtained by taking only the more important commodities. Under this standard there could be no rise or fall of general prices. Any commodity might rise or fall in price, but such rise or fall would have no effect on the total value of commodities. What is true of a single commodity would be true of commodities as a whole, there could be no alteration of general prices that would disturb the aggregate value of commodities. This would be a standard that for all practical purposes would correspond to a constant quantity of commodity.

There would be changes in the prices of commodities with the progress of invention and discovery. The introduction of improved methods of agriculture and better farming implements would temporarily lower the prices of farm products. Corn, wheat, etc., would now be produced at a less expenditure of labor than other commodities. They would, therefore, fall in price; but this would be balanced by a slight rise in the prices of all other things. When, however, a corresponding improvement in production shall have taken place in all other lines the prices of farm products will have risen to their former level. Every improvement in production will have the effect of lowering the prices of

those commodities whose labor cost is diminished and slightly raising the prices of all other commodities.

The relative importance of a commodity is liable to change in the course of time. Corn, for instance, which represented 8 per cent of the total product when the standard was adopted may, after the lapse of some years, constitute only 5 per cent of the total product. The relative importance of cotton, however, may have increased. The standard should be revised from time to time so as to conform to these permanent changes in production. A commodity which has become important should be put in the standard, while one which has become of no importance should be dropped.

The revised standard would be the exact equivalent of the old standard and there would be no alteration in prices. But prices will fluctuate less under the standard as revised since the effect of the change is to give it greater stability. The revision of the standard which would probably be necessary, or rather advisable, at long intervals would present no great difficulties and, inasmuch as it would not disturb prices, would be attended with no evil results whatever.

Any commodity could be included in the standard which is capable of being accurately defined as to quantity and quality. A great number and variety of products would meet this requirement. It would probably not be a difficult matter to secure standard commodities representing the greater part of the annual product.

The price of a commodity varies with the location of the market. It is higher in those markets farther from, and lower in those nearer to the source of supply. The standard prices then are those which prevail at some one selected market, as, for instance, Chicago. The wholesale Chicago prices of the standard commodities would regulate the value of the circulating medium throughout the entire country. One hundred thousand dollars would purchase in New York that quantity of goods corresponding in value not to the

aggregate wholesale value at New York of the standard quantities of corn, wheat, cotton, oats, silver and gold, but to their value at Chicago.

While New York and Chicago prices are not the same, they should bear such a definite relation to each other that the prices at one place being given those at the other can be readily determined. If railway rates were fixed, the wholesale prices at Chicago, barring such slight variations as are due to local fluctuations in supply and demand, would bear a fixed relation to the prices at all other points. It is assumed then that the cost of transportation is a constant quantity.

VII. THE CIRCULATING MEDIUM.

An Act of Congress establishing the multiple standard would also provide for the issue of a paper money to replace the gold and silver coins and notes now in use. This money would be a full legal tender in payment of all obligations public and private. It would be provided that after a specified future date the old circulating medium should no longer be a legal tender, but that prior to that date it might be exchanged, dollar for dollar, for notes issued on the basis of the new standard. After that date gold and silver coins and notes issued on the basis of either of these metals would be receivable only at the market value of the gold or silver which they represent.

The notes issued under this scheme would be convertible into either gold or silver at the option of the party presenting them for redemption. No notes would be redeemable in amounts of less than, say, \$1000.

It would be necessary to establish in connection with the Treasury Department a bureau whose duty it would be to ascertain, record and publish daily the wholesale Chicago prices of the standard commodities. This information should be published in a form that would clearly show the variations in the purchasing power of money as evidenced

by the changes in price of the standard commodities. This daily report might be in the following form:

Wholesale prices at Chicago of the standard commodities. (Date.)

Corn (standard quality), \$ 0.5125 per bushel.

* * * * *

Silver (standard quality), \$ 1.00 per ounce.

Gold, " " 20.68 "

Value of standard quantities of corn, wheat, cotton, oats, silver and gold at above prices.

80,000 bushels corn, \$0.5125 per bushel, \$ 41,000

* * * * *

3,500 ounces silver, \$1.00 per ounce, \$3,500

72.5 ounces of gold, \$20.68 per ounce, 1,500

\$101,000

Value of one dollar of the circulating medium in terms of the standard, \$0.99+.

The aggregate value of the standard items as given above is \$1000 in excess of \$100,000, indicating an aggregate rise in the prices of the standard commodities to that extent, and a corresponding depreciation of the circulating medium. The amount of this depreciation is found as follows:

$$\$101,000; \$100,000 = \$1.00 : x. \quad x = \$0.99+.$$

At the time the multiple standard is adopted it corresponds in value to 4835.58 ounces of gold or 100,000 ounces of silver. \$20.68 cents per ounce for gold, or \$1.00 per ounce for silver, is then the price, at which the government undertakes for the time being to buy or sell gold or silver. It cannot, in the nature of the case, be a permanent price, since the gold or silver equivalent of the multiple standard is liable to change. The government price must be raised or lowered from time to time so as to keep it in practical conformity with the value of gold and silver in the markets of the world.

The price of gold and silver being fixed by the government their value in the home markets will follow that of the

circulating medium. To the extent that there is a rise or fall of general prices, just to that extent will the local or home value of gold and silver be depressed or raised. Let us assume that the prices of the standard commodities have risen until the sum of the standard items is \$102,000. It now requires 4932.29 ounces of gold or 102,000 ounces of silver to purchase what 4835.58 ounces of gold or 100,000 ounces of silver would purchase if prices were not abnormally high. This means that the local values of gold and silver have been depressed to that extent. It follows that a given depreciation of the circulating medium under the multiple standard would bring in notes to secure gold or silver as readily as a corresponding depreciation of the circulating medium under the gold standard would bring in notes to secure gold. On the other hand, a given appreciation of the currency would be as effectual in bringing in both gold and silver to secure notes in the one case as it would in bringing in gold alone in the other.

A circulating medium issued on the basis of the multiple standard and convertible into either gold or silver in the way above described would tend to conform in value to that standard in the same way and to the same extent that a currency issued on the basis of gold tends to conform to the value of gold in the world's market. There can be no greater fluctuation in the value of this circulating medium than is possible in the gold currency of one country as compared with that of other countries. The money issued on the basis of the multiple standard would conform as nearly in value to that standard as a gold currency would to the world's market value of gold. Both kinds of currency would be liable to the same local and temporary variations in value. The one, however, would tend to conform to a standard practically fixed, while the other would tend to conform to a variable standard.

At any given time and place, the change which the purchasing power of money has undergone as compared with

its value at some prior time and place depends on two factors: (1) Its local appreciation or depreciation. (2) The alteration in the value of the standard itself. The adoption of the multiple standard would give us a currency the local fluctuations of which could be no greater than those of a gold standard currency, and which besides would be practically free from the variations due to alterations in the value of the standard.

If the government valuation of gold and silver were made to follow closely the general world market value of these metals, the currency issued under this scheme would, as we have seen, be self-regulative in the same degree that a currency issued on the gold basis is self-regulative and would, besides, be free from those variations to which gold as a standard is liable.

This automatic check on the local variation of general prices may not, however, come immediately into play; and though it eventually brings prices back to their appropriate level, it may not do so until the rise or fall has been sufficient in degree and long enough continued seriously to disturb industry. What is needed is a remedy that acts as soon as prices show a tendency to rise or fall—that acts promptly and effectually and which, therefore, makes anything more than a slight temporary variation of general prices an impossibility.

To regulate the value of the circulating medium through convertibility into gold or silver, it is necessary that \$100,000 should always secure or be secured by that quantity of either gold or silver corresponding in value to the standard. But gold and silver have two values; one a local value which in any given country depends on the state of the currency, the other a general market value. Should the currency be redeemable in gold or silver at the local or the general market value? If its general market value is to govern, then the person presenting \$100,000 in notes for redemption may not secure gold or silver equal in value in the home market to the

standard. To illustrate: Suppose that prices have risen until the sum of the standard items is \$102,000. The established price of \$20.68 per ounce for gold and \$1.00 per ounce for silver represents the general market value of these metals. Their local value, however, has decreased in the same ratio that general prices have risen. One hundred thousand dollars can be exchanged for only 4835.58 ounces of gold, or 100,000 ounces of silver, while in the home market the standard corresponds in value to 4932.29 ounces of gold, or 102,000 ounces of silver. The gold or silver for which the notes may be exchanged has no greater value in the local market than the notes themselves. For this reason no motive exists, even when the currency is locally depreciated, for buying gold or silver except to supply a foreign market. The man who buys gold or silver with depreciated currency and sells it again when the currency has regained its normal value finds that he is no better off than he would have been, if he had merely retained the depreciated notes. They would have appreciated as much in his hands as the gold or silver.

A circulating medium which is convertible into gold, or one convertible into silver, or one convertible into either of these metals at a fixed price, has but little elasticity. This is equally true of a currency based on the single gold or the single silver standard or of that based on the multiple standard and convertible into either gold or silver. The rise of prices must bring about a foreign demand for the precious metals before the volume of the circulating medium is automatically reduced.

A more sensitive mechanism for the regulation of general prices is obviously desirable. The only way in which this can be secured is by making the process of contraction or expansion coincide more nearly with the rise or fall of general prices. This greater elasticity would be obtained by varying the price of gold or silver inversely as general prices.

The quantity of gold or silver required to redeem a given amount of notes should be made to vary in the same ratio as the sum of the standard items. By varying the price of gold and silver in this way greater elasticity would be given to the circulating medium. But would this result in itself justify the scheme proposed? Would it not make a given amount of notes redeemable in too large a quantity of gold or silver? This might be our first impression but a little reflection, however, will convince us that it is not the case.

Under the single gold standard, notes, whether depreciated or not, always exchange for the same quantity of gold. This makes the circulating medium tend to conform to the general market value of gold. When, however, the currency is locally depreciated, one cannot, by converting it into gold, secure that command over commodities which he would have if the local value of gold corresponded to its general market value.

In the circulating medium, based upon the multiple standard, this difficulty is overcome by making the price of gold or silver vary inversely as general prices. Assuming that the local depreciation of gold and silver corresponds to that of the circulating medium, then the amount of either metal required to redeem \$100,000 in notes would be that quantity of gold or silver which has a local value equal to that of the standard; or, which is the same thing, that quantity which at its general market price would correspond to the sum of the standard items.

The government is compelled to buy gold and silver slightly above their general market price when the currency is appreciated, and to sell them slightly below it when it is depreciated. Fluctuations in the purchasing power of money would thus become a general tax upon the community. The loss thus entailed on the government would be slight, however, as compared with that which the people in their individual capacity sustain, where no attempt is made to limit the fluctuations of the circulating medium.

The convertibility of gold or silver into notes and of notes into gold or silver in the way described would prevent any sensible variation in the purchasing power of money. Under this scheme those periodic collapses of credit, in so far as they are the result of a speculative condition of industry affecting the prices of commodities, would not occur, since the motive for unduly extending credit, namely, the expectation of making a profit through the depreciation of money, would not exist. Accurately speaking, the motive for undue extension of credit is not based on a belief that the value of the monetary unit will fall, but is to be ascribed rather to the expectation that the value of goods will rise. The business community habitually look upon the established monetary unit as possessing a constant quantity of value. It is partly as a consequence of this fact that interest, wages and other fixed money payments do not readily adjust themselves to a change in the level of general prices. To eliminate the conditions that permit a rise or fall of general prices is to remove the cause of undue expansion or contraction of credit.

But is it necessary that a deficiency of currency should be supplied or an excess removed only through the purchase or sale by the government of gold or silver? If there should be any occasion for a considerable expansion or contraction of the volume of the circulating medium, it would, if effected in this way, unduly increase or decrease the government holdings of gold or silver. There should exist some means of easily and quickly increasing or decreasing the amount of money in circulation to any desired extent. There are two ways in which the government might remove an excess or supply a deficiency of currency: (1) by borrowing or lending as the case may require; (2) by selling or buying.

To supply a deficiency of money through the medium of loans, it would seem necessary for the government to assume the banking function and establish a direct relation between itself and the borrowing public. An elaborate machinery

would have to be maintained and kept constantly in working order, which means that banking would become an established governmental function.

The government might make any needed addition to the volume of currency by going upon the market and purchasing good securities, continuing this operation until the demand for currency was supplied. In this way the circulating medium could readily be expanded to any extent whatever. National, state and municipal bonds and the bonds of such industrial corporations as are under government regulation and control would be suitable for this purpose.

An excess of currency might be removed by simply reversing this process. A tendency of general prices to rise might be counteracted by the sale of such securities as the government might possess. The process of reducing the volume of the circulating medium could be continued from time to time until the excess is removed. If the government does not possess securities enough to effect the necessary reduction in the volume of the currency, it might issue and sell call bonds for this purpose.*

The government would always purchase on a falling market and sell on a rising market. It follows that the purchase and sale of securities, though undertaken solely with the view of regulating the currency, would incidentally be a source of revenue. The profit which would accrue to the government in this way would probably be much greater than the loss it would sustain in consequence of the variable price of gold and silver.

Whether the contraction of the circulating medium is effected in this way or by the sale of gold and silver, it ultimately takes the form of taxation. The excess is not removed as a tax since it must be carried off by some machinery which can be called into immediate action. It is necessary, however, to include it in the future taxes levied

* See "An Honest Dollar," by E. Benjamin Andrews, Publications of the American Economic Association, Vol. iv, p. 434.

since the government must maintain its stock of gold and silver and pay its bonds. In the long run then taxation is the agency employed to regulate the volume of the currency. Contraction is accomplished by collecting in the form of taxes more than the government expends, while expansion requires only that the revenue should be less than the expenditure.

Considered by itself, the fixing of the price of gold or silver, so as to make it approximate the general market value, would appear to be a very difficult matter; but, in reality, it is very simple. Viewed in their relation to each other, the price and the reserves are related as cause and effect. So long as gold and silver are valued neither too low nor too high no difficulty will be experienced in maintaining the proper reserves. By varying the price of gold or silver from time to time so as to keep the reserves right in proportion and amount, the practical conformity of the government price to the general market value would be secured.

To begin with, the gold prices prevailing at the time of the adoption of the multiple standard would furnish the means of easily fixing the price of gold and silver in terms of the new standard. This, as we assumed, was \$20.68 per ounce for gold and \$1.00 per ounce for silver. When any considerable difference arises between the price thus fixed and the general market value, it will affect the reserves in one of the following ways:

1. A decrease in the stock of gold in the treasury.
2. A decrease in the stock of silver.
3. A decrease in the stock of both gold and silver.
4. An increase in the stock of gold.
5. An increase in the stock of silver.
6. An increase in the stock of both gold and silver.
7. An increase in the stock of gold and a decrease in the stock of silver.
8. A decrease in the stock of gold and an increase in the stock of silver.

The first result indicates that gold is being taken out of the country because it commands a higher price abroad.

The price in this case should be gradually raised until equilibrium between the local and the general market value is restored. In the second case the price of silver is too low and in the third the price of both gold and silver should be raised. The fourth result would be evidence of too high a local valuation of gold; the fifth, of silver, and the sixth, of both gold and silver. The seventh result would show that gold was overvalued and silver undervalued, while the eighth would indicate an undervaluation for gold and an overvaluation for silver.

It is assumed that the reserves of gold and silver are not affected by changes in general prices. Of course a rise of prices will increase the private holding of gold and silver while a fall of prices will bring these metals into the treasury. In either case the effect is temporary and does not increase or diminish the total stock of gold and silver within the country.

The circulating medium might be made redeemable in gold alone. Greater simplicity would thus be secured without any loss of efficiency. Nor is it necessary that the commodity into which the notes are convertible should form a part of the standard. Gold might be taken out of the standard and still be made to perform satisfactorily the entire work of regulating the value of the currency.

The circulating medium under this scheme would be issued directly and exclusively by the government and the volume of money would at all times correspond to the actual needs of commerce.

VIII. A NATIONAL *vs.* AN INTERNATIONAL STANDARD OF VALUE

The notion prevails to a greater or less extent that an international standard of value is a commercial necessity. This is one of the principal arguments for the single gold standard. It is claimed that its adoption by the leading commercial nations puts that country which does not have

this standard at a disadvantage in its international trade. This is based upon the assumption that fluctuations in the rates of exchange between gold-using countries and those which have some other standard are a burden that falls for the most part upon the latter. But is this true? Do the gold standard countries in fact suffer less than others from fluctuations in foreign exchange? A fluctuating rate of exchange may or may not be an evil. It is, if due to changes in the value of our own monetary unit; but if occasioned by alterations in the value of the monetary unit of other countries, it is not.

To make stability in the rates of foreign exchange the test of a good monetary system is to lose sight of the most important function that money performs in modern society. The crucial test is not steady rates of foreign exchange, but the existence of a practically constant relation between the monetary unit and commodities generally. If the purchasing power of money is constant, we have nothing to fear from fluctuations in foreign exchange. This is clear if we remember that the rate of exchange is merely the expression of the relation between two different monetary units. A change in the value of either is followed by an alteration in the rate of exchange. Between two gold standard countries the rate of exchange is practically constant although gold may fluctuate greatly in value. Between a gold and a silver standard country the rate is fluctuating; but if the purchasing power of silver is more nearly constant than that of gold, it is the gold and not the silver standard country that suffers.

Some advantages would follow from the adoption by all nations of a uniform monetary system, if along with it could be secured in each country stability in the value of the monetary unit. Such a scheme does not seem to be attainable under the existing social and political conditions. The gold monometallists propose to realize this conception of an international standard by making gold the standard commodity in every commercial country. The benefits

derived from the general adoption of the gold standard are, however, apparent rather than real. The question at bottom is not so much the relation which exists between two monetary units as such, as that existing between commodities in the one country and commodities in the other.

Cost of transportation is an element in the price of all and a very large element in the price of many commodities. It is assumed, however, for the purposes of this argument, that gold is unlike other commodities in that transportation is nowhere an element in its price. If there were any other commodities which, like gold, could be carried without cost to all parts of the world, then gold would have, so far as these commodities are concerned, everywhere the same purchasing power. But gold does not possess the same purchasing power in all countries, and it may be that there are no two places within the same country at which it is exactly the same.

Gold has a greater purchasing power in some countries than in others. In some places it buys more of commodities generally; in others, less. Other things being equal, the purchasing power of gold is greatest or, which is the same thing, the general level of gold prices is lowest in that country whose imports are made up of those commodities which are carried at the least cost. The effect of this would be to make general prices rather higher in those countries whose exports are valuable goods and whose imports are mainly cheap heavy products. On the other hand a purely agricultural country, which exports cheap and imports costly goods ought to have a lower range of general prices than a manufacturing country. This would be true if there were no restrictions upon international trade. Duties levied upon articles of international commerce must, however, be taken into account. An increase in the duty on imports means that the level of general prices within the protected country is artificially raised. What would be true as between nations, if we had perfect

freedom of international trade, would also hold as between different parts of the same country. The application to railway rates of the principle of "charging what the traffic will bear" tends, however, to equalize the purchasing power of money in different parts of the country. Whether it varied from place to place within the same country or not, there would, if transportation rates were fixed, be a constant relation between the purchasing power of money at any two points.

The purchasing power of gold in any given country depends on two sets of conditions—one internal and the other external. As these are not the same for any two countries, and moreover are not constant for any one country, there is no definite, ascertainable relation between the purchasing power of gold in different countries. As its purchasing power depends on this relation and not on the average efficiency of labor within the given country, it is easy to see that the conception of a standard, which the gold monometallist has in mind is not realized in universal gold monometallism. Even if the purchasing power of gold did increase, taking its average the world over, in the same ratio as the efficiency of labor, there would be no necessary connection between the efficiency of labor and the purchasing power of gold in any given country. In a country whose industrial development was below the average the purchasing power of gold would be too high, while in a country which had taken the lead in industrial progress it would be too low.

No argument for international money is sound which fails to recognize that the first requisite of a good monetary system is steadiness of value. Besides, as the great bulk of our commerce is in the very nature of the case domestic, not foreign, it behooves us to look at the money question from the point of view of domestic rather than of foreign trade.

How under the multiple standard could the reserves of gold and silver be maintained in the presence of a greatly

fluctuating foreign demand? As above stated this result could be secured by raising or lowering the price of gold or silver as the case might require. From the point of view of foreign trade gold and silver are simply commodities and are exported or imported in obedience to the same laws that determine the international movement of other things. Where capital travels freely from one country to another there is no discoverable relation between the movement of the precious metals and the balance of trade.

"There is in Europe," says Professor H. C. Adams, "a system of international payments of which we know little or nothing in this country. If, for example, a merchant in Paris wishes to make a payment in Berlin, it is quite customary for him to send securities of some sort to his Berlin agent, which, being sold, permit him to place so much of their proceeds as are necessary to the order of his creditor. The securities thus used are known as 'international values.' They may be the bonds of any reliable state whose paper cannot be retained among its own citizens. Thus the bonds of Italy, Spain, Turkey and Russia are so used. Railroad securities, as also the paper of other well-established industrial corporations, swell the total of 'international values.' The point of importance, however, is to recognize the existence of such values, and to understand that by means of them any special stress upon one market may be in part transferred to other money centres. These 'international values' act as connecting pipes between great reservoirs of capital." *

We should bear in mind that a diminution of the government reserves of gold and silver through exportation may be due to the fact that capital is being withdrawn from the country. It is this very mobility of capital that introduces into modern industrial society the periodic and widespread evil known as the commercial panic. It has bound together

*"Public Debts," p. 56. See also Bagehot "Economic Studies," p. 67, and Report of U. S. Comptroller of Currency, 1888.

the commercial nations of the world in such manner that any shock to the industries of one country is immediately transmitted, perhaps with increased force, to every other country. The cause may be local but the effect is general.

In case of a collapse of credit in any country this cosmopolitan loan fund, attracted by the high rate of interest, rushes in to fill up the void. This raises the rate of interest in all countries through which this fund circulates. The sudden redistribution of this international capital affects disastrously all commercial nations. What is at first a purely local evil develops into a struggle for this general loan fund, which means ruinously high rates of interest in all countries and a general commercial panic.*

Now it is this very evil that the adoption of the multiple standard would enable us to avoid. It would secure us exemption from all commercial disturbances which are not peculiarly our own. It would supply what now does not exist, *viz.*, the means of preventing a sudden withdrawal of capital without raising the rate of interest.

Let us assume that this standard has been adopted and that the entire business of the country has become adjusted to the new unit of value—that all contracts and obligations of every kind are expressed in terms of it. Suppose now that England, for instance, is visited by a severe commercial crisis. The immediate effect is a rise in the rate of interest and a fall in the price of securities on the London market. England is now a seller of securities. She must have cash and the only way to secure it is to offer stocks and bonds at prices which will tempt foreign investors to supply her with gold. This means a contraction of the circulating medium in all other gold standard countries. The monetary system of the United States being on a different basis would not be disturbed. The American investor would not be able to

*The panic of 1893 was due primarily to disturbances in the London money market, for which the United States was not responsible, but which it was powerless to shut out. See "Panic in the U. S. in 1893," by Albert C. Stevens, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, January, 1894.

make a profit by purchasing English securities. As soon as gold begins to be taken for export the government raises its price. American capital must take the form of gold before it can purchase English securities. But gold, here, is not as it is in the gold standard countries, a commodity which can be bought at a fixed price. The American investor finds that the price which he has to pay for gold rises in the same proportion that the price of stocks and bonds on the London market falls. From his point of view, what has really taken place is not a fall in the price of English securities, but a rise in the price of gold. There has been no change in the United States in the relation of money to commodities or in the market rate of interest. The only effect of a foreign panic has been a rise in the price of one commodity, *viz.*, gold. While the gold standard countries are able to check the loss of capital only by raising the rate of interest to a point which means widespread commercial disaster, the United States, by simply raising the price of one commodity, easily prevents any loss of capital or rise in the rate of interest. It could protect itself in the same way against any monetary disturbance in the silver standard countries. Under this system foreign panics would be effectually shut out.*

An increase in the American price of gold may mean either one of two things: (1) A rise in the rate of interest in the gold standard countries; or, (2) an increase in the general purchasing power of gold. The first of these may be due to a foreign monetary panic, the second to a resulting industrial depression. The former is of short duration, the latter may be of long continuance. But whether it be a sudden rise in the rate of interest or an increase in the general purchasing power of gold, the evil is one from which the United States would, under this scheme, be exempt.

* The advantages of a non-exportable medium of exchange were pointed out by Henry C. Carey. See Vol. ii of his *Miscellaneous Works* under the headings of "Monetary Independence" and "Appreciation in the Price of Gold."

IX. THE MULTIPLE STANDARD AND THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM OF DISTRIBUTION.

Let us suppose the existence of a society in which there is considerable division of labor but no money, no conception of wealth in the abstract. A producer, who, after procuring through barter such quantities of other things as he needed, still had a surplus of his commodity, would find it to his advantage to let someone have this excess, who should agree to return in exchange therefor at some future time a specified quantity of the same or some other commodity. Credit would constitute a supplementary demand. It would furnish the means through which the aggregate demand would be made to equal the aggregate supply.

The rate of exchange between present and future goods would be such as would enable those having the excess of present goods to find purchasers for them. A lower rate than this they would be unwilling to take and a higher rate they would be unable to get. There could be no undue expansion of credit under such conditions. Credit would merely provide a market for what would otherwise be an excess of product and only to the extent of this surplus could the volume of credit be expanded. It would permit inequality between supply and demand, so far as the individual is concerned, but at the same time it would preserve a balance between supply and demand in the aggregate.

It is only when money comes into general use and the abstract takes place of the concrete conception of wealth that an undue expansion of credit becomes possible. Fluctuations in the volume of credit are simply a part of the general fluctuations in industry caused by changes in the value of money.

As long as the concrete notion of wealth prevailed and credit was expressed in terms of commodities generally, the apparent rate of exchange between present and future goods was the actual rate. But when credit came to be expressed

in terms of a fluctuating monetary unit, the nominal rate of interest might be very low, while the real rate was very high or *vice versa*.

It is a fact of common observation that during the so-called good times, the period of rising prices usually preceding a panic, there is a high nominal rate of interest, while during the subsequent depression in industry, the period of falling prices, the nominal rate is low. The nominal rate, however, under the existing system is no indication of the real rate. The change in value which the monetary unit is undergoing must be taken into account. If general prices are rising, the rate of interest is really less than it appears to be, while if they are falling it is greater. If, then, we add to or subtract from the nominal rate of interest according as general prices are falling or rising, we find, especially if the change in the value of money is rapid, that the real rate is lower during the period of rising prices and higher during the period of falling prices, just the reverse of what appears to be the case.*

This is what we should naturally expect. The very fact that the volume of credit is being abnormally expanded shows that some exceptional motive exists for resorting to credit. This is the high profits on the one hand and the low interest on the other. The fall in the value of money raises profits at the expense of interest, wages and rent. Of course it does not appear to the borrower that there has been a fall in the rate of interest, for the nominal rate has probably risen. The difference between the nominal and the real interest is presented to his eye under the guise of unusual profits.

With regard to the lender it may be said that he also fails to distinguish between the nominal and the actual rate of

* See "Remedies for Fluctuations of General Prices," by Professor Alfred Marshall, *Contemporary Review*, March, 1887.

Also "Notes on Banking in Great Britain and Ireland, Sweden, Denmark and Hamburg," by Robert Harry Inglis Palgrave, *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Vol. 36.

interest. He is unconscious of what he loses through the repayment of his loan in money of diminished purchasing power; and, as the excess of the present over the usual market or nominal rate of interest seems to him just so much clear gain, his willingness to loan increases with the rise in the nominal rate, even though the real rate at the same time falls. When there is an upward movement of general prices borrowers increase their demand for loans, and there is consequently a rise in the nominal rate of interest. But the competition of lenders usually prevents a rise in the nominal rate sufficient to compensate for the fall in the purchasing power of money, and the result is a decline in the real rate of interest.

A fall in general prices means a decrease in profits and, therefore, in the demand for loans. There is, however, no equivalent fall in the nominal rate of interest. Lenders make their calculations on the basis of the nominal, not the real rate of interest, and when the former declines, there is an increasing unwillingness to loan. It is in this way that a decline in general prices has the effect of raising the real rate of interest.

The rate of wages is affected by rising prices in the same way as that of interest. Nominal wages are raised, but real wages are lowered. The increased activity in industry, in so far as it merely absorbs labor previously unemployed, may not raise even the nominal wage. The supply of labor under the present industrial order is nearly always in excess of the demand and it is conceivable that the aggregate expenditure of labor might be considerably augmented without any increase in the price of labor. As the laborer does not distinguish between real and nominal wages, or in other words does not perceive the contemporaneous rise in general prices, an increase in the nominal wage seems to him a real gain. This at least partially accounts for the fact that wages rise less rapidly than the prices of commodities. A rapid depreciation of money always lowers real wages. A fall in prices,

on the other hand, is not accompanied by an equivalent fall in nominal wages.*

This means that there is a rise in the rate of the laborer's remuneration. This may seem to give support to the claim of the monometallists that falling prices benefit the laboring class. The advantage thus gained, however, is merely apparent, not real. A rise in the rate of the real wage does not necessarily mean an improvement in the laborer's condition. The amount of wages as well as the rate must be taken into account. The laborer is not benefited by an increase in the rate of his wages, if at the same time his total earnings are diminished; yet this is what a fall in general prices always tends to bring about. Enforced idleness, irregular employment and a great falling off in the aggregate earnings of the laboring class are the inevitable result of a rapid decline in general prices.

What is true of interest and wages is also true of rent.

Fluctuations in general prices must be looked at from the point of view of the profit receiver to understand their influence upon production. As he is the borrower of capital, the employer of labor and the manager of industry, it is through him that a rise or a fall in general prices must bring about an increase or a decrease in industrial activity.

If nominal interest, wages and rent moved up or down with general prices, the real interest, wages and rent would remain the same and each class would get its normal proportion of the total product. But the inertia of nominal interest, wages and rent prevents them from rising or falling with general prices, and consequently every change in the value of money disturbs the normal relation between interest, wages, profits and rent. A rise in prices leaves nominal

*In the United States during the period from 1860 to 1865 money wages rose in the ratio of 100 to 148.6 while general prices rose in the ratio of 100 to 232.2. From 1873 to 1879 prices in the United States declined in the ratio of 129 to 95, but money wages fell during the same period only in the ratio of 166.1 to 134.4. See Report of the Finance Committee of the Senate on Wholesale Prices, Wages and Transportation, 1893.

interest, wages and rent behind, and thus increases abnormally the share which goes to the entrepreneur. A fall in prices on the other hand fails to carry nominal interest, wages and rent down with it and, therefore, reduces real profits. A fall in the value of money not only has the effect of increasing the nominal income of those who direct industry but it augments their real income as well. To the industrial stimulus arising from a mere increase in nominal profits is added the much more effective one, a larger share of the aggregate product. On the contrary, a rise in the value of money diminishes both nominal and real profits. The relation existing between interest, wages, rent and profits is such that when prices are rising the income of the entrepreneur is increased at the expense of interest, wages and rent ; but when prices are falling real interest, wages and rent are raised at the expense of profits. The effect of rising prices is to give the entrepreneur a disproportionately large share in the total income of society, while the effect of falling prices is to make his share disproportionately small.

As invention, discovery and improvement in economic organization are constantly raising the average efficiency of labor, falling prices must be considered with reference to their effect upon a society in which cost of production is being diminished. Industrial progress brings great benefits, but it also imposes heavy burdens. It raises the average efficiency of labor, but at the same time it involves the destruction of wealth and the displacement of labor and capital.

Let us suppose a fall in general prices which is coincident with and just equal to the increase in the efficiency of labor. This is what should take place if the conception underlying gold monometallism is to be realized. What now would be the effect upon industry? An answer to this question must take account of the influence of falling prices on the one hand, and of improvement in production on the other.

In order to understand the influence of industrial progress upon the production and distribution of wealth, the distinction between interest and profits must be kept clearly in mind. The interest receiver or creditor and the profit receiver or entrepreneur own all industrial capital. Its management, however, is exclusively in the hands of the latter. The industrial property of the interest receiver exists in the form of a mortgage or fixed money claim upon the capital and product of economic society. All industrial property not in the nature of a bond or other right to a fixed money payment belongs to the entrepreneur.

Now, in the case assumed, how would the benefits of industrial progress be distributed, and upon whom would the burdens fall? The reduction in the value of existing capital through improvement in production would fall entirely upon the entrepreneur. He could not recoup himself for this loss, since according to the supposition general prices have declined in the same ratio as cost of production. This burden is one from which the interest receiver is practically exempt, as is evidenced by the nature of his claim upon industrial society. The principal and interest of the obligations held by the debtor constitute a first claim upon the capital and earnings of industry. Interest on bonds or other indebtedness must be paid before dividends or profits. The industrial property of the stockholder or individual entrepreneur stands between the interest receiver and the possibility of loss. The destruction of capital occasioned by economic progress is a burden which, to the extent of the entrepreneur's interest, falls upon him alone and cannot be shifted. Improvement in production destroys the industrial property of the entrepreneur on the one hand, while the appreciation of money enables the interest receiver to appropriate it on the other.

What could be expected under such a régime but industrial depression? The entrepreneur—the director and initiator of production—in the very nature of the case is

obliged to bear the loss of capital occasioned by industrial progress, and why should he be still further burdened through falling prices for the sake of conferring a special benefit upon the interest receiver, who is himself exempt from any special burden? There seems upon analysis to be no foundation whatever for the claim of the monometallists that justice to the interest receiver requires that general prices should fall as the efficiency of labor is increased. As between the two capital owning classes, equity would demand that if either is to receive a special benefit at the expense of the other in consequence of industrial progress, it should be the one upon whom progress imposes a special burden. Justice as between the two capital owning classes themselves as well as the interests of society at large demand that the entrepreneur, who assumes the initiative in production, should not be artificially burdened for the special benefit of the class who take no active part in industry. The effect of the whole system is to discourage production, and to make a bond a more desirable investment than an entrepreneur's interest in capital.

Wants may be classified as present and future, and corresponding to these two classes of wants are two classes of commodities: (*a*) means of subsistence or goods intended for immediate consumption, and (*b*) intermediate products, or those which have in view the satisfaction of future wants. The latter are transformed into buildings, machinery and other means of production. Consumption goods are the results of production in their final form. Capital, on the other hand, is unfinished means of subsistence. All labor which takes the form of an addition to the existing stock of capital sooner or later ripens into consumption goods. An increase in capital means an increase in the future supply of means of subsistence.

It follows that there is a certain proportion between the demand for intermediate and the demand for final products which, in a given state of industrial development, is the

normal one. Along with the growth of capital and the increase in the productive capacity of society must go a corresponding increase in the power of society to consume. Under the existing economic organization, it is through the distribution of the product between interest, wages, profits and rent that the due proportion between the demand for intermediate and the demand for final products must be secured. It is chiefly from profits that capital is augmented, while wages are mainly a demand for subsistence. Regular and uninterrupted production depends on normal distribution, but the indispensable condition of the latter is stability in general prices.

As long as money fluctuates in value there can be no such thing as normal demand. Every change in general prices alters the proportion in which the aggregate income of industrial society is divided between interest, wages, profits and rent. When prices are rising a disproportionately large part of the total income passes into the hands of the entrepreneur. This suggests an explanation of the familiar fact that during such a period there is a rapid accumulation of capital and a great extension of industry. The demand for all those things necessary to the extension of industry is greatly increased without a corresponding increase in the demand for final products. This is the necessary consequence of the change in distribution which the rise in general prices brings about. A relative decrease in the share of the wage receiving class, which is spent mainly for subsistence, and a relative increase in that of the profit receiving class, which largely takes the form of a demand for buildings, machinery, etc., must soon produce a condition of industry in which there is what may be described as a general over supply of goods. An abnormal increase in the share of the entrepreneur augments the productive capacity of industrial society at the expense of its power to consume. This disproportionate distribution leads inevitably to glutted markets and falling prices. Production is

checked, and the already insufficient demand of the wage receiving class is still further reduced.

These recurring periods of abnormal activity, followed by paralysis of industry, are not difficult to understand. The slightest upward movement of general prices increases the income of the entrepreneur. But this augments the demand for credit which, in turn, leads to a still further rise in prices. The effect is to increase disproportionately the demand for intermediate products. In the usual course of things the rise in general prices will continue until the abnormal gains of the entrepreneur begin to reach the final stage of consumption goods. It cannot continue beyond the expiration of the production period since at this point the disproportionate increase of intermediate products, which accompanies the upward movement of general prices, must begin to make itself felt in a corresponding increase in the supply of final products. It is this fact which sets a limit to the possible rise in general prices. The continuance of the demand for means of production depends upon the maintenance of an efficient demand for means of subsistence. But this in turn depends upon a normal distribution of the product between interest, wages, rent and profits. The fall in general prices must set in when the end of the production period is reached. But when the rise in general prices has been considerable the due proportion between the demand for intermediate and the demand for final products cannot be immediately restored. To effect the necessary increase in the subsistence demand would require a fall in general prices sufficient to eliminate or seriously reduce profits. But this would tend to curtail production and thus actually to diminish the subsistence demand.

There is under the present industrial order no such thing as continuous and uninterrupted accumulation of capital. Even our periods of apparent prosperity are not times of normal and healthy business activity. With the upward movement of general prices industry is largely speculative. Capital may be rapidly accumulated and production may, for the

time being, run ahead of consumption. But the disproportionate increase in the demand for intermediate products has the effect of eventually bringing upon the market a supply of consumption goods in excess of the effective demand. The period of falling prices now sets in, during which production falls below consumption. The already insufficient demand for final products is still further reduced as a consequence of the curtailment of production. The industrial capacity of society is more than adequate to meet the existing demand. The inability of society to utilize all the existing capital cuts off the motive for further accumulation. There is no incentive to keep up that part of the capital of society which cannot be employed in production. There is then actual destruction or consumption of the accumulated capital of society. The total consumption is really greater than the total production. It follows that society may emerge from the period of depression with less capital and less productive capacity than when it entered upon the downward trend of prices. This consumption of capital will continue until a point is reached at which the demand calls into use all the existing capital. Here supply and demand again balance and industry is once more in what may be called its normal state.

The belief is more or less prevalent that irregularities in production have their main cause in some defect in the medium of exchange. The nature of the defect, however, does not seem to be fully understood. Fiat money, free and unlimited coinage of silver and international bimetallism are all proposed as remedies. But these are at best nothing more than mere palliatives. They would all leave the root of the evil untouched. The aim which free coinage of silver and international bimetallism have in view is to protect society against a permanent appreciation of the circulating medium. But granting that the two metals could be combined in such manner as to secure a constant cost of production for the monetary unit, it would not follow that the circulating

medium based upon it would have a constant purchasing power. The value of gold and silver, while in the long run controlled by cost of production, depends at any given moment, as does the value of all other commodities, upon supply and demand. As the total quantity of gold and silver in existence is very large, while the yearly product is relatively very small, it is obvious that an increase or a decrease in the money demand for them may keep their value for considerable periods of time either very much above or very much below cost of production. The stability of general prices cannot be secured through free coinage of silver, international bimetallism or any similar measure. It might prevent a permanent money famine, but it would not ensure that elasticity in the money supply which is absolutely essential to normal production. The industrial depression, with its enormous waste of labor and capital, would still make its regular appearance. General prices would alternately rise and fall. Cost of production under the existing system is too indirect and remote a regulator of the purchasing power of money to be of any practical value. Some more direct and immediate means of controlling general prices must be provided, if regular and uninterrupted production is to be secured. General prices are in a state of continual fluctuation, and the problem is not how to prevent these fluctuations altogether, but how to confine them within such narrow limits that no disturbance to industry will result. Under the existing monetary system the upward movement of general prices tends to continue throughout the production period. Of course many other influences come in to modify the result. A collapse of credit, for instance, may arrest the rise in prices before the end of the production period is reached or some extraordinary demand may carry off what would otherwise have constituted an excess of commodities and so extend the rise in prices beyond this point. It is this want of direct control over the purchasing power of money which gives rise to the industrial cycle.

The socialists are right in maintaining that the industrial problem is one of distribution. They are wrong, however, in asserting that the competitive principle is essentially vicious and that the only remedy for abnormal distribution is the reorganization of economic society upon a non-competitive basis. Some industries, it is true, are not subject to competition and to these the socialistic principle of state control must be applied. There is, however, a very large field of competitive industry. But the medium of exchange is the instrument of competition and it is mainly because of imperfections in the monetary system that the competitive control of industry has thus far been a failure. The co-ordination of the various industrial forces is effected through the agency of prices and it is the failure of prices to show the actual situation that leads to irregularity in production.

The crucial test of normal distribution is the maintenance of an efficient demand. It must not be supposed, however, that the normal share of interest, wages or profits is a fixed proportion—the same for all stages of industrial development. In a progressive society distribution is undergoing continual change. With the accumulation of capital an efficient demand can be maintained only through a continuous rise in the rate of wage and a continuous fall in the rate of interest. The maintenance of a due proportion between the demand for subsistence and the demand for those things which constitute an addition to the existing means of production, operates to give wages a continually increasing proportion of the total product.

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AN EARLY ESSAY
ON PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.*

On May 3, 1844, the American Philosophical Society of Philadelphia gave Thomas Gilpin, Esq., permission to read a printed paper entitled: "On the Representation of Minorities of Electors to Act with the Majority in Elected Assemblies." † The paper had been printed by the author at his own expense and dedicated to the society. The date at the end of the paper is May 1, 1844; in the dedication May 3, 1844.

Two copies of the pamphlet are in the Philadelphia Library; one is reported to be in the Harvard College Library, one in the Franklin Institute Library, in Philadelphia, and one in the Library of the Boston Athenæum. It is a small pamphlet of fifteen pages and was reprinted in the *Penn Monthly* in 1872. ‡

This paper is remarkable as being one of the earliest systematic discussions of the plan now known as Minority, or Proportional Representation. The paper antedates Thomas Hare's earliest essays on the subject of Minority Representation by thirteen years; and that of James Garth Marshall by almost ten years.

The author wrote in a city, the members of whose legislative body, called Councils, were elected at the time on a general ticket by a majority of the votes. The results had

* Read before the Political Science Association of the Central States, Indianapolis, January 1, 1896.

† Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. iv, p. 81, Philadelphia, 1847.

‡ In answer to a request for information, published in the *Philadelphia Ledger* of December 4, 1895, as to where other copies might be found, Mr. James Monaghan, of the West Chester (Pa.) bar, replied that he had one copy in his private library. No other copies than those mentioned have come to the attention of the writer.

been unsatisfactory. It seemed to Gilpin that such a plan was based on two principles, one of which was sound, and the other unsound. It is right that the majority shall govern, but not right that the voice of the minority shall be unheard. He, therefore, undertook to examine the question whether a legislative assembly can be so elected as to represent the respective interests of the community *in deliberation* and to allow to the majority that control *in its decisions* to which it is entitled.

The political evils from which the city of Philadelphia suffered at that time seem to have been the same as at present—bossism and the subordination of local to national issues. The caucus comes in for severe criticism, and one of the arguments the author advances for his system is, that in his opinion, it would prevent “those hasty and unjust displacements from office which have taken place by granting to the successful party all the benefits of office, so offensive to the sentiments and feelings of a large and independent part of the community, desirous only of a steady, just and impartial administration of government.” From which it would seem as if the spoils system had already become firmly established in Philadelphia by 1840 or even earlier.

The system of election by a majority, as distinct from plurality, vote, the author thinks, was occasioning many evils—not the least among them that of giving to a small third party an entirely disproportionate influence when the two great parties were nearly equal in numbers. Thus he said the system of majority voting in Massachusetts had thrown an entirely undue power into the hands of the Abolitionists, who, by giving their support first to one party and then to another, could practically make their own terms, and was thus forcing both the other parties to become radical on the slavery issues, when otherwise neither of them would have been so. Nor did he think that the plan of plurality voting, just then adopted by Massachusetts, as a remedy for this evil, would help matters—on the contrary,

it would make them worse, since it might give to a party, absolutely in the minority, the power of controlling the public policy of the community, without consulting the other parties at all.

The plan proposed by the author was very simple. Each party was to put up its candidates as usual, a number equal to the whole number to be elected. The voting was to go on in the usual way, each voter having one vote for each of, say, twenty men—that was the number then in Councils. After the election each party was to have a number of representatives assigned to it, bearing the same ratio to twenty, as its vote bore to the total vote. The names standing first on the party list should be declared elected until the number assigned to the party should be exhausted. It is practically the Free List System which has been adopted of late in portions of Switzerland.

There is no indication in the proceedings of the American Philosophical Society that the paper was discussed in that body, either at the time, or later; nor is it very apparent from the history of the period what was the immediate occasion which gave rise to the paper. The subject of representative reform was indeed much debated at the time. The law of Congress requiring the States to be divided into single-member districts, had only just been passed, after great excitement in Congress, in answer to a demand for fairer representation and a chance for the minority. It is quite possible that more detailed researches will show that these ideas were advanced by earlier writers during the discussions incident to this Act of Congress. At present they seem, in this form at any rate, to have been original with Thomas Gilpin; even if they had been advanced before by writers and thinkers in Europe, which does not yet appear.

Hare does not mention having seen this pamphlet, though the expressions: *quota* and *representative quota* are here used much in the Hare sense. J. Francis Fisher, of Philadelphia,

in his "Degradation of our Representative System and its Reform,"* claims to have worked out a plan similar to Hare's before the latter had published anything upon the subject. In such case he may have been indebted to Gilpin, or at least to the discussion which Gilpin started, for the fundamental thought; but if so, he forgot to give Gilpin credit for it. Fisher was also a member of the Philosophical Society and may have heard Gilpin's paper. He must have known of Kane's claim for Gilpin in the obituary notice of the latter, read before the society, February 17, 1854,† in which he said that Gilpin had proposed the first matured plan for minority representation, which had gained public attention among us. Indeed, Fisher could hardly have escaped seeing the pamphlet itself, as Gilpin doubtless sent copies to all his colleagues in the society.

Salem Dutcher, in his "Minority, or Proportional Representation," speaks of it as the first essay on the subject of Minority Representation in English, and states that only one copy was known to be in existence.

Thomas Gilpin, the author of the paper—which whether the first or not, is certainly an early and cogent argument for the principle of fair play for the minorities—was born in Philadelphia, in 1776, and died in the same city in 1853. He was a successful paper manufacturer, and has the credit of having introduced many improvements into that branch of industry in this country. He came of Quaker stock. His father, Thomas Gilpin, was banished from Philadelphia at the outbreak of the Revolution on account of supposed sympathy with England. He had felt in his life the bitterness of belonging to a minority which not only was unrepresented, but was not even allowed to speak on its own behalf. His son, whose thoughts may have been turned to the subject by the experience of his father, gathered together a

* Philadelphia, 1863.

† Proceedings of American Philosophical Society, Vol. vi, p. 13, Philadelphia, 1859.

series of papers relating to the treatment of these Quakers and published them in 1848, under the title: "Exiles in Virginia with Observations on the Conduct of the Society of Friends during the Revolutionary War."*

Father and son were members of the Philosophical Society, the former, one of the first members; the latter, elected in 1814.† Thomas Gilpin was a regular attendant at the meetings of the Philosophical Society, and dedicated other pamphlets than the one on Minority Representation to the Society, notably one entitled, "An Essay on Organic Remains as Connected with an Ancient Tropical Region of the Earth."

In his home at Kentmere he entertained many of the most prominent men of his time. James A. Bayard was a near neighbor. Henry D. Gilpin, Attorney-General of the United States, was a frequent visitor, and in such intercourse it was natural that he should develop his interest in scientific politics.‡

The history of this pamphlet on Proportional Representation, illustrates in a striking way how there is a time for everything, and how everything must wait for its time. Written at a period when there was a general demand for some kind of reform in our system of representation, it undertook to show how, by adopting a system of proportional representation, the general ticket and caucus system could be made to yield satisfactory results. It failed to accomplish its immediate purpose; and only now, after fifty years, is beginning to bear practical fruit. The caucus system and the single-member district system have not yielded the results hoped for. Whether any scheme of proportional or minority representation can do better, may be

*Cf. Proceedings of American Philosophical Society, December 6, 1895, Vol. xxxiv. Philadelphia, 1896.

†Cf. Early Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, April 15, 1814, p. 446.

‡The writer is indebted to Mr. Wm. Bernard Gilpin, of Philadelphia, grand-nephew of the subject of this sketch, for these facts.

a question; but it begins to look as if some such method were destined to have a trial, and in such an event, Gilpin's plan has much to recommend it. The historical interest attaching to the paper has seemed to make it worth while to reprint it entire, and accordingly it appears below.

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On the Representation of Minorities of Electors to Act with the Majority in Elected Assemblies. By Thomas Gilpin. Philadelphia: John C. Clark, Printer, 60 Dock Street, 1844.

Owing to the difficulty of procuring impartial and useful legislation in the present mode of conducting the elections, it becomes worthy of consideration, whether there may not be a plan constituted for choosing representatives for the several legislative bodies differently from the present one, so as to have a more equal and just relation to the condition of society—to preserve more truly the rights of the people; to carry more strength and talent, and a more efficient expression of public opinion into deliberative assemblies.

The present mode of choosing representatives by *a majority of the votes of the electors*, has been so obviously before the people, and it is so easy for the majority to continue it, that it has been used in popular governments, from their early origin, and has remained without any attempt at improvement, or even consideration. It is true that it is based upon the just principle, of *the right of the majority to govern*; but in practical legislation it is connected with a very erroneous one, *that the voice of the majority alone is to be regarded*. Thus, in making an election of representatives as it is now done, in a district, by the majority, a large part of the people forming *barely the minority*, is deprived of any interest or voice in the elected councils, and there is no opportunity to bring into them any considerations, but those respected by the majority.

But if the deliberative assemblies were divested, as they ought to be, of the strong desire for political power, and exclusive legislative action, there would be a better estimate of the advantage of a representation to correspond to the general feeling and opinion of the people.

Let us therefore examine the question, Whether there can be a legislative assembly elected, so as to represent the respective interests of the community *in its deliberations*, and to allow the control of the majority *in its decisions* to which it is entitled.

For the purpose of testing the proposition, it will be necessary to advert to the operation of the present system in its forming some of the representative assemblies, in the example of one or two particularly known to us; but these are not referred to from any motive of adverse observation.

The usual results of the elections in the City of Philadelphia, for its Councils or Corporation, gave for several years, but a bare majority of the electoral votes to elect the whole representation, which was thus continued from year to year by one party, and the operations of the Councils and City interest governed exclusively by it.

By the returns, at the elections for several years previous to the last, a very uniform state of voting at the polls continued—say for the years 1840, 1841, 1842. In 1841, the number of votes polled was 10,304, and the votes were returned but of two parties, who gave respectively 5545 votes, and 4759 votes,—so that a change of 394 votes in that year, from one party to the other, would have displaced the whole representation of twenty members of the Corporation. And it is also obvious, that as the whole number was put in by *the majority*, there was no representation for the *minority*, which gave the votes of nearly one-half the citizens. These have no voice in the councils, be their candidates ever so worthy and efficient, and their interests ever so important. And it would be illiberal to conclude that abstract political sentiment should constitute a disqualification to attend to

their own and the public concerns in a legislative assembly. Independently of this, it is very evident, that the influence derived from the possession of power and office tends to preserve it; it is scarcely ever, if ever, voluntarily yielded to a just consideration of the equal rights of the community, in consulting the general good feeling requisite for constituting a legislative assembly. And it is evidence of an arbitrary, and not of a fair republican principle, for any party to retain the exclusive representation and responsibilities of the public weal; because experience has abundantly shown, that where this has been long continued, either in republics or monarchies, it involves them all in the same character, and is the virtual source of oppression and injury—the cause of great discontent,—and when not subversive of the administration, it is subversive of the harmony and confidence which ought to be afforded to it.

And it is *the right of every interest to be represented, as far as possible*. There are many advantages to be derived from the introduction of opposing ideas, if it is only to test the strength of correct or prevailing measures: for it is certain that a delegation to represent the most important interests may be taken from all parties, so as to balance the public mind, draw forth its energies, and substitute relative instead of arbitrary action, so much the result of assemblies holding long and exclusive legislation.

It is a matter of general acknowledgment, and even of record, that had the voice of the opposition, so frequently and respectfully offered but disregarded, in the administration of our late financial concerns, received attention from the persons then in power, the catastrophe so universally spread over the country, would have been greatly lessened, and probably averted; and as we should not be confident that other institutions are now free from a similar effect of exclusive action, a cautious oversight should be given to regulate them.

There is another evil growing out of the present system of electing representatives in this manner in opposition, without having respect to the minorities: in many places a third party is coming forward, which though the minor one, and without independent power, is nevertheless important to both; and being at hand to be solicited, can give its numbers and influence to either; holding a sway between them, it is able in return to commute for its own interests beyond their merit.

A management of the kind among the parties now in the State of New York, is producing this dilemma there, although for want of exact information, it cannot be further observed upon at present: but in the State of Massachusetts, it is exhibited more exactly,—it is there that a *third party*, now the advocate of abolition, holds the balance so as to vacillate between the two political parties. And in order to make this understood the case may be stated as it exists, at least in its proportionate numbers, to show in what way this effect is produced.

The larger party in one district may have a proportionate vote, say of 10,000 electors, and yet be deficient in a majority.

The opposing political party may vote . . . 8,000
and the third party, *now for abolition*, . . . 5,000

Making together an aggregate of 23,000

Now it is evident, that the measures of both the former, may be under the management, or even control, of the third party. In this manner partial legislation and ultra measures have been obtained by the urgency of the smaller body of the three, which would not have been permitted in an independent organization of the electors and representatives.

The Legislature of Massachusetts has sought to remedy this evil, by providing that a *plurality of votes* shall be regarded as that of a *majority*; but the event of this will be, that the

plurality party, though able to command a greater number of votes than either of the others, but less than both, will obtain the sway in the State, and subject both the other parties to it.

It will therefore be evident, that this proposed expedient will not redress the evil,—and how strangely will it operate! The plurality votes of 10,000 electors, will enable it in legislation to have control over 13,000; because the plurality ticket being united, will carry its majority over the divided tickets of the other voters—which of course is subversive of the principles of republican representation.

Has there not been good reason to believe that in this way, interests of high importance to society have been frequently compromised during the contentions of the large political parties, by alternate cessions to the various sub-interests in return for their votes and influence, to an extent and character detrimental to the future interests of society, and which neither party would have conscientiously acceded to, if invested with free and independent legislation?

The question then offered is, Does the case admit of a practical system for equal representation?

The following one is presented for it:—It is believed to be efficient, and justly applicable to the present state of society. It is founded upon the principle of Republican Government and equal representation, and capable of bringing forward the latent good sense of the people, now much withdrawn from public service, owing to the overrule of political contention and party management; and that it will cause the elected body to be an exact representation of the public interests.

Let the number of representatives, allotted to each district of a State, be divided into the number of electors, so that *a quota may be established, to allow a certain number of votes to choose a representative.*

The number of votes thus assigned, taken for all the delegates together, will of course be the number of votes

found in the district; for the quota for the election of each delegate may actually be determined upon, when the votes are all handed in, at the close of the election.

As every quota of votes may be united in by any interest, and will entitle it to a representative, so one or more quotas united, according to the number of voters, may choose one or more representatives for an interest, independently of the others.

Should even *general politics* continue to be a *paramount consideration*, as it has so long prevailed to be, and the number of voters be so large as to command a sufficient number of quotas, a majority in the elected body may continue to act even for *political purposes*; but other quotas will be obtained by the minority to have an opportunity to represent *their political* or other views, and different interests thus represented may advocate independently any important measures which require it.

In this way, the selection of candidates may be made up without excitement, and certainly without competition; because they may be sent very much from separated parties, having a union of interests, so that each may promote its own candidate; of course the equivalent considerations for introducing partisans into general tickets will be at an end, and with them all the small legislation of closet and club-meeting politicians, to make their nominations of representatives, bound to a general understanding to uphold party interests, and not at liberty to advocate measures independently beyond them.

This plan would be eminently conservative of general representation; it would produce steadiness of legislative action, would prevent the sudden dismissal of *all the representatives of a party from power at any one time* by the contrivance of officious politicians, who are able easily to turn the scale by misrepresentations when the parties are nearly equal; and even when this occurs by a sudden change of the public mind, the change cannot act disadvantageously on

legislation, because there will always remain a sufficient number of the electors unchanged to return many of the most suitable delegates of the previous party to be mingled with those newly elected.

This plan will prevent very much those hasty and unjust displacements from office which have taken place, by granting to the successful party "all the benefits of office," so offensive to the sentiments and feelings of a large and independent part of the community desirous only of a steady, just, and impartial administration of government.

By this means the Legislature would be filled by delegates for special objects, and renew its republican features by qualifications to take charge of the respective interests of the community, with a better consciousness of service and responsibility than that of being sent as *simple delegates* or *representatives* of a political party for the term of one year, more qualified to practice in *the art* than in *the science* of public economy and legislation.

Would not such an appropriation of suitable persons vastly improve our public assemblies?

Would it not introduce individual responsibility and intelligence, both into the several assemblages for the appointment of candidates, and by the selection of men adapted to their appointments?

Would it not induce respectable assemblages of persons now adverse to common political meetings, but who would be willing to attend when the *special interests of the country required it, for business purposes, and for objects* which demanded legislative aid and representation?

Would it not in a measure *reorganize the attention of the community*, break up the caucuses of political societies, to which the better part of the people are victims, and the victims of the aspirants to offices, who offer no choice to them but of party candidates elected to sustain themselves?

Might not the great interests of the country first be brought forward and understood, and then persons selected

to attend to them in their several departments, and these varied on occasions where particular objects required it?

Let us now review the course of some of the last elections for the City of Philadelphia, in relation to the adaptation of this system, and it will be found, that had the plan been then carried into effect, it would not have destroyed *the majority* of the present party, although, it is true, it would not have so far gratified it *as to allow it all the delegation*; yet the Councils would have been more just, and of course more safe in all their operations, if they had been guided by such a courtesy as to have united other interests with their own in conducting the public business. For thus the Councils represented little more than a *divided authority*, dependent upon an *uncertain majority*, chiefly supported, if not contrived, out of previous patronage and incumbency of office.

The votes given at the city election, 1841, were . . . 10,304
and 20 representatives were elected.

If, then, 500 votes would be the assigned quota as
the due proportion for a representative, the
aggregate would be, for the 20, 10,000

Dispensing with the residuary fraction of	304
the majority to elect gave 5545 votes, which,	
at 500 votes per delegate, gave	11 rep.
The minority which failed to elect gave 4759 votes,	
which would have elected	9 "

Making the whole number of 20 rep.

and this would have left in favor of the ruling party a majority of two representatives, which is as great as the general electoral vote would have given on the former mode, or could be claimed for it on any public appeal.

As an act of justice, such an arrangement is required to satisfy the public mind, and it would amalgamate the better feelings of the community?

Should any excitement be produced by disquietude of the people, by accidental circumstances, or by retaliation, and a consequent change of City Councils ensue, so that the *opposite party alone* gets into power, the event will not be less to be deprecated than by having the present or any other *partial or exclusive administration*.

It is always unwise to afford exclusive power to any one party, particularly as it regards its own character and responsibility: the party out of power is accustomed to take advantage of every failure of the measures of those in power, and many operations are often in progress, the propriety of which, at least in public judgment, is decided by success, be their nature and risk what they may; but even this judgment may not be altogether so unreasonable when legislation is one of assumed and exclusive responsibility, because the acts of any public body are much better deliberated upon, and more judiciously determined, when there is not the uniform disposition to urge business forward by the sanguine view often taken by persons accustomed to act together.

The following view may be taken of the result of this plan for presenting the *minorities to act with the majority* in the public body, by showing its application to the last return of votes for corporators in the City Councils; and the rules are given by which this plan may be adapted to govern similar elections.

After the tickets have been agreed upon on the part of the electors as usual, and include the whole number of representatives to be voted for, they are to be handed in by them at the several wards to the judges and inspectors.

But the votes are to be assigned differently from the usual mode, and the choice of representatives will be made from them as follows:—

First. A number of votes to form a *representative quota* for the *choice of one member* will have to be fixed upon: this might be done by referring, for a standard, to the number of the votes given in the district at the last previous election;

but it may be better to wait for the close of the pending election, and then procure the number of votes polled at that time.

Second. This number is to be divided by that of the number of representatives allotted for the district, in order to fix upon the proportion of votes, as a *representative quota*, which each ticket must give to entitle it to choose a delegate.

Third. Each elector's ticket may contain, as candidates, the whole number of representatives to be voted for in the district; and these should be placed in preferences highest on the list, in order that those first set on it may be chosen according as the number of votes given may entitle the ticket to one or more of its candidates.

Fourth. The representatives are to be chosen by any electing interest whose votes amount to one or more representative quota, and it is to have one or more representatives accordingly. Those who are highest in vote, are to be first chosen; and when the votes are equal, then the preference is to be given to those who are highest named on its list of candidates.

Fifth. When the number of representatives is not made up by the votes in the representative quotas, then the remainder is to be taken from the residuary numbers of the unsatisfied votes, beginning with the highest number unsatisfied on each ticket, and then in succession, from which there is to be taken the candidate highest in vote on its ticket; or if the votes are equal, then the highest on the list.

Sixth. If only one representative is to be chosen from a district, the election is, *in this case only*, to be made as it is now done, *by the majority*.

In fixing primarily upon the representative quota, it is not desirable to arrive at any particular exactness in the division of the whole number of votes among the representatives; at least not to descend to the fractional parts of hundreds, because less than these could not be entitled to a representative. And when the multiple or whole number is determined

upon, it places all the representative quotas on the equal footing necessary for all useful purposes, and they will have all the same claim upon the residuary votes.

Under the above rules we refer to a general result of the election of 1841, which would have been as follows:—

In this statement the whole election returns are given; but the division of the minority vote is of course supposititious.

The votes of the majority were . .	5,545	
“ of the minority.	4,759	
	<hr/>	10,304

Thus, twenty representatives allotted, establishes a representative quota of 500 votes to each delegate.

Majority interests represented.	Votes Polled.	Delegates elected assigned.	Residuary Votes.
1. Political party (W.), . . .	5545	5545	11
Interests which might be represented :			45
2. Political party (L. F.), . .	4759	1859	3
3. Temperance interest, . .		1200	2
4. Girard College,		600	1
5. Agriculture,		700	1
6. Manufactures, Commerce, }		400	0
		below 500	
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	10,304	18	

The quota representation thus voted, does not yield the full number of delegates, and the two required are to be taken from the residuary numbers highest on the returned tickets, viz:

6. Manufactures and Commerce,	400	1
2. Political,	359	1
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Making the full number		20

The representative is to be taken from the highest in vote or in place on the several tickets; thus the party which does not obtain a member on its quota, and ascends highest in the residuary vote, obtains one when the quotas are supplied.

The reference in the foregoing statement has been made to the state of the election returns of the three years previous to the last, because they were tolerably uniform, and the result of the middle year was taken. In the year 1843 the votes were materially changed, and suddenly gave a majority of 2448 for the highest political party; this majority may be either accidental or permanent, and it might have been produced on either side by some accidental or extra influence; but in this view it is not intended to discuss the merit of any particular politics, but only to allude to the cases, in order to guard against partial representation, and the injurious effect of sudden vacillations upon public affairs.

If the change is one of those, liable to be produced by an easy influence of the public mind, it ought to be guarded against by some change of system in taking the public votes; and if it is more permanent, it is still equally proper to arrange a method by which both sides should have a due representation of their opinions and measures.

It will be proper, further to carry out this rule, in order to show its application to the election returns of the votes and representatives of the City and County of Philadelphia in 1843, and the manner in which a quota representation would then have given a majority of the Assembly members and have represented the same political interest.

County votes of the majority,	6,604
“ of the minority,	3,890
Total,	<u>10,494</u>

And as four representatives are allowed, the quota representation in this case to elect a representative will be 2500, leaving the residuary portion, 494.

	Votes polled.	Delegates.	Residuary votes.
1. Political party (W.), . . .	6,604	2	1,604
2. Political party (L. F.), . .	3,890	1	1,390
	<hr/>		
	10,494		

But as the quota representation
yields only 3 delegates, one is
to be taken from the highest
residuary vote (W.), 1604, 1

Making the full number, 4

Which, in this case returns:—

Of the 1st political party (W.), . .	3	Representatives.
Of the 2d “ “ (L. F.), .	1	“
	<hr/>	
	4	

Large political parties do not seem to be expedient for conducting the useful business of a country, as their purposes become conventional, and their action becomes merged in the support of place or power, which should be prevented when there is sufficient identity of public interest independent of such considerations.

How little ought general or national politics to influence the internal police arrangements of a State or city, its improvements or its finances? Yet is it not made a medium for general acceptance to every office, public services being a secondary consideration to subserviency in political measures?

The majority power has for a long time ruled all the interest of the country, and has been exercised with arbitrary inconsiderateness alternately by each party. It can be corrected in no way so effectually as by throwing immediately before the public the objects which should claim its attention, in order to produce an immediate connection between the people and their interests, and this can only be effected by a representation independent of politics.

By this plan, however, the rise of a political party to a certain extent is not altogether impossible, and might be permitted if useful; but it being easy thus to introduce into the legislative bodies other interests by minorities, they will keep it in check by the independence of their election, as they probably will by their intelligence.

Should even the Native American party now coming forward be found worthy of public support, and get favor, so as to be useful for a time, its purity and efficiency will be much preserved by its not attaining to a predominant sway, or, at least, by only arriving at it relatively to other interests.

Reference has been made to the election returns of the City of Philadelphia, merely on account of its easy investigation, as it answers for an example of the deficiencies in representation; these, however, exist in the same manner in all the elected bodies and they will so remain and be unsatisfactory to the constituents, until the interests of the minorities become respected, so that they may be represented and act with the majorities; and it is believed the plan now offered, when it becomes understood, may be adopted to remedy the deficiency and it is referred for that purpose to the discretion and intelligence of those who acknowledge the serious evils of party contentions arising out of the right of the elective franchise.

That the alteration, by this plan, in making election returns, would change the representations from various localities may be expected; but it is to be expected that it will be generally to great advantage, because it carries out a principle of exact representation and relief; and as delegates can be sent to represent every important interest, it must give evidence of its own propriety, and must eventually be acceptable.

The practice heretofore pursued, of resting all predilections upon the title of a great political party, has subjected the district divisions, as well as the political parties, to *very peculiar*, though they may be *appropriate epithets*, many of

them certainly not selected for their elegance, and which clearly indicate considerable restiveness on the part of the people.

The advocates of particular measures, or even of a favorite candidate, will have at all times an opportunity to unite for a quota representative, and by calling upon each elector to discriminate among the candidates, to place at the head of his ticket the best man, and thus bring forward an interest to be respected in the representative body; this will require deliberate reflection on the choice to be made among the various objects of moral or civil benefit, in order to give preference to those of the highest importance.

If this system be sound and practical, as it is believed to be, the further promotion of it is respectfully submitted. At no period of republican history was there required more attention to the renewal of representative principles and the revival of representative purity. In an enlightened age, the extension of a great confederation of popular governments is in irresistible progress over an immense land, now allied in the courtesy of great national feeling: it becomes, therefore, necessary to preserve this; and may it not be accomplished less by extreme authority, than by rendering a just representation to the varied interests of an extended people?

Philadelphia, 1st May, 1844.

RUDOLF VON GNEIST.*

Rudolf von Gneist was born in Berlin, August 13, 1816. His father, at that time *Justizcommissar* in the *Kammergericht*, was soon after transferred as *Landgerichtsrath* to Eisleben. There Gneist went to school, though in the meantime he spent several years with an uncle who was a country parson in Pomerania. In the fall of 1833 he went to Berlin to study law. After passing the first two state examinations in law and the doctor examination he became privatdocent at the University of Berlin, though he did not forsake the career of the law. In 1841 he was made assessor, and acted as assistant judge in the *Kammergericht* and *Obertribunal*.

His teaching was originally confined to Roman law, criminal law and procedure. He took an active part in all the political questions which agitated the time especially after the accession of Frederick William IV. Politics were even then of determining influence for his scientific efforts. One cannot do justice to the latter without considering his political life. His lectures on the publicity of judicial procedure and jury trials had not only a scientific, but an important political significance.

In 1844 he became Extraordinary Professor and in the following year published a work on formal contracts according to the Roman law of obligations, and a second upon jury trials. In the only field which then stood open for his political activity, the city council, of which he was a member, he familiarized himself with the practice of municipal self-government.

That he was defeated in the elections for the National Assembly, and for the second Chamber of the Diet which

* The MS. for this paper was furnished to the Academy contemporaneously with its appearance in the *Archiv für öffentliches Recht*.

was soon dissolved, and that he was thus prevented for the time being from appearing in a wider political arena, could only be advantageous for his subsequent career. He participated in the movements of 1848 and 1849, only in the modest positions of City Councillor and militia man, though, in several critical moments, he had an opportunity for a discreet and effective intervention.

His political views at that time corresponded to the prevailing liberalism, which with its constant reference to English models had been imported into Germany from France and Belgium. Even at that time far removed from the extravagances of the radicals, he hoped for a constitutional national life in Prussia, such as had been realized in the west European nations, and in a diluted form in the smaller German States. The German liberalism of the forties and fifties, with its unhistorical and mechanical conceptions of law and state, with its individualistic constructions based alone on reason, could confront no greater contrast than the pseudo-historic and romantic tendencies of Frederick William IV., behind whose aristocratic forms lay concealed the interests of the large landlords, just as those of the urban bourgeoisie lay back of liberal principles. After the storms of the Revolution the so-called conservative party again obtained the supremacy, and it can be readily understood, that Gneist withdrew not only from his political, but also his judicial activities, and devoted himself exclusively to his more theoretical occupation. It is to these years of retirement that he owed the ripening of his political ideas, that the world owes his epoch-making works on English public law, and to which the modern German state is indebted for the logical development of its self-government and its administrative jurisprudence.

After Montesquien in his celebrated Chapter 6, of the 11th book of the "Spirit of the Laws," described the ideal picture of the English constitution as it never existed, and never could exist, England became the ideal of political

liberty for the people of the Continent. In an unparalleled victory, the constitutional doctrine had conquered, as a political creed, the educated classes of the Romanic nations. If in the German States a powerful monarchy and the remains of an aristocratic feudal social order often weakened the models which German liberalism adopted from France and Belgium, yet even Germany could not escape entirely from the wonderful magnetism of the constitutional political doctrine. In the storms of the Revolution, had not the mighty creation of the Hohenzollerns succumbed to it—the state, whose king only a year before had sworn that the paper of a constitution should never force itself in between him and his people?

Hardly, however, had Continental Europe entered into possession of the constitutions so ardently longed for, when a disappointment showed itself that became greater the more logically the constitutional theory was carried out. Struggles for the possession of power, and a party régime for maintaining it became the whole of public life. The strictest constitutional government, which France had ever had, succumbed to a street fight, to make place for the most violent class struggles between the wealthy and the poor.

Of all this nothing was seen in England. The maladministration and the defeat of the July monarchy in France, the partisan management of the administration in Prussia after the transition to the constitutional system, led both in France and Prussia to the conviction that the cause of this phenomenon must lie not in the constitution, but in the administration. Again as in the time of Montesquieu the people of the Continent looked to the peculiar state organism on the other side of the Channel, in which alone as it seemed, political liberty could be realized. If it were the foundation of the English constitution, the English administration, which prevented the evils of the constitutional system, it must be the foundation of the Continental constitutions, the administration derived from the absolute

state, which called forth those evils. The adoption of English public law seemed incapable of giving satisfaction, only because it had been a partial one, because it had been limited to the constitutional law, and had ignored the administrative law.

This was not a German but a general European movement. In France, de Tocqueville demonstrated that centralization of the administration was the historical cancer of the state, even in the days of the *ancien régime*, and he called for decentralization after English models. Likewise in Italy after its unification there was a strong movement led by Alfieri and Boncompagni in favor of regionalism instead of the Romanic centralization as the basis of the administration. Even if their notion of the nature of English administration as mere decentralization, was not very profound, yet even this was opposed to the spirit of the Romanic peoples. The movement has had no conspicuous success to show in any Romanic nation. That the result was different in Germany came from the fact, that the social and historical prerequisites were indeed different from those in the Romanic nations. To have opened the way for a proper recognition of this, and thus to have prepared the reform of the German administration is the imperishable merit of Gneist.

It was not a scientific but a practical need that led the student of Roman law into the field of public law; the German to the study of the English law. The results, however, were works of fundamental scientific importance, by which he disseminated a proper appreciation of English public law, not only on the Continent, but as the congratulatory addresses of the English universities on the fiftieth anniversary of his doctorate gratefully testify, in England as well.

He first utilized the results of his investigations in his lectures. In the year 1853 appeared a small work on "*Adel und Ritterschaft in England*" (Nobility and Baronage in

England). It was followed by his principal work, "*Darstellung des heutigen englischen Verfassungs und Verwaltungsrechtes*" (Exposition of Modern English Constitutional and Administrative Law), of which the first part appeared in 1857, the second in 1860. Separated later into three independent works, "*Die englische Verfassungsgeschichte*," (English Constitutional History), "*Das englische Verwaltungsrecht der Gegenwart*" (English Administrative Law of To-day) and "*Selbstverwaltung Kommunalverfassung und Verwaltungsgerichte in England*" (Self-government, Municipal Organization and Administration Courts in England), the book went through three editions.

The political and scientific influence of the work was tremendous. While previously both the liberal party with its demand for the greatest possible extension of the administrative rights of the elected communal legislatures, and the conservative party, with its desire for the maintenance of the manorial power, had alike called England to witness, they now saw before them, the English political system in its most concrete form. It was not the realization of one or another party doctrine in the legislation relating to administration, not the upholding of a party régime in the administration, which constituted the essence of the English administration, but the gratuitous service of the propertied classes in official positions and the non-partisan execution of the public law in the administrative courts. Involuntarily the appeals of both parties to English experience were silenced by this prosaic truth. None the less to carry out the principles of self-administration which were here seen in the most concrete shape, continued to be an end to be desired also for Germany in the confusion of the transition to a new legal order.

After Gneist at the beginning of the new era had been appointed, in 1858, Ordinary Professor at the University of Berlin, and had entered the House of Deputies, there appeared to open up before him a wide field for scientific

and political activity. The constitutional struggle which soon broke out unfortunately crippled Prussian legislation for half a decade. With his profound scientific insight into the necessary conditions of national existence, Gneist was far removed from the idea of the absolute rights of the popular representative body as regards the budget, which the radicals asserted. Later he opposed these views on several occasions in special monographs, such as "*Budget und Gesetz*," 1867 (Budget and Law), and "*Gesetz und Budget*" (1879). His position among the opponents of the government resulted from his scientific contention that the organization of the army, established after the Wars of Liberation, was based upon law, and hence could be changed only through a law. This is not the place to repeat the demonstration which I have elsewhere attempted, that this opinion was erroneous. In any case the attitude of Gneist to the question of the reorganization of the army, which at times assumed a character of unusual personal acrimony was based upon the honest conviction, that the preservation of the continuity of law was the supreme duty of the state.

Only after the great wars, when Prussia undertook the reorganization of its partially patrimonial and aristocratic, though essentially bureaucratic administration, could the results of Gneist's scientific investigations obtain practical concrete embodiment. He was untiring in rendering more generally accessible in shorter works the political conclusions of his great work. He deemed it the duty of the publicist, by constant repetition, to make his views the common and permanent property of the educated classes. It is to this effort that we owe the works on "*Verwaltung, Justiz, Rechtsweg, Staatsverwaltung und Selbstverwaltung nach englischen und deutschen Verhältnissen*" 1869, (Administration, Justice, Procedure, National Administration and Self-administration in English and German Conditions).

Nor could a more favorable time for the realization of Gneist's ideals have been found than the seventies. He was indeed the right man for the right time. The royal power derived from its successes a halo, and a moral strength, such as can rarely and then only temporarily be attained. As self-administration consists not in the privileges of special classes of society, but in their service for the state, this monarchy, as no other, was in a position to reject any attempt of society to rule the state, and to impose upon society the service of the state. The sharp contrast between the landed aristocracy who had hitherto lorded over the eastern part of the state in a patrimonial manner, and the capitalistic liberalism of the cities and the western provinces, precluded any understanding among the different parties and social classes as to any distinct method of ruling the state. A point of union could be found only in personal services for the state, in connection with an independent execution of the public law through a formal administrative jurisprudence.

The Prussian legislation on administration naturally took the course which in theory Gneist had demanded. There could be no question of a mechanical imitation of English institutions, the problem was to transplant the principles of self-administration and administrative jurisprudence that had developed in England, to German soil upon the basis of the conditions there given by historical growth. If it were not granted to Gneist to carry out the reform of the Prussian administration in the post of honor, as he had perhaps hoped, yet his political influence as a deputy was of most profound importance for its concrete embodiment. His appointment in 1876, as a member of the newly established *Oberverwaltungsgericht* (Supreme Administration Court) gave him an opportunity to participate in the execution and elaboration of this new branch of public law which to the last months of his life he always regarded as his most important duty. The high water

mark of Gneist's activity was reached in the seventies. As a politician he was no longer so high in popular favor as during the era of conflict, yet he had achieved the high political and scientific distinction of having transplanted into Germany self-administration and administrative jurisprudence, while in their mother country both disintegrated more and more and fell gradually into decay. This distinction cannot be lessened by the contemporaneous errors of the *Culturkampf*. It will remain a permanent credit to political science and the modern German state.

Beside this varied scientific and political activity, Gneist devoted a special interest to the German *Juristentag* (legal convention founded in 1860). In the lack of a common legislature, its meetings offered the only means for the discussion of legislative problems of general interest. With few exceptions he presided regularly after 1868, and until his last years conducted the assembly in a brilliant manner. He repeatedly submitted opinions to the *Juristentag*, thus in 1863 on the question whether a judge has to pass on whether a law has been constitutionally enacted, and later upon *jury trials*.

He maintained his interest for the *Juristentag* even after the latter had accomplished its mission and had become comparatively significant. Even at his last Whitsuntide outing, his chief thought was the spring meeting of the permanent commission.

Honors were plentifully heaped upon him in the last fifteen years of his life. When as he had frequently desired, the Prussian *Staatsrath* (Council of State) was assembled again in 1883 his appointment as a member was a matter of course. The numerous fiftieth anniversaries, which, beginning in 1886, it was his privilege to celebrate, particularly that of his doctorate on November 20, 1888, brought him from far and near testimonials of the most general recognition and veneration. At the fiftieth anniversary of his

official service he was appointed, *Wirkl. Geh. Ober-Justiz-rath* and on January 27, 1895, *Wirkl. Geh. Rath* with the title Excellency. To the brief reign of Frederick III. he owed his transfer to the nobility.

Up to the last years of his life he maintained a full and many sided activity. At the desire of his family he abandoned his seat in the Reichstag and later in the Landtag, but he remained faithful to the University and the *Oberverwaltungsgericht*. He accompanied the burning political questions of the school law and the military law of 1892, with occasional writings, and we are indebted to the last two years of his life for the excellent monographs on the national legal concept of estates, the Prussian three-class system and the constitutional position of the Prussian ministry. To him life was labor and effort until the last moment. When early on the twenty-second of July, 1895, death called him away from his richly rewarded labors, there was left in the scientific life of Germany a gap, which was the more keenly felt as he was active to the end.

On the fiftieth anniversary of his doctorate Gneist himself declared that he had begun his scientific career as a faithful follower of the historical school. All his scientific works are built up on thorough historical investigations. In all his lectures he gave extensive historical introductions, and in public law these constituted indeed more than half the course. Yet his scientific equipment and endowment was by no means an historical one. The historic conception pervading all scientific thought which sees in all existing things the result of past and the basis of future development, the product at once of free human action and internal necessity, was in its essence foreign to him. At school he relates he had a peculiar liking for mathematics, and his talents turned chiefly to abstract reasoning. Like his great contemporary L. v. Stein, who showed these tendencies in an even more marked degree, he never entirely emancipated himself from the early influence of the philosophy of Hegel,

though he would hardly admit this to be the case. His lectures on penal law were in particular strongly influenced by Hegel.

This abstract tendency soon encountered contrary influences, and was thus preserved from a one-sided development. Gneist united himself with the then flourishing historical school and its influence was indeed strong enough to estrange him forever from the supposedly purely abstract constructions of law and state, of the philosophy of enlightenment and of modern radicalism. But its influence could not swerve him into the pseudo-historical paths of Christian German romanticism. In spite of his tolerance of opinions different from his own, he always had an intense dislike for Stahl. On the other hand he did not oppose a truly historical political doctrine to the false historical position of this small but powerful party, or to the entirely unhistorical doctrines of the dominant liberalism and radicalism. The general principles which he derived from English public law formed an essentially different system, that can be briefly characterized as social political doctrine.

The tendencies of Gneist in political science were influenced by the fact that he came into this field from his interest in politics, from a lively interest in the fate of his people at a time of great political transformations. It is simply impossible therefore to appreciate his scientific position without touching the political side of his activity. Each of his works on political science had not only a political tendency, but a direct political purpose. In this lies the strength and the weakness of his writings. They all breathe the political life which surrounded the author. Hardly any political relations and effects remained unconsidered, though every institution was considered in its organic connection with things. Yet one should not forget that the grouping had to serve political purposes. Writing as a politician the constructions and deductions of legal dogmatism are held in the background. The fixation of ideas left much to

be desired in rigidity. The great scientific standard bearer of self-administration did not give even a legal but only a political definition of it. For the modern constructive method which banishing all political considerations would treat public law according to the same purely logical principles as private law, Gneist, a politician, who saw the state in its lively organic connection, had no sympathy whatever. And yet he once allowed himself to be led into the same paths when he attempted to demonstrate from the provisions of the Landrecht the illegality of the confessional schools in Prussia. Had he followed his usual historical political method, he would have been led inevitably to the opposite conclusion by the consideration of subsidiary legal sources and the administrative practice.

His entire political doctrine, derived from the English public law, appears to be conceived from the point of view of internal policy. Especially in the foreign relations of states, direct conscious human action, the free workings of personality come to the foreground. Involuntarily the conviction here forces itself upon us that mankind makes history, while the greatest German historian goes further in saying that external history always controls the internal. His opinion is evidently one-sided, in that it takes no account of internal necessity, but it results in pragmatic history as a natural consequence of the one-sided consideration of external politics. Internal policy on the contrary chiefly includes the struggles of the government with the different social interests and of the latter among themselves. If, however, social life consists in the relations of mankind to external nature, then certain definite and permanent rules can be deduced for it just as well as for nature itself. Internal policy appears chiefly as the field of inherent necessity of development according to definite laws. This conception dominates Gneist's entire political system.

Shortly before the appearance of Gneist's great work, I. v. Stein had emphatically pointed out the significance of the

social factor for all historical development, in his "*Geschichte der sozialen Bewegung in Frankreich*" 1850 (History of the Social Movement in France), which soon established a world-wide reputation for the youthful author. He had demonstrated that the entire history of France from the great Revolution to the fall of the July monarchy had been distinctly social and had developed according to certain laws. Gneist transferred this idea to his exposition of the English administration, and furthermore deduced from it general principles of the state and society. In both is seen the inclination toward purely logical abstractions from general ideas, which they had inherited from the philosophy of Hegel.

The struggle of social interests dominates, therefore, the internal development of the states. As the social powers endeavor to subject to themselves the public powers, so conversely the state as the source of distributive justice must endeavor to break down any one-sided social rule, and yoke all social interests in its service. In this development definite rules will govern that can be deduced from the facts and scientifically formulated. But social development and hence state and society are not as materialism supposes based upon absolute necessity. The shaping of events is in part the free work of man. With a knowledge of the rules of social development events may be so shaped, that a definite result can be maintained according to these rules. Thus within the realm of social necessity the factor of human freedom of action comes into play. Law in general and public law in particular is therefore the expression of social power and is incomprehensible without a knowledge of the social factors on which it is based. But it is the result of free human action. Thus the conception of state and law, in spite of the one-sided social point of departure to which the perspective of internal politics had led him, approaches the historical concept and departs very far from that of modern materialism.

Only by thus accepting the possibility of free human action in the operation of the general laws of state and society, could Gneist think of utilizing the results of his investigations of English public law for the German state. His investigations were not merely to spread information in regard to the political conditions of one of the most important civilized nations of the world—in this connection England would demand our attention scarcely more than perhaps Italy or the United States. English law furnished him the most suitable means from which to deduce general propositions valid for modern Europe, concerning the relation of state and society, the duties of the state in face of one-sided class interests and the means of filling these duties. According to these propositions the long tried English methods of self-administration and administrative jurisprudence were to be transferred to Germany and established on the basis of existing conditions.

The definite political ideal which presented itself to him was to permeate all relations of public life with the consciousness of duty toward the state. It sounds perhaps absurd, but there is a certain truth in the statement, that the best informed student of English public law shares in the error of his great predecessor Montesquieu, in thinking that this ideal which he had formed for himself was actually realized in England. England was and is quite different from his notion of it. As the older Parliamentary system of England forms an analogy to the Continental estates, so the older self-government of England, which to Gneist is a model, formed merely the companion piece to the patrimonial administration of the Continent. The self-government of Gneist which is based on duty to the state and is permeated with the consciousness of this duty was first realized in Germany. The entire idea is purely German, specifically Prussian, and not at all English.

Self-government in this sense needs definite bearers. Gneist contemplated as such the propertied classes in city

and country in the widest extent. By the habitual conduct of public duties in municipal and national posts of honor, a governing class like the English gentry was gradually to be formed. The essential purpose of the self-administration was educational, the spirit was the same as that in which formerly the municipal ordinance of Stein had been issued. The self-administration, granted to the individual a participation in the administration not as a personal right but as a personal duty, that he should thus become accustomed to subordinate his demands on the state to the general interest. The realization of self-administration was accordingly nothing other than the reconciliation of state and society by the complete devotion of the latter to the service of the state.

However ideally the relation of state and society was here conceived, the German state of the present, more fortunate than Prussia in the great reform era of Stein and Hardenberg, carried out the principles of self-administration almost to their extreme logical consequences. Yet we must not be thereby deluded into thinking that the reconciliation of state and society has been effected. Two factors oppose it.

Self-administration demands capable bearers, and can therefore be supported only by the propertied classes. Thus the lower orders of society are excluded from the self-administration. But at the present it is they who make the social demands heard with emphasis before unknown. Gneist was as helpless in the face of this problem, as were the men of the reform era of Stein before the needed economic and financial reforms that were realized by Hardenberg. Gneist was essentially a bourgeois politician, not in the narrow spirit of the class interest of the French bourgeoisie, but in the spirit of the English and German middle classes always conscious of their social duties. He always had a warm heart for the welfare of the laboring classes, and showed it on every occasion. But a society which he placed in the service of the state naturally would cease with the propertied

classes. Though he recommends the employment of the lesser citizens in subordinate local offices, this is evidently not a solution of the social question. A further extension of self-administration could only afford an even greater opportunity than is already offered, for socialistic agitators to attain posts of authority.

Self-administration cannot in fact attain what is demanded of it. That it works more inefficiently than the professional officialism and thus is in danger of falling into the hands of the clerks is a matter of course. Its educational value ought not to be overestimated. Self-administration can moderate one-sided social claims, but the complete devotion of society to the state is opposed to the life principle of the former, is opposed to the egoistic nature of mankind. The pillar of the English self-administration, the justice of the peace, receives from Macaulay the very dubious praise that his justice is better than none at all. The German self-administration in part under the supervision of professional officials, and permeated by a profound sense of duty is doubtless much better than the English ever was. But it cannot impede the formation of purely social parties. It is among the bearers of the self-administration that we find the purely social organization of the *Bund der Landwirthe* (Agriculturists' Alliance). In face of the manifold social interests and social demands, the notion of self-administration is clearly inadequate.

Thus Gneist, who recognized only purely political parties as having any reason for existence, could not understand the new party formations in Germany and even allowed himself to participate in public declarations against them. He had recently treated the matter elaborately in his book on the national legal idea of estates.

Though self-administration has not attained those ideal aims which existed in the mind of Gneist, it is after all the essence of an ideal that it finds the limits of its practicability in the imperfection of all earthly things. No one would

venture to deny that self-administration and administrative jurisprudence are of the highest importance for the development of the modern state. To have clearly recognized and demonstrated the nature of both institutions is the imperishable achievement of Gneist as a teacher of public law. Not less is his importance as a politician. To thrash over the errors of the era of conflict and the *Culturkampf* may be left to those who feel themselves above the possibility of human error. The building up of the German administration in the manner he demanded is a permanent political achievement for the modern German state, even though England was not his model to the extent which he imagined.

More fortunate than his great predecessor Montesquieu he was able to see the realization of his ideals, though he was forced to admit also their partial inadequacy. And in the heaven of political science his star will blaze near Montesquieu's, the great Frenchman near the memorable German, both filled with the most lofty political ideals, both great in what they achieved of this ideal for the modern state, even when this ideal was wrong.

The picture of Gneist's activity would be incomplete, if we did not at this point devote a few words to the purely human side of his nature. Such description must necessarily be sketchy and inadequate. The ideals of a person often characterize him best. As his political ideal was permeated by the consciousness of duty so also was his personality. He could live only in the fulfillment of his duty even to the last minute. He held it moreover to be, above everything else, his duty to support decisively principles of which he was convinced. Yet on the other hand no one was freer from overestimation of himself, or belief in his personal infallibility. The strictest critic of his own views in scientific and political life he was constantly weighing and testing them, and had no hesitation in discarding them when he found them at fault. He never longed for the fame of those politicians who in all change of

the time, follow unmoved the same program for a generation. From this self-criticism arose his great tolerance for contrary views, even though they were personally opposed to him and though he had no sympathy with them. He declared that in this or that point people would always come to different conclusions. Differences of opinion never interfered with cordial personal relations.

We can only indicate here that it was granted him to have the happiest family life imaginable, a life so happy that it was proverbial among his intimates. The parting is, for this reason, so much the sadder. At the death of the greatest teacher of public law that Germany has had in the last century, we think not only of his work but of his personality. Though removed from our sight he will long be held in loving remembrance.

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INDIVIDUAL DETERMINISM AND SOCIAL SCIENCE.

I.

Meyer and Darwin do not deserve the admiration or devotion solely of the followers of a certain class of studies, *i. e.*, physics, mechanics or biology;* these men have revealed to us mysteries that change completely the content of human knowledge. They are two discoverers who complete and supplement each other. It could not be otherwise; Darwin must have profited much from the discoveries of Robert Meyer, from the studies of Hermann von Helmholtz, by the strong positivist influence given to research in the realm of physico-chemical science, and by the ever increasing importance accruing to the problems of mathematical mechanics. In this way only it became possible to solve a mass of problems whose elucidation did much to clear the way for the conception of physiological life as a pure mechanism. Further, the minds of scholars had already become accustomed to hear of *forces* which act and react and then are *transformed* while still remaining identical in their real nature. In fact, Comte himself, powerfully influenced by physico-chemical science, attempted as early as 1842 to extend it to social science.† Thus it would have been impossible to have conceived of Darwinism (I am not speaking of evolution) without the progress already made in physico-chemical science in the first half of this century. As a result of this movement the law of the conservation of

* Cf. H. von Helmholtz, "*Ueber die Erhaltung der Kraft*," 1847; R. Meyer, "*Bemerkungen über die Kräfte der unbelebten Natur*," 1842; "*Die organische Bewegung in ihrem Zusammenhang mit den Stoffwechsel*," 1845.

† Cf. E. de Roberty, "*A. Comte et H. Spencer*," Paris, 1894; E. Faguet, "*A. Comte, ses idées générales et sa méthode*," in the *Revue des deux mondes*, July 15, 1895; G. de Greef, "*Le transformisme sociale*," Paris, 1895, p. 366; Heinrich Waentig, "*Auguste Comte und seine Bedeutung für die Entwicklung der Socialwissenschaften*," Leipsic, 1894.

energy held the first place; and possibly, as many think,* it remained second to none after the publication of the volume on the Origin of Species. This opinion may be accepted even by those who do not hold that the origin of species was not explained in Darwin's volume on "The Origin of Species." Darwin showed the method of applying this energy. Hence I very willingly accept the opinion of Hæckel, who defines the supposed theory of descent as "the *mechanical explanation of the phenomena of organic forms.*"† Meyer demonstrated the persistency of organic energy. Darwin explained the method of the action of this energy: "Thus everything depends upon *matter and motion*, and we are led back to the true philosophy of nature inaugurated by Galileo, namely, that in nature all is matter and motion, or simply a modification of the same, by the simple transformation of parts or quality of motion. . . . This supposition is, however, false, if it is understood that in the living animal there is a force of vitality, a source of force, independent of ordinary molecular action, and that there is in it a chemical composition differing from that in organic bodies."‡

Helmholtz had already succeeded in measuring the velocity with which nervous impulses traverse the motor nerves and had found the velocity to be thirty metres a second. The results obtained by Rutherford, and which he has recently communicated to the British Association for the Advancement of Science, contradict in some degree this measurement. Rutherford observed that the reaction-time is not the same for sight as for hearing and touch. He was able to establish by experiments upon eight intelligent men, whose age varied from nineteen to sixty-two years, that

* Cf. A. Mosso, "*La Fatica*," Milan, 1891, p. 67.

† E. Hæckel, "*Schöpfungsgeschichte*," Jena, ed. 1891. This affirmation of Hæckel is a contradiction of many others, claiming that Darwin discovered the origin of man. The passage cited corrects this hazardous affirmation.

‡ G. Secchi, "*L' Unità delle Forze fisiche*," Milan, 1870, Vol. ii, p. 377; See A. Mosso, *Op. cit.* pp. 71-72; E. Morselli, "*Carlo Darwin ed il Darwinismo*," Milan, 1892.

the reaction-time for sight is from 16 to 22 hundredths of a second, while for touch and hearing, it is from .14 to .19. The shortest reaction-time was found when the response was given by the hand on the same side as the ear or the part of the body touched. However this may be, the principle from which Helmholtz set out remains true. In 1847, Helmholtz, ignorant of the works of Meyer, Colding and Joule on the relations existing between mechanical and psychical work, published an important document on the conservation of energy (*Ueber die Erhaltung der Kraft*), which he completed later after learning of the results obtained by Joule. In this work Helmholtz presented the relations existing between mechanical and psychical phenomena, and confirmed the truth of Meyer's theory of the conservation of energy.

To-day, through the experiments of Mosso, "the thermometer shows a transformation of energy in the brain which results in the production of heat."* But Mosso was not unduly enthusiastic over his experiments, and with scientific calm writes: "In order to discredit the hypothesis that the psychical and motor activity of the brain is in intimate relation with the thermal processes, it is sufficient to have observed in the preceding chapter that a decided increase of cerebral temperature is produced *without apparent* modification of psychical or motor activity of the brain, and that vice-versa during periods of great activity of the brain, its temperature does not vary to any sensible degree." I do not know, however, how far Professor Sergi is right in claiming that Mosso does not draw the proper conclusion from his observations. The observation of Sergi is worthy of consideration. It is easy to understand how psychical energy manifested by thoughts, by psychical activity, cannot be manifested by an increase of heat. If we have in the brain 100 units of psychical energy, and use

* Cf. A. Mosso, "*La Temperatura del Cervello*," Milan, 1895, p. 89; "*La Température du Cerveau*," Turin, 1894.

80 in thought, it is clear that only 20 remain for the increase of heat. Hence that which at first sight would seem to be a contradiction is, in reality, an additional proof of the conservation and of the transformation of psychical energy. While this is a very pleasing suggestion, it cannot be denied that it is based upon a very vague hypothesis. Besides being vague, it is contradicted by Mosso's own experiments. On page 197 of his recent work, he writes: "The non-dependence of the cerebral temperature on the temperature of the blood is made evident in the given experiment, where, the convulsions having ceased, the cerebral temperature presents a new increase of which there is scarcely the slightest trace in the arterial blood and muscle curves. Here we have a proof that these waves of cerebral temperature do not depend on the variations of the blood-vessels, because in this case the medulla oblongata had been subjected to a lesion."

Hence the demonstration made by physicists, that a definite quantity of heat can be transformed into a given quantity of work, and this quantity of work again transformed into the same amount of heat, etc., if applied to biological phenomena of man, is entirely premature and illusory when extended to psychical phenomena. When, therefore, Morselli writes: "Psychology has been able to show that the determinism of psychical phenomena is precisely of the same nature as that of biological phenomena,"* he makes a statement which may be true, but which cannot as yet be accepted as proven. The fact that physical well-being results in optimism, and that this leads to benevolence, to sympathy, to hope, to altruism, is not sufficient proof of this affirmation—while misery and deprivation result in physical despondency and exhaustion, give rise to the lowest instincts, weakening the inhibitory powers of the brain, and produce pessimism, egoism, indifference, apathy.

*E. Morselli, "*L'Eredità materiale, intellettuale e morale, del Secolo XIX*," Genoa, 1895, p. 14.

This might furnish a reason for the fact that acts of daring, of altruism, of heroism, belong to early manhood while egoism is characteristic of children and the aged.

The possible transformation of physical phenomena into mental phenomena, or vice-versa is far from being proven. The transformation of physical phenomena into mental phenomena, Spencer considered more probable than the transformation of mental phenomena into physical phenomena.* Roberty observes a curious contradiction, namely, while A (physical phenomenon) corresponds to, or is equal to B (mental phenomenon), B is not equal to A.† It would be most arbitrary to admit at the present time the identity of the two classes of phenomena. The manifestations of individual human conduct are too vague to infer from them that psychological laws are identical with those of biology. Physiology weighs and measures, while the beginnings of psychology are largely to be made.

I would simply say that we are to-day ignorant of these so-called psychological laws that some persons affirm.

II.

Our brain is certainly composed of matter, but the properties and composition of this matter elude us almost entirely. Nevertheless, it is affirmed that each individual has his own physical and psychical individuality (temperament and character) which is determined by physico-psychical heredity.‡ The affinities which psychology includes are most varied; the factors of the psychical are psychological, nervous, and hence also physico-chemical. The *Ego* is the complex result of chemical, physiological and psychological reactions. From this point of view the observation of Wundt is true that "nothing is more natural than to think of consciousness as a kind of stage upon which

* H. Spencer, "*Principes de psychologie*," Paris, pp. 160-62.

† E. de Roberty, "*La recherche de l'unité*," Paris, 1893, p. 199.

‡ C. Richet, "*L'hérédité psychologique*," 3d ed., Paris, 1887.

our ideas are the actors, appearing, withdrawing behind the scenes, and coming on again when their cue is given.”* Consciousness is cognizant of the results of work done in the hidden laboratory situated within it; such work can be called also *unconscious* if by this general term it is intended to designate the mechanico-physico-chemical work of the nervous substance, and also of that external condition of organic-psychical work.†

We have numerous more or less probable theories of sensation and perception, which depend merely upon hypotheses. The sensory nerves which produce pleasure or pain upon being excited, nearly all have their terminations in the skin.‡ The brain as well as the internal organs in general are non-sensitive, and it is this fact which renders us incapable of judging of our internal sensations. There is no doubt that all psychical activity is determined by the molecular movement of the cerebral substance, and especially of the gray cortex; but that an idea as such, or a sentiment, or an act of volition as such, are in themselves true and proper motions, we cannot believe until the scientific truth be affirmed with certainty.§ However this may be, the mind of each individual necessarily receives sensations continually, and many of these remain impressed upon it. How this takes place we do not know.||

In the mind of every individual consciousness develops. This is the result brought about in his brain, from his past, from his experience, from the environment in which he has lived. Thus, if Ferdinando Gregorovius had not

* Wundt, “*Psychologie physiologique*,” Paris, Vol. i, p. 536.

† G. Marchesini, “*Saggio sulla naturale Unita del pensiero*,” Florence, 1895, p. 30.
 “Mais dans le cerveau se trouvent en outre réunis les centres nerveux spécifiques, dont chacun correspond à une partie déterminée de cellules, de tissus, et d’organes intérieurs et périphériques du corps. Indirectement la conscience et la volonté sont donc un produit non seulement du cerveau, mais de la totalité des cellules, dont est constitué l’organisme dans son ensemble.” P. de Lilienfeld, “*La pathologie sociale*,” in the *Revue internationale de sociologie*, 1895.

‡ A. Mosso, “*La Fatica*,” p. 266; Nitti, “*Il Lavoro*,” Turin, 1895.

§ G. Marchesini, *Op. cit.*, p. 16.

|| C. Richet, *Op. cit.*

been born in the mediæval castle of Heidelberg, and lived there for many years, if his imagination had not been awakened by the great Polish revolution of 1830, in which he witnessed so many bloody struggles, certainly, as he himself recognizes, he would not have written the history of Rome.* In Darwin's life it can easily be seen how enormous was the influence of these factors upon his intellectual development.† Richard Wagner writes: "The remarkably keen feeling of sadness which usually overpowered me while directing our ordinary operas was often interrupted by an inexpressible and unusual happiness when I attained at times from the representation of noble works, a most intimate knowledge of the absolutely incomparable effect of musical and dramatic combination, at the very moment of the representation, an effect so intimately felt, of such depth, and at the same time of such ardor, as no other art can produce."‡ Thus he tells us through what phases of depression, of vivid impressions, of warm enthusiasm, his musical nature came little by little to be formed.

Now a new fact or phenomenon, which is presented to the brain of an individual, is as if it were reflected upon this *substratum* of consciousness already acquired. Every individual explains, understands, and sees new phenomena colored by those already seen. In other words, each of us sees the future and the present subject to his own concepts formed in the past. Ferri exaggerates when he writes that "in spite of the apparent influence of ideas and opinions upon individual activity, the truth is, on the contrary, that man works as he feels, and not as he thinks."§ The mental development of a given individual during his life may be represented by a line: A——c——d—f——B.

* R. Gregorovius, "*Diari Romani*," Milan, 1895, p. xlii-xv.

† Francis Darwin. "Life and Letters of C. Darwin," London, ed., 1895.

‡ R. Wagner, "*Musica dell'avvenire*," Milan, 1892, p. 21.

§ E. Ferri, "*La sociologie criminale*," Turin, 1893, p. 374; Ad. Wagner, "*Statistisch-anthropologische Untersuchung der Gesetzmässigkeit in den scheinbar willkürlichen Handlungen*," Leipsic, 1864.

Thus it is easy to perceive that according to the various degrees *c, d, f*, etc., of the mental development which is formed subject to surrounding influences, this individual judges of phenomena and affairs in a different manner. According to the development of his own personality, in this conception, "notre moi," as M. Barrés says, "c'est la manière dont notre organisme réagit aux excitations."* Our mind is formed by a stratification in such a way as to make, as it were, a true photographic plate. New impressions, therefore, depend upon those preceding. It has been said, that as each planet has its own autonomy, and is united with the system of the universe, so free-will is determined by the general purpose and by the general laws of life.† But the feeling of purpose is not determined by the structure and hence by the needs of the individual. With Calderon we ask ourselves: What is free-will when it is determined? Those who deny free-will place individual determinism outside of the individual himself. They do not leave any part to the individual. Thus it is said: "Among the forces of whose action, whether beneficent or harmful, we are yet conscious, without being able to define, analyze, or avoid them, are electricity and magnetism. Not one of us in the normal condition of health, and atmospheric surroundings, is conscious of the magnetic and electric currents which pass through us, much less those which are developed in the organism. Yet no one will doubt the influence which the electricity of the atmosphere, as well as that of the organism, exercises upon the physical body."‡ I do not deny the influence of these factors, but their action is concentrated in the individual. The human mind determines individual action in a given manner precisely because

* M. Barrés, "*Examen de trois idéologues*," Paris, 1892.

† L. Luzzatti, "*Saggio sulle dottrine dei precursori religiosi e filosofi dell'odierno fatalismo statistico*," in *Riforma Sociale*, anno II, vol. iii. The proof of my affirmation can be found in the little work by G. Fischer, "*Die Freiheit des menschlichen Willens und die Naturgesetze*," Leipsic, 1871, who also denies free-will, and in the volume by Fousengriva, entitled "*Le libre arbitre*"

‡ D. Metzger, "*Essai de spiritualisme scientifique*," Paris, 1895.

in its formation it has undergone the action of these factors.

In recent times the influence of external causes, such as the salubrity of the locality in which laborers work, has been much exaggerated, and on the contrary, the importance of the power of resistance of the organism of the laborer has been too little considered. But the reports of inspectors of factories constantly note that where the work is prolonged too long and results in fatigue, the salubrity of the locality is insufficient to preserve the laborer from the consequences of fatigue and exhaustion.* From this cause we find that among the rich and poor, not only does the mortality differ, but the mortality itself depends upon different influences, so it may be said that there is a real pathology different from each class in society. A large proportion of the diseases of the laboring classes depends upon nothing else than an excess of work, work exhausting and painful, predisposing them to all diseases. In other words, the physical organism is slowly formed through external influences, and is then reacted upon subsequently in various ways, according to the structure which has been formed. This is true also for the individual mental development. Though individual actions are, scientifically, inexplicable phenomena individual determinism cannot be doubted. It would be denying the law of the conservation and transformation of energy common to all matter. Individual determinism, however, instead of being due to external mechanical action, as is commonly supposed, is due to the mechanical formation of the human mind, and to the successive phenomena of action and reaction, which are always mechanically developed in it. Therefore for those who deny free-will, individual personality disappears; this personality is, in their eyes, entirely passive, a pure and simple result of cosmico-social surroundings. Now this is not true. If the individual is submitted to all these influences, when he

* Nitti, *Op. cit.*, p. 184.

acts, he acts almost entirely on the basis of the personality which these conditions have developed in him. The determinism of a human being is not as it were external to the individual, as the so-called positivists have affirmed, but it dwells in the individual himself—is within him.

Others, ignorant of the structure and formation of the human mind, and discouraged by the great difficulty of searching into the causes which govern individual actions, have pretended to solve this difficulty by means of the so-called free-will theory. When, however, it was possible to establish the fact that marriages, births and deaths take place with a greater regularity than cyclones on the ocean or the number of centimetres of water which the rain-gauge indicates in a given region for the different seasons, there was then the utmost necessity for modifying preconceived notions of human nature as something entirely unique and above everything else in creation. Thus arose numerous eclectic free-will schools. Free-will, according to the prevailing opinion, was reserved for the single individual, and it was recognized that it did not exist in the mass of the population. (Quetelet, Dufar, Rümelin, Wappaüs, Messedaglia, Mayr, Bodio, Oettingen, Gabaglio, etc., etc.)

The same story repeats itself; we had not yet come to understand the forces which form individual character, and we said human conduct was free, just as before the conduct of the people, of the masses had been said to be free, while the laws of conduct were unrecognized. If individual determinism cannot be demonstrated, much less can free-will be demonstrated. If individual consciousness is free, how does it happen that the regularity of its action is repeated in all social manifestations? Were this conformity merely ascertained from time to time, it might then be said to be purely accidental; but this is not the case. All social phenomena rest upon an essentially individual basis. The social phenomenon does not exist without this individuality. Individuals seek to satisfy their own desires, considering of

little account the relations which their acts will have upon social phenomena.*

Körosi, in a recent communication to the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, gave the results of his researches in regard to the fecundity of man according to various ages. If the husband be 39 and the wife 20, the birth-rate is represented by 31 per cent; if the wife be 30, by 20 per cent. When the husband is 40 and the wife 35, the birth-rate is represented by 27 per cent; with a wife of 40 years, by 17 per cent, and with a wife of 65, by $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. Now it is well-known that there are very few men who choose a wife of 65 years or even of 40 years. In consequence the birth-rate is high. But if the majority of girls are married between the ages of 20 and 30, this depends upon their individual will.

If x commits suicide, he concerns himself very little with the fact that similar decisions have already been made by other individuals, or that his death is necessary in order to make up the average of suicides in a given year. Rather do the conditions of environment develop certain tendencies in individuals, and later, when these individuals come to contend with the difficulties of life, some find themselves unequal to carrying on this struggle, and commit suicide, exactly as others become insane. Perhaps we should call the act of mental aberration voluntary?

In the United States, in 1850, in a population of 23,191,876, there were 15,610 insane persons; in 1880, in a population more than doubled, 50,155,703, the number of insane was 91,997, or three times as many in proportion. In Italy the number of insane persons, which in 1876 was 51 for every 100,000 inhabitants, in 1883 was 67.75. In France, for 100,000 inhabitants there were 131 insane persons in 1883; 133.8 in 1884; 138.5 in 1885. In Germany there were 82.7 in 1883; 84.2 in 1884; 88.5 in 1885. Thus

* A. Small and G. Vincent, "An Introduction to the Study of Society," Chicago, 1894.

the conclusion that the advancement of civilization causes the number of insane persons to increase.* The fact should be recognized that the increasing feverish activity of our society develops general progressive paralysis, epilepsy, etc., hence the individuals affected by mental weaknesses due to social agencies are not in a condition to resist, and become insane when they are submitted to certain other social circumstances. If the conditions of a given social atmosphere should remain always constant, we should see the number of suicides and also the number of insane persons exactly constant. But social activity from time to time undergoes many variations, owing to changing influences. The greater part of individual characteristics have developed with tendencies due to the conditions of environment; thus when other agencies are brought into action, the social life is entirely and completely changed.

The warlike origin of the Albanians, the insufficient resources of their land, and the rich valleys in their neighborhood, explain their habit of brigandage. In 1832 the Greeks and the Albanians succeeded in their war of independence, and Otho II., the second son of the King of Bavaria, ascended their throne. But did the brigandage of the Albanians terminate in 1832 on this account? The conditions of their surroundings had confirmed this habit in their character, and it will require time before the new social environment succeeds in suppressing it.†

Individual character is a result of the conditions of social and natural environment, and of hereditary phenomena, and yet under new conditions of environment it reacts in an entirely mechanical manner. It is impossible for a mass of population entirely "determined" in its action, to result from many individuals relatively free, as the theories of individual free-will affirm.

* *Revue des Revues*, 1895.

† E. Reclus, "*Europe méridionale*," Paris, p. 185; E. Demolins, "*Les types sociaux du bassin de la Méditerranée*," Paris, 1895.

III.

Lange writes in regard to the Germans: "Thus the utilitarian tendency presents in Germany an idealistic character. Industry never makes a prodigious forward stride as in England; one does not see cities suddenly rise from the ground, nor riches accumulate in the hands of the entrepreneurs."* This is an observation of social psychology. It is not meant by it that *every* German corresponds to this description which he applies to the population as a whole. He means that the conditions of environment and hereditary phenomena are such as to imprint this character upon the majority of the Germans.

Psychology in its present condition describes mental phenomena external to the individual, while social psychology describes the phenomena of individual minds taken in their entirety, in their mass. Statistics give in figures, with mathematical precision for all social phenomena, that which social psychology describes in general terms. Thus what we have said in regard to social psychology applies also to statistics. Statistical laws relate to masses. They present to us social phenomena due to individual acts, because these acts are the result of conditions of environment already fixed in a similar way for each individual. If this uniformity of environment, in which the mass of mankind lives, did not exist, how could there be the average type of individual from which all others are easily differentiated?

Statistics tell us that in Italy more thefts are committed proportionately than in Russia. In other words, the feeling of respect for the property of others is less deeply rooted in Italy than in Russia. Thus when economic difficulties increase equally in Italy and in Russia, Italian criminality will increase more than Russian. The conditions of natural and social environment have developed in the minds of individuals of the two countries a different moral sentiment.

*Lange, "*Geschichte des materialisme*," 1875.

Accordingly, in new conditions of environment the individual acts according to the personality which has been formed in him. There has been in existence in London, for several years, a committee to determine by an examination of the physical characteristics of the children of each school, those children who are weakly constituted, or mentally defective, or abnormal, and unable to contend in school or later in life with persons of average normal endowment.* In the schools inspected, the number of these defective children is almost constant every year. Given the climatic, hygienic, physiological, and economic conditions, which exercise an influence in an almost constant degree in determining the single individuals of various generations of this population, and these abnormal children are as sure a result as are the normal children.

We can divide the influences of environment into two classes, time and locality. A region which presents the same atmospheric and meteorological conditions, etc., etc., has a population with certain demographic characteristics. This identity of conditions of environment tends to have the same effect upon the majority of individuals when considered singly. It forms individuals in a definite way, and the mass of these individuals present the same characteristics, and perform similar acts. According to official statistics the population in the following countries is divided between country and city according to these figures:

	Urban Population.	Rural Population.
Switzerland,	16	84
Belgium,	34.5	65.5
Russia,	9.2	90.8
Greece,	15	85
Denmark,	17.6	82.4
Sweden,	9.2	90.8
Norway,	13	87
Holland,	38	62
England,	48	52
France,	24	76

*"Annales de l'Institut International de Sociologie," 1895, Vol. i.

The countries which present a proportionately small rural population are England, Holland and Belgium. This fact is easily explained when the development of industrial manufactories in these countries is taken into consideration. If no new industrial process should be discovered, if the wages of workmen and agriculturists should remain in exactly the same state as in 1893, if the agricultural production should continue the same as in this year, if, in a word, the equilibrium of 1893 should not be disturbed, then the demographic distribution of the population in city and country would be maintained in the same proportion. It is a result of the enviroing locality. But all these conditions tend to change. The agricultural production varies according to the meteorological conditions. In the south of Russia it is necessary to wait five or six years before having a good harvest of grain. There is a deficiency of rainfall, and only after several years of drought is there one of abundant rain. It follows from this that the peasants prefer the more steady wages in an industrial manufactory to the uncertainty of the harvests.

At Marseilles the coal which comes from England through the Strait of Gibraltar, after being carried 3000 km. is sold at a lower price than the coal which comes from the mines of Grand' Comte, 177 km. distant. This fact is due to the perfection of the English system of mining the coal, to the quality of the mines, and still more to the low rates for transportation. In time this will result in closing of the mines of Grand' Comte, or the employment of new mining machinery, or something else. If the mines of Grand' Comte should be closed, the population which is employed there would commence cultivating the land, or enter industrial establishments. Thus an exodus of the population would take place. The mortality, the birth-rate, the number of marriages, of insane, of criminals, etc., depend upon whether people live in the country or in the city. The conditions of environment are modified through the changes

which arise in the social surroundings, due to the labor of man, or to natural conditions.

From 1821 to 1881, three times as many Italians as English have migrated to the United States.* The Italian emigrants preserve many national characteristics, a very frugal method of life, a high rate of crime, etc. But their children are less Italian, and in a less degree still are those of the third generation. Thus in spite of this great Italian emigration the mode of life in the United States, especially in the northeastern section, is essentially Anglo-Saxon. Though this assimilation does not take place suddenly, no one can deny the formation of a new character, due to the influences of the new surroundings. Between the environment and the individual, or society as a whole, there is an intimate *rapprochement*. Statistical investigation is based upon the equal influence which the conditions of environment exert upon the individuals who make up the population. There cannot be homogeneity in statistical principles unless they are derived from the same natural and social conditions.

The grouping of individuals in society, however, has no other *raison d'être* than that of overcoming the difficulties of the primitive environment and then of exercising natural energies in the best manner possible for the benefit of these single individuals. Human society is organized according to the nature of the individuals and the natural environment in which it exists. All the relations established between individuals depend upon these two factors. These, in their turn, are subject to the influences which are formed in them by social relations. Thus there takes place a continual transformation of natural environment, of individuals, of social relations, which in a general and comprehensive way is called social transformation, or evolution.

Rome.

G. FIAMINGO.

* Report of Commissioner of Immigration, Washington, 1892. M. Dubois "*Sistèmes coloniaux et peuples colonisateurs*." Paris, 1895.

BRIEFER COMMUNICATIONS.

NEW ACADEMIC DEGREES AT PARIS.

Recent changes and proposals for reorganization in the French universities are of interest to American students who may be contemplating foreign study. The proposed changes are more general in character and shall be treated first, while changes in the study of political and social science in the Law Faculties which have been already effected will receive consideration at the close of this communication.

Some months ago, Professor Harry Furber, Jr., of Chicago, presented a concise memorial to the French Ministry of Public Instruction, which set forth that while the opportunities for study offered by the great schools of France and especially of Paris were in every sense excellent, the great majority of Americans who study abroad go to Germany rather than to France. To what can this strange avoidance of France be attributed? It is because Americans have had no real opportunity to test the merits of French scholarship. Innumerable obstacles stand in the way of their access to French schools, while the constant surveillance of compulsory examinations at frequent intervals, is troublesome in the extreme. The American who studies abroad is as a rule a specialist, a graduate of some home institution. Germany puts him upon practically the same footing with natives, giving him the degree of Doctor after the successful completion of his studies, and this is enough to turn the tide in Germany's favor. For the degree is a tangible mark of achievements and a valuable aid in the search for a position at home.

At any German university an American is admitted on the basis of a certificate from any college of recognized standing in the United States. He may then map out his own curriculum. As Professor Furber justly remarks, "the two functions of the university, that of providing facilities for education, and that of certifying to intellectual attainment by the granting of diplomas, are kept rigidly distinct. The student is free from examination except when he chooses to apply for a degree." The tendency, indeed, seems to be toward increasing laxity in the requirements for admission for foreigners and toward more strenuousness in the final examinations.

France, on the contrary, insists upon formalities which are highly embarrassing to the American who desires to study there. He has a

peculiar purpose and position to which the system affords no means of adaptation. The frequent compulsory examinations and rigid courses which serve the purposes of French professional training rarely accord with his pursuit of special study, nor can he always secure an adequate recognition of his previous training.

If France is desirous of drawing foreign students to her schools, the observations of Professor Furber are quite pertinent. They have led in fact to the formation of a *Comité Franco-Américain*, composed of some thirty leading French scientists, with the purpose of securing action in the matter. From the outset this committee seemed inclined to accede to all reasonable requests made by the Paris-American University Committee, consisting of resident Americans. The result of the joint deliberations of these committees has in some respects been exceedingly encouraging.

It has been proposed to create a new degree, whose exact designation is not yet settled—which would be particularly suited to the needs of American specialists. The degree would be conferred upon the student who had successfully pursued a sufficient number of cognate studies, without necessarily having confined himself to a single faculty or a single school. It would thus be possible, for instance, to receive the new degree upon the successful completion of courses and examinations in public law, philosophy of law, and political economy in the Law Faculty, and in modern philosophy and modern history in the Faculty of Letters.

The present limits of the various faculties and schools at Paris are the result of historical accident, on the one hand, and the necessities of professional schools, on the other. Thus the Law Faculty is practically a training school for young men who intend to enter the public legal service. Hence every candidate for a degree in law follows the prescribed curriculum, with little or no liberty in the choice of his subjects.

The *Comité* seems inclined to favor the recognition of work done in American colleges of acknowledged rank. It has proposed to consider the degree of Bachelor from such institutions the equivalent of the French *Bachelier*. There seems to be some misunderstanding here since this degree has a totally different significance, though the same name, in the two countries. The *Bachelier* is the first of the French degrees in time as well as rank, given in the first part of the student's college career, and followed later by *Licencié* and *Docteur*. The French "*Bachelier*" cannot be considered equal to our average "Bachelor."

The French naturally seek some guarantee that the advantages they propose to offer may be conceded only to such Americans as are

sufficiently advanced in their studies to profit by them. Such a guarantee it would be difficult to give while our universities are independent of one another both in purposes and methods; and while universities vary not only in general rank, but often exhibit unequal standing in the several schools or faculties of a single institution.

The decision of the problem involved in the choice of those American colleges which should be recognized, and the determination of the *extent* to which work at institutions thus favored might be taken into consideration by the French authorities as equivalent to work here were matters which had to be referred to competent American authorities. An American-Paris University Committee was therefore formed, with Professor Simon Newcomb, of Washington, at its head, and including a number of our most prominent university authorities. Attempts, too, are to be made to establish a number of scholarships for study in France—open to competition by students of colleges, recognized by the committee, at whose disposal they may be placed.

It is not impossible and might perhaps be advantageous if the work and opinions of this American Committee should acquire sufficient influence to induce our educational institutions to adapt their arrangements to whatever requirements the committee might see fit to make. Before we can successfully claim that respect on the part of foreign science, to which the past and present achievements of some of our colleges seem already entitled, there will have to be more uniformity and more certainty in our higher academic world.

If France is disposed to throw open the doors of her higher schools to Americans, and to make ability the sole criterion for academic honors and degrees conferred,—as seems to be the case,—we should insist upon an adequate recognition of studies successfully pursued in America by the student, and upon admission to all degrees in so far as they do confer no civil or professional privileges. While we might desire their degree of Doctor of Law, for instance, we are not entitled to ask the privilege of entering their public legal service, or of practicing law in France,—a right which now attaches to the law degree. The difficulty here involved might be obviated,—as I have been told has already been done in the case of some foreigners,—by conferring the degree *without* any such rights. It would then be reduced to what the foreigner generally seeks, a mark of scientific ability conferred by French scientists.

The proposed new degree will admit of new combinations of studies. There can be no doubt that this is a step forward. The limits of faculties are, as has been pointed out, historical accidents, or the result of the needs of strictly professional schools. The political and social sciences,—to cite perhaps the most important instance,—have

quite recently assumed such importance, and survived such alterations in their fundamental conceptions, that it has become impossible to confine them within the limits of existing "faculties" or "schools." In some places in Europe we find these subjects included in the law faculty; in others, they form part of the department of philosophy; in still others, a new faculty or a new school has been founded, like the Faculty of Political Sciences at Tübingen.

Changes affecting the status of the political sciences have already been made which are of considerable importance. They are grouped with the legal studies which, in my judgment, is preferable to associating them with the philosophical faculty. The status of these studies is now fixed by the *Décret* of April 30, 1895, which has gone into effect with the beginning of the term just commencing. Henceforth, as the *Décret* prescribes, the diplomas for "*Docteur en Droit*" will bear mention either of the "*sciences juridiques*," or of the "*sciences politiques et économiques*," according to the choice of the student in the arrangement of his studies. There are thus two more or less distinct courses of study, and two different systems of examination now open to the student in the law faculty. He may confine himself chiefly to the private legal disciplines, or to political science and economics. Moreover, the number of the examinations for the degree of Doctor of Laws has been reduced, and the order in which they are taken has become optional in the cases where political and economic sciences are chosen. The requirements now include two oral examinations instead of three, and the defence of a single thesis prepared by the candidate, instead of two.

The subjects required in examination of those students who seek their Doctor of Laws for work in political and economic sciences, are as follows :

For the first examination :

1. History of French Public Law.
Principles of Public Law.
Comparative Constitutional Law.
2. Administrative Law, or
Public International Law, according to the choice of the candidate.

For the second examination :

1. Political Economy and the History of Economic Doctrines.
2. French Financial Legislation and the Science of Finance.
3. At the option of the candidate :
Industrial Legislation and Economy, or
Rural Legislation and Economy, or
Colonial Legislation and Economy.

The thesis must appertain to one of the subjects mentioned.

The above enumeration may convey a partial, but by no means adequate, idea of the seriousness with which political sciences are now studied in French universities. Some years ago, instruction in political and social science at Paris was neither very advanced nor very extensive,—outside, perhaps, of the *École Libre des Sciences Politiques*, founded in 1877. In the last few years, however, these sciences have occupied an increasingly large part in the instruction offered in the *Collège de France*, and also in the Faculty of Law of the University of Paris.

The objection, which but a few years ago might have been made with a certain degree of justice, that Paris offers the student next to nothing in the way of advanced work in economic or political sciences can now no longer be brought forward.

C. W. A. VEDITZ.

Paris.

PERSONAL NOTES.

AUSTRIA.

Vienna.—Dr. Eugen Peter Schwiedland has recently become Privatdozent at the University of Vienna, in Economics and Finance. He was born October 23, 1863, at Budapesth, where he received his early education in the Gymnasium. There he attended the University in 1881–1882, though in the latter part of the year 1882 he went to the University of Vienna, where he remained until 1885. In October, 1887, he received the degree of *Doctor juris* from the University of Vienna, and entered at once in the judicial career. In the fall of 1889 he entered the public administration, and occupied a post in the Department of Labor Insurance in the Ministry of the Interior. Dr. Schwiedland became in 1890 the successor of Professor V. Mataja, in the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Lower Austria. He is one of the editors of the *Revue d'économie politique*, now in its tenth year. Besides many articles which Dr. Schwiedland has contributed to the weekly and daily press he has written :

“*Das Verhältniss der Gross und Kleinhandelspreise.*” Conrad's Jahrbücher, 1889.

“*Étude sur les rapports entre les prix en gros et en détail.*” *Revue d'économie politique*, 1890.

“*Die Arbeitseinstellungen in Amerika; ein Beitrag zur Naturgeschichte der Strikes.*” Conrad's Jahrbücher, 1889.

“*Die Einführung obligatorischer Arbeiterausschüsse, etc., in Oesterreich.*” Schmoller's Jahrbuch, 1891.

“*L'organisation de la grande industrie en Autriche.*” *Revue d'économie politique*, 1891.

“*Die Wiener Pertmutter Industrie und ihre Krisis.*” Pp. 21. Vienna, 1891.

“*Les formes de l'industrie.*” *Revue d'économie politique*, 1892.

“*H. Pigeonneau, nécrologie.*” *Ibid.*, 1892.

“*Essai sur la fabrique collective.*” *Ibid.*, 1893.

“*Les industries de l'alimentation à Paris.*” *Ibid.*, 1895.

“*Die Entstehung der Hausindustrie mit Rücksicht auf Oesterreich.*” *Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft, Sozialpolitik und Verwaltung*, 1892.

“*Eine alte Wiener Hausindustrie.*” *Ibid.*, 1892.

“*Ein Gesetz zur Beschränkung der freien Concurrenz im Handel.*” *Ibid.* 1893.

“*Aufhebung des Sitzgesellenwesens durch die Arbeiter.*” *Ibid.*, 1894.

"*Kleingewerbe und Hausindustrie in Oesterreich; Beiträge zur Kenntniss ihrer Entwicklung und ihrer Existenzbedingungen.*" Vol. I, pp. 237; Vol. II, pp. 450. Leipzig, 1890.

GERMANY.

Berlin.—Dr. Richard Böckh was appointed Ordinary Honorary Professor of Statistics at the University of Berlin, October 20, 1895. He was born the 28th of March, 1824, at Berlin, where he attended the Friedrichs Underische Gymnasium, and 1842-45 the legal faculty of the University, with the single interruption of a summer semester 1844, which he spent at Heidelberg. He entered the government service as *Kammergerichts-Ausscultator*, in 1845, at Berlin. In 1847 he became *Regierungsreferendar* at Potsdam and later at Erfurt. In 1852 he was advanced to the grade of Assessor and employed as assistant at the Royal Prussian Statistical Bureau in Berlin, 1855-61, in the office of the *Oberpräsidium* in Potsdam, and 1861-64 again in the Statistical Bureau. In 1864 he was named Government Councilor, and in the same year member of the Royal Statistical Bureau and of the Royal Statistical Central Commission. From 1862-81 he was docent in the Seminary of the Statistical Bureau. In 1875 he became the Director of the Statistical Bureau of the city of Berlin. In 1881 he was appointed Extraordinary Professor at the University of Berlin, and in the same year received *honoris causa* the degree of Doctor from the faculty of political science of the University of Tübingen. The title of *Geheimer Regierungsrath* was conferred upon him in 1885, while in the following year he became a director of the Seminary of Political and Statistical Science at the University of Berlin.

Professor Böckh is a member of the International Statistical Institute, corresponding member of the Royal Belgian Statistical Central Commission, of the Belgian Société royale de médecine publique, of the Société de médecine publique et d'hygiène professionnelle of Paris, honorary member of the Hygienic Association of Budapesth, and vice-president of the Permanent Commission of the International Demographic Congress.

Dr. Böckh's contributions to statistical science have been very numerous. Besides his official reports and smaller essays especially in the *Zeitschrift des Central-Vereins für das Wohl der arbeitenden Klassen*, *Zeitschrift des kgl.-preussischen Statistischen Bureaus*, *Magazin für die Litteratur des Auslandes*, *Der deutsche medizinische Wochenschrift*, etc., he has written:

"*Die Bevölkerung von England, Frankreich und Preussen.*" *Mittheilungen des Kgl. Statistischen Bureaus*, 1853.

"*Die Sprachgrenze in Belgien.*" *Zeitschrift für Erdkunde*, 1854.

"*Veröffentlichungen aus der administrativen Statistik der verschiedenen Staaten.*" Ibid., 1856.

"*Statistik der öffentlichen Sparkassen der Provinz Brandenburg.*" Zeitschrift des Centralvereins für das Wohl der arbeitenden Klassen, 1859.

"*Die Methoden der Volkszählung.*" Ibid., 1861.

"*Ortschafts-statistik und historisch-geographisch statistische Uebersicht des Regierungsbezirkes Potsdam und der Stadt Berlin.*" Ibid., 1861.

"*Die Sterblichkeitsverhältnisse der Kurmark, ein Beitrag für Altersversorgungskassen.*" Arbeiterfreund, 1863.

"*Geschichtliche Entwicklung der amtlichen Statistik des preussischen Staates.*" Festschrift für den internationalen statistischen Kongress in Berlin. 1863.

"*Die Bearbeitung der Kreisstatistiken.*" Zeitschrift des Kgl. Statistischen Bureaus, 1861.

"*Statistik der Urwahlen zum Abgeordnetenhaus.*" Ibid., 1863.

"*Gutachten betreffend Provinzial-Kreis-und Gemeinde-Abgaben.*" Ibid., 1863.

"*Aktenstücke zur Zählung von 1867.*" Ibid., 1863.

"*Geschichtliches über die Beurkundung des Personenstandes im preussischen Staate.*" Ibid., 1871.

"*Preussische Statistik,*" Bd. XXXV.; "*Die communal Finanz Statistik.*" 1875.

"*Sprachkarte vom preussischen Staate nach der Aufnahme von 1861.*" 1863.

"*Die statistische Bedeutung der Volkssprache als Kennzeichen der Nationalität.*" Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie, 1866.

"*Der Deutschen Volkszahl und Sprachgebiete in den europäischen Staaten.*" 1869.

"*Historische Karte von Elsass-Lothringen*" (jointly with H. Kiepert). 1870.

"*Die natürlichen Grenzen Frankreichs und Deutschlands.*" Unser-zeit. 1870.

"*Das deutsche Sprachgebiet in Frankreich.*" Magazin für die Litteratur des Auslandes, 1870.

"*Belgien und die vlämische Partei.*" Ibid., 1871.

"*Sterblichkeitstafel für den preussischen Staat im Umfange von 1865-1875.*" Conrad's Jahrbücher, Bd. xxv.

"*Statistisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Berlin.*" Vols. III. to XX., 1875-93. Published 1877-95.

"*Die Bevölkerungs-Gewerbe-und Wohnungsaufnahme in der Stadt Berlin vom 1 Dez., 1875.*" 4 Hefte, 1878-80.

Idem vom 1 Dez., 1880. 3 Hefte, 1883-88.

Idem vom 1 Dez., 1885. 2 Hefte, 1890-91.

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"*Karte der Verbreitung der Deutschen in Europa.*"

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"*Bericht über den demographischen Kongress im Haag, 1884.*" Deutsche Vierteljahrschrift für öffentliche Gesundheitspflege. Bd. xvii.

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"*Die Arbeiten des statistischen Amtes der Stadt Berlin.*" Börners Bericht über die Hygiene Ausstellung, 1882-83. III., 1886.

"*Mortalité d'après les causes de décès.*" Rapport du Congrès de la Hage, 1884.

"*Table de mortalité de la ville de Berlin, année 1879.*" Jubilee Volume, Royal Statistical Society, 1885.

"*Travaux du bureau de statistique de la ville de Berlin.*" 25me anniversaire de la société de statistique de Paris, 1886.

ITALY.

Palermo.—Professor Francisco Maggiore-Perni has recently been appointed Ordinary Professor of Statistics at the University of Palermo. He was born at Palermo, November 11, 1836, and received his early education in the Jesuit schools of that city. He attended the Law Faculty of the University of Palermo in 1853-57, where in 1857 he obtained first prize in the competitive examination in Political Economy and received the degree of *Doctor juris*. In 1859 Dr. Maggiore-Perni engaged in the practice of the law, which he followed until

1863, when he became Director of the Municipal Bureau of Statistics of the city of Palermo, a post which he still holds. In 1864 he became a member of the Statistical Commission of the city and department. His university career began in 1877, when he became Docent of Statistics at the University of Palermo. In 1886 he was appointed Professor Incaricato, in 1890 Extraordinary Professor, and in 1895 Ordinary Professor. Professor Maggiore-Perni was formerly editor of the journals *L'Idea* (1858-59), *Revista de Sicilia* (1865-68), *La Regime* (1869-72), *Giornale ed atti della Societa siciliana d'economia politica* (1875-90), *Annuario di diritto pubblica* (1890-95), and *Gazetta municipale di Palermo* (since 1871). Professor Maggiore-Perni is member of a large number of learned bodies such as the Italian Royal Academy of Science, Letters and Arts, the Sicilian Society of Political Economy, the German Jurists' Society of Prague, the Jurists' Society of Berlin, and the Royal Academy of Jurisprudence and Legislation of Madrid. Professor Maggiore-Perni's principal publications are :

"*Applicazione delle leggi economiche alla siciliana esposizione delle opere d'industrie nel 1857.*" 1857.

"*Della compilazione e della materia statistica.*" 1858.

"*Sul credito territoriale ed agrario.*" 1858.

"*Materie prime e prodotti.*" Pp. 24. 1859.

"*Sulla scienza delle finanze.*" 1859.

"*Sull' Associazione, studii.*" 1859-1865.

"*Progetto di un nuovo ordinamento della statistica in Sicilia.*" 1860.

"*Delle strade ferrate in Sicilia,*" Opera premiata dal R. Istituto di Incoraggiamento di Sicilia. Pp. 332. 1861.

"*Lo stato italiano e i beni di mano-morta siciliana sotto l'aspetto giuridico ed economico.*" Pp. 132. 1864.

"*Sui censimenti della popolazione e su quello della città di Palermo del 1861.*" Pp. ccvii, 482. 1865.

"*L'incameramento e i beni di mano-morta siciliana.*" 1865.

"*Della privativa dei tabacchi in rapporto all' industria siciliana.*" 1865.

"*Della unificazione legislativa.*" 1865.

"*Mac-Culloch, la sua vita e le sue opere, cenni.*" 1865.

"*Sull' ordinamento delle finanze.*" 1865.

"*Dei pubblici impiegati e dei loro diritti in rapporto allo Stato e alla legge di disponibilita.*" 1866.

"*Dei varii progetti sulla soppressione degli ordini religiosi, e destinazione dei loro beni.*" 1866.

"*Progetti e provvedimenti finanziari.*" 1866.

"*Della moneta di carta e delle conseguenze del suo corso.*" 1866.

- "*L'economia pubblica e la nazionalità.*" 1866.
- "*Sull'ordinamento finanziario ed amministrativo in Italia.*" 1867.
- "*Di taluni errori intorno all'ordinamento amministrativo d'Italia.*" 1867.
- "*Del progetto della Commissione sull'asse ecclesiastico.*" 1867.
- "*Dei sofismi e delle metafore in politica, economia e pubblica amministrazione.*" 1868.
- "*L'accentramento e i lavori pubblici in Sicilia.*" 1869.
- "*Topografia e popolazione della città di Palermo.*" Pp. 122. 1869.
- "*Di Emmerico Amari e delle sue opere.*" Pp. 110. 1871.
- "*Sui movimenti della popolazione di Palermo dal 1862 al 1864.*" Vol. I. Pp. lx, 387. 1872.
- "*I censimenti della popolazione di Palermo del 1861 e del 1871 e i movimenti del decennio.*" Pp. 114. 1874.
- "*L'imposta fondiaria in Italia ed il progetto della perequazione. Memoria.*" Palermo. Pp. 76. 1875.
- "*Dei movimenti della popolazione di Palermo del 1863 al 1867.*" Pp. 444. Palermo, 1878.
- "*El dazio di consumo e la proposta di riforma in rapporto di bilanci della grande città con tre tavole statistiche.*" Pp. 92. Palermo, 1879.
- "*L'economia politica in Sicilia nel secolo XIX.*" Atti dell'Accademia R. di scienze lettere ed arti, 1875.
- "*Tommaso Natile, i suoi tempi et la riforme economiche in Sicilia nel secolo XVIII.*" Ibid., 1880.
- "*Discorso per la solenne celebrazione del decennio anniversaria della società siciliana d'economia politica.*" Palermo, 1885.
- "*La tutela e il lavoro dei fanciulli nelle miniere di Sicilia,*" Saggio economico statistico. Pp. 28. Palermo, 1875.
- "*L'industria manifatturiera di Palermo e il lavoro delle donne e dei fanciulli.*" Pp. 24. Palermo, 1877.
- "*Sulle condizioni economiche agrarie della Sicilia in rapporto alle altre regioni italiane.*" Pp. 70. Palermo, 1877.
- "*La popolazione siciliana in rapporto al territorio e alle condizioni sociali.*" Pp. 32. Palermo, 1877.
- "*Prezzo del grano e dei suoi prodotti pasta e pane nella Città di Palermo dal 1850 al 1874.*" Pp. 24. Palermo, 1876.
- "*Sul bisogno di una Statistica Storica delle grandi città.*" Pp. 9. Palermo, 1876.
- "*Statistica elettorale politica ed amministrativa della Città di Palermo dal 1861 al 1877.*" Pp. 94. Palermo, 1879.
- "*Statistica dei giurati della Città di Palermo dal 1861 al 1880.*" Pp. 42. Palermo, 1879-80.

- "*Sul caro prezzo del pane in Palermo.*" Pp. 31. Palermo, 1880.
- "*Dei movimenti della popolazione di Palermo nel decennio 1862-71*" in rapporto al precedente. Pp. 165. Palermo, 1880.
- "*Dei movimenti della popolazione di Palermo nel decennio 1872-81.*" Pp. 72. Palermo, 1884.
- "*Sulla salute pubblica della città di Palermo.*" Pp. 23. Palermo, 1883.
- "*La statistica nel concetto, nell' ufficio, nella dignità li scienza.*" Pp. 16. Palermo, 1883.
- "*Tentativo di una definizione della statistica in rapporto al suo assunto e al suo metodo.*" Pp. 41. Palermo, 1884.
- "*Importanza della statistica in ordine al suo sviluppo scientifico e civile.*" Pp. 22. Palermo, 1887.
- "*Del grado di certezza della statistica nei suoi numeri e nelle sue induzioni.*" Pp. 22. Palermo, 1888.
- "*Limiti ed attinenze della statistica con le scienze che studiano i vari ordini della vita sociale.*" Pp. 109. Palermo, 1889.
- "*La regolarità degli atti umani e le leggi statistiche.*" Pp. 96. Palermo, 1889.
- "*Unità e indipendenza della scienza statistica.*" Pp. 66. Palermo, 1889.
- "*La popolazione di Sicilia e di Palermo dal X al XVIII secolo.*" Pp. 624. Palermo, 1892-93.
- "*Movimento economico e sociale dell' Italia di fronte a se stessa e a talune grandi nazioni*" Appunti statistici. Pp. 44. Palermo, 1893.
- "*Le inchieste sociali e le monografie di famiglia in rapporto alla statistica.*" Pp. 24. Palermo, 1893.
- "*Palermo e le sue grandi epidemie dal secolo XVI al XIX.*" Saggio storico-statistico. Pp. 608. Palermo, 1894.
- "*La legge dell' emigrazione permanente in Italia.*" Pp. 154. Palermo, 1894.
- "*Sulle condizioni demografiche economiche ed amministrative della città di Palermo.*" Pp. 140. Palermo, 1895.
- "*Delle condizioni economiche politiche e morali della Sicilia dopo il 1860.*" Pp. 250. Palermo, 1896.

BOOK DEPARTMENT.

NOTES.

A VALUABLE ADDITION to recent literature treating of the industrial history of England is Professor Cheyney's "*Social Changes in England in the Sixteenth Century as Reflected in Contemporary Literature.*"* This work is all that the title indicates and considerably more. In an opening chapter the author gives an exceedingly lucid and well-balanced account of the English manorial system as it existed down to the sixteenth century. Condensed into twenty pages, this is as good a description of English agricultural conditions in the Middle Ages as has yet been written, and supplies an admirable basis for the consideration of the references to contemporary literature which are mustered in the second chapter and form the body of the book. Beginning with John Ross' "*Warwickshire Antiquary*," which appeared about 1460, Professor Cheyney makes use of nearly every contemporary authority of importance down to the "*Petition of the Diggers of Warwickshire*," which was presented about 1598. Citations are drawn from nearly fifty contemporary sources and the result is a more vivid picture of the industrial changes leading up to and following the numerous inclosures of this period than it would be possible to give by any other method. Professor Cheyney's conclusions are conservative. The period from 1475 to 1575 is shown to have been a period of rapid change and development in comparison with the centuries which preceded. These changes represented progress, but fell with peculiar hardship on the lower classes of agricultural laborers who adjusted themselves but slowly to the new conditions, when sheep-raising displaced agriculture and manufacturing and city-life came forward prominently. By the end of the sixteenth century the readjustment was effected and the England which emerged in the seventeenth century was a new world, industrially, socially and politically. This monograph will be especially useful to students of English industrial history since it gives them in compact form the contemporary literary references to the rural changes which characterized this important period.

* *Social Changes in England in the Sixteenth Century as Reflected in Contemporary Literature.* Part I. *Rural Changes.* By EDWARD P. CHEYNEY, A. M. Publications of the University of Pennsylvania, Series in Philology, Literature and Archæology. Vol. iv, No. 2. Pp. 114. Price, \$1.00. Boston: Ginn & Co., 1895.

THE FIRST VOLUME of Mr. Foster's "Commentaries on the Constitution,"* gives some idea of the magnitude of the work which the author has undertaken. In this volume of some 715 pages, questions introductory to the study of constitutional law are treated; such are, the general nature of federal constitutions; formation of the Constitution of the United States; the meaning of the Preamble; the three departments of the government; Congress—its members and officers. If the present plan is followed, the work, when completed, will form a running commentary on our organic law. This seems to be the purpose the author has in view. Little or no attempt has been made to treat the general questions of constitutional law in their relation to one another, nor to examine their growth from the standpoint of the public law.

"THE BUILDING OF THE NATION,"† by Henry Gannett, may be looked upon as a popular Compendium of the Census by one who has borne an honorable share in the preparation of the official document. The style is somewhat more pyrotechnic than becomes that of a government document, but the matter is essentially the same. Successive chapters treat of National Domain, Government, Population, Agriculture, Manufactures, Mineral Resources, Transportation, Finance and Wealth. This descriptive matter forms the basis of the work, though there are a few words of introductory generalization under the caption, "An Industrial Republic," while at the close the author drops into prophecy and gives a highly colored "Forecast of the Future." But gorgeous language and the gorgeous binding of the book cannot affect the solid basis of fact upon which it is built up. Mr. Gannett is primarily a geographer, and includes in full the geographical data which he has made familiar to us in the Census publications. Statisticians are generally agreed that this is useless ballast, which might give place to matter of more value.

WE SURELY HAVE to thank Mr. Godkin's publishers for having persuaded him to put his "Reflections"‡ into a more permanent, or, at

* *Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, Historical and Judicial: With Observations upon the Ordinary Provisions of State Constitutions, and a Comparison with the Constitution of Other Countries.* By ROGER FOSTER. Pp. 713. Price, \$4.50. Boston: Boston Book Company, 1895.

† *The Building of the Nation.* By HENRY GANNETT, Chief Geographer of the Geological Survey and of the Eleventh Census. Pp. 252. Price, \$2.50. New York: Henry T. Thomas Company, 1895.

‡ *Reflections and Comments, 1865-1895.* By EDWIN LAWRENCE GODKIN. Pp. 328. Price, \$2.00. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1895.

least, more convenient shape than the files of a weekly periodical running over thirty years could give them. They are selected from the author's editorial contributions to the *Nation* and they deal with a great variety of non-political subjects, both "grave and gay," that have at one time and another interested the American people since the close of the Civil War. They show us the editor of the *Nation* at his best and in his most genial moods. These short essays cover a charming variety of topics—"Culture and War," "The 'Comic Paper' Question," "The Morals and Manners of the Kitchen," "John Stuart Mill," "Panics," "Tyndall and the Theologians," "Chromo-Civilization," "The Debtor Class," "Physical Force in Politics," "The Evolution of the Summer Resort" and numerous other unrelated, incongruous subjects. They are light and airy, and deal with transient superficial social phenomena—sort of post-prandial productions—with this important difference: they are the productions of one whose vision is keen and far-seeing, whose pen is sharp and whose capacity for trenchant statement is seldom equaled. These "Reflections" form a genuine and substantial contribution to that class of literature which gives us acute criticisms of social and political life unaccompanied by ponderous reasoning that is fast going out of vogue in these fearfully scientific and abstrusely theoretical days. Apropos of the daily Jeremiads on the uncertainties of trade, the wrecks of industry and the wickedness of man, the following sentence from "Panics" may not prove untimely or uninteresting, coming from one not given to overweening optimism: "To any one who understands what this new social force, Credit, is, and the part it plays in human affairs, the wonder is, not that it gives way so seldom, but that it stands so firm; that these hundreds of millions of laborers, artisans, shopkeepers, merchants, bankers and manufacturers hold so firmly from day to day the countless engagements into which they enter, and that each recurring year the result of the prodigious effort which is now put forth in the civilized world in the work of production, should be distributed with so much accuracy and honesty and, on the whole, with so much wise adjustment to the value of each man's contributions to civilization."

THE SECOND VOLUME of Gomel's useful treatise* upon the financial causes of the French Revolution has appeared and the work has been *couronné* by the French Academy and by the *Académie des Sciences morales et politiques*. The first volume has already been described

* *Les Causes financières de la Révolution française.* Par CHARLES GOMEL. Paris: Guillaumin et Cie, 1893.

in the ANNALS.* The present one deals with the period between the dismissal of Necker (1781) and the assembling of the Estates General. M. Gomel tells his story in a characteristically lucid style. While adhering closely to his theme he manages, without diverting the reader's attention, to trace at the same time the changing attitude of the public toward the government. The history of the revolution can, perhaps, be best approached from the financial side. The political movement, which began at least two years before the meeting of the Estates General, was the result of a financial crisis and, as M. Gomel remarks, who knows but the violent overthrow of the older system might not have been avoided had Louis XV. been followed by a monarch preserving even ordinary insight and strength of character. Our author treads a well-beaten path. He is no lover of paradox and the reader looking for new and suggestive restatements of the well-known antecedents of the revolution will be disappointed. Turgot, Necker, Bailly and Droz seem long ago to have discovered and presented the really salient characteristics of the period.

MACMILLAN & Co. publish a small volume by William Gow, Underwriter of the Marine Insurance Company of Liverpool, on the question of marine insurance.† The volume contains the substance of a course of lectures delivered at the University Club under the auspices of the Liverpool Board of Legal Studies. The intricate questions of the extent and limitation of liabilities of the companies and the rights of the insured are examined with great care.

THE TENDENCY of the legislative branch of government to gradually absorb all essential powers to itself has frequently led to doleful protests on the part of political writers. In his monograph ‡ on the control over legislation in the United States and its members, Professor Hershey has given a succinct account of the various devices and organs which counteract this tendency. He discusses in turn the veto, the right of the judiciary to pass upon the constitutionality of legislation, and the direct participation of the people in legislation through constitutional conventions and various forms of referendum.

* Vol. iii, p. 381. November, 1892.

† *Marine Insurance*. By WM. GOW. Pp. 401, Price \$1.50. New York and London: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

‡ *Die Kontrolle über die Gesetzgebung in den Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika und deren Gliedern*. By DR. AMOS S. HERSHEY. Pp. 73. Heidelberg: Hörnung, 1895.

Prepared in Germany, without access to original sources of information, such an essay must necessarily be a summary. It is, however, a good summary, and has the merit of combining in a single treatment all the checks upon legislative activity which our constitutional development has produced.

ONE OF THE MOST useful bibliographies of the social sciences published is the "*Bibliographia sociologica*,"* now in its fifth year, and of which the first two numbers for 1895 have just been received. The editors of this bibliography have recently adopted the Dewey system of classification in the arrangement of titles, and introduce the present number with a brief explanation of the advantages of this change. The bibliography embraces over four thousand titles and is practically exhaustive for French, German and English literature. The references to periodical literature are especially full, and will make this publication invaluable to students of special social problems.

THE LOWELL LECTURES, delivered this year, on "The Church in the First Three Centuries,"† have been published with the addition of illustrative quotations. The lecturer limited himself to stating the facts in a clear and interesting manner, and did not attempt any original contributions. The result is an excellent example of what such work should be. Only two criticisms suggest themselves. On matters of dispute Mr. Moxom does not often state that there is an opposite view; and in some cases, *e. g.*, use of penances, he fails to discuss germs which are of importance on account of their later developments.

The bibliographical note is unsatisfactory. It is limited to English works and even of the English books, "Cruttwell," "Gwatkin," and other important works are omitted. And any such list ought to be more than a mere aggregation of titles. Sources should be distinguished from secondary works and the latter should be classified according to their merit.

JUST NOW, WHEN American manufacturers are beginning to complain that they cannot hold their own in certain directions against

* *Bibliographia sociologica. Sociologie et Droit. Sommaire méthodique des traités et des revues.* By H. LA FONTAINE and P. OTLET. Pp. xxiii, 170. Price, 10 francs. Brussels, 1895.

† *From Jerusalem to Nicæa.* By PHILIP STAFFORD MOXOM. Pp. xii, 457. Price, \$1.50. Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1895.

Japanese competition, the recent monograph of Dr. Oscar Münsterberg* upon Japan's Foreign Trade from 1542 to 1854 is peculiarly welcome. In spite of his inability to make use of the native sources, the author of this monograph has brought to light a very extensive literature bearing upon Japan's trade relations with other countries and the account which he gives us of Japan's foreign relations is fairly complete. The most extended period is from 1640 to 1855, when Japan attempted to maintain a policy of complete non-intercourse with the outside world. It is to be regretted that Dr. Münsterberg did not enlarge the scope of his monograph so as to include the last forty years of Japan's history and thus make his survey of more than historical interest.

PERSONS INTERESTED IN fundamental questions concerning the functions of government will find pleasure and profit in a little volume, "Anarchy or Government?" † by William M. Salter. Anarchy is here used as signifying "freedom from organized force imposing itself on society." Admitting that this is the ideal state of society and that the abstract presumption is against government, the author inquires on what grounds and how far a community may use force in attaining its ends and finds the chief justification for nearly all the functions, at present exercised without question, in the fact that the individuals in society "are not mere units, but members of a somewhat beyond themselves." He repudiates all idea of a contractual relation. In the industrial field we now have, with scarcely any exception, "anarchy" and the enlargement of government functions to cover parts or all of this field is often opposed, especially by Spencer, on grounds which would logically lead to the abolition of all government except for defensive warfare. The author concludes that as to how far a society may go in securing social welfare, no line of principle can be drawn. How far freedom of contract shall be permitted and what industrial functions the state shall assume, are questions of expediency. While there are decidedly questionable propositions here and there, the main line of argument and the theoretical conclusion reached seem entirely sound.

THE NEW CONSTITUTION of South Carolina, which went into effect on the thirty-first of December, 1895, contains many important changes

* *Japans Auswärtiger Handel von 1542 bis 1854*. By Dr. OSCAR MÜNSTERBERG. Pp. xxxviii, 312. Price, 7 marks. Münchener Volkswirtschaftliche Studien. Herausgegeben von Lujo Brentano und Walther Lotz. Stuttgart, 1896.

† *Anarchy or Government?* By WILLIAM MACKINTIRE SALTER. Pp. 176. Price, \$1.75. New York and Boston: T. Y. Crowell & Co., 1895.

which reflect the peculiar social conditions in that State. Perhaps the most striking is the restriction of the electoral franchise, so as to exclude the illiterate population. The amendment, as actually adopted, will probably have, as immediate effect, the disenfranchisement of a large percentage of the colored population. A general provision is inserted that every elector must be able to read and write any part of the constitution; or, if unable to do this, must have paid taxes on assessed property of a value of at least \$300. This is modified by a curious qualification, intended probably to enable the illiterate white population to become electors. It is provided that "up to January 1, 1898, all male persons of voting age applying for registration, who can read any section in the constitution submitted to them by the registration officers, *or understand and explain it when read to them by the registration officer*, shall be entitled to register and become electors." Such persons are to remain, during life, qualified electors, unless disqualified by other provisions of the constitution. A right of appeal from the decision of the registration officers to the Court of Common Pleas, and thence to the Supreme Court, is provided for.

THE SECOND VOLUME of the new, revised edition of Villari's "*Niccolò Machiavelli e i suoi Tempi*" * has been issued by Hoepli, of Milan. While the type is smaller than that of the first edition the paper and printing in the present issue are much better. The author has made a number of changes in detail and taken account of the criticisms which his book called forth; for example of the late Professor Baumgarten's views of the *Prince*. A number of new documents have been included in the appendix, among others autograph marginal criticisms made by Queen Christina, of Sweden, upon the *Prince*. A third volume has still to be revised in order to complete the work.

MR. WEBSTER'S TREATISE on the "Law of Naturalization" † forms a companion volume to the same author's work on the "Law of Citizenship in the United States." The author discusses in great detail the relation between laws governing emigration and naturalization and, in this connection, lays down the principle that "complete naturaliza-

* *Niccolò Machiavelli e i suoi Tempi-illustrati con nuovi documenti*. By PASQUALE VILLARI. Second edition, revised and corrected. Vol. ii. Price of the three volumes, 15 lire. Milan: Hoepli, 1895.

† *The Law of Naturalization in the United States of America and of Other Countries*. By PRENTISS WEBSTER, A. M. Pp. 423. Price, \$4.00. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1895.

tion, in the international sense, exists only when, in absolute good faith, all the rules which govern emigration from the country of origin . . . are complied with." The right of expatriation, in so far as it is a recognized legal right, is fully considered. The author then proceeds to take up the various stages leading to naturalization in the United States and, in the concluding chapters, describes the process in the countries of Europe and South America. A special feature of the book is the excellent analytical index which enables one to refer with great ease to the great number of legal questions connected with this subject.

REVIEWS.

The Canadian Banking System, 1817-1890. By R. M. BRECKENRIDGE, Ph.D. Publications of the American Economic Association. Vol. X., Nos. 1, 2, 3. Pp. 476. Price, \$1.50. New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

Dr. Breckenridge's bulky volume on the Canadian Banking System represents much intelligent industry, rendering information available that has hitherto been scattered among government records, forgotten pamphlets and magazine articles. It is more than a mere history or description of banking experiments in Canada. It presents with considerable fullness the arguments pro and con made at the various intervals during which the Canadian banking system has undergone revision. The book, in a way, therefore, constitutes a treatise upon the principles of banking, for these principles have received a thorough exposition during the discussion of banking reform in Canada. On this account, since the banking question is still unsolved in this country and bids fair soon to be uppermost in politics, Mr. Breckenridge's work is timely and valuable.

The development of banking in Canada, unlike that in the United States, has been continuous, and in the existing system there still linger features or provisions which were first put to the test by the earliest banks established in the colonies. The National Banking System of the United States was born of a crisis, having been at first essentially a device in succor of the National Treasury. The growth of banking in Canada has been affected by no such extraneous motives. As a rule, changes in the Canadian system have been made solely for the purpose of improving it. The experience, therefore, of Canada is much more helpful to the student than the experience of the United States, where banks have too often been used either as spoils of politics or as expedients in government financing.

Mr. Breckenridge is very thorough in his history of early banking in Canada. Of the 470 pages in his book 315 are allotted to the discussion of banking prior to 1890, when the latest revision of banking law was made. In the first five chapters he describes the banking experiments made in Lower and Upper Canada prior to 1839, and in the Province of Canada from 1841 to 1867. The effects of the banking act of 1857 and of the mania for free banking which prevailed after 1850 are fully and clearly set forth. The four succeeding chapters, which treat of banking reforms, of banking under the confederation of 1867 to 1889, of the revision of 1890, and of the working of the present system, will be of most interest to the general reader. They can not, however, be read independently of the preceding chapters, for the author in discussing the various reforms proposed does not bring to view the evils and the advantages which experience had shown former systems to possess. This is unfortunate, for the latter half of his book, beginning with page 219, if it were in some degree complete in itself, as it might easily have been made, would have been likely to meet with some popular favor in this country, whereas the present volume by its bulk is likely to repel the average reader. It is to be regretted that Mr. Breckenridge, when constructing his chapters, did not have in mind the needs and prejudices of general readers and make each one so far as possible complete in itself. He has so run the chapters one into the other, making each statement in one chapter hinge upon statements in a preceding chapter, that a reader is baffled and confused in his search for information, unless he makes continuous examination of the whole book. A carefully prepared index would have lessened the evil and made much of the information in the book instantly accessible, but the book has no index whatever, so that a student is compelled to rely upon the rather meagre table of contents. The publication committee of the American Economic Association is certainly inexcusable for having permitted such a valuable book go out in its present form.

The salient features of Canadian banks are well known, and Mr. Breckenridge's contribution is valuable not so much because it describes them, as because it shows the inductions on which they are based and states the arguments which secured their adoption. The popular notion is that Canadian banks are left by the government to do business about as they please, whether as concerns deposits or discounts or note issues, and that as this policy of non-interference by the government has proved successful in Canada, the system upon which it rests must be an excellent one *per se*. There is no doubt that the Canadian banking system now in operation is an excellent one, but its excellence consists by no means merely in the lack of govern-

mental supervision. Because banks in Canada are not required to keep a minimum reserve of specie or legal tender money to secure a conversion of notes or the payment of deposits, it by no means follows that a system embodying these two features would be successful in this country.

One of the most important features of the Canadian system is its encouragement of branch banks, which enable the institutions at monetary centres to loan capital with safety in remote parts of the Dominion. Under the branch bank system the condition of credit in all parts of the Dominion is well known to all the bankers in the large cities, for their own business extends to every part of the country and they have daily reports from their own agents and representatives in all quarters.

Another important feature of the system, and one essential to its safety, is the fact that the bank notes lack the legal tender quality or a government guarantee. Consequently each bank watches with sharp eye the operations of all competitors and will, on detecting any sign of weakness in one of them, refuse to accept its notes and thus throw discredit upon it. The banks of the three monetary centres of the Dominion, Montreal, Toronto and Quebec, act as clearing houses for all the banks in the Dominion. Bank notes are sent to them for redemption, and inasmuch as no bank cares to make money for its competitors, all bank notes are presented for redemption as soon as received. Thus the sharpest banking talent in the Dominion is constantly on the lookout for evidence of unsound banking and is armed with a weapon that metes out swift and sure punishment.

Furthermore, as the banks demand from one another statements of their condition, and monthly reports are made to the government, each banker in the Dominion has at his hand all material necessary for self-protection. The parent banks naturally maintain the closest scrutiny of the affairs of their branch organizations. This scrutiny is not made by an officer of the government, who may have been appointed for political reasons, but is made by men who are selected by the banks because of their known capacity. The scrutiny, therefore, is not perfunctory, as is often the scrutiny of bank examiners in this country, but is thorough and without favor, for each bank knows that it cannot afford to let the slightest shadow fall upon its credit. No one can study the Canadian system impartially without coming to the conclusion that its security is largely the result of the concentration which is the outgrowth of the legalizing of the branch bank.

There are several other excellent safeguards for the depositor and note-holder. A new bank, for instance, cannot begin business until at least \$250,000 has been paid in on its capital stock and kept on

deposit with the Minister of Finance for four weeks, and even then the chartering of the bank is discretionary with the government. The directors of a bank must hold a certain proportion of its paid-up capital stock. The circulation must not exceed in amount the capital stock and is secured by deposit with the government of 5 per cent of the capital stock. That bank notes may never fall below par, it is provided that the notes of an insolvent bank shall draw interest at 6 per cent, and that if they are not paid out of the assets of the bank within sixty days after its failure, they may be paid by the government out of the safety fund. They constitute a first lien on bank assets. Liabilities to the Dominion are a second lien, and liabilities to the government of any province a third lien.

Such are some of the provisions which are the fruit of Canadian experience in banking, and there is much evidence that they are effective in securing both note-holder and depositor. The banks are required by law to keep no reserve against their circulation or their deposits; but a force stronger than law compels them to keep a reserve sufficient to meet the demands made upon them. As these demands vary according as the business of a bank varies, it is found that the reserves of Canadian banks differ widely in amounts. The banks of the financial centres, since they act as clearing houses for the banks of the Dominion, are obliged to keep larger reserves than the other institutions. The whole argument for and against required reserves is very well set forth by Mr. Breckenridge and deserves a careful reading by bankers in the United States.

JOSEPH FRENCH JOHNSON.

University of Pennsylvania.

Souveraineté du peuple et Gouvernement. Par EUGÈNE D'EICHTHAL.

Price, 3 fr. 50. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1895.

Several years ago M. de Laveleye declared that the parliamentary system was working defectively almost everywhere, even in England. Accepting this statement as still more true to-day than at the time it was written, M. d'Eichthal calls attention to the two evil tendencies of parliamentary government from which France has chiefly suffered. If the system is to be faithful to its history in England for the last century, an assembly like the Chamber of Deputies should serve as an agency for the creation and control of successive ministerial governments. Instead of accomplishing this end the Chamber at times does little more than furnish an arena for warring groups of politicians, no one of which can remain dominant long enough to save France from the scandal and danger of unstable ministries. Moreover it has

been currently reported that this body was vaguely ambitious of governing directly, after the manner of the Convention. The resignation of Casimir Périer last winter revealed the weakness of the executive in the presence of its encroachments.

Now M. d'Eichthal believes that any exaggerated power the Chamber possesses is supported by the notion, widely current, that it is something more than a political device; that, in a sense which is not true of any other department of the government, it stands in the place of the sovereign people. This notion has arisen in the face of Rousseau's dictum that the sovereignty of the people can not be delegated even to an assembly of representatives. Rousseau's followers, especially during the Revolution, regarded any departure from direct government by the people as an unfortunate but perhaps necessary concession. Still the concession once made, and an assembly of delegates impersonating the sovereign once organized, these politicians have always been inclined to beat down all barriers offered to the will of this body. In his criticism of this notion M. d'Eichthal shows that in the eighteenth century the idea of popular sovereignty was a mere rallying cry against the "divine right" theory of the monarchy. Such an idea could not be worked out in practice unless men were ready to accept the decision of a bare majority,—one-half plus one of the voting population—as the will of the sovereign. But the Chamber generally does not represent even a majority, because about a third of the voters stay at home. One-third of the voters plus one may then elect the Chamber, and when it is remembered how largely the votes of this one-third are controlled by local committees, an assumption of sovereignty by such an assembly is simply odious.

M. d'Eichthal's sketch of the doctrine of sovereignty from Aristotle's time to the present century is one of the most suggestive parts of his book. In his second part he describes the doctrine of the separation of powers, and shows how great an impetus it received from Montesquieu's account of the English government, incomplete though that was. It is assuredly curious to reflect that at the very moment when the English constitution was developing rapidly in the direction of a harmonious co-operation between the executive and the legislative functions of the government, an acute observer of English affairs should base upon that very constitution the doctrine of the separation of powers. M. d'Eichthal regards the American constitution as the most perfect application of the doctrine as expounded by Montesquieu; which was natural, since the framers of the constitution attached much importance to his opinions, and the contributors to the *Federalist* show comparatively little familiarity with other political speculations. In referring to the part the doctrine played in the Revolution, M.

d'Eichthal does not sufficiently emphasize the influence of Rousseau. For example, when there was an attempt in March, 1793, to organize an effective ministry selected from the Convention, Bancal materially contributed to its defeat by a quotation from Rousseau's statement of the dogma.

Although M. d'Eichthal's discussions refer largely to the current problems of French political life, they are an important contribution to the study of the tendencies of democratic government in all countries where it exists.

Western Reserve University.

HENRY E. BOURNE.

A Scientific Solution of the Money Question. By ARTHUR KITSON. Pp. viii, 418, with appendix. Price, \$1.25. Boston: Arena Publishing Company, 1895.

This is a good book with a bad title. Science does not solve social questions; the most it can do is to analyze social conditions, and formulate the laws of social forces. It is doubtful even, whether we can rightly speak of a "money question" at all. Social forces have, indeed, severed the population once more, into two opposing groups, holding diametrically opposite views, this time on monetary and financial matters. The issue thus formulated may for convenience be spoken of as "the money question;" but this is a matter of politics, to be decided by majorities and not solved by science. Science should go much further back and get at the final cause of present conditions, and then measure the forces now at work. Mr. Kitson's book, on the contrary, begins from above and analyzes present conditions with remarkable perspicacity. Finding them, from the standpoint of "the greatest good to the greatest number," utterly illogical, he calls science to his aid and solves the question for the benefit of all. This, I say, is unscientific, from a sociological point of view, for it is certainly an assumption to imagine that social evolution always favors the cause of the many over against the interests of the few.

Mr. Kitson concludes: "that the present orthodox system of political economy is a false and fraudulent system, and is based upon principles utterly fallacious and immoral;" and again: "that the true science of economics, dealing as it does with economic conduct, is essentially a moral science, and its principles must agree with those of ethics." This is judging the theories of the past from the facts of the present. Instead of being false, fraudulent and immoral, political economy was a frank and truthful statement of the economic and ethical conditions of the time of its expression, and its conclusions

were certainly logical from the sociological premises of the time. Its deductions may no longer fit in with the facts; but that is because social premises have changed. One might as well call elderly people false, fraudulent and immoral, because they are unable to think and feel in their old age, as they did in their youth.

Leaving the sphere of the abstract good, and coming to an analysis of present conditions, Mr. Kitson is better. Recognizing, with the more advanced economic thinkers of the day, that values are after all but "ideal creations" and "abstract relations," he has the acumen to see, and the temerity to maintain, that they "cannot possibly be measured, nor can they be expressed save by numbers," and that hence "gold can neither measure nor express values." Instead of vainly seeking a chimera, which ever eludes one, as so many economists have of late been doing,—Mr. Kitson boldly states that "a standard of value is an absurdity, a nonentity." Of course there never has been, except in men's minds, and there never will be, in this world at least, an invariable unit of value; as the very principle of dynamics and evolutionary growth precludes the possibility of such a factor. An invariable unit of purchasing power, in the form of a ratio between values, is, however, not only conceivable but practicable; and Mr. Kitson's lucid demonstration of this point, with his scheme for its fulfillment, is indeed admirable. His analogy of the balloons (Preface p. iv) is too good to be squeezed into a note.

This leads Mr. Kitson to the fallacy of the commodity unit of purchasing power. As time changes all things, so must time affect the material of which such commodity is composed, and especially its value relation to other commodities. Mr. Kitson is wrong, however, in saying that economists "in omitting the element of time from their definition of a unit of purchasing power, and instituting a material unit, . . . have left the industrial world at the absolute mercy of a clique of speculators, whose incomes are derived from alternately depressing and stimulating production." This is giving economists too much credit. One might as well attribute the institution of negro slavery in America, to Las Casas, because he chanced to remark that the blacks made better workers in the sugar fields than the Indians. The commodity standard was no more evolved by the economists, than was the feudal system by the Schoolmen. Social evolution pushed it to the front in our days as still another means of bringing about that ever recurring bipartition of society, which property in persons, and property in land, was no longer able to achieve. Finding it already there, economists simply adopted it as a premise,—just as Roman jurists accepted slavery, and the feudalists recognized serfdom, in the days gone by.

The monopolization of the commodity composing the standard, has indeed brought about that train of results for chrematistic good and socialistic evil, which Mr. Kitson so well describes ; but it is certainly unscientific to say that "the monopolization of money is due solely to special laws, restricting and prohibiting the issuance of money except by privileged institutions." These laws are effects, not causes—or at most only immediate causes. The revolutionists of the last century attributed all the ills of man to monopolistic land laws. They could not stop at law reforms, however, but had to attack the very foundations of the feudal system ; and still somewhat the same conditions confront us again to-day. Agitators and reformers may wage war on immediate causes, as they are tangible ; but scientists must go much deeper than this in their solutions of questions.

In his chapter on "Gresham's Law," Mr. Kitson is at his best. Starting from the amply justified historical premise that "the tendency of commerce and of industry is toward cheapness, toward a destruction or abolition of value, as used in the commercial sense," Mr. Kitson so amends Gresham's Law as to make it read : "Cheap money is the best money and drives out dear money." With Mr. Walker he believes that "money is what money does." Cheap money is not, therefore, poor money, for Gresham's Law distinctly shows that the cheaper the money the better it performs the money function. This chapter of Mr. Kitson's on Gresham's Law, hits home, and it is to be hoped that it will be taken up and argued out by the "hard-money men." The author boldly challenges criticism, and well defines the issue. Let us now have the dialectics of the opposition !

On the contrary, Mr. Kitson's chapter on "Usury" seems to me weak. Not that he is altogether on the wrong track, perhaps, nor that his general propositions could not be defended, but rather because he has not gauged the strength of his opponents, if indeed they may even be so called. The Austrian theorists can not be studied entirely from Professor Smart's admirable little book, "An Introduction to the Theory of Value," and I do not find Mr. Kitson referring either to von Wieser's "Natural Value" or Böhm-Bawerk's "Capital and Interest," in the original. The author's exposition of the fallacy of Henry George's argument in favor of interest, is much better ; but then the weight of Henry George's theories does not rest primarily on the question of interest. One can not choose one's own opponent in the field, but must rather accept the challenge from the best.

Finally in regard to the matter of governmental interferences, there is too much reliance placed in Mr. Kitson's book on Herbert Spencer's ideal of a coming era of Industrialism, when individuals shall have equal opportunities, and still the right of property be maintained. It

may be true enough to say : "that financial panics, under our present usurious, monopolistic, monetary system are inevitable," and again, "that the parent of interest and the cause of poverty, involuntary idleness, over-production, general rises and falls in prices, is a monopolized currency ;" but when we conclude, as Mr. Kitson does, "that since these evils which afflict society are directly due to laws, under the fostering care and protection of which they have grown to their present gigantic proportions, their removal is possible only by abolishing all laws restricting, hampering or interfering in any way with the issuance of money," we are off the scientific track entirely and back again on the highroad of agitation.

Mr. Kitson's book is well written throughout. The reasoning is clear and, if one admits the premises, also conclusive ; the examples and quotations are chosen with discrimination, and the language is good. The author need not have resorted to artificial means of emphasis,—in the way of italics, underlining, exclamation points, etc.,—to bring out his points. The conclusions are clear of themselves, and such a copious use of the typographical art, only mars their lucidity.

LINDLEY M. KEASBEY.

Bryn Mawr College.

Historical Essays. By J. B. LIGHTFOOT. Pp. 245. Price, \$1.50. London and New York : Macmillan & Co., 1895.

This collection of papers by the late Bishop of Durham is published under the auspices of the Trustees of the Lightfoot Fund, a legacy of copyrights to the diocese to which the energies of the author had been devoted in life. The contents of the book have found publicity at various times in the form of lectures, but have not hitherto appeared in print. The essays, therefore, bear the marks of their origin, and we are called upon, except in one case, to contemplate popular articles rather than scientific papers.

The five chapters treat of widely different subjects, beginning with "Christian Life in the Second and Third Centuries." The object of the writer was to "exhibit Christianity as an independent force, working in and by itself, without the aid of any extraneous supports or any peculiar advantages." The apostles were now gone and Christianity had not yet been made a state religion, so that whatever success was achieved was due to the vital energy of the religion itself. The social condition of the converts was a constant reproach, the theological tenets of the sect were in direct opposition to the Roman theory of the state, and Christian worship was regarded as an act of treason, yet the doctrine finally overcame all opposition and became supreme.

Such is the well-worn theme, but the Bishop has treated the subject in an interesting manner, particularly at the point where he emphasizes the ubiquity and obtrusiveness of the pagan religion. This was due to the fact that it was addressed so completely to the outward senses. Every act of life, commercial transaction, or household duty was represented by an appropriate deity. Every locality, house, field, stable, farmyard; every sanitary regulation, every virtue, and perhaps every vice, had its patron god. There were the gods of birth to preside over the Roman child, Edulia and Potina watched its eating and drinking; Cumina rocked its cradle; Farinus or Locutus watched its efforts to talk; Statina its attempts to stand. Thus at every point in life the Christians were obliged to break with public sentiment in a way that we can scarcely realize at the present time. Refusal to worship the statue of an Emperor was only an incident in a long line of protests leading to the cry of "Atheists" and final martyrdom. The apologists had done well, but it was the martyrs who won the victory for Christianity.

The essay on the "Comparative Progress of Ancient and Modern Missions" is a reply to the critics who cry that missions are a failure. The author points out that the resemblances between early and later missionary efforts are greater than the differences. They show the same alternations of success and failure, the same ebb and flow of spirit and conquest. The modern critics are too impatient, for they expect the missions to accomplish in fifty years as much as the fathers did in many centuries. The Church should not be disheartened when it looks backward, "for," says the Bishop, "history is an excellent cordial for the drooping courage."

England during the latter half of the thirteenth century is described in an interesting manner in two lectures. It was an age of great sovereigns, great statesmen, great lawyers, philosophers, divines, great poets and painters in all civilized Europe. The writer, however, confines his attention to England. He quotes Macaulay's panegyric of the time, wherein he makes it the beginning of all of England's greatness; the constitution, the common law as a science, the supremacy of the seas, the universities, the English language, all were born, as it were, in the time of Edward I. But the author is surprised that Macaulay did not include architecture and the scholastic philosophy, for these now reached their highest development. The age has been called "precocious," because it attempted more than it could accomplish. This precocity is here ascribed to the stimulation of the Crusades, but many of the aspirations of the time were centuries too early. The greatness of England, such as it did attain to, cannot be measured in population or revenue, for at the highest estimate there were but 2,500,000

inhabitants, or, more probably, only one million and a half. The fame of the century comes from its attainments in culture.

"The Chapel of St. Peter and the Manor House of Auckland," may be called the only work of original research in the book. The essay, however, does not appeal to a wide circle of readers. The devotion of the Bishop to the architectural history of Durham was fitly commemorated by his friends recently, in the restoration, in his name, of the ancient chapter house of Durham Cathedral. This was re-opened in July, 1895.

The essay on "Donne, the Poet Preacher," is a sympathetic treatment of one who, like Lightfoot, had been Dean of St. Paul's, but some three hundred years before him. The friend of Ben Jonson, George Herbert and Izaak Walton, Donne combined the quaint conceptions of the poet with the earnestness of the true preacher, as we may see by the quotations in this paper.

J. M. VINCENT.

Johns Hopkins University.

Higher Education in Tennessee. By LUCIUS SALISBURY MERRIAM, Ph. D. Contributions to American Educational History, No. 16, edited by Herbert B. Adams; Bureau of Education, Circular of Information, No. 5. Pp. 287. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1893.

Blount College and the University of Tennessee. An Historical Address. By EDWARD T. SANFORD, A. M. Pp. 119. Published by the University, Knoxville, Tenn., 1895.

There are too many "colleges" in Tennessee. Some of them are too generous in conferring degrees; some have too low standards for graduation and low requirements for admission; some have sub-classes; and some appeal to a religious denomination or a locality not for support, but rather for patronage, as though a college might be run for a business profit. The public school system of the State is not yet properly correlated with the colleges, though there has been improvement since the re-organization in 1873.

The State is far from lavish in its appropriations for higher education. All schools profit indirectly by the exemption from taxation of school and college property. The only direct beneficiary is the Peabody Normal College, the annual appropriation for which was raised by the last legislature to \$20,000.

In five cases the State has been made the agent through which the grants of the nation in aid of education have reached the beneficiary. In one conspicuous case, that arising under the Morrill land grant act

of 1862, the whole grant, amounting to nearly \$400,000, was turned over to the University of Tennessee, on two conditions; the University must out of its own meagre funds, provide the equipment required by the terms of the national grant, and in addition give free tuition to two hundred and seventy-five State students.

In the earliest case, in 1806, one hundred thousand acres of land were turned over to the State to be sold at two dollars per acre for the benefit of two colleges to be designated. After some thirty years the colleges settled with the State, having received in all less than \$50,000. Was there culpable negligence in the management of this trust? There are two answers made in Tennessee. A fair conclusion from the facts, as presented by both authors under discussion, is this: The importance of the grant was not appreciated. It was managed by legislatures which reflected the jealousy and positive ill will of their constituents toward the beneficiaries. Mr. Sanford "will not complain" of the action of the State, but he asks whether the State ought not in equity and honor to make good the shrinkage of this and other trust funds under its management. During this period the people generally manifested great opposition to the colleges; and academies and common schools were neglected.

Such are the sombre features to be gathered from a study of the material presented in these books. There are some brighter ones. In the early days some, referred to as the "upper classes," educated their children well at home and sent their sons to the colleges. In these later days are the gifts of the few large benefactors: the Vanderbilts, Fayerweather, Peabody, and Slater, none of them, however, residents of the State. The zeal of devoted denominational leaders in supporting denominational colleges is noticeable, as is also the influence of the great educators of the State of both the earlier and the later generations.

Dr. Merriam's monograph is itself a collection of monographs, chiefly by his own hand. Seven institutions, the University of Nashville, University of Tennessee, Vanderbilt, Cumberland, University of the South, Southwestern Presbyterian and Southwestern Baptist, are treated in separate chapters, which together cover 207 pages. Thirteen other colleges "for males or for both sexes" are comprised in one chapter of eighteen pages. Nineteen "colleges for women" in another of sixteen, and five "colleges for negroes" in one of twenty pages. Six pages are devoted to a supplementary description of the Public School System of the State.

A general survey or summary gathers up the leading considerations suggested by the study of the material. In the first copies issued the "General Survey" occupies five pages (pp. 15-19). But passages

amounting to two pages were omitted from the later copies upon the complaint of some Tennesseans. The expurgation is unfortunate. The statements complained of have been verified by several independent investigators. With one or two exceptions they are deductions from the material which is left undisturbed in the other parts of the book and can be supplied by the reader who will study the pages carefully. The chief exception referred to is the remark that there are many "colleges" in the State not worth the labor of writing up and that the author may have made mistakes in trying to distinguish between those to be included and those to be omitted in a few cases.

There is no conflict of judgment to be noted between Mr. Sanford and Dr. Merriam. The scope of Mr. Sanford's address is more limited. His treatment of the land grant of 1806 is superior by reason of more lengthy citations and more abundant references.

FREDERICK W. MOORE.

Vanderbilt University.

An Advanced History of England. By CYRIL RANSOME, M. A. Pp. xviii, 1069. Price, \$2.25. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

This book has been prepared for the use of students who have mastered the elements of English history, and it is specially designed to be a text-book for advanced study in schools and colleges. It is adapted to practically the same grade of students as Gardiner's "Students' History of England," and Green's "Short History of the English People," though it presupposes less knowledge on the part of its reader than does the latter history, and it gives more details in the description of events and movements than either of the above named works.

The author introduces into the text of his history the exact words of the most important historic documents and, wherever he finds it possible to do so, he analyzes the characters and pivotal actions of the great national heroes by letting them speak for themselves. One of the best features of the book is the biographical part of it. The author has labored, and we believe successfully, to make the great individual figures stand out in clear light, with their distinct character for good or evil, and he shows both the statesman's contributions to the epoch and his relation to and dependence upon the peculiar social environment of the time in which he worked. The gradual development of the constitution, and parliamentary government is well brought out and none of the advanced histories of this grade have succeeded so

well in presenting constitutional and parliamentary history in conjunction with political and social history. The ordinary college student approaches constitutional history with only a vague knowledge of social and political history for a background and the result is far from satisfactory. Constitutional history must rise out of the onward life and development of the people, for no constitutional principle can be understood in the abstract. This book seems to us to give these two phases in good proportion. There has been too much space used in giving the details of battles. It is a just point of criticism, for in a book of this character the student needs a luminous exposition of the causes which led to armed conflict and the distinctive results, which grew out of the decisive battle, but the details of movement and position are useless lumber for him, save in so far as they throw light upon the character of the men who were important figures in the contest.

The sections which bear upon the Church and its controversies with Kings and with Popes are in the main satisfactory, and will enable readers to comprehend the points at issue in these ecclesiastical struggles which have so deeply affected the course of history and the life of the people.

The style in which this new history is written, has nothing about it especially attractive. The sentences are clear and the author's meaning is always apparent, but the book will be read rather for the facts it contains, than because there is any charm in the way in which they are told. The maps are numerous and good for their purpose. Charts of family descent and connection are frequent and are very serviceable. The book is attractive in form and quality, and is a valuable addition to our text-book literature on English history.

RUFUS M. JONES.

Haverford College, Pa.

Essays in Taxation. BY EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN. Pp. 434. Price, \$3.00. New York and London: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

It is probable that most students of the science of finance in this country are in the same frame of mind as the reviewer with regard to this collection of *Essays in Taxation*. Their sense of grateful appreciation to Professor Seligman for the important work he has so well done, and for the assistance he has rendered them in their studies, is so strong as to check any inclination for critical comment. Whether one approve or disapprove the particular conclusions or lines of argument contained in this series of papers, he relies for his opinions, even in larger measure than he is himself conscious, upon the data which Professor Seligman has furnished as the basis of his judgments.

In this sense every review of this collection of essays must be in the nature of an opinion from the pupil to the teacher.

Should I be asked for the chief merits of these essays, most of which have been published separately, I should call attention to the fact, that their perusal leaves upon the reader that sense of satisfaction which comes only from contact with a large collection of well selected and well arranged books, upon the topic in which he is especially interested. A studiously minded person naturally hesitates to express his view upon so complicated a subject as finance, even though he may believe his thought worthy of attention, lest upon its publication he find that he has been repeating arguments of years gone by. The chief service of a great library to a scholar is to liberate him from the tyranny of unknown arguments, and to encourage the utterance of truly worthy thoughts or suggestions; and no more useful work can be done by one who has access to the books than to classify their contents, selecting from each its salient point, and rendering a report of his reading to other students in the same field of investigation who are not so fortunately situated. This is what Professor Seligman has done. Not only in these essays but in other monographs not included in the present collection, and this is why no student of finance, in this country, at least, will feel he has a right to an opinion until he has read whatever Professor Seligman may have written.

Another service rendered by the author is found in his collection of the facts pertaining to the condition of local finances in the United States, and in his critical analysis of these facts. The most marked characteristic of the taxing laws of the States and minor civil divisions is their confusion and lack of harmony; and it is essential that the source of this confusion, as well as its nature, should be made clear before the work of re-adjustment can be carried on in a satisfactory manner. It is indeed a difficult task to classify confusion so as to make it comprehensible and a task which calls for marked critical ability. The writings of Professor Seligman have made considerable advance in this direction, and were I to express any regret in connection with the essays which the author saw fit to select, it would be that he did not think it wise to revise and include in this publication, his article upon "Finance Statistics of the American Commonwealths" which appeared in number eight (1889), of the Publications of the American Statistical Association. It is true that many of the facts stated in this article are found in his treatment of the General Property Tax, the Taxation of Corporations and Double Taxation; but these chapters do not convey so strong a sense of the hopeless confusion which exists in the fiscal conditions of our local governments as when brought together in a single essay.

The essays contained in this collection are thirteen in number. The collection includes most of the author's important contributions to the discussion of taxation, with the exception of his treatise upon "Progressive Taxation" and upon "The Shifting and Incidence of Taxation." In addition to the essays which have appeared from time to time in periodicals, the collection includes several contributions which have not heretofore been published. Although the author in his Preface expresses the hope that the collection "will be found not to be entirely lacking in continuity," it must be acknowledged that the book does not leave upon the reader the impression of a comprehensive or systematic treatise. The book is what it pretends to be, a collection of essays written from time to time upon the subject of taxation.

The third chapter is devoted to a discussion of the Single Tax, and may be classed as one of the few attempts to consider this elusive theory of social regeneration from the financial point of view. The treatment does not seem to me to be entirely satisfactory, and this led me to review in my mind the various attempts at answering Henry George. President Walker's little work, "Land and Its Rent," is far from conclusive; the Duke of Argyle is by no means convincing; and Rae's chapter in "Contemporary Socialism" is no more satisfactory than the others. Does this prove that the Single Tax theory is above criticism? So it would seem to the superficial observer. The truth is, however, that the Henry George scheme has not a sufficient amount of consecutive logical reasoning in it to permit of a consecutive argument against it. One is inclined to regret that Professor Seligman undertook a formal answer to a formless argument.

One of the most significant analyses in the Science of Finance is that which undertakes to make a classification of public revenue. Chapter ix, which treats of this subject, is of especial interest in view of the fact that Professor Seligman saw fit to modify his views as originally expressed upon this subject. It would take too long to state clearly the manner in which the second statement differs from the first. There are, however, one or two points to which I should like to call attention in connection with the classification as finally accepted. All revenue, according to these essays, is either "gratuitous," "contractual," or "compulsory." Under which of these heads, one may inquire, shall revenue in the form of an indemnity or tribute, be classed? It might be said that the state of society for which the classification is made does not recognize tribute and the answer would be satisfactory; but it can hardly be said that revenue by indemnity, or as an award from an international board of arbitration, is becoming less common as the

years go by. From one point of view this might be called compulsory revenue, but this would be to prevent the accepted meaning of that word as used in defining a tax. Again, under the head of compulsory revenue our author includes revenue by eminent domain. One may inquire if the taking of private property for a public purpose according to the principles of eminent domain may properly be classified as revenue at all. Is it not rather a coerced exchange of property?

The chief question which arises in connection with this classification, however, pertains to the use which is made of the term "price." Professor Adolf Wagner conceives that in case a government undertakes an industry the charge made for the service or the commodity sold is in all respects a price, and his discussion adjusts itself to the thought that a government may perform an industrial service in exactly the same way as an individual or a corporation. While Professor Seligman stops short of this extreme statement, he does recognize a "quasi-private price." This position is at least open to question and the opinion is here ventured that better results will be attained by adjusting a science of finance throughout to the conception that all acts of the State, whether industrial or not, rest upon an entirely different basis from acts of individuals or corporations. The chief point at issue between the author and other writers pertains to the recognition of a "fee" as a form of revenue. In this I am inclined to agree with Professor Seligman. Fees are a distinctive form of revenue and wherever legitimately used bring into the foreground a peculiar and characteristic set of relationships.

In general one may say that whatever points in these Essays are open to question, are so, because each essay was written as an independent discussion upon a selected topic. It is quite possible that here and there thoughts have been expressed which would be modified if the requirements of a comprehensive fiscal analysis were held in mind. As a whole this volume constitutes the most important contribution to the science of finance which has thus far appeared from the pen of an American author.

HENRY C. ADAMS.

University of Michigan.

Studies in Economics. By WILLIAM SMART, M. A., LL. D. Lecturer on Political Economy in the University of Glasgow. Pp. x, 341. Price, \$2.75. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

This book is one of the best fruits of the newer subjective movement in economic science. Professor Smart is one of those fortunate economists who have had large business experience before studying

practical life as a science. In his most abstract thinking he retains his clear grasp of concrete things. He uses the deductive method, not as a mere mental exercise, but as a powerful thought-instrument in the scientific explanation of actual life. These studies will impress theorist and statistician alike with their candor, their sober sense, their keen analytical power, their reliance upon observed fact, their clear and vigorous statement, and, it is hoped, with the general correctness of their conclusions. While relentless in their devotion to fact, they are beautified throughout by a noble sympathy for the less fortunate among men. This sympathy is not a blind or cheap sentimentality. It is a deep and vivid realization of the essential worth and the high capability of human life.

Of these ten essays, five have already appeared, substantially in their present form, in various periodicals, English and American. Four of the ten are studies in "Wages," three in "Currency," and three in "Consumption."

The first essay, entitled "The Standard of Comfort," contains a theory of wages. The object is to effect a reconciliation between the older "cost" theory of wages and the newer "productivity" theory. Along lines of reasoning already made familiar by Professor Smart's translations of Böhm-Bawerk and his own writings, he shows how wages can be fixed only by the value of labor conducted back from the value of the product of labor. It is the "national dividend" or the aggregate of consumption goods "which gives value to the land, the capital and the labor that produce it. It defines the value of the productive factors because it is directly their product. And it limits the value of these factors, inasmuch as that value cannot exceed the value of the dividend."

From this he concludes that the *absolute* value of labor, as well as of the other factors, can only be increased by an increase in the national dividend produced, while the *relative* value of labor may increase, dividend remaining the same, only at the expense of land or capital. It is possible also that labor "may get a double share; that is, may get a larger comparative share, while the share itself is absolutely greater." In all this it is seen that the amount of the national dividend fixes a limit to the rise of wages and profits, which "is no less inflexible than it is unseen." If more of this dividend be spent on the return to capital, less must be spent on wages.

This consideration introduces the conception of "cost." Labor in any line of production has a certain "cost," at any given time, equivalent to the value of its product in another line of production. If in a new country a manufacturer starts a factory, he must count as the cost of labor at least the rate of agricultural wages. The rate of agricultural

wages, which thus figures as a cost and gives value to manufacturing labor, has, it is true, itself been determined by the marginal productivity of the labor in agriculture. But it is a cost which determines the value of labor in manufactures. Consumers cannot get these goods unless they will pay a price which will give to labor at least this cost price.

This is the reconciliation between the cost and the productivity theories of wages. As a cost it determines the value of the manufacturing labor. But its value has itself been determined by its product in agriculture. Professor Smart expressly repudiates that conception of cost which makes it mean the cost of producing the laborer and thus furnishes a basis for a national wage. He also expressly repudiates the conception of cost as pain. This latter idea is fundamental in his system. Work, in his view, is not necessarily a pain. He is optimistic enough to think it not impossible that men may some day have only that amount and kind of work to do which will be in itself purely pleasurable. He recognizes clearly the fact that much of the work of the world is now in itself a pleasure and that all attempts to build a theory of wages based upon the relation between the pain-cost of labor and the value of the product of labor are futile.

The doctrine that the standard of comfort determines wages is true, he claims, to the extent that it corresponds with this "cost price of labor." "The minimum wage which the worker should get is determined by the laborer's standard of comfort, not because the laborer may demand a certain standard and by refusing to accept less may force it from an unwilling employer, but because this standard is what the unconscious working out of the distribution problem by competition puts to the credit of the worker, among the other factors, as his own product." Thus he reconciles Ricardo and Wieser. His law of wages is then, as he himself acknowledges, substantially the same as that of Professor J. B. Clark, "that wages depend on the value that the final unit of labor can create in the general system of affiliated industries."

Professor Smart draws two very important conclusions from his discussions, namely, that this "cost" furnishes "a true irreducible minimum" wage, and that under present conditions wages tend to rise both absolutely and relatively. "Not only is the national dividend larger but the worker gets a larger share of it." The latter proposition he bases upon the fact that wealth is increasing much more rapidly than population.

In this reasoning about the relation of profits to wages we see how Smart is really going back to the principles of Mill and Ricardo. And in the doctrine that the present relatively slow increase of

population as compared with that of capital is giving a relatively larger wage to the worker, we find the neglected side of the theory of population—the truth, namely, that when, as now, the capabilities of the growth of capital outrun those of population, we need not preach damnation to the parents of large families.

The essay entitled "A Mere Commodity" is the best discussion of the nature of money which has appeared in recent years. He shows how misleading is the conception of money as a "mere commodity," and he gives us the happy definition of money as the "universal commodity." This essay has already been widely read in the *Fortnightly Review*. It is better therefore to give more extended notice to the second of the studies in currency, bearing the title, "Must Prices Fall?" In an argument of unsurpassed clearness and force he demonstrates that a fall in the general level of prices can result only from a scarcity in the currency. Improvements in production cannot cause a fall in the level of prices, but only in the prices of particular goods. So soon as the improvement is extended to the production of other goods the increase in these goods constitutes a new demand for the increased goods whose price first fell, thus tending to raise it. When the improvements become general, the general increase of all commodities will bring about the same general level of prices as before, assuming equal elasticity of demand in all goods. The assumption is also necessary that these improvements apply equally to the production of the money metal. The fact of a fall in the level of prices shows that the supply of the money metal has not increased *pari passu* with the increase in other commodities.

He claims that the present "cheapness" has benefited only two classes, "the working classes whose money wage is not reduced," and those to whom are "due debts measured in gold." And even with reference to these he adds: "But if low prices are coincident with irregular employment, and if the gain of the creditor endangers the solvency of the debtor, even these two classes may find that the balance swings against them."

In another essay, Professor Smart has a very ingenious explanation of the alleged phenomenon of general "over-production," in which he claims that the want of expansion of the currency, with expanding industry, presents the same phenomena as partial over-production, and is mistaken for general over-production. I shall not attempt to follow his argument, but wish simply to challenge his statement that general over-production is a contradiction in terms. He says: "There cannot be over-production of things in general for two reasons: first, that, while in comparison with other nations we are rich, we are absolutely, exceedingly poor; and second, that as new wants lead to

new activities, and new activities awaken new wants, there is an infinite field for extending the production of almost everything that satisfies any considerable human desire."

To point out the unlimited possibilities of development in "new wants" and "new activities" in the future does not prove that "general over-production" may not now exist. There are obviously very discernible limits to "wants and desires" as they exist at any given time. The consumptive capacity is limited, by limits physical and intellectual. The total consumptive capacity, physical, intellectual, æsthetic and religious, of the Australian savage is very limited compared with that of the Englishman. If the Australian, his wants and capacity to consume remaining the same, could suddenly be endowed with the productive power of the Englishman and should use it to its full capacity for a single year there would be possible a general over-production of a very considerable kind.

For production under present conditions there are necessary: (1) understanding of the kinds and quantities of goods wanted, and (2) ample productive power. All that would be necessary for a general over-production would be a general over-estimate as to the quantities of goods wanted. There would be a general excess of goods produced which, other things equal, would leave prices unchanged, while every producer would have goods in stock which no one would buy. That this state of things would tend to develop new wants is quite true. But that does not prove that "general over-production is a contradiction in terms." The case stated would leave society with a choice between two things—either to work less or to develop new wants. This is the margin of choice which lies eternally before individuals and races and upon the issue of which depends stagnation or progress. That such a general over-production ever does take place may well be denied. That it is conceivable, however, seems equally certain.

The studies in consumption are particularly fresh and suggestive. He attempts a new definition of the word "wealth" by including, not merely "the sum of exchange values" but those re-arrangements of natural conditions which, by creating "utilities," add to real wealth without increasing "valued assets." "The constant striving of economic progress is toward taking commodities out of the category of values and making them pure utilities like the rain and the sunshine."

The two essays, "New Wealth and Old" and "The Socializing of Consumption," aim to make clear that it is within the power of the owners of wealth to make society generally richer by their mode of consumption. By a wise consumption they may add continually to

the stock of "old" or "parent" wealth while enjoying a fuller stream of new wealth. Capital and consumption goods may be made to increase concurrently. By a wise consumption again they may put wealth in such forms, durable and non-exclusive, that others as well as themselves shall enjoy it. In his treatment of this topic he has contributed much more than his predecessors, Cantillon, Quesnay, Adam Smith and J. S. Mill. In reading, one feels that at last the subject of consumption is being approached from the right standpoint.

The attempt to distinguish between new wealth and old is not always successful. He leaves a sense of vagueness. Sometimes he seems to mean by "wealth," physical quantities, sometimes "utilities" or satisfactions, sometimes simply "values." What then is "old wealth" or capital? Is it concrete things, lands and machinery? Or does it include "conditions" which yield unvalued utilities? Or is it a simple sum of values? Again, what does it mean to "invest" new wealth? In what shape is this new wealth? And how can it be "saved" or thrown back into capital? If it is concrete things, machines, food, materials, to what uses can they be put? If it is a sum of value, does not this abundance of things tend to shrink it, if we try to make capital out of it? The only way of escape is to project our effective want farther into the future and to use these things to produce that which will supply wants more remote. Professor Smart fails to give that definiteness to his explanation of this process which it demands.

I have given this extended notice to Professor Smart's volume because it represents a movement in economic science of the very highest importance. The older economics of Ricardo and Mill looked at economic phenomena too exclusively from a physical standpoint. The Historical School, while giving more place to subjective motives, were yet so strongly under the influence of the evolutionary tendencies of the last half century that the laws of human society were looked at as substantially the same as the laws of organic life. The whole newer movement in economics, so well represented by the Austrian School, by Marshall and Clark and Patten, is rapidly restoring the balance. Human society is the creation of the human will. The motives and choices of individuals are the stuff which constitute the bonds of society. Society is not an "evolutionary" but a teleological structure. The fitness which makes social institutions persist is not that cart-before-the-horse fitness of physical evolution, but the preconceived fitness of economic utility. No writer of the newer school has more forcibly illustrated, than Professor Smart, how necessary it is, if we would understand social causation and development, to take this standpoint of the individual will and explain society and progress in terms of individual economic choice.

Professor Smart has, in these essays, demonstrated admirably the strength of the deductive-analytic method in certain fields of economic science. He has rare skill in seizing typical facts, in bringing them into relation with each other in such a way as to reach sound general law. His method does not involve ignorance of fact, or neglect of fact, for he shows everywhere that his typical fact is chosen because it is a well ascertained fact.

His work shows the synthetic tendency in the latest economics, a tendency to so use the results of particular research advocated by the historical school that the laws of the classical writers, so far as they contain truth for the present, can be restated in the setting of our new facts. In this way it is seen that the work of the classical school is not obsolete. There is a vital continuity running through their works, through the work of the historical school, and through the efforts of the Austrians. Writers like Smart are combining the strength in all these tendencies into a new method and a new science.

Some of the specific influences which have helped to form his work he himself mentions, his early and extensive business experience, his fondness for Ruskin and Carlyle, and his studies in the Austrian writers. Love for fact, keenness and power in constructive reasoning, and a spirit of broad humanity are all conspicuous traits of the writer. Add to these a terse, clear style, easy in movement, luminous in diction, ample, but never superfluous in content—the result is work of high merit. Little of importance can be said of it, which is not praise.

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SIDNEY SHERWOOD.

Money and Banking. Illustrated by American History. By HORACE WHITE. Pp. 488. Price, \$1.50. Boston: Ginn & Co., 1895.

Horace White has done for banking in the United States a work similar in some respects to that done by Mr. Breckenridge for banking in Canada. Mr. White's "Money and Banking," while not so thorough a treatise as Mr. Breckenridge's, has the advantage of a clear and taking style, is compact and well arranged, and its information is made accessible by an index. The book is divided into two parts. The first treats of the evolution of money and of the world's experience with the gold standard. The second treats of representative money, under this head being included all forms of fiat money and bank note issues. In the appendices are given accounts of bimetallist movements in Germany, a sketch of Mr. Shaw's "History of Currency," the Baltimore plan, and Secretary Carlisle's plan for revision of the national banking law, the gold price of greenbacks during suspension of specie payments, and the Gresham law. A handy bibliography closes the volume.

Mr. White's work deserves commendation principally on account of the clear light which he throws upon the banking question. His descriptions of the functions of a bank, of the clearing house system, and of American banking before and since the Revolution, all comprised within two hundred pages, make a story which can be comprehended by a high school boy. It is a story which should be familiar to every educated American citizen, and has never been better told than by Mr. White. He finds more to praise than to condemn in the plan on which the first and second banks of the United States were established, and unlike some historians attributes the disasters and scandals connected with the operations of these banks, not to unsound banking, but rather to political interference. These chapters will be interesting to persons who wish now to extend the banking functions of the National Treasury.

Mr. White describes in some detail the conditions which gave rise to the method of redemption adopted by the famous Suffolk bank. In his opinion the experience of Massachusetts has furnished almost conclusive evidence that the "Banking Principle," when safeguarded by provisions that have stood the test of experience, will yield the safest, soundest and most useful system of banking. The business of banking in New York, he shows, resulted in placing the stamp of approval on the safety fund system, and Mr. White is pretty clearly of the opinion that the best system of banking for this or any country must comprise the advantage of the Suffolk system and the safety fund. He describes the national banking system and gives a qualified approval of the Baltimore plan, believing that it embodies the essential features of the Canadian system. This plan, however, does not make any provision for a branch banking system and does make the bank-note practically a legal tender to all banks, inasmuch as their redemption is guaranteed by the United States. Evidently, therefore, there is lacking in this plan that feature of the Canadian system which secures the daily redemption of notes and the constant supervision of banking operations by the most competent inspectors, namely, the bankers themselves. As Mr. White remarks, however, we cannot hope to perfect our system by one act, but must be satisfied with gradual improvements. Nevertheless we must not lose sight of the danger that lurks in an unsecured circulation. If the banking laws of this country are to be revised, no safeguards that have stood the tests of experience should be ignored. The banking principle may, indeed, be the soundest, yet if adopted under circumstances which render unnecessary a development of those natural safeguards which make it sound, it may open the door wide for rascality.

Mr. White's treatment of money errs on the side of dogmatism. He

belongs to the extreme wing of the monometallic school, which practically declines to combat the arguments for bimetallism on the ground that there are no arguments to combat. His discussion of money, therefore, is in the main an exposition of the advantages of the gold standard. It is really a special plea for that standard, yet a pretense is made to the statement and consideration of adverse arguments, just enough, perhaps, to convince the general and uninformed reader that he has both sides of the case before him. Mr. White has undoubtedly tried to be fair in his statement of the bimetallists' contention, yet he is so thoroughly convinced of its worthlessness that he cannot patiently or respectfully consider it.

Recognizing the fact that the bimetallic theory rests upon the so-called quantity theory of money, Mr. White devotes one chapter to its demolition. The thing which he demolishes, however, is not the quantity theory at all, but the notion that prices must rise or fall as the volume of money increases or decreases. No such conclusion is deducible from the quantity theory as set forth by any recent writer of repute, and the theory is certainly not to be condemned because some people misunderstand and misuse it. An uninformed reader will get the impression from Mr. White's chapter that the quantity theory lacks the support of scientific authority. General Walker and his father are the only economists who are mentioned as its advocates. Why omit the name of John Stuart Mill? He declared: "That an increase in the quantity of money raises prices, and a diminution lowers them, is the most elementary proposition in the theory of currency, and without it we should have no key to any of the others." Every student of Mill knows with what thoroughness he pointed out the "cautions with which the principle must be guarded in attempting to make use of it for the practical explanation of phenomena." Mill, as does Walker also, recognized fully the effect of credit and demand upon prices, and the impossibility of a precise estimate of their effect. Mr. White condemns the theory because of these indeterminate factors—credit and demand—but he offers no substitute, except the general statement that money is a commodity and that "all trade is barter, even when the precious metals are employed as intermediaries."

When Mr. White gets into "the practical explanation of phenomena" he completely forgets his theoretical scorn of the quantity theory. For instance, in opening his discussion of paper money he remarks that money is "an instrument of exchange," and "there may be too many or too few of these instruments at any time or place, as there may be too many or too few carts or wheelbarrows." Hence, if a government issues \$100,000 paper money, and "if the conditions of trade and industry remain the same, there will now be 100,000 too

many instruments of exchange and the surplus will be exported." That is about as bold a deduction from the quantity theory as can be conceived. Again, praising the "Bullion Report," he says that it proved, "with as much certainty as any proposition in Euclid, that the paper currency had depreciated, and that the depreciation was due to its redundancy." Such a claim for the quantity theory it is doubtful if General Walker himself would make. Mr. White is, in reality, an adherent of the quantitative school of theorists, although he does not seem to be aware of the fact. On page 119, he says: "Barring public alarm and apprehension, the value of the currency [he is discussing paper money] will be governed by the law of supply and demand, *i. e.*, the supply of and the demand for instruments of exchange." And on page 197, discussing the purchasing power of greenbacks in 1869 and 1870, he says: "The supply of instruments of exchange was the same at both periods, but the demand for them was greater at the second period than at the first. For this reason they gained in value to the extent of about 15 per cent." Such instances of reliance upon the theory of demand and supply, of which "quantity theory" is only another name, recur frequently in the book, and one is led to wonder why the author should make such vigorous assault upon it.

It would appear that Mr. White dislikes the quantity theory mainly because of the friends it has made. It is the mainstay of bimetallism, and in this country of late the advocates of the free coinage of silver have made constant and marvelous use of it. As a believer in the gold standard during troublous times, Mr. White has doubtless grown weary of hearing the enemy always harping on the "quantity theory," and has concluded that the best way to silence them is to kill off the theory. That would be all right, of course, if as an expounder of monetary phenomena he did not forget that the theory is dead. But while as an advocate he has killed the quantity theory, yet as a historian he gives it the respect due to the most exact of mathematical sciences.

It is hardly fair to assume, as the author does in discussing India, that silver has declined in value merely because its gold price has fallen. He calmly makes this assumption, however, and then easily proves that India's wage-earners must have suffered in consequence. To anticipate the objection that the purchasing power of wages has not changed in India, he declares that the evidence shows that "during recent years the silver price of Indian produce has risen" and that rice has "more than doubled in price since the rupee began to fall." In support of these assertions he refers to the testimony of a witness before Lord Herschell's committee in 1892.

However, it was hardly fair for Mr. White to omit to say that the evidence submitted convinced the committee that the price level in India had not been much changed during the last twenty years, although there had been some advance in very recent years; and as for rice, witnesses on all sides agreed that its price was regulated by a monopoly, so that the price of rice in gold-using countries has been kept steady. Such was the testimony of Sir Charles E. Bernard, an officer of the Indian government, and he is abundantly corroborated by other witnesses. But Mr. White appears to be so anxious to win the reader over to unquestioning faith in the gold standard, that he neglects to tell all the truth about India. Likewise, when discussing the contention that an "alleged fall of prices" has been caused by the single gold standard, he quotes with emphatic approval the report of the Senate Committee on Finance, which showed that wages and prices have risen since 1873, and then, although accepting this report as authoritative, denies that there has been any appreciation of gold. And this denial immediately follows two paragraphs devoted to proving that low prices are beneficial to mankind and generally acceptable, as is indicated by the fact that "all who advertise in the newspapers proclaim low prices." "Is it possible," asks the author, "that these advertisers misconceive the public interests?"

I am under no temptation to quarrel with the author's conclusions respecting the maintenance of the gold standard in this country. He does not "misconceive the public interest" concerning the main issue, but his book, or that part of it treating of money, is not likely to win friends for the gold standard. It is just the kind of a plea for the gold standard which will do harm at the present time, for the public are still debating the question, and the man who relies upon this book for his argument will surely meet with discomfiture in the forum. From every other point of view, however, it is admirably conceived and executed. It is not a history of American experiments with the currency, yet it describes with great clearness those experiments which have been most instructive and possess greatest significance at the present time. In no other book do we find so compact and intelligible chapters on the monetary and financial expedients adopted during the War of the Rebellion by the Federal Government and by the Southern Confederacy. There is a vivid description of the "gold room," a good summary of the Legal Tender Decisions, and a clear discussion of recent financial exigencies. In short, Mr. White has proved himself an entertaining and useful historian, and it is a pity that he has suffered theory and dialectics to spoil his good work.

JOSEPH FRENCH JOHNSON.

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The Mississippi Basin: The Struggle in America between England and France, 1697-1763. With full cartographical illustrations from contemporary sources. By JUSTIN WINSOR. Pp. ix, 464. Price, \$4.00. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1895.

In dedicating his recent book to Clements Robert Markham, President of the Royal Geographical Society, Mr. Winsor honors a man, who, like himself, "knows how the physiography of a continent influences its history, how it opens avenues of discovery, directs lines of settlement and gives to the natural rulers of the earth their coigne of vantage." Though there may be other compelling influences, he deems no other control so steady.

This book is a continuation of the series opened by "Cartier to Frontenac," with which it is uniform in size and style. Naturally it is a history not so much of discovery as of struggle, a record not of plotting rivers and mountain ranges but of re-adjusting political boundaries.

At the beginning of this epoch the English occupied simply the strip of territory east of the Alleghanies stretching from Acadia to Spanish Florida, but under the "sea-to-sea" charters the English insisted on territorial rights extending westward to the New Albion of Drake. The French held the mouths of the two great waterways; they had explored the St. Lawrence system, and La Salle had followed the Mississippi to the Gulf. The French claimed that the right of discovery entitled them to the basins drained by these great rivers. From such clashing claims nothing but conflict could ensue. This book is devoted to setting forth the protracted and complicated struggles between the races for the prize of the great inland plain, struggles which ended in the conquest of Canada by the English, and in the establishment of their claims to territory as far west as the Mississippi.

The details of these operations could not fail to be perplexing, but the broad lines of policy are clear. Among the most interesting topics are the contrasts between the English and French as colonists and as traders with the Indians, especially in their land policy: "John Law and the Mississippi Bubble;" "The Albany Congress;" "Braddock's Campaign;" and "The Winning of the Ohio and St. Lawrence in 1758-9." The English royal generals are made to cut a sorry figure in comparison with their French rivals. Yet the blame for the early inefficiency is not attributed entirely to their "fussy imbecility;" the record of inertia and discord among the colonists is not inspiring.

Contemporary maps are rather less numerous than in the earlier book. A few modern charts have been inserted; it may be questioned whether in a book so crammed with geographical data several comprehensive present-day charts would not save the reader much reference

to the atlas, and add to his intelligent interest in the "full cartographical illustrations from contemporary sources," without bringing him into that "bondage to the modern map" which Freeman so deplored.

The purist will meet with some surprises. He may think that a few such words as "fundament," "abided" and "vagabondish" deserve, as Mr. Winsor would say, to be "re-Englished."

GEORGE H. HAYNES.

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The Poor in Great Cities, Their Problems and What is Doing to Solve Them. BY ROBERT A. WOODS, W. T. ELSING, JACOB A. RIIS, WILLARD PARSONS, EVERETT J. WENDELL, ERNEST FLAGG, WILLIAM JEWETT TUCKER, JOSEPH KIRKLAND, SIR WALTER BESANT, EDMUND R. SPEARMAN, JESSIE WHITE MARIO and OSCAR CRAIG. Pp. xxi, 400. Price, \$3.00. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1895.

Most serious students of social science will misjudge this volume at the first glance because of its outward appearance. That such pre-judgment is not justified becomes apparent as soon as one begins to read in this interesting collection of essays.

This volume makes no pretense at being a solid, scientific treatise on poverty and pauperism. There is no connection between the several papers except that they all deal with some feature of city poverty, and the order of arrangement is confusing. We are first told about "The Social Awakening in London," by Mr. Woods. Then we pass over to America and view "Life in New York Tenement Houses, as Seen by a City Missionary," Rev. William T. Elsing; see "The Children of the Poor," as described by Mr. Riis; are then told "The Story of the Fresh-Air Fund," by Mr. Willard Parsons and the history of the "Boys' Clubs in New York," by Mr. E. J. Wendell. President William J. Tucker follows and describes "The Work of Andover House in Boston," and Mr. Joseph Kirkland relates what has been done "Among the Poor of Chicago." We are then again transported to England to "A Riverside Parish" of London, which Sir Walter Besant delineates. After Mr. Spearman's account of the "School for Street Arabs" in Paris comes a description by Miss Mario of the life of "The Poor in Naples." Returning to New York the reader is told about "The Agencies for the Prevention of Pauperism," by the late Mr. Oscar Craig and following this comes a second paper on "The New York Tenement House Evil and Its Cure," by Mr. Ernest Flagg. To a greater or less degree each writer deals with similar phases and reiterates observations, arguments and proposals given by

the other authors. Nor are their views always in harmony. One traces the causes of poverty and pauperism to defects of individual character, mental and physical. Another discovers most of them in the social and economic environment of the poor. The writers vary greatly in the matter of style. Some are easy masters of a lucid, flowing, well-ordered narrative; others are not. Some are widely known as authors and students of social problems and others appear here for the first time. Some of the authors see little else but sorrow, misery, vice, crime and grinding toil in the average life of our city poor. Others while fully aware of all these terrible conditions see much that is cheerful, much that indicates improvement and enlightenment, and a gradual bettering of things in the slums. The social horizon of London from every point of view, says Mr. Woods, is bright with encouragement and glowing with the magnificent achievements of the recent great social awakening.

One of the most interesting and instructive papers in this volume for the American reader is that by Rev. William T. Elsing on the tenement houses of New York. Dr. Elsing speaks with authority. Nine years of life and work among the people of the East Side of lower New York have made him familiar with all the details of his subject. He writes with feeling, but he always expresses himself with marked discretion and commendable moderation.

Speaking of the tenement houses, he says: "To many persons, living in a tenement house is synonymous with living in the slums, yet nothing is farther from the truth. It would be an easy matter for me to take a stranger into a dozen or more homes so poor, dirty, and wretched that he would not forget the sight for days, and he would be thoroughly convinced that a home cannot exist in a tenement house; but I could take that same person to an equal number of homes in the same section of the city, and sometimes in the same house, which would turn him into a joyful optimist and forever satisfy him that the state of things is not by any means as bad as it might be." (Pp. 45-46.) It is refreshing and novel to read his sensible remarks defending the traditional monster, the landlord. "The landlords are of necessity compelled to be peremptory and sometimes arbitrary in their demands. If a landlord were even a little too lenient his tenement property would certainly prove a losing investment. The apparently unreasonable harshness of many landlords is often justifiable, and the only means of securing them against loss." All who have any real knowledge whatever of the character of the average poor know how just are these observations.

Mr. Elsing offers several suggestions that he believes could be carried out with substantial and beneficial results by those who are

striving to improve the conditions of life among the poor. He does not offer them as "remedies" but simply as helps. They are: first, increase of room, sunshine and air in tenement houses; second, increase of small parks; third, better house construction and sanitation; fourth, the regeneration of the saloon by removing its objectionable features and making it a reputable social club house; fifth, erection of bath houses; sixth, formation of a "universal loan association;" seventh, provision of trained nurses; eighth, "greater co-operation among all good men."

FRANK I. HERRIOTT.

Iowa College.

CLASSIFIED BIBLIOGRAPHY.

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[In this list are included the titles of only the more important works belonging within the field of Politics, Law, Economics and Sociology.]

I. POLITICS AND LAW.

The Constitution of the United States at the End of the First Century.
By GEORGE S. BOUTWELL. Pp. 412. Price, \$3.50. Boston:
D. C. Heath & Co., 1895.

[A concise statement of the leading principles of interpretation adopted by the United States Supreme Court in dealing with constitutional questions.]

Die bürgerliche Erbfolge im rechtsrheinischen Bayern. Nach amtlichen Quellen dargestellt. By Dr. LUDWIG FICK, Münchener volkswirtschaftliche Studien. Achtes Stück. Pp. 314. Price, 7 m. Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta, 1895.

[A contribution to the history and present status of the law of inheritance in Bavaria. No general law applicable to the state at large can be made effective which does not take into consideration the existing local peculiarities.]

Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, Historical and Juridical; with Observations upon the Ordinary Provisions of State Constitutions and a Comparison with the Constitutions of Other Countries. By ROGER FOSTER. Vol. I. Pp. 713. Price, \$4.50. Boston: Boston Book Company, 1895.

[Noticed in current number of the ANNALS. P. 127.]

Reflections and Comments, 1865-1895. By EDWIN LAWRENCE GODKIN. Pp. 328. Price, \$2.00. New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1895.

[Noticed in the current number of the ANNALS. P. 127.]

A Treatise on International Law. By WILLIAM EDWARD HALL. Pp. 791. Price, \$6.00. 4th Edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press. New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

[This edition was prepared by the author just prior to his death in November, 1895. While considerable additions have been made to the third edition, the general division of the subject into the four parts, treating of general principles, the law governing states in their normal relations, the law governing states in the relation of war and the law governing states in the relation of neutrality, is adhered to.]

The King's Peace. An Historical Sketch of the English Law Courts. By F. A. Inderwick. Social England Series. Edited by Kenelm D. Cotes, Oxon. Pp. 254. Price, \$1.50. London: Swan, Sonnenschein & Co.; New York, Macmillan & Co., 1895.

Constitutional History and Constitution of the Church of England. Translated from the German. By FELIX MAKOWER. Pp. x, 545. Price, \$3.75. London: Swan, Sonnenschein & Co.; New York, Macmillan & Co., 1895.

[An important contribution to the study of English constitutional history. The relation of the Church to the general political development of England is a field which has hitherto been almost completely neglected by writers on the subject.]

Patriotic Citizenship. By THOMAS J. MORGAN. Pp. 368. Price, \$1.00. New York: American Book Company, 1895.

[A plea for a more positive, assertive patriotism. The author's method is to propound a series of questions relating directly to American institutions and to answer these by means of quotations from leading writers in political and social science.]

Die Beziehungen zwischen dem Staat und der Zeitungspresse im Deutschen Reich. Nebsteinigen Umrissen für die Wissenschaft des Journalismus. By ELLIS PAXSON OBERHOLTZER. Pp. 180. Price, 3 m. 60 pf. Berlin: Mayer & Muller, 1895.

[A clear statement of the law in Germany concerning libel, the sale and circulation of newspapers, newspaper copyright, etc. The introduction contains a suggestive discussion of journalism as a science.]

Proceedings of the Second National Conference for Good City Government, held at Minneapolis, December 8 and 10, 1894, and of the First Annual Meeting of the National Municipal League and of the Third National Conference for Good City Government, held at Cleveland, May 29, 30, 31, 1895. Pp. vii. 544. Price, \$1.25, paper; \$1.50, cloth. Philadelphia: National Municipal League, 1895.

[Noticed in the ANNALS for January, 1896. Vol. vii. P. 109.]

Du Contrat social. By J. J. ROUSSEAU. Edition comprenant, avec le texte définitif, les versions primitives de l'ouvrage, collationnées sur les manuscrites autographes de Genève et de Neuchâtel. Une Introduction et des Notes par EDMOND DREYFUS-BRISAC. Pp. xxxvi, 424. Price, 12 fr. Paris: Felix Alcan, 1896.

Anarchy or Government? An Inquiry in Fundamental Politics. By WILLIAM MACKINTIRE SALTER. Pp. 176. Price, \$1.75. New York: T. Y. Crowell & Co., 1895.

[Noticed in the current number of the ANNALS. P. 131.]

Politics and Patriotism. By FREDERICK W. SCHULTZ. Arena Library Series, Vol. v, No. 21. Pp. 496. Price, 50 cents. Boston : Arena Publishing Company, 1895.

[In the thirty-eight chapters of this work the author endeavors to point out the trend of civic life and spirit in the United States. The difference in moral standards in public as compared with private life is strongly emphasized. Municipal abuses in our larger cities form the central feature of the book.]

Municipal Government in Continental Europe. By ALBERT SHAW. Pp. 505. Price, \$2.00. New York : Century Company, 1895.

Citizenship and Suffrage in Maryland. By BERNARD C. STEINER, LL. B. Pp. 95. Price, \$2.00. Baltimore : Cushing & Co., 1895.

Labor in Its Relation to Law. Four Lectures delivered at the Plymouth School of Ethics, July, 1895. By F. J. STIMSON. Pp. 145. Price, 75 cents. New York : C. Scribner's Sons, 1895.

[A brief but clear presentation of the law affecting labor, strikes, boycotts and the employment contract.]

II. ECONOMICS.

(a) *Miscellaneous.*

Spaniens Niedergang während der Preisrevolution des 16 Jahrhunderts. Ein induktiver Versuch zur Geschichte der Quantitätstheorie. By Dr. MORITZ JULIUS BONN. Münchener volkswirtschaftliche Studien. Pp. 119. Price, 4 m. Stuttgart : J. G. Cotta, 1896.

Theoretische Socialökonomik. By H. DIETZEL. Erster Band. Einleitung, Allgemeiner Theil, Buch I. Wagner's Handbuch der Politischen Oekonomie. 2 Hauptabtheilung. Pp. xi, 297. Price, 8 m. Leipzig : C. F. Winter, 1895.

[A discussion of the definition, methods and division of the field of political economy and of the theory of value along conservative lines.] Soll Deutschland seinen ganzen Getreidebedarf selbst produzieren?

By ROBERT DRILL. Eine politische Studie. Münchener volkswirtschaftliche Studien. Neuntes Stück. Pp. 118. Price, 2 m. 40 pf. Stuttgart : J. G. Cotta, 1895.

Proceedings First Annual Convention International Deep Waterways Association, Cleveland, September 24, 25, 26, 1895, with an appendix ; also a Report of the Proceedings of the Toronto Convention. Prepared by FRANK ABIAL FLOWER. Pp. 465. Price, free. Postage : Canada, 3c ; U. S., 13c. Published by International Deep Waterways Association : Toronto, 1895.

[Noticed in January, 1896, ANNALS, Vol. vii. P. 108.]

Deutschlands Sodaindustrie in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart. Ein kritischer Beitrag zur Geschichte der deutschen Zollpolitik. By Dr. J. GOLDSTEIN. Münchener volkswirtschaftliche Studien. Dreizehntes Stück. Pp. 108. Price, 2m. 40 pf. Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta, 1896.

Principles of Economics. By ALFRED MARSHALL. Pp. 823. Price, \$3.00. Third edition. London and New York: Macmillan, 1895. [Reviewed in January, 1896, *ANNALS*, Vol. vii. P. 99.]

Deutsche Kern und Zeitfragen. By ALBERT SCHÄFFLE. Pp. 500. Price, 10 m. Berlin: Ernst Hofmann & Co., 1895.

[Reprints of the author's articles in various German periodicals dealing with the statistics of population, international trade, recent extensions of the suffrage, etc.]

Japans auswärtiger Handel von 1542 bis 1854. Bearbeitet nach den Quellenberichten. By Dr. OSCAR MÜNSTERBERG. Münchener volkswirtschaftliche Studien. Zehntes Stück. Pp. 312. Price, 7 m. Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta, 1895.

[Noticed in current number of *ANNALS*. P. 131.]

Essays in Taxation. By E. R. A. SELIGMAN. Pp. x, 434. Price, \$3.00. New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

[Reviewed in current number of the *ANNALS*. P. 146.]

Studies in Economics. By WILLIAM SMART. Pp. 341. Price, \$2.75. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

[Reviewed in the current number of the *ANNALS*. P. 149.]

Entwicklungsgeschichte der Glasindustrie Bayerns (nach seinem heutigen Umfang) bis 1806. By Dr. EDUARD VOPELIUS. Pp. 96. Price, 2 m. 40 pf. Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta, 1895.

(b) *Money and Banking.*

Statesman and Demagogue or the Dynamical Theory of Money. A Physico-Political Argument on the Silver Question. By ALPHONSE ALLMAN. Pp. 198. Published by author: San Francisco, 1895.

[Holds that "money must mechanically be treated as a fluid on which the wealth as well as the population of a nation floats in accordance with the principles of Archimedes and of the hydrostatic paradox." Argues against the quantitative theory and bimetallism.]

Report of Uncle Sam's Homilies on Finance. An Exposition of the True Functions of Money. By CHARLES ELTON BLANCHARD. Current Thoughts Library, Vol. I, No. 1. Pp. 208. Price, 25c. Cleveland: Current Events Company, 1895.

[Advocates fiat money, the value to be kept constant by regulation of supply, and to be redeemable in gold or silver.]

La mesure de la valeur et la monnaie. By MAURICE BOURGUIN. Pp. 276. Price, 8 fr. Paris: L. Larose, 1896.

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[Noticed in *ANNALS* for January, 1896, Vol. vii. P. 104.]

Congressional Currency. An Outline of the Federal Money System. By ARMISTEAD C. GORDON. *Questions of the Day Series*, No. 85. Pp. 234. Price, \$1.25. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1895.

[A sketch, in popular style, of the federal money system and of financial legislation since 1860. Clear and useful to the general reader.]

Le problème monétaire et la question sociale. By CH. M. LIMOUSIN. Edition de la "Société Nouvelle." Pp. 17. Published by Société nouvelle: Brussels, 1895.

Bug vs. Bug: A Brief Summary of the Principal Arguments of Silver Men and Gold Men. By W. N. OSGOOD. Pp. 108. Price, 25 cts. Boston: C. E. Brown & Co., 1895.

[Unsatisfactory even as a summary, almost no argument being clearly stated.]

The History of Currency, 1252-1894. Being an Account of the Gold and Silver Moneys and Monetary Standards of Europe and America, together with an Examination of the Effects of Currency and Exchange Phenomena on Commercial and National Progress and Well-being. By W. A. SHAW. Pp. 437. Second Edition. Price, \$3.75. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. London: Wilson & Milne, 1896.

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III. SOCIOLOGY.

The Law of Civilization and Decay: An Essay on History. By BROOKS ADAMS. Pp. 302. Price, \$2.50. London: Swan, Sonnenschein & Co. New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

[A theory of social development relying almost exclusively upon the supposed teachings of history, to throw light upon the future of the race.]

Die Gesellschaftsordnung und ihre natürlichen Grundlagen. Entwurf einer Sozial-Anthropologie zum Gebrauch aller Gebildeten, die sich mit sozialen Fragen befassen. By OTTO AMMON. Pp. 408. Price, 6 m. and 7 m. Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1895.

[The author has attempted to construct a social anthropology. Written in a popular way for general readers. Contains two parts

devoted to a discussion of the evolutionary theory of society and its application to social and political problems respectively.]

Fallacies of Race Theories as Applied to National Characteristics. Essays. By WILLIAM DALTON BABINGTON. Pp. 277. Price, \$2.00. London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1895.

The Poor in Great Cities. Their Problems and What is Doing to Solve Them. By WALTER BESANT and others. Pp. 400. Price, \$3.00. New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1895.

[Reviewed in the current number of the ANNALS. P. 161.]

Social Changes in England in the Sixteenth Century as Reflected in Contemporary Literature. Part I, Rural Changes. By EDWARD P. CHEYNEY. Publications of the University of Pennsylvania, Series in Philology, Literature and Archæology. Vol. IV, No. 2. Pp. 114. Price, \$1.00. Boston: Ginn & Co., 1895.

[Noticed in current number of ANNALS. P. 126.]

Practical Christian Sociology. A Series of Special Lectures before Princeton Theological Seminary and Marietta College, with Supplemental Notes and Appendices. By Rev. WILBUR F. CRAFTS, Ph. D. With an Introduction by JOSEPH COOK, LL. D. Pp. 524. Price, \$1.50. New York: Funk, Wagnalls & Co., 1895.

[Reviewed in January, 1896, ANNALS. Vol. vii. P. 104.]

Corso di Sociologia. Vol. I. Sociologia generale. By ANTONINO DE BELLA. Pp. xvi, 206. Price, 8 lire. Published at Nicotera (Calabria), Italy, 1895.

[This volume contains a condensed outline of a system of sociology based on biological analogies. In the chief divisions entitled, "Elementary Physiology," "Physiology of Complete Organs," "Social Psychology," "Social Pathology," "Social Physics" and "The Data of Sociology," the author devotes the largest part of his space to calling attention to and in attempts to prove his analogies. One of the longest chapters is devoted to a physiological discussion of Malthusianism.]

The Labour Annual. Second year, 1896. A Year-Book of Social, Economic and Political Reform. Edited by JOSEPH EDWARDS. Pp. 256. Price, paper, 1s.; cloth, 2s. London: Clarion Co., 1896.

[An excellent manual and record of conventions, meetings and all that pertains to labor interests in England, with many references to foreign countries.]

Beiträge zur Lösung des Verbrecherproblems. By JOHANNES JAEGER. Pp. 185. Erlangen: Fr. Junge, 1895.

Nationale Wohnungsreform. By PAUL LECHLER. Mit einem Sonderabdruck aus "Deutsche Kern- und Zeitfragen." Neue Folge, Von A. Schäffle. Pp. 93. Berlin: Ernst Hofmann & Co., 1895.

[Two essays dealing with the growing need for more dwellings in Germany, especially in the large cities, and particularly for the working classes of the population. The question of government aid in building suitable houses and establishing colonies near the large cities with reduced rates of transportation is discussed in its various bearings.]

Factory Legislation in New England. Its Tendencies and Effects. Its Legal and Economic Aspect. By S. N. D. NORTH. Pp. 69. Pamphlet Reprinted by the Arkwright Club from the Bulletin of the National Association of Wool Manufacturers, 1895.

Government and Religion of the Virginia Indians. By SAMUEL RIVERS HENDREN. Johns Hopkins University Studies. Series XIII, Nos. 11-12. Pp. 63. Price, 50 cents. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1895.

Buckle and His Critics: a Study in Sociology. By JOHN MACKINNON ROBERTSON. Pp. 565. Price, 10s. 6d. London: Swan, Sonnenschein & Co., 1895.

[This work is constructive as well as critical. Buckle is defended with one hand, while with the other his "real errors" are laid bare. In a chapter on "The Development of Sociology" the author explains his own theory of social evolution.]

The Tribal System in Wales; Being Part of an Inquiry into the Structure and Methods of Tribal Society. By FREDERIC SEEBOHM, LL. D. Pp. 238, III. Price, \$4.00. London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1895.

[A valuable contribution to the literature dealing with different types of social organization, based upon original and, to most students, inaccessible sources.]

Social England. A Record of the Progress of the People in Religion, Laws, Arts, Industry, Commerce, Science, Literature and Manners from the Earliest Times to the Present Day. From the Accession of James I. to the Death of Anne. Pp. 632. Price, \$3.50. Vol. IV. Edited by H. D. TRAILL. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. London: Cassell Company, 1895.

Geschichte des Socialismus und Communismus im 19 Jahrhundert. III. Abteilung: Louis Blanc. By Dr. OTTO WARSCHAUER. Pp. 163. Berlin: Hermann Bahr, 1896.

[This is the third volume in a very interesting series of historical monographs dealing with some of the leaders of socialistic movements in this century. The present number takes up Louis Blanc in a biographical way and gives a discussion of the national workshops. Over forty pages are devoted to a criticism of the movement with which Louis Blanc was identified.]

Our Industrial Utopia and Its Unhappy Citizens. By DAVID HILTON WHEELER. Pp. 344. Price, \$1.25. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co., 1895.

MISCELLANY.

AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION AND POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION OF THE CENTRAL STATES.

The American Economic Association and the Political Science Association of the Central States held a joint meeting at Indianapolis, from December 27, 1895, to January 2, 1896. The following is the official program of the scientific sessions of the two associations :

AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION.

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 27—Evening Session, 8 p. m.

I. Address of Welcome,

Governor MATHEWS.

II. Response by the President of the Association.

III. President's Annual Address : "The Pure Theory of Economic Progress,"

Professor JOHN B. CLARK, Columbia College.

SATURDAY, DECEMBER 28—Morning Session, 10 a. m.

Symposium.—The Relation of Changes in the Volume of the Currency to Prosperity.

Papers by Professor IRVING FISHER, Yale University, and President FRANCIS A. WALKER, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Brief addresses by Professors WILLARD FISHER and EDWARD A. ROSS.

Afternoon Session, 3 p. m.

Symposium.—The Practicability and Desirability for the Commercial World of a Double Standard of Currency.

Papers by General A. J. WARNER, President of the American Bimetallic League, and Professor F. W. TAUSSIG, Harvard University. Brief addresses by Professors W. A. SCOTT, H. W. FARNAM, SIDNEY SHERWOOD and JOHN H. GRAY.

MONDAY, DECEMBER 30—Morning Session, 10 a. m.

I. Do We Want an Elastic Currency?

Professor F. M. TAYLOR, University of Michigan.

II. The Desirability of a Permanent Census Bureau,

Professor RICHMOND MAYO-SMITH, Columbia College.

- III. The Density of Population in the United States in 1890,
Professor WALTER F. WILLCOX, Cornell University.

Afternoon Session, 3 p. m.

- I. Some Unpublished Letters of David Ricardo,
Dr. J. H. HOLLANDER, Johns Hopkins University.
- II. The Formulation of Normal Laws with Especial Reference to the
Theory of Utility,
Professor SIMON N. PATTEN, University of Pennsylvania.
- III. Pawn Shops and Their Work in Cincinnati,
H. A. MILLIS, Fellow in Economics, Indiana State University.
- IV. The Fallacy of Saving,
Dr. H. R. SEAGER, University of Pennsylvania.

POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION OF THE CENTRAL STATES.

MONDAY, DECEMBER 30—Evening Session, 8 p. m.

President's Annual Address: "The Scope of Sociology,"

Professor ALBION W. SMALL, University of Chicago, First
Vice-President.

AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION—POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION.
(Joint Session.)

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 31—Morning Session, 10 a. m.

Symposium.—The Sphere of Voluntary Organization in Social Movements.

Papers by Professor F. H. GIDDINGS, Columbia College (A. E. A.), and Professor C. A. HENDERSON, University of Chicago (P. S. A.). Discussion by Professor LESTER F. WARD and Professor H. H. POWERS, for the Economic Association, and Professor GRAHAM TAYLOR, Hon. WILLIAM D. FOULKE, and President J. H. FINLEY, for the Political Science Association.

Afternoon Session, 2.30 p. m.

Symposium.—Present Obstacles to the Adoption of Business Methods in Municipal Administration.

Papers by Hon. FRANKLIN McVEAGH, Chicago, Ill. (P. S. A.), and CLINTON ROGERS WOODRUFF, Secretary of the National Municipal League (A. E. A.). Discussion by Professor JOHN H. GRAY, for the Political Science Association, and Professor J. W. JENKS, Professor J. R. COMMONS and Dr. E. W. BEMIS, for the American Economic Association.

POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION OF THE CENTRAL STATES.

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 1, 1896—Morning Session, 10 a. m.

- I. Mirabeau a Victim of the *Lettres de Cachet*,
Professor FRED M. FLING, University of Nebraska.
- II. The Worship of Reason in Paris during the Reign of Terror,
Professor HENRY E. BOURNE, Western Reserve University.
- III. History and Geography,
Professor U. G. WEATHERLY, University of Indiana.

Afternoon Session, 2.30 p. m.

- I. The Ohio River as a Gateway to the West,
REUBEN G. THWAITES, ESQ., Secretary Wisconsin Historical Society.
- II. James Wilson and the Philadelphia Convention,
Professor A. C. McLAUGHLIN, University of Michigan.
- III. The Earliest American Essay on Proportional Representation,
Professor EDMUND J. JAMES, University of Chicago.
- IV. The Development of the Republican Party, 1789-1805, Geographically Considered,
Dr. O. G. LIBBY, University of Wisconsin.

THURSDAY, JANUARY 2—Morning Session, 9.30 a. m.

Symposium.—How may Collegiate and University Instruction in History, Economics, Political Science and Sociology be made more Effective for Good Citizenship.

Papers by Professor JOHN J. HALSEY, Lake Forest University, and Professor FREDERICK C. HICKS, University of Missouri.

Owing to the absence of some of the members of the Political Science Association, it was found possible to shorten the session somewhat without departing materially from the above program.

As the titles of the papers indicate, the money question was that which was foremost in the minds of the economists. The treatment of this question during the sessions of December 28 and 30, and through informal discussions on the Sunday intervening, was most exhaustive—not to say exhausting. Nearly every shade of opinion was ably represented, and this served to make this session one of the most instructive the association has ever held. The meetings were well attended and there was an unexpectedly large delegation of Eastern members of the American Economic Association present.

The council of this association held several meetings during the session. The following officers were elected for the coming year: President, Professor Henry C. Adams, University of Michigan; Vice-Presidents, Professors Franklin H. Giddings, Columbia College; E. R.

L. Gould, Chicago University, and Roland P. Falkner, University of Pennsylvania; Secretary, Professor J. W. Jenks, Cornell University; Treasurer, Professor Charles H. Hull, Cornell University; Publication Committee: Professors F. W. Taussig, Harvard University, Chairman; Sidney Sherwood, Johns Hopkins University; Mr. John G. Brooks, Cambridge; Professors, H. H. Powers, Stanford University; Davis R. Dewey, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and W. A. Scott, University of Wisconsin. Members of the Council elected are as follows: (a) term of office expiring 1898, President F. A. Walker, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Professor John Cummings, Harvard University; Professor Frederick C. Clark, Ohio State University; Professor E. A. Ross, Stanford University; Professor W. A. Scott, University of Wisconsin; Professor W. F. Willcox, Cornell University; Professor F. W. Moore, Vanderbilt University, and in addition, all old members whose term expired 1895; (b) term of office expiring 1897, Professor Willard Fisher, Wesleyan University; Professor J. J. McNulty, College of the City of New York; Dr. Chas. J. Bullock, Cornell University; (c) term of office expiring 1896, Professor Francis Walker, Colorado College; Professor John F. Crowell, Smith College; Professor J. W. Crook, Amherst College; Professor Irving Fisher, Yale University.

The following resolutions relating to the publications of the American Economic Association were adopted by the Council:—

(1) The association shall issue a series of short studies, original or reprinted, not less than six a year nor more than twelve, in which practical questions shall be discussed.

(2) The publication committee shall consist of six members, two of whom shall be elected each year.

Also the following resolutions relating to the United States census: *Resolved*, that the American Economic Association express its sympathy with all efforts to improve census methods in the United States; and that the president appoint a committee to promote, if possible, an effective co-operation with the United States authorities in the plans and methods of future census operations. *Resolved*, that the American Statistical Association be invited to appoint a like committee to act with the committee of the American Economic Association.

No definite decision was arrived at as to the place of meeting for next year, but Nashville was the city most prominently mentioned in this connection.

The following is as complete a list of the members present at the meetings as can be given:

Professor Edw. W. Bemis, Chicago; Dr. A. F. Bentley, Chicago; Mr. Warren Bigler, Wabash, Ind.; Professor T. N. Carver, Oberlin

College ; Professor R. C. Chapin, Beloit College ; Professor F. C. Clark, Ohio State University ; Professor J. B. Clark, Columbia College ; Professor J. P. Cushing, Knox College ; Professor W. M. Daniels, Princeton College ; Professor R. P. Falkner, University of Pennsylvania ; Professor H. W. Farnam, Yale University ; Professor F. Petter, University of Indiana ; Professor Irving Fisher, Yale University ; Professor Willard Fisher, Wesleyan University ; Professor W. W. Folwell, University of Minnesota ; Professor John H. Gray, Northwestern University ; Professor E. R. L. Gould, University of Chicago ; Mr. J. C. Hagerty, Laporte, Ind. ; Professor C. R. Henderson, University of Chicago ; Dr. J. H. Hollander, Johns Hopkins University ; Professor C. H. Hull, Cornell University ; Mr. C. M. Hubbard, Cincinnati ; Professor J. W. Jenks, Cornell University ; Professor George W. Knight, Ohio State University ; Dr. S. M. Lindsay, University of Pennsylvania ; Professor Richmond Mayo-Smith, Columbia College ; Professor J. J. McNulty, College of the City of New York ; Mr. H. A. Millis, Cincinnati ; Professor F. W. Moore, Vanderbilt University ; Mr. W. H. Motsinger, Shoals, Ind. ; Mr. Charles R. Murphy, Decatur, Ills. ; Professor Simon N. Patten, University of Pennsylvania ; Professor H. H. Powers, Leland Stanford Jr. University ; Professor Edward Alsworth Ross, Leland Stanford Jr. University ; Miss Alice M. Schoff, Cincinnati ; Professor Wm. A. Scott, University of Wisconsin ; Dr. H. R. Seager, University of Pennsylvania ; Mr. R. P. Shepherd, Hiram, O. ; Professor Sidney Sherwood, Johns Hopkins University ; Professor F. W. Taussig, Harvard University ; Professor F. M. Taylor, University of Michigan ; Professor W. G. L. Taylor, University of Nebraska ; Mr. Reuben G. Thwaites, University of Wisconsin ; Professor C. W. Tooke, University of Illinois ; Professor C. A. Tuttle, Wabash College ; Mr. F. J. Van Voorhis, Indianapolis ; General A. J. Warner, Marietta, Ohio ; Professor L. F. Ward, Smithsonian Institution ; Professor J. R. Weaver, De Pauw University ; Professor W. F. Willcox, Cornell University ; Professor J. A. Woodburn, University of Indiana ; Professor A. Yager, Georgetown, Ky.

HENRY R. SEAGER.

University of Pennsylvania.

NOTES ON MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT.

[This department of the ANNALS will endeavor to place before the members of the Academy matters of interest which serve to illustrate the municipal activity of the larger cities of Europe and America. Among the contributors are James W. Pryor, Esq., Secretary City Club, New York City; Sylvester Baxter, Esq., Boston *Herald*, Boston; Samuel B. Capen, Esq., President Municipal League, Boston; A. L. Crocker, Esq., President Board of Trade, Minneapolis; Victor Rosewater, Ph. D., Omaha *Bee*, Omaha; Professor John Henry Gray, Chairman Committee on Municipal Affairs, Civic Federation, Chicago; Jerome H. Raymond, Ph. D., University of Wisconsin; F. L. Siddons, Esq., Washington, D. C.; Donald B. MacLaurin, Esq., President Civic Federation, Detroit, Mich.; Professor A. C. Richardson, Buffalo, N. Y.; M. B. May, Esq., Cincinnati, Ohio; W. B. Spencer, Esq., New Orleans; William H. Parry, Esq., Comptroller City of Seattle, Wash.]

AMERICAN CITIES.

New York.—The two commissions appointed by the Governor to frame general charters for cities of the second and third classes have been busily engaged in preparing their reports for the present session of the Legislature. The necessity for the codification of the present legislation relating to cities of these classes was a logical outcome of the constitutional amendments of 1895, which greatly modified the system of special legislation for cities by adopting a distinction between general and special city laws. The Constitution divides the cities of the State into three classes—those with a population of 250,000, or over, constituting the first class; those with a population between 50,000 and 250,000, the second, and those with a population less than 50,000, the third. The term “special city law” is defined in the Constitution as one which applies to less than all the cities of a class. Such laws must first be submitted to the city or cities to which they relate and, if rejected by such city, must again be passed by both branches of the Legislature. Up to the present time every city has received a special charter and the great diversity of legislation on this subject makes it exceedingly difficult for the Legislature to determine the exact effect of legislation for cities. The commissions that have been at work upon these subjects have gone beyond mere consolidation and codification and have considered the question of the most desirable form of charter for such cities. The commission charged with the consideration of cities of the second class has been seriously considering whether it would be possible to change the ordinary system of municipal incorporation by substituting a general for the

usual specific grant of powers to cities of that class, in other words, to give to the municipality unrestricted power within the limits of State law. This means the adoption of a system of incorporation similar in many respects to the German system. It is extremely doubtful whether the courts would so far depart from their present attitude as to give full effect to a plan of this nature.

Municipal Government Board. One of the results of this readjustment of municipal legislation in New York State is a proposition of the Hon. Frederick W. Halls, to establish a State Municipal Board of Control. A bill embodying this idea has been framed and is to be presented at the present session of the Legislature. The principle of this plan is one which is beginning to receive recognition in some of the American States and which has already been fully developed in England and Germany. It means the substitution of a system of administrative control for the present uncertain central control exercised directly by the State Legislature. The contrast between the two systems is clearly brought out in Professor Goodnow's work on "Municipal Home Rule." The first steps in this development in the United States are described in Professor Commons' paper in the ANNALS for May, 1895, on "State Supervision for Cities."*

The bill as presented provides for a board to consist of the Comptroller, Attorney General, and five competent persons to be appointed by the Governor, by and with the advice of the Senate. The term of office is to be five years. Section IV gives to the board such general supervision of the municipal administration of the cities of the second and third class as will enable them to examine into the government of such cities, and keep themselves informed as to their condition, with special reference to the compliance of city officials with the constitution and laws of the State. "It shall also be the duty of such Board, whenever, in their opinion, public interests require it, to examine the accounts of such cities, or any of them, or of any of the officers or employes of such cities, and the result of such investigations shall be reported upon in the annual report of the board to the Legislature." They are also to make recommendation to the Legislature as to any desirable changes in the form of city administration; are given power to prescribe the form of annual report to be made by the Mayor or any other municipal department to the board. It is furthermore made their duty to certify as to the legality, regularity, and form of municipal bonds, and no such bonds shall be issued without such certificate. It is the intention of the framer of the measure that men

* Vol. v, p. 865, issued in separate form as Publication No. 146, of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Price, 15 cents.

of the very highest ability be selected for these important positions and to attain this end relatively high salaries are to be fixed.

Report of Commission on Legislative Procedure. The commission, appointed to examine into legislative procedure and to recommend such changes as might be found necessary, has presented its conclusions to the Governor. The report dwells upon the fact that, under the present system it is impossible for the members of either house to examine the enormous mass of bills submitted for their inspection. In the Legislature of 1895, for instance, over 3000 bills were introduced. In examining the nature of these proposed measures, the commission finds that by far the greater number affected particular localities, in other words, were local or special in their nature. One of the most pressing needs, therefore, is to place such bills in a separate schedule and to adopt special procedure for their consideration. In recommending such a system the commission turns to the experience of England and endeavors to adopt the system of "private bill" legislation to American legislative procedure. They recommend that all private and local bills, including bills which relate to the municipality, be filed before the beginning of the Legislative session or, at least, thirty days before their presentation to the Legislature. They suggest that the committee to which such bills are referred shall fix a day for a public hearing of the bill, and be given power to take testimony under oath and to compel the attendance of witnesses. In this way a kind of judicial examination as to the merits of the bill, the interests involved, the objections thereto, is guaranteed. In the report, the commission gives some account of the experience of other States and cites a large number of constitutional provisions relating to methods of procedure.

Budget, 1895. The Board of Estimate and Apportionment of New York City has completed the budget for 1896, which shows an increase over that of 1895. The total appropriations for the year amount to about \$46,500,000, of which nearly \$44,000,000 must be raised by taxation. In looking over the various items of expenditure, one is impressed by the large appropriations made to such departments as street cleaning, fire and police. Thus for the work of the present year, the department of street cleaning is given over \$3,000,000. In this respect Philadelphia, with twice the length of streets and an appropriation of about \$800,000 stands in direct contrast. The experience of New York has shown, however, that efficient street cleaning is an extremely expensive service. The care and thoroughness which has characterized the administration of this department in New York City during the past year, has been little short of a revelation to its inhabitants. For the first time in its history the streets of the city have been

kept clean. The impression which this fact has made upon the city authorities, contributed, no doubt, to the readiness with which this appropriation, representing an increase of nearly \$650,000 over the preceding year, was made.

Tenement House Reform. The Tenement House Commission, which recently presented an elaborate report on the conditions of tenement dwellings in New York City, has proposed a measure to the present Legislature which involves a great extension of the city's right of eminent domain. The bill proposes to give to the city, authority to condemn and remove all rear tenements for the purpose of converting the sites thus condemned into court yards, to be used by tenants for recreation and breathing places. An annual appropriation of \$5,000,000 is to be provided to carry out the scheme. Other provisions to compel landlords to make necessary sanitary improvements are inserted in the bill. It will be interesting to see whether the constitutionality of such an act, if passed, will be sustained by the courts; whether the condemnation of rear tenements will be construed as such a "public use as will justify the exercise of the right of eminent domain." If any conclusions may be drawn from the present position of the State and federal courts, the answer would probably be in the negative. With the growth of our large cities, however, and the increasing difficulties which this problem of the housing of the poor involves, it is extremely probable that the courts will gradually be brought to a broader interpretation of the term "public use," just as they have been compelled to broaden the application of the principle of "public policy." It is in pressing social problems such as these, that the change is likely to be first shown.

Consolidation. The question of the consolidation of New York and Brooklyn is again before the Legislature. In 1895, in accordance with the resolution of the Legislature, this question was submitted to the vote of the people of both cities. The result was a majority in favor of the proposition, although as regards Brooklyn, the majority was extremely small. During the year which has elapsed, those opposed to consolidation claim that popular sentiment has changed considerably, and that another election would result in a majority opposed to the scheme. In accordance with the wish of some Brooklyn and New York City members, a joint legislative committee has been appointed to examine into the question of consolidation. This committee gave a public hearing the seventeenth and eighteenth of January. Those opposed to any such measure contended that but one-third of the electors participated in the vote of 1894, which cannot, therefore, be regarded as a final decision. The friends of consolidation dwell mainly upon the commercial advantages which must accrue from a

union of these great industrial and commercial centres. The indication at present seems to be that the question will again be submitted to the people before any further action is taken by the Legislature.

Philadelphia.—A recent decision of the Supreme Court has brought to the city, authoritative confirmation of the chaotic condition of street railway franchise grants. The power which the State Legislature undoubtedly may exercise, in the absence of constitutional restrictions, over the city's streets, was made use of to a considerable extent at an earlier period in the city's history. In 1869, the right of way on two of the important streets in the city was granted to a private corporation without the consent of the municipality. The recent attempt of the city to impose the duty of repaving on the company, a duty contained in a general ordinance applicable to all companies, has been adjudged by the Supreme Court to be beyond the power of the municipality, inasmuch as the terms of the act of the Legislature granting the right of way could not be so changed as to place additional burdens on the company.

Buffalo.*—The Niagara Falls Power Company has filed its acceptance of the franchise for the introduction of electric power into Buffalo. The filing of this notice makes the grant effective and its terms require the company to deliver at least 10,000 horse power by June 1, 1897.

Railway Franchises. In November, 1895, a new corporation—the Buffalo Traction Company—applied to the City Council for a franchise to build and operate sixty-six miles of new street railway, of which thirty-two were parallel to the existing lines of the Buffalo Railway Company. The latter vigorously opposed the new grant, and, at a hearing before the Board of Aldermen and before the Committee on Streets, remonstrances were heard. The State law requires that before a new railroad can be constructed the State Railway Commission must issue to the corporation a certificate that "public necessity and convenience" require its construction. The Commission held such hearing, but reserved its decision.

A second hearing was had before the Board of Aldermen on the ground that the first had been illegal for want of proper notice. At this meeting the proposed duration of the franchise (sixty-six years) was severely criticised. In spite of such remonstrances, however, the Board of Aldermen passed the ordinance in the form proposed by the Traction Company. It then went to the Board of Councilmen, which held its last meeting for 1895 on December 24, when it was passed without debate.

* Communication of Mr. A. L. Richardson.

The Mayor held the ordinance until the meeting of the newly elected Board of Aldermen early in January, 1896, and sent to them a communication stating that he had obtained some additional concessions from the Traction Company. In this agreement with the Mayor it was provided that the proposed changes, one of which was the reduction of the term of the franchise from sixty-six to fifty years, when accepted by the Councils, should have the same effect as if incorporated in the original franchise. The Board of Aldermen disregarded the fact that the original ordinance was no longer before them. They passed a resolution (one member only voting nay) accepting the proposal of the Traction Company and changing the grant, *then in the hands of the Mayor*, to conform to it.

Under the charter the Board of Councilmen must approve every measure passed by the Aldermen before it goes to the Mayor, and they may amend it, if they see fit, while they cannot originate measures of any kind. Thus the Councilmen are intended to act as a check on hasty legislation by the Aldermen, and accordingly their regular meetings are held two days later than those of the latter. But, before sending to the Aldermen the communication above referred to, on January 6, the Mayor had called a special meeting of the Board of Councilmen *for the evening of that day* to take action on proposed amendments to the grant passed by the Common Council of 1895 and then in his hands for approval or disapproval. This was also a new board, containing several new members who had decided opinions about voting away valuable franchises without due consideration. They did not propose to be "railroaded" in this manner, and therefore remained away from the special meeting, which thus failed of a quorum. At ten o'clock that night, being the last night on which he could act, the Mayor signed the franchise as originally sent to him.

Fortunately for the city, however, the State Railroad Commissioners came to the rescue of its true interests on January 23d by denying the application of the Traction Company for a certificate that "public necessity and convenience" require the construction of its road. This makes the whole scheme abortive, and proceedings in the courts have since been begun to enjoin both the city and the company from taking any further proceedings under the so-called franchise.

Cincinnati.*—Through the efforts of the Cincinnati Municipal Civil Service Reform Association a bill has been introduced into the Ohio Legislature to regulate the selection and tenure of subordinate officials of cities of the first class (Cincinnati and Cleveland) and of the first and second grades of the second class (Columbus, Dayton and Toledo).

* Communication of Max B. May, Esq.

The main provisions of the act are as follows : Whenever 1000 votes of the city of Cincinnati or Cleveland, and 500 votes of Columbus, Dayton or Toledo petition the Board of Elections to that effect the proposition to adopt civil service rules shall be submitted to the popular vote, and in case of defeat such proposition shall upon application be submitted at succeeding municipal elections. If the proposition is adopted, the Mayor shall within thirty days appoint a Civil Service Commission of three, the members of which shall hold office for three years and not more than two of whom shall be members of the same political party.

This commission shall classify all the offices and places of employment in the service of the city, including the teachers of the public schools, and no one shall be appointed to any office or place in the classified service unless his name appears upon the register prepared from the returns of examinations held by the commission, such names being placed upon the register in order of relative excellence.

The examinations shall be public, competitive and free to all citizens of Ohio with specified limitations as to age, residence, health, habits and moral character, and shall relate to matters which will fairly test the relative capacity of the candidates to discharge the duties of the respective positions. The examination may include tests in physical qualification, health and manual skill, but no questions of a political or religious nature shall be asked.

No officer or employe of the classified service shall be removed or discharged except for some cause relating to his fitness to perform the duties of his office. Such cause shall be determined by the appointing power and reported in writing to the Commission, and shall not be made public except upon demand of the discharged.

The bill does not apply to officials now elected by the people nor to those appointed by Council, the courts or the Governor ; nor to members of the city boards, including the heads or chiefs of any division thereof relating to engineering, water works, street cleaning, fire department, parks, Superintendent of Public Schools, police, law officers and one private secretary of the mayor.

The law contains ample provisions for its effective execution, the penalties in cases of violation being especially severe. In short it is a sort of local option in civil service for the cities named above. It will not, if adopted, affect any officials now in office. Great efforts will be made to have the law adopted at this session of the Legislature. If passed it cannot be submitted to the electors of Cincinnati until April, 1897. In its general features the law was modeled after the Illinois Act, which was recently adopted, and is now in force at

Chicago, though many provisions of the Federal law, and those of New York and Massachusetts were followed.

Taxation. The question of taxation is one of the pressing problems now before the city. In Ohio personalty as well as realty is taxable, and in order to ensure an honest return of personalty, the Legislature several years ago enacted a law authorizing the County Commissioners to contract with a Tax Inquisitor for the listing of property improperly or fraudulently omitted from the taxpayer's return. The County Auditor must list all omitted property so reported by the Inquisitor, with a penalty of 50 per cent. The Tax Inquisitor is compensated by receiving 25 per cent of all taxes collected through his efforts. This law is commonly known as the Morgenthauer law, from the Tax Inquisitor. Many people have been unfortunate enough to become the victims of his ingenuity and skill, and because of his duties and constant watchfulness, many of the more wealthy citizens, those who have large personal estates, have become citizens of other States, though they still remain in this city. The result has been that the amount of personalty listed for taxation has steadily decreased within the past few years, and the tax lists do not increase in proportion to the population.

Under existing laws, city and county bonds, usually fives and fours, which command a premium, are taxable, and in this city the rate has been 2.8 per cent and 2.7 per cent per \$100. Then again the foreign corporations doing business here are taxed upon the property in possession, and are compelled to pay a privilege tax besides, and in addition to this local stockholders must list such stock for taxation.

The whole question of taxation was recently discussed by the Commercial Club, an organization composed of prominent citizens of various vocations. A report recommending to the Legislature among other things the repeal of the Morgenthauer law and the abolition of taxes upon the stock of corporations listing property in this State for taxation, and of the taxes on State, county and municipal bonds was adopted. The report likewise recommended the abolition of all taxes on personalty, substituting therefore a system of licenses based on gross sales supplemented by a tax on realty exclusively.

The Board of City Supervisors, who have the final authority in the matter of taxation, urges in an elaborate and instructive report recently issued, the necessity of an immediate reform of the tax laws. The more important recommendations are those demanding that brokers and agents of foreign manufacturers be licensed in proportion to business done; that commission men, professional men and patent medicine dealers should be licensed; that the tax rate on county and municipal securities and mortgage notes be fixed at one-tenth of one

per cent, "the question being whether a fraction of a loaf should be accepted or no bread at all."

All relief in this matter must come from the Legislature, which is now in session. As the country dominates the city, it is doubtful whether anything will be done. Bills providing for the repeal of the Morgenthau law and for the call of a constitutional convention to consider primarily the tax question have already been introduced.

An agitation for an increased park area and the acquisition of property for parks, public squares, parkways, boulevards and recreation grounds has been begun by some of the more public spirited citizens. Nothing in this direction can be accomplished without legislative aid, and it is quite probable that legislation for this purpose will be pressed during the winter.

South Carolina.—The new constitution which went into effect on the thirty-first of December, 1895, contains several provisions affecting directly and indirectly the form and operation of the system of municipal government in the State. Reference has been made on page 131 of the present number of the *ANNALS* to the electoral qualifications which will considerably reduce the registration lists in cities. As to provisions directly affecting cities, we find, in the first place, a clause contained in Article XI, which will prove quite a burden to the finances of many cities, which provides "that separate schools be provided for the children of the white and colored races, and no child of either race shall ever be permitted to attend school provided for the children of the other race."

The most important provision relating specifically to cities is intended to limit city authorities in the granting of franchise privileges. It provides that no such grant for railway, gas, water, telephone, telegraph, etc., be granted by the State Legislature without the consent of the local authorities. Furthermore, that "cities may acquire by construction or purchase, and may operate water-works systems, and plants for furnishing light, and may furnish water and light to individuals and firms or private corporations for reasonable compensation. Provided that no construction or purchase shall be made except upon a majority vote of the electors in said cities or towns who are qualified to vote." This section is another instance of a tendency which has become well marked in recent constitutions to insert provisions which were formerly placed in city charters, thus placing at least a portion of such charter beyond the ordinary law-making power of the State Legislature.

The constitution furthermore provides that no city or town shall create indebtedness beyond 8 per cent of its assessed valuation.

Also, that cities may exempt from taxation, except for school purposes, by special ordinance, manufactures which have been established in the locality for a period of five years. Such ordinance to be ratified by a majority of the electors. Another "referendum" provision relates to the issuance of city bonds, which question must be submitted to the people at a special election. As a condition precedent to such election there must be a petition to the General Assembly of a majority of the freeholders of the city.

FOREIGN CITIES.

Paris.—After a long-continued agitation, the Chamber of Deputies has finally passed a bill which seems the first step toward a change in the system of local and, more especially, municipal taxation in France. In the larger cities, the *octroi*, a tax on food products and other articles of every day use, has been the main element in the budget of the city. The fact that it had for so long a time been a part of the French system and that the people had thus become accustomed to the payments, was the main argument used in favor of its retention. Those opposed to the system have on their side all those arguments which relate to the evident inequality of such a system and to the undoubted burdening of the poorer classes. The act of November 20, 1895, requires municipalities to abolish the *octroi* tax on so-called hygienic drinks, namely, beer, wine and cider, and gives them the option of abolishing the *octroi* altogether. As a substitute it will be necessary to increase some of the existing taxes, such as the house duty, the land tax, etc. The city of Paris is exempted from the operation of this act. The reason for this is to be found in the fact that the needs of the enormous Parisian budget could not be met were this tax to be abolished. To supply the deficiency would mean an intolerable increase in the direct taxes. Thus in the budget for 1894 the *octroi* furnished \$29,851,910 out of a total income of \$58,171,264. The total income from taxation exclusive of the *octroi* was but \$6,538,420.

Rapid Transit. The question of a system of rapid transit has been before the city for a number of years. The relative merits of different propositions have been carefully considered, and it seems that some definite conclusions will be reached during the present year. The municipality, if the vote of the City Councils voices popular sentiment, is exceedingly anxious to undertake the construction and operation of the system. In a recent communication of the French Minister of Commerce to the City Council, he expresses his approval of such a plan, provided that a certain portion be completed before the year 1900.

This will be the first instance of municipal ownership and operation of street railways in continental Europe.

Glasgow.—The tendency to unification in the administration of English cities is illustrated by recent changes in the government of Glasgow. The decline of administrative efficiency of the municipalities of Great Britain during the eighteenth century made it impossible to entrust them with the new functions which the growth of population had made necessary. As a result, we find a series of parliamentary enactments, giving to special commissions, trusts, or other administrative bodies the control over special departments in the city government. After the Municipal Corporation Act of 1835 this power was gradually transferred to the reorganized City Councils. It was characteristic of English legislation, however, that, in the endeavor to adapt old forms to new conditions, the former special committees and commissions were retained in name and in law, although, in fact, merged in the Municipal Council. Thus, in the case of Glasgow, the Council was not given general authority over city affairs in its capacity as Town Council, but acted as Police Commissioners, Water Commissioners, Park Trustees, Improvement Trustees, etc. The Glasgow Corporation Act of 1895 abolished these distinctions and made the Council the general authority, both in law and fact, over these municipal functions. In addition, it greatly increased the present powers of the Council and thus brought about a closer harmony between municipal needs, form of government and scope of powers.

City Gas Works. During 1895 the city has reduced the price of gas from sixty to fifty-six cents per 1000 cubic feet. This represents a reduction of 50 per cent since 1870, when the price was \$1.14 per 1000 cubic feet. It has been the policy of the municipality, since this service has come under direct municipal control and management, to make the question of profit subordinate to the broader question of public welfare. In reducing the price of gas the city has had in view its more extended use by the laboring classes for lighting, heating and cooking purposes. To further facilitate this the department has entered into the business of selling and renting gas stoves. At present over 10,000 such stoves are rented by the city. With each reduction in price, the consumption has greatly increased and, as a result, the financial outcome has been most satisfactory. Within recent years the city has also entered into the electric light business and, during the last year, has increased the facilities by the addition of a new \$100,000 plant.

English Cities.—In the matter of municipal sanitation the English municipalities are rapidly overtaking the German cities which have hitherto taken the lead in this field of municipal activity. It is true

that in the former the necessity for immediate and definite action had become imperative within recent years. The laxity of control over building operations, drainage connections, etc., which characterized the English administration of the earlier decades of the century, had gradually developed conditions which threatened the health and safety of many of the cities. Nothing but the immediate danger of the situation could have induced Parliament to permit, and the municipal authorities to adopt, vast schemes for the expropriation of slum districts. The modern spirit of strict administrative control has been extended into other fields. Thus, in many of the cities, of which the most recent examples are the districts which go to make up London, one finds elaborate provisions for the protection of the population from contagious diseases. The parish of Islington, for instance, has recently constructed a complete disinfecting establishment and constructed a series of dwellings where families in which such disease has been prevalent may find temporary shelter. These institutions, in connection with the isolating hospitals, which have now become so general, have greatly reduced the danger of epidemics, at one time so disastrous among the poorer classes of the English population.

SOCIOLOGICAL NOTES.

[The editor of this department is glad to receive notes on all topics of interest to sociologists and persons working along sociological lines in the broadest acceptance of the term. It is not the purpose of these columns to define the boundaries of sociology, but rather to group in one place for the convenience of members of the Academy available bits of information on the subject that would otherwise be scattered throughout various departments of the ANNALS. The usefulness of this department will naturally depend largely on the measure of co-operation accorded the editor by other members of the Academy.]

Among those who have already indicated their interest and willingness to contribute are such well-known workers along sociological lines as Professor F. H. Giddings (Columbia College), Professor W. F. Wilcox (Cornell University), Dr. John Graham Brooks (Cambridge Mass.) Dr. E. R. Gould (Chicago University), Mr. John Koren (Boston), Hon. Carroll D. Wright (Washington, D. C.), Professor E. Cheysson (Paris), Mr. Robert D. McGonnigle (Pittsburg, Pa.), President John H. Finley (Knox College), Professor D. R. Dewey (Boston), Rev. Dr. L. T. Chamberlain (New York), Dr. Wm. H. Tolman (New York), Dr. D. I. Green (Hartford), Mr. Robert Donald (London), Professor Giuseppe Fiamingo (Rome), Dr. Georg Simmel (Berlin), Professor Dr. Georg v. Mayr (Strassburg), Miss Emily Green Balch (Jamaica Plains, Mass.), Miss M. E. Richmond (Baltimore, Md.), and others.]

The Negro Problem.—The most significant as well as the most hopeful contributions to the study of the negro problem in the South, are to be found in many of the educational and industrial conferences rather than in political conventions and assemblies. No more persistent and enterprising efforts are being made to raise the status of the negro than those at the Tuskegee Normal and Industrial Institute at Tuskegee, Alabama. For several years it has been customary to hold a negro conference, to which are invited the negro farmers and laborers within a radius of many miles. The most practical questions are discussed, and the needs and wants of every line of activity represented are discussed in the plainest manner. As many as six hundred farmers attended one of these conferences, driving into the school grounds in all sorts of vehicles, or riding on mud-bespattered mules and horses. One man drove fifty miles in very inclement weather to be present, and many came twenty and twenty-five miles.

Mr. Booker T. Washington issued a call for the first conference on February 23, 1892, and he thought there would be scarcely more than seventy-five present; but to his surprise nearly five hundred came, and the numbers have increased from that time in each succeeding year. The reports of these conferences, couched in genuine negro dialect, illustrate in a forcible manner many of the simplest and deepest wants

of this race, and the conferences themselves have enabled their better trained leaders to do a great work in encouraging those who attended in habits of thrift and industry. Many local conferences have been organized, modeled on the plan of the Tuskegee one. These occasions furnish also an opportunity for circulating simple literature where it tells in the widest circles.

The following points to remember and to carry out during the coming year were issued in circular form at a recent conference :

Things to Remember and Practice.

1. Do not stand still and complain, but go forward—mere fault-finders accomplish little.
2. If you have an immoral minister or teacher get rid of him.
3. It is wrong to keep your family in a house with but one room—have at least two rooms—three are better.
4. Do not plant too much cotton, but more corn, peas, sugar-cane, sweet-potatoes, etc.; raise hogs, cows, chickens, etc.
5. Do not mortgage your crop; if you have done so, go in debt just as little as possible.
6. Pay off the old debt as soon as possible and do not make another one.
7. Keep out of law-suits—Do not lie around town on Saturdays.
8. Don't waste money on excursions, whiskey, cheap jewelry and other things that can be done without.
9. Own a home just as soon as possible—begin buying one this year.
10. A three months' school amounts to but little, extend the term to at least six months, by each one taxing himself.
11. See that you treat your wife better than you did last year.
12. Do not be deceived by emigration agents.
13. Give the lessons learned in these Conferences to your neighbor.

The following circular containing suggestions for a plan and subjects for discussion at local conferences, modeled on the Tuskegee Negro Conference, was also issued:

1. Elect a president, vice-president and secretary. (Have as few officers as possible.) Hold conferences as often as circumstances seem to demand, at least one every two months. Hold one as soon as possible on your return from the Tuskegee Conference, that you may give your community the benefit of your experience.
2. Subjects for discussion: How many mortgage their crop? How many are planting nothing but cotton? How many live on rented lands? How many live in houses with but one room? How many are paying off mortgages? How many are building better houses? How many have bought land? How many do not mortgage at all? How many have raised enough corn, vegetables, meat, etc., for their families?
3. How long is your school session?
Is anything being done to extend the school term?
Is a new school house needed? What is being done to secure one?
Is the school house properly supplied with seats, black-boards, etc.?
Is the teacher right in education and morals? Is the same true of the minister?
Is your teacher properly paid and properly treated?
Are any plans on foot to improve the school?

4. Are the morals of the people improving? Is a line drawn between the good and the bad?

Are women being treated better?

Is less whiskey being used?

Is money squandered on excursions?

Do the people practice their religion during the week?

Are people wasting their money in useless lawsuits?

Perhaps the great need of simplicity and directness, as well as the importance of concentrating effort on raising the economic and industrial status of the negro in the South, can be best illustrated by quoting two of Mr. Booker T. Washington's short addresses to the colored farmers of Alabama. Few men, if any, have as keen an insight into the real needs and possibilities, as limited by present conditions, of the negro race than Mr. Washington, and these two addresses, which have been widely circulated as small tracts, are worthy of perusal and careful study by all persons in the North interested in this race question:

THE COLORED FARMER.

The Importance of Owning a Home.

No people can be prosperous as long as a large proportion of them continue from year to year to rent houses and land. Since land is as cheap as it is in the South there is no reason why every head of a family should not live in his own house. The money paid out during five or six years for rent will in most cases buy the land rented. Most farmers do not begin because they are not able to buy a large number of acres at once. A few acres, twelve, or twenty well cultivated, will be of more value than 100 acres poorly cultivated, and too, it is much easier to pay for the small farm and thus be independent. When one rents, the house soon begins to go to pieces, the fences fall down and the land grows poor and the farmer does not make repairs and manure the land, because he is not the owner and does not expect to live on the place long. Every time a farmer moves from one place to another he loses one year's work. A man never begins to have self-respect until he owns a home. If he owns his house he will see that it does not fall to pieces and that the fences are kept up.

Each year he will make the land richer. He will plant peach trees, apple trees, and strawberries, will build a nice little barn, etc. He will also own cows, hogs, chickens and raise vegetables and thus not be compelled to buy everything he eats. When he begins to do these things, then he begins to live and be happy and respected by white and colored men. No one is respected as a man until he begins to get that which he can call his own. Many have gotten so into the habit of renting and mortgaging their farms and homes into debt, and buying everything they eat from the store instead of raising it, that they think there is no other way better than this one. But there is a better way and it can be brought about if each one will secure for himself a little farm that he can call home.

If all who read what I have written or hear it read, will begin at once to buy, in five years, with a few exceptions they can be living on their own farms.

Each man owes it to his wife and to his children to give them a home as soon as possible in which to live.

BOOKER T. WASHINGTON,
Tuskegee Normal School,
Tuskegee, Alabama.

To the Colored Farmers of Alabama:

This has been an exceptionally good crop year. What permanent advantage will there be to you as farmers as a result of those good crops? Many have been in debt for years and have had to pay heavy interest for money and provisions on which to live while raising a crop. If the results of this good crop are to be wasted, the next year will find you no better off than you have been during the last ten years. Instead of spending money now for useless articles—articles that you can do without—let each farmer save his money; put it into a bank, or save it in some other way. Do this, and you will not be obliged to mortgage your crop or go into debt for provisions. Every farmer should resolve to live this year without mortgaging—without going into debt.

To illustrate the unwise way in which many are spending their money: there are not a few who this year have bought expensive buggies, and at the same time are living on rented land and will be obliged to mortgage in order to live another year. Better a thousand times do without the buggy and begin to buy a home or save the money with which to buy food so that you may keep out of debt.

If you have money enough ahead, why not begin to buy a small farm for yourself?

No person can ever be permanently prosperous and independent who lives on rented land.

Land is cheaper now than it will ever be again. Now is the time to secure a home. Will you not promise to begin to buy a home; will you promise not to mortgage your crop—not go into debt this year?

Keeping out of debt will in the end benefit both buyer and seller.

Tuskegee Normal School, Tuskegee, Ala.

B. T. WASHINGTON.

A Workingman's Model Home.—Many visitors to the Columbian Exposition at Chicago in 1893 will remember the Model Workingman's Home in charge of Miss Katharine B. Davis, who is now the head-worker of the College Settlement in Philadelphia. It formed a part of the New York State exhibit, and thousands of interested visitors examined it carefully, took home the plans and specifications, together with full information as to the cost of construction and furnishing, and doubtless many duplicates of this excellent piece of work have been erected in various parts of the country. It was due to Miss Davis' energetic efforts that the idea of constructing and exhibiting the model was carried out. She prepared the plans, directed the building, and personally superintended the experiment of caring for a family of five persons for a month at an average cost of fifty-four cents per day for food. The exhibit undertook to answer the following questions:

How good a house can be built in the State of New York, outside of the cities of New York and Brooklyn, so as to rent for \$10.00 a month?

How completely and suitably can such a house be furnished for \$300 00?

How well can a family of six persons—father, mother, and four children under ten years of age—be clothed on \$100.00 a year?

How much and what variety of food can the above family have for \$200.00 a year, and can the requirements made by a scientific study of foods be met in practice for such an amount?

The house actually constructed had a frontage of twenty feet and a rear depth of twenty-eight feet, and was built at a cost of \$1000.00, exclusive of ground. Full details of the amount of lumber and material that entered into this building may be found in the report of the exhibits of the State of New York, published at Albany in 1895. The house was completely furnished for \$300.00. Full details of each item of furniture and its cost are also given in the report; also, full answers to the other questions already indicated.

During the month of July the experiment was made of putting the bills of fare, already agreed upon, to a practical test. A Columbian guard, lodging in the nearest barracks, was very glad to go to the house for his meals. A widow, who had been secured as an assistant in the care of the house, brought her three children and lived there night and day during the month. The object of the experiment was explained to the man and woman, and, as they were intelligent people, they readily assented to the proposed conditions. They promised to eat only what was furnished them in the home. They also agreed that if they found the food insufficient to satisfy appetite or maintain strength, they would frankly say so. The children were constantly under the eye of the mother and of the experimenter and could be trusted to say so if they were hungry. Dr. J. S. Mitchell, of Chicago, made a thorough physical examination of the family on the first day of the experiment and at the end of the month, and he makes the statement that the health of the family throughout the month was good. All were contented. The man had gained in weight. The woman had lost three quarters of a pound, which is not remarkable considering that the housework for a family of five persons—cooking, washing and ironing—had been carried on in the presence of from 500 to 2000 persons daily. This was a strain to which she was unaccustomed and it speaks well for the diet that she did not lose more. The children held their own; but not having been previously well fed, it would have taken at least another month of simple diet and regular hours to have resulted in a visible gain.

Full details as to the bills of fare, the weight and nutritive elements in each article of diet, are given in Miss Davis' report, and the report as a whole constitutes one of the most interesting contributions to one of the most practical questions in social reform.

Charity Organization Work.—Summaries of the work for the year 1895 for the Charity Organization Societies of Baltimore and

Boston, two of the best managed in the United States, are at hand. As far as statistics are concerned, those for Baltimore are exceedingly satisfactory. The figures in all cases indicate an entire family counted as a unit, except when employment, transportation, or institutional care has been found for several members of the same family.

The total number of applicants for relief during the year was 19,072, and of this number employment was found for 3993; the employment proving to be permanent in the case of 2516. A large amount of this employment was found for the society's applicants through entirely outside agencies, which is an indication of the application of true charity organization principles. It is true that the society had a Work Relief Fund, through which work was given to 327 persons, and temporary work to 1150. Material relief was procured for 4649 families; the relief coming chiefly from individuals who were interested in the several cases and through co-operating agencies, and not from the society's own funds. Every effort was made to procure adequate relief, and that actually provided varied in amount from less than \$1 to \$100. 1078 cases were exposed as impostures and frauds. 400 friendly visitors were interested in the work during the year, and made visits aggregating in number 6598. The total cost of the work was exactly \$9,389.40.

A great deal of care was taken in the preparation of this report to give meaning to the figures. In the matter of employment the society's agents were instructed to count only those positions as secured which were personally known to them to be so, and the figures under this head stand for a large amount of personal service on the part of agents and volunteers for many visits and for much soliciting of friendly interest in individual cases.

The society does not administer material relief from its own funds for several reasons: First, because many of the poor will not receive any other form of help from a society known to have a relief fund, clamoring for material assistance instead; second, because co-operation with other agencies giving relief is checked by such a fund, the churches and relief societies naturally asking why money collected for relief is not so used; third, because any such fund, if large, dries the sources of individual benevolence and demoralizes the rich, who should be personally interested in the families helped by them; fourth, because a small fund, unable to meet the legitimate demands made upon it, would encourage in its administrators the habit of putting off the poor with that worst of all possible makeshifts—an inadequate dole.

The wisdom of this appeal or statement in behalf of the non-relief giving principle, where it is followed out in the proper spirit by securing adequate relief through private agencies, must appeal to many

workers elsewhere who are now battling with the results of a wrong policy in another direction.

Some social statistics concerning the families helped by the Baltimore Society may be of general interest. Of 1377 new families brought under the care of the society during the year ending November 1, 1895, there were 821 married couples, 252 widows, 72 deserted wives, 79 single women, 41 deserted husbands or widowers, 104 single men, 6 orphaned or abandoned children, 2 divorced or separated legally. Of the total number of persons included in these 1377 families, 2279 were under 14 years of age; 513 between 14 and 20; 1448 between 20 and 40; 651 between 40 and 55; 214 between 55 and 70; and 59 over 70. Of the heads of families, 728 were white Americans, 233 colored Americans; next in order came the German, Irish, Polish and Russian, French and Canadian respectively. As to the causes of need, it seems that 36 per cent of the cases were due to lack of employment; 18 per cent to sickness; 11 per cent to insufficient employment; 5½ per cent to shiftlessness or inefficiency, and about 4 per cent each to physical defects, accident, and poorly paid employment; and 5 per cent to intemperance.

The summary for the Boston society indicates that for the year 1894-95, that is the fiscal year ending May 31, 1895, the total number of visitors at work was 880; including volunteers, however, during the year, the number who actually performed such work was 1046, while the total number of families dealt with was about 5000, indicating a slight falling off from the excessively large number for the fiscal year 1893-94. The total expenses of the society for the fiscal year 1894-95 amounted to \$19,551.38.

The Cultivation of Vacant City Lots.—Lack of employment is the chief cause of distress among the applicants for relief with whom charity organization societies have to deal. For the most part, these persons represent the shiftless, incompetent, and physically weak. It is exceedingly difficult to find any relief for them that promises more than temporary results. The question of cultivating vacant lots in the cities, thus finding some employment for this class, and ultimately encouraging some of them at least to go into agricultural pursuits, is an effort still in the experimental stage. It has been tried under very many conditions, and we have taken occasion in these columns to call attention to some of these experiments. Experience has been scarcely sufficient to warrant the formation of positive opinions either for or against the scheme, and until we can present to the readers of the *ANNALS* a carefully prepared and exhaustive study of what has popularly become known as "The Detroit Plan," in all

its various aspects, we will continue to give from time to time in these notes accounts of the results of single experiments.

Dr. Wm. H. Tolman has very kindly furnished the following facts concerning vacant city lot farms in New York. The vacant lot farms, under the care of the New York Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor, were cultivated by eighty-four planters, who received 138 acres, the average allotment being $1\frac{1}{2}$ acres. On this land there were raised 6235 bushels of potatoes, 817 bushels of peas, 1259 bushels of beans, 19,119 heads of cabbage, 530 crates of tomatoes, and 39 bushels of carrots. Besides this, turnips, radishes and lettuce were grown, and the total crop was valued at \$10,399.52. The total expenses connected with the experiment were \$4,065.95. In comparing these figures in order to estimate the margin of profit, it must be remembered that no rent was paid for the land, and, furthermore that, instruction, seed, tools, fertilizer and the preparation of the soil were all supplied free. The expenses were heavy because the experiment was a new one; the land was at some distance, from the heart of the city, being across the river; the cultivation was on scientific principles, and the ignorance of the applicants compelled very careful instruction. The success of the scheme thus far has been clearly demonstrated; but the next step in advance, whereby the planters shall be permanently improved and not become dependent on the committee the following year, has not yet been pointed out.

The scheme has been practically a farm school, and men coming from the tenement houses, who had never handled a hoe before, and had not the least idea of farming, were taught and soon learned how to raise enough to render themselves self-supporting. A janitor on one and one-quarter acres raised crops to the value of \$117.15; a laborer on one-quarter of an acre, to the value of \$25.00; a photographer on one acre, to the value of \$102.45; a painter on one-half acre, \$30.95; a hod carrier on three-quarters of an acre, \$88.10; a tailor on one-half acre, \$77.65. All of these men had had no experience whatever in farming. At an exhibit of the products of the Vacant Lot Farms at the Live Stock Society Show, recently held at the Madison Square Garden, the second prize was awarded to the Vacant Lot Farms. The Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor has kept very careful social statistics of each of the eighty-four planters, and these will be made public in a leaflet in the near future.

In Boston the Industrial Aid Society for the Prevention of Pauperism made a similar experiment, and in its sixtieth annual report it summarizes its results as follows: *

* We are indebted for this summary to the January number of the *Monthly Register* of the Philadelphia Society for Organizing Charity.

"In May, a special meeting of your Executive Committee was called to consider a letter from the directors of the Associated Charities referring to us the question of making a trial in Boston of what is known as the Detroit or Pingree plan of putting poor people to work raising potatoes and other vegetables upon vacant city lots. The Associated Charities thought this matter to be within the scope of our society rather than theirs. Your Executive Committee deemed it wise to try this plan in Boston, and decided that it was a kind of industrial aid which it was appropriate for us to tender to the worthy poor of our city. A sub-committee was appointed, with full power to undertake the experiment, and to arrange all necessary details. The sub-committee, in co-operation with a number of citizens interested in the project, formed a new committee and solicited funds from the public. Money was liberally contributed, and the work was begun at once. Your agent had charge of most of the details and has spent much time and thought upon the potato field.

"After rejecting many lots of vacant land freely offered to us in the neighborhood of the city as unfit for our use, it was finally decided to hire a farm and have all the work consolidated at one place. What is known as the Morton farm on the corner of Morton and Canterbury streets, between Franklin Park and Forrest Hills Cemetery, was selected. A capable farmer was engaged as superintendent, and the ground was fertilized, plowed and harrowed ready for planting, at the expense of the committee. In all, fifty men and two women took lots. About one-third of an acre was allotted to each applicant, and he was instructed how to plant his crop and what to plant. Potatoes were bought and furnished by the committee, and formed the great bulk of the crop, but corn, beans, cucumbers, tomatoes, and even melons were also planted.

"Every applicant had to bring credentials from some society or individual who would vouch for his worthiness and need. Men came from all parts of the city; from East Boston and Charlestown, as well as from Jamaica Plain and Roxbury. All seemed grateful for the means offered them of helping themselves and their families, and most of them strove hard to prove their gratitude by honest and painstaking work upon their lot. There were but one or two exceptions to this rule out of the whole number.

"The crops have been abundant, and we feel that in many respects the experiment has been a success. It gave to the fifty-two men and women a new zest in life. They worked hard during week-days, and on Sundays they would go out to Morton street, taking with them their families and friends, and show great delight in seeing the growth of the crops and in exhibiting their 'farms.' We hope that it

may be the means of inducing many of the unemployed to seek work in the country.

"Each cultivator had from forty to fifty bushels of potatoes, besides other vegetables, as the result of his labors. The potatoes that they did not need for their own use, they were able to sell at from fifty to eighty-five cents per bushel. In some cases they exchanged their potatoes with their grocers for flour and other necessities. The potatoes were of fine quality and size, and brought the highest prices in the market."

Liquor Traffic in South Carolina.—The future of the South Carolina Dispensary system is still dubious. The hostility of the conservatives toward it is well known. And when, in May, 1895, an injunction was granted by the United States District Court restraining the State Board of Control from interfering with the importation of liquor from other states for private use, the near end of the Dispensary régime was freely predicted. The financial feature of the scheme had been relied upon to win it friends, and hence the belief prevailed that the loss in receipts, sure to result from the removal of all restrictions on the purchase of liquor not intended for sale, would doom it as a revenue measure. That the efficiency of the system has been impaired, since both the seller and consumer are no longer cut off from the sources of supply, is unquestionable.

However, the final word on the constitutionality of the absolute monopoly of the State is yet to be spoken. The right of a citizen to import liquor, the product of other States, for home use, will be tested by the United States Supreme Court during the winter. Whatever the decision of this tribunal, and the ultimate fate of the Dispensary the common saloon is forever banished from South Carolina. The late Constitutional Convention of the State incorporated an article on intoxicating liquors, which leaves it optional with the Legislature to continue the Dispensary system, or to pass a prohibitory law, or to grant licenses for the sale of intoxicants in packages, not to be consumed on the premises. Drumselling over a counter can not be legalized. This departure from the ordinary methods of liquor legislation must be considered as a direct result of the Dispensary experiment. The possibility of doing away with the bar traffic, and still not attempt absolute prohibition, has been demonstrated. Even the opponents of the system admit that this has proved a great social gain, which has by no means been entirely offset by the growth of illicit selling.

The new constitution gives the State's share of the profits from the liquor monopoly to the public schools, which must be regarded as a further bid for popular favor.

Temperance Question in the United States.—Mr. Josiah Strong, of New York, has been largely instrumental in initiating in the temperance cause a forward movement of no mean proportions and one that is to be carried out in a liberal and scientific spirit. Heretofore many sympathetic workers in the cause of social reform have hesitated to advocate compulsory instruction on the effects of alcohol and narcotics in the public schools because the teachers are so poorly prepared for this work, if it is to be done in a fair and scientific spirit, and so many of the text-books that are available are of doubtful accuracy in all respects. Such instruction, if it is to become general and really helpful, must be thorough and impartial and not be used as a means of disseminating a creed or dogmatic conclusions however desirable in their results. If any other attitude than this be assumed by our educators, an entering wedge for evil and not for good will have been placed in our educational system.

A large part of the world's progress in the twentieth century will no doubt be in the art of living. Much of the world's misery has been due to ignorance of the laws of life, individual and social.

In recognition of the need of popular instruction touching the laws of health, nearly all the States in the Union together with the general government have enacted laws requiring that instruction be given in the public schools in physiology and hygiene with special reference to the effects of alcohol and other narcotics on the human system.

Not long since, there was a petition presented to the trustees of the American University at Washington, D. C., signed by many representative American citizens of all parts of the land.

This petition asked that there might be created a department of the American University for such original investigation, study and instruction as would furnish to the country the needed teachers of teachers in the new and almost universally mandatory branch of public school instruction above referred to.

The Board of Trustees of the American University complied with this request on certain conditions, and appointed a committee, viz.: Bishop John F. Hurst, LL.D., Rev. Charles H. Payne, LL.D., and Vice-Chancellor Samuel L. Beiler, Ph.D., to meet the Board of Counsel of the Temperance Educational Association to arrange all details.

This meeting has just taken place in New York. There were present the above named committee, together with the following representatives of the Board of Counsel of the Temperance Educational Association, viz.: Mrs. Mary H. Hunt, A. H. Plumb, D. D., Daniel Dorchester, D. D., Jesse B. Thomas, D. D., and Mr. William E. Sheldon, all of Boston; I. N. Quimby, M. D., of Jersey City; L. D. Mason, M. D., of

Brooklyn; and Rev. Drs. W. C. Roberts and Josiah Strong, both of New York.

It was agreed that, upon the payment to the treasurer of the American University of the sum of \$250,000, or such lesser sum as should be deemed by the Board of Trustees sufficient for the beginning of the work of said school, there should be inaugurated a department of the University, to be called "The College of Scientific Temperance," which shall be a college of investigation and instruction in physiology, hygiene and pathology, with special reference to the nature of alcohol and kindred substances, together with their effects upon mankind, and including the following studies as they are related to the purpose of this college, viz.: toxicology, chemistry, biology, psychology, ethics, criminology, law, political economy, reformatory measures and pedagogy, with such other studies as may be found necessary.

This movement is neither partisan nor sectarian. There are many religious denominations represented on the Board of Counsel. The College of Scientific Temperance is not founded as a propaganda but as a scientific school whose sole object is to find and inculcate whatever may prove to be the truth touching the subjects of investigation. The College agrees to publish from time to time, for the benefit of public school instructors and of the general public, the results of the scientific investigations of its faculty and students.

College Settlement Work.—The scope and possibilities of this work have nowhere been more clearly brought to light than in the bibliography compiled by Miss M. Katharine Jones, and recently issued by the College Settlements Association, together with their sixth annual report.* The facts speak for themselves. There are seventy-six houses catalogued in the bibliography as representing social work under the general settlement idea. The first edition of this bibliography, printed in the winter of 1893-94, contained but twenty-five. The settlement idea, briefly speaking, is residence by earnest and cultured men and women among the people of the lower classes, for the purpose of neighborly contact, mutual help and understanding, and the gradual leavening of the slum districts by kindness, example, wise teaching, and high ideals, until each lapsed section is

*"Bibliography of College, Social and University Settlements." Compiled by M. KATHARINE JONES, of the College Settlements Association. Allied Printing Trades Council, Philadelphia.

"Sixth Annual Report of the College Settlements Association," Incorporated A. D. 1894. From September 1, 1894, to September 1, 1895. Philadelphia: Dunlap Printing Company.

"The Fourth Annual Report of the St. Mary Street College Settlement of Philadelphia." Continuing the work of the St. Mary Street Library. October 1, 1894, to October 1, 1895. 617 Carver street, Philadelphia.

reclaimed to thrift, cleanliness, order, industry, good citizenship, and an upright way of life.

In this bibliography we see, however, how greatly modified this primary idea has been both by external conditions, and by the varying aims, training and spirit of the representative workers. The settlements themselves have been established not only in the crowded districts of great cities, such as New York, Boston, London, Philadelphia, Chicago, and Kyoto in Japan—they have also been planted in other surroundings, as has been the picturesque Log Cabin Settlement of the mountains of North Carolina.

A different stamp is upon each settlement. There is a wide divergence of methods, and of final aims. One settlement appears to be marked chiefly by the intellectual spirit, another by the ethical, another by medical association, another by the religious aspect,—while of one it is stated plainly: "It is non-sectarian, but avowedly Christian, and openly co-operative with the churches."

All settlements should not be alike. In the nature of things, they cannot be. Each settlement is a unique influence, and a unique power. Each stands for its own independent idea. None should adhere to a narrow or sectarian point of view; all should aim to be leaders in large and liberal social thought.

City Missions are tending more and more to adopt settlement methods in distinctively religious work. By this combination they hope to accomplish the broadest and deepest work of social regeneration. They say that moral suasion alone cannot regenerate a community. Lovely and unselfish lives of cultured residents are not in themselves enough. Aesthetic ideals, schools, kindergartens, garbage inspection, soup kitchens, swimming-pools, clubs, and industrial and civic classes are not always effective. The bodies of the poor may be washed, their tenements may be painted and repaired, their courts and alleys cleaned, their children combed and taught, their tastes elevated, their votes turned toward honesty, and their men and women guided toward a better family life,—but all falls short of the desired result and lacks permanency, unless there are deeper forces at work.

Doubtless the religious motive will always be in some form or other the only effectual one in sustaining settlement efforts of the best kind. There remains special work for those settlements that restrain the outward expression of the religious motive which, others making religious work, however non-sectarian, prominent in their efforts, can never do. There is work for all kinds of settlements and no one type can perform adequately the complete settlement function in the complex society of the average slum district.

Since the publication of Miss Jones' bibliography we have received notice of the establishment of two temperance settlements, one in Boston, started by the Massachusetts Y's, and the other in Chicago.

Christian Missions and Social Progress.—This is the title of a course of six lectures that have been prepared by the Rev. Dr. James S. Dennis and recently delivered before the students of Princeton Theological Seminary. Dr. Dennis has made a sociological study of foreign missions. The titles of the separate lectures are as follows, and speak in a measure for themselves :

1. The Sociological Scope of Christian Missions.
2. Social Evils of the Non-Christian World.
3. Ineffectual Remedies and the Causes of Their Failure.
4. Christianity, the Social Hope of the Nations.
5. The Dawn of a Sociological Era in Missions.
6. The Contribution of Christian Missions to Social Progress.

Dr. Dennis has issued an outlined syllabus of his course, which will be repeated, by invitation, later in the year at the Auburn Theological Seminary, Auburn, N. Y.; at the Lane Theological Seminary, Cincinnati, Ohio, and at the Western Theological Seminary, Allegheny, Pa.

It is needless to say that such a study as Dr. Dennis has undertaken of Christian missions, from the sociological point of view, is a fruitful field for inquiry. Altogether too little attention has been given to this aspect of practical missionary work, and we believe there is no better method of meeting the hostile criticisms to which missionary enterprises have been subject of late by many travelers in foreign countries, than to interest those who intend to take part in such missionary enterprises, or, at least to defend them, in this phase of the subject. Furthermore, a thorough study of the social effects of Christian teachings in the midst of hostile or semi-hostile civilizations, will go far to bring about the best possible development of Christian missions, and to remedy existing evils so far as they may be well founded.

Dr. Dennis would have added greatly to the usefulness of his syllabus if he had embodied in it references to the literature of his subject. He says in an introductory note that "An unexpected volume of data was discovered through the kindness and courtesy of missionaries, and this special and hitherto somewhat neglected aspect of the subject was found to shed a new lustre over the whole field of mission effort." In so far as his data are available in printed form, Dr. Dennis would have conferred a service on other students of this subject by giving them bibliographical references. In this connection it may be interesting to call attention to an article by Rev. S. F. Moore, of Seoul, Korea, published in the *Assembly Herald*, in the Department of Foreign Missions, edited by Mr. Robert E. Speer, which

contains information as to the social condition of butchers, who are a despised class in Korea and hitherto have not been permitted to wear the ordinary civilian hat and "mangen" worn by all other classes, nor were they considered to be on the same footing with other workingmen. Through the conversion to Christianity and the earnest efforts of one of the converts, Mr. Pack, and some of his fellow butchers, together with the support of the missionaries, a movement was set on foot to get for them recognition on a plane equal to that of other workingmen, and that protection from the government and society that would prevent the higher class of people from beating them and taking away their goods. As the result of efficient effort, the movement was successful, and the butchers, who for the past five hundred years have been treated with contempt by all classes as the very off-scouring of the earth, have been notified by posters, stamped with the government seal, that henceforth they shall be allowed to wear the ordinary civilian hat and "mangen," and they are now rejoicing in a new measure of freedom.

MAY

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ANNALS
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OF
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE.

BRYCE'S "AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH."

Bryce's "American Commonwealth" is a unique work. It is not only a comprehensive account, at once intelligent and intelligible, of the political institutions of one great nation by a member of another; but it is also the best of all such accounts, either in our own or other literatures. It is also worthy of remark that it proceeds from a nation whose leading citizens have not been noted for their sympathy for and appreciation of American conditions, either political or social. The book is remarkable for the mastery of details, the firm grasp of general principles, and a deep and pervasive sympathy with the institutions which are described, which is as rare as it is refreshing. It is doubtless the ability, arising from such sympathy, to put himself into the position of an American observer and to look at things for the time being from an American point of view, which carries the author so successfully through many an obscure and difficult portion of his subject.

Mr. Bryce has not only succeeded in presenting an able exposition of matters on which previous writers, both native

and foreign, had written much; but he enters with equal success fields in which the systematic material is very meagre, and treats subjects in a most satisfactory way which no previous writer has attempted to discuss in a scientific manner. No one can read the work without conceiving a great admiration for the lucidity of exposition, the accuracy in matters of detail, and the comprehensiveness of the plan, as well as the success attending its execution. This admiration is increased by a second and third reading. It is also a noteworthy feature of the work that it is adapted, not only for the scholar, but also for the general reader, and is especially valuable for the college student who may desire to secure a general view of some of the most important aspects of our national life.

It is, therefore, in no spirit of carping criticism that an attempt is made in the following paper to point out certain inaccuracies of statement, and certain misleading features in the expositions. Foreigners will for a long time to come depend chiefly upon this book for their ideas of America and American institutions; a circumstance as fortunate for them as for us. But this fact makes it all the more necessary and desirable that even the small defects and errors, if such they be, which are discussed in the following pages, should be remedied in a new edition. Some of the points mentioned are evidently mere slips of the pen; some are views advanced because the author has followed leading and standard authorities in this country in their misconceptions and errors; while others relate to matters on which there are decided differences of opinion and inference. In a few cases the mere form of presentation is criticised where it seems likely to prove misleading to those foreigners whose knowledge of the subject matter treated is limited to this work.

The following paper deals exclusively with the first volume of the third edition. There are five general points as to which criticism will be offered in these pages: First, the

author's statement as to the basis of the classification of the distribution of functions between State and nation; second, his remarks on the subject of the responsibility of officials; third, his exposition of the judicial power of the United States; fourth, his formulation of the principles of constitutional interpretation; fifth, his views as to the final authority in interpreting the Constitution. There are various other subjects of minor importance which will be mentioned in the course of the discussion.

In treating of the distribution of functions between the Federal Government and the States, the author declares,* that "the administrative, legislative and judicial functions, for which the Federal Constitution provides, are those relating to matters which must be deemed common to the whole nation, either because all the parts of the nation are alike interested in them, or because it is only by the nation as a whole that they can satisfactorily be undertaken." This statement, taken in connection with other statements relating to the same subject, seems to imply, and would undoubtedly convey to a foreigner, the idea not only that those matters which are entrusted to the Federal Government are all of national and general interest, but also that all matters of general and national interest are entrusted to the Federal Government.

This is a very common form of describing the distribution of functions between the nation and the States, but it is erroneous. As a matter of fact, the actual distribution of functions between the Federal Government and the States, as the author suggests elsewhere, was the outcome of a struggle between those who were in favor of giving the Federal Government much more extensive powers than it now has, and those who were in favor of giving it still fewer. It would be highly improbable that as a result of such a struggle, all those subjects and only those subjects which were of national and general interest should have been actually

* P. 33.

assigned to the general government; while only those which were of special and local interest should have been assigned to the States. And it is, moreover, certain that even if an ideal distribution of this sort had been made in the first place, it would no longer be ideal after a century of development in which the relative importance of different subjects has been materially changed. As a matter of fact, however, many of the most important matters which are of national and general interest were not entrusted to the Federal Government. Surely the subject of a common commercial law, for example, or common marriage and divorce laws, is just as important as a common law of naturalization, a common bankruptcy law, and a common system of weights and measures, as to which subjects Congress has full power of legislation; although in regard to one of these it may be said never to have legislated at all, and in regard to another only temporarily and occasionally. All that can be said, therefore, in regard to the actual distribution of powers between the Federal Government and the State governments in our political system, is that certain general powers have been given to the Federal Government, being only those which commended themselves to the men who drew the Constitution as being absolutely necessary to the working of such a government as they were planning, or, possibly, in some instances those as to which one party yielded its convictions in the interest of compromise and conciliation.

How very different a modern distribution of functions between the Federal and State governments would be, if we had the subject before us anew, can be seen by comparing, in this respect, recent federal constitutions (*i. e.*, those made since 1870), with our own. The federal constitution of Germany, for example, or that of Switzerland, both reflect in their distribution of functions between State, and nation the economic and social conditions of the latter half of the nineteenth century, instead of those of the close of the eighteenth.

In discussing the subject of the responsibility of the President, his cabinet and other officials in the United States, the author expresses himself as follows: "In America, the President is responsible, because the minister is nothing more than his servant, bound to obey him and independent of Congress." * Further,† "the President is personally responsible for his acts, not indeed to Congress, but to the people by whom he is chosen. No means exist of enforcing this responsibility except by impeachment." In another place,‡ "if the resolution [of Congress] be one censuring the act of a minister, the President does not escape responsibility by throwing over the minister, because the law makes him, and not his servant or adviser, responsible." In another connection it is declared,§ that "every power in the state draws its authority, whether directly like the House of Representatives, or in the second degree like the President and Senate, or in the third degree like the federal judiciary, from the people, and is legally responsible to the people and not to any one of the other powers." Finally, speaking of State officials the author says,|| that "they are in no sense a ministry or cabinet to the governor, holding independently of him, and responsible neither to him nor to the legislature, but to the people. They do not generally take his orders and need not regard his advice."

It is difficult to see how this exposition, in spite of various modifying and explanatory statements to be found elsewhere in the work, should not be confusing to a foreign student of our politics. The term "responsible" in political science and in constitutional discussions, has come to have a definite technical meaning which makes it improper to use it in describing the relations of the officials in the United States to the people.

* P. 91.

† P. 93

‡ P. 210.

§ P. 306.

|| P. 497.

Looking for a moment at the President alone, there is no sense in which the term "responsible" is used in the discussions of political science in which the President can be fairly said to be responsible to the people at all. He is elected for a period of four years and during that period is as completely and absolutely out of the reach of law and legal process in his official capacity as President, as even the crowned heads of Europe. It is true that if the President desires to be re-elected, he may shape his policy with reference to the impression it will produce upon the voters of the country, or, at least, upon the politicians; but, so the German Emperor, if he desires to secure the passage of a bill through the German legislature, will act in such a way as, in his opinion, will contribute to that end, but he is not for that reason responsible, in any political sense, to the people. Even if the President might be said, in a certain sense, to be responsible in his first term, that is, so far as he may be affected by the desire to influence public sentiment in favor of securing a second term, certainly this cannot be said of his conduct during his second term with reference to a third. He knows full well that no conduct of his would be likely to secure a third term in the present temper and with the present political traditions of the people of the United States.

No power is given to individual citizens, or to the citizens taken collectively, or to the States individually, or to the States taken together, to control or supervise in any way the acts of the President. He is, so far as any of these elements in our political system are concerned, absolutely irresponsible. Nor can he be reached by any process of the court, and he is, therefore, in this sense, as truly above the courts and free from responsibility to them as any king in Europe. Indeed, one may say that in a certain sense the crowned heads of Europe are more immediately responsible to some power outside of themselves than is the President. If the German Emperor, for example, were to act in such a way as

to justify the opinion that he had become insane, a method is provided in the law by which he can be practically suspended from the exercise of his office and his power placed in the hands of a regent; but no such power is given under our Constitution to any political authority whatever. This question acquired a practical significance during the long illness of President Garfield. The President was in this instance certainly unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and in such cases the Constitution declares that they shall devolve upon the Vice-President. But the Constitution provides no way of determining when such a condition actually intervenes, nor does it give either to Congress or the Vice-President the right of initiative in the matter, and leaves the President, therefore, in control of the situation.

On the other hand, the President is undoubtedly responsible in a sense to Congress for his acts. Mr. Bryce states definitely that he is not responsible to Congress. Congress is authorized by the Constitution to impeach, convict and remove from office, a President, who, in their opinion, shall be guilty of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. And, since, under our Constitution, Congress is made the absolute and final judge of what constitutes those particular crimes for which a President may be impeached (with the single exception of treason which is defined in the Constitution itself), it is evident that Congress may remove a President from office without the possibility of his appeal to any other authority, either the courts of justice or the people themselves.

There is no doubt that the process required for the enforcement of this control over the President is so difficult in its workings that it can hardly be resorted to as a means of affecting the ordinary political action of the President. The explanation of this fact, however, is to be sought in political and not in constitutional difficulties.

Nor is the statement in regard to other officials any more

nearly correct. There is, generally speaking, no legal responsibility of administrative officials in this country to the people, in any sense in which that term can be properly used. On the contrary, one may much better describe the system of government in the United States as one composed of many irresponsible officials, with power to check and hinder one another, a limit to whose irresponsibility is set simply by the fact that they have comparatively short terms of office, at the end of which they must be re-elected by the people in order to be continued in such office. But when one considers that, generally speaking, owing to the rapid change in tenure of political parties and the notion that rotation in office is an eminently democratic and desirable institution, good conduct in office does not lead to re-election, nor bad conduct necessarily to rejection, it is surely not proper to speak of political or legal responsibility to the people in any sense in which that term is ordinarily employed in political parlance. This description would apply fully to the systems of State government, and even in the case of the Federal Government, where owing to the power of the President to dismiss any official at will, complete administrative responsibility is assured, the officials are even further removed from any direct responsibility to the people than in the States. It is also a misstatement to speak of the federal judiciary as being legally responsible to the people. The only body to which they are in any sense responsible, except the courts themselves, is Congress, which may, by process of impeachment, remove them from office.

Such an exposition of this subject is not only open to objection, as not stating the actual facts of the case and as likely to be misleading to foreign students of our politics; but still more so because the habit which is widespread in this country of speaking of our officials as being responsible to the people, is one which leads the public to believe that they really are so, and it makes it difficult to secure public interest in proposed schemes for more efficient administration.

We imagine that, under our present organization, we have an effective control over public officials, whereas the whole history of our politics and law bears out the statement that no such control really exists as is implied by the expression that officials are responsible to the people. A most startling illustration of the ineffectiveness of popular control is given in a recent number of the *ANNALS*.* Mr. S. E. Moffett there describes the efforts of the people of California to secure action of a certain kind by a railroad commission. Although the members of this commission are elected by the people, and although the people seemed to be determined to secure action in accordance with their wishes—if there is any standard by which we may judge such determination—yet in spite of repeated elections, in spite of rejecting time and again every member of the commission who sought re-election after failing to comply with the popular demand, the people of California after more than a decade of effort are no further along than they were at the beginning.†

The exposition which the author gives of the judicial system of the United States, especially as relating to the federal judiciary, is not satisfactory. It is a complicated and difficult question about which few Americans, outside of the legal profession, concern themselves at all, and it has never ceased to be a *pons asinorum* for European jurists. Professor Bryce evidently understands the situation himself, but he does not make his exposition as clear as could be desired.

He gives in one place‡ a summary of the chief common or national matters which fall within the jurisdiction of the

* November, 1895, Vol. vi, p. 469.

† "The idea that officers are directly 'responsible' to the people and to no one else has, among our own citizens, diverted attention from a grave defect in our State government, viz: that most of the officials, such as sheriffs, states attorneys, attorneys-general, auditors, etc., are responsible to nobody. It is a sheriff's duty to suppress riots. Suppose that he sympathizes with the rioters or desires their votes and so does not suppress their disorder; to whom is he responsible for this misfeasance? To nobody."—Meritt Starr.

‡ P. 33.

national government, and declares at the end that this "list includes the subjects upon which the national legislature has the right to legislate, the national executive to enforce the federal laws and generally to act in defence of national interests, and the national judiciary to adjudicate." This seems to imply, in the very form of the statement, that the function of the federal judiciary is not only primarily, but exclusively, to pass upon cases in which the Federal Constitution or federal laws are involved.

In another place he declares* that "sometimes a plaintiff who has brought action into a State court finds, when the case has gone a certain length, that a point of federal law turns up which entitles either himself or the defendant to transfer it to a federal court, or to appeal to such a court should the decision have gone against the applicability of the federal law. . . . Within its proper sphere of pure State law, and, of course, the great bulk of the cases turn on pure State law, there is no appeal from a State court to a federal court."

When discussing the State judiciary,† the author declares that "the jurisdiction of the State courts, both civil and criminal, is absolutely unlimited, that is, there is no appeal from them to the federal courts, except in certain cases specified by the Federal Constitution, *being cases in which some point of federal law arises.*" (The italics are the writer's.)

In mentioning the points in which the legal independence and right of self-government of the several States appears, the author says‡ that "each of the forty-four States has its own court from which no appeal lies (*except in cases touching federal legislation or the Federal Constitution*) to any federal court." (The italics again are the writer's.)

There is in all this, and other similar statements may be found in the work, no indication whatever that one of the

* P. 332.

† P. 502.

‡ P. 419.

chief functions of the federal judiciary is to pass upon and administer State law. Indeed, the implication, or rather statement, is very distinct that the function of the federal courts is limited to deciding cases in which some point concerning the federal laws or the Federal Constitution may be raised.

There are, it is true, references to the fact that certain classes of cases are transferred to the federal courts* because the States cannot be trusted to do complete justice between their own citizens and those of another State. The clause in the Federal Constitution relating to the federal judicial power over controversies between citizens of different States is quoted at length,† and in another place‡ the express statement is made that "a plaintiff who thinks local prejudice will befriend him will choose the State court, but the defendant may have the case removed to a federal court if he be a citizen of another State or an alien, or if the question at issue is such as to give federal jurisdiction."

These latter passages indicate that Mr. Bryce himself understands the case, but surely the former passages, with the express statement that the function of the federal judiciary is limited to federal law, using that term to include constitutional as well as statute, can hardly be reconciled with the latter in such a way as to leave a clear impression upon the mind of the foreign student, or indeed upon the mind of the American student, unless from some special course of study or legal training he may have come to understand the situation.

If the author is speaking in the above passages only of appellate jurisdiction in the strictly legal sense of the term, his exposition is substantially accurate, of course: but in this case the exposition as a whole is confusing to all except the trained lawyer.

It is an interesting feature of our federal system of government that the respective jurisdictions of the different

* P. 228.

† P. 234.

‡ P. 333, foot-note.

departments of the Federal Government are so very different. We should naturally expect, in the organization of a scheme of government with a distribution of powers, that the various departments—legislative, executive and judicial—should be co-extensive in their competence; that the executive should be engaged in enforcing those laws, and only those laws, which the legislative power might be authorized to pass, and that the judiciary should be engaged in the settlement of disputes involving those laws, and only those laws, which the legislature might pass and the executive might enforce.

But in the case of the Federal Government of the United States, the competence of the judicial authority is almost indefinitely greater than that of the legislature, arising from the fact that its jurisdiction extends not only to suits at law or equity coming under federal law, using that term in the broadest sense, but also all cases at law or equity, no matter what the point of law involved, whether State or national, arising between citizens of different States. Its jurisdiction turns, in other words, not merely upon the subject-matter of the issue involved, but also upon the nature of the parties to the suit. A dispute arising between a citizen of Pennsylvania and a citizen of New York about the meaning and force of a contract made under Pennsylvania law and to be performed in Pennsylvania, is surely a question of pure State law, as that term would be understood by either lawyer or layman. There is no question that Pennsylvania law and only Pennsylvania law would apply;* within certain limits Pennsylvania precedents would be followed, and yet such a controversy belongs to the jurisdiction of the federal courts. It is an interesting fact that considerably more than half the business before our federal courts relates to the decision of such questions, involving

* The federal courts have, however, in some cases gone so far in the direction of putting their own interpretation on what State law is that they have built up a sort of federal law by construction on matters which are not otherwise entrusted to the Federal Government at all; notably subjects falling within the general field of commercial law.

pure State law with no admixture of federal law whatever. Some authorities, indeed, claim that the federal courts spend three-fourths, and others say five-sixths, of their time in the consideration of such questions. Of this important feature of our judicial system—one of the most characteristic and significant of them all—the foreigner would get no adequate, and it would be extremely doubtful whether he would get even a correct, idea from Mr. Bryce's exposition.

In discussing the distribution of powers between the national and State governments and the method of interpretation by which we determine what powers are to be assigned to one and what to the other, the author declares* that "a lawyer may think it was equally unnecessary and, so to speak, in-artistic, to lay any prohibitions on the national government, because it could *ex-hypothesi* exercise no powers not *expressly* granted."

In another place † the author says that "a State is not deemed to be subject to any restriction which the Constitution has not *distinctly* imposed." In the same connection he states it to be the rule ‡ that "when a question arises whether the national government possesses a particular power, proof must be given that the power was *positively* granted." (The italics are the writer's.)

The impression which one might get from the first statement that our established constitutional doctrine is to the effect that the national government has only such powers as are expressly granted and which is strengthened by the other two passages quoted, is corrected by a positive statement § that "the grant need not be expressed, for it has frequently been held that a power incidental or instrumental to a power expressly given may be conferred upon Congress by necessary implication." But that this is an inadequate correction made in this incidental way, appearing only in a

* P. 313.

† P. 318.

‡ P. 319.

§ P. 329 foot-note.

foot-note, is evident from the fact that Mr. Bryce has been quoted as supporting the first doctrine indicated.

The necessity for this correction, recognizing the implied powers, and for giving expression thereto in connection with the original statement of its powers is apparent when it is considered that an exceedingly important portion of the acts in exercise of federal powers fall under the head of those granted by implication rather than by express mention.

The statement that the State is not deemed to be subject to any restriction which the Constitution has not distinctly imposed, is an erroneous one, for not even the federal courts themselves, nor, so far as I know, any individual judge, has ever held that the prohibition upon the States to tax federal bonds, federal property, the income of federal office-holders, etc., is even suggested by any distinct provision of the Constitution, although all the courts have taken essentially the same view as to the existence of this prohibition growing out of the general nature of our dual system of government. The latter fact is mentioned by the author,* but is not brought into any organic connection with the statement above quoted. So of the doctrine mentioned below, that the grant of control of interstate commerce to the Federal Government impliedly withdraws it from the field of State legislation.

Nor is the author's attempt to delimit the federal power in relation to the police power of the State † quite successful. He declares that "Congress must not attempt to interfere with the so-called police power of the States within their own limits." The statement is correct in the form in which it is put if its limitations be understood, but it might imply to a foreigner that any act of Congress which interfered with the police power of the States within their own limits would be unconstitutional; which is not true. The courts have held that when the Federal Constitution gives to Congress authority to legislate upon any subject, the fact that such

* P. 520.

† P. 319 foot-note.

legislation interferes with the autonomy of the States in other departments which have been left beyond the control of the Federal Government, shall not be construed in such a way as to make such legislation unconstitutional. And, consequently, it may, and does, frequently happen that the incidental effects of the exercise of acknowledged constitutional powers on the part of Congress limit very seriously such action within domains which are considered as being purely matters of State concern. Thus Congress may regulate commerce in such a way as to interfere most decidedly with the police power of the States, and, indeed, the courts have held that the absence of legislation on the part of Congress implies that interstate commerce shall be free and must not be restricted as an incident to the exercise of the police power on the part of the States.*

In treating of the final authority in the interpretation of the Constitution of the United States, the author declares † that "the only authority competent to decide finally on the constitutionality of an act of Congress or of the national executive, is the federal judiciary." This is modified by the exception of purely political questions,‡ and, in an entirely different part of the work under a different head, the author expresses himself as follows: § "It is, therefore, an error to suppose that the judiciary is the only interpreter of the Constitution, for a certain field remains open to the

* Cf. *Leisy v. Hardin*, 135, U. S. Rep., 109. "Whenever, however, a particular power of the general government is one which must necessarily be exercised by it and Congress remains silent; this is not only not a concession that the powers reserved by the State may be exerted as if the specific power had not been elsewhere reposed; but on the contrary, the only legitimate conclusion is that the general government intended that power should not be affirmatively exercised, and the action of the States can not be permitted to effect that which would be incompatible with such intention. Hence, inasmuch as interstate commerce, consisting of the transportation, purchase, sale and exchange of commodities is national in its character, and must be governed by a uniform system, so long as Congress does not pass any law to regulate it, or allowing the State so to do, it thereby indicates its will that such commerce shall be free and untrammelled."

† P. 337.

‡ P. 337 foot-note and p. 262.

§ P. 374.

other authorities of the government, whose views need not coincide, so that a dispute between those authorities, although turning on the meaning of the Constitution, may be incapable of being settled by any legal proceeding. This causes no great confusion, because the decision, whether of the political or judicial authority, is conclusive, so far as regards the particular controversy or matter passed upon."

The impression given by this and similar passages which might be quoted, is that the Constitution of the United States has, on the whole, marked out a sphere of action within which the different departments, in the exercise of their constitutional functions, cannot come into serious conflict. It implies, therefore, that on the whole the peaceable and peaceful working of the Constitution is exactly what might be expected from a consideration of its skillful adjustments. It seems, on the contrary, to be a much truer view that in this respect the Constitution is by no means consistent, that grave opportunities for conflict do exist, indeed, lie in the very nature of the political framework itself, and that the reason for its peaceful working thus far is to be found not in the excellence of its mechanical adjustments, but in the political good sense and training of the American people.

Passing over for a moment a discussion of "What is a political question?" the Constitution itself does not provide, in so many words, for a final authority in its interpretation. It is, therefore, a matter of inference, of construction, to determine what is the final authority in the interpretation of the instrument. It would seem that that is the final authority in the interpretation of any political instrument which is authorized by that instrument, indeed, required by it, to put an interpretation upon its provisions, and whose interpretation or construction is not subject to the revision of any other body.

If we accept such a definition, we shall find that there are several final interpreters of the Constitution, and in the work of construction it is by no means necessary that an

harmonious co-operation of these different authorities is to be accepted, as the only, or even natural, outcome. Thus, the Constitution of the United States provides that no person shall be a member of the House of Representatives who has not been a citizen of the United States for seven years, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen. It provides also that the House of Representatives shall be the final judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own members. This gives to the House of Representatives the final authority to interpret the meaning of the word "inhabitant," subject to no revision by any other body. The same provision exists in regard to the Senate, and it might very well be that the House of Representatives should exclude a man from membership on the ground that he was not an inhabitant, and if he were elected to the Senate be admitted to that body on the ground that such objection was not valid; *i. e.*, the two bodies might put entirely different interpretations upon the meaning of the word "inhabitant," and their decisions being subject to no revision would be final. Of course, in such a case as this, no great harm would probably follow from conflicting decisions.

Prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment with its authoritative definition of a citizen, the House of Representatives might have excluded a free colored man from membership on the ground that negroes could not be citizens of the United States; the Senate might have admitted him on the ground that color was not a qualification of citizenship; the federal courts might have refused to entertain suits brought by him on the ground that no member of the African race was or could be made a citizen of the United States by act, either of the Federal or State governments (*Dred Scott* case).

The House of Representatives is given the authority to impeach any officer of the United States for treason, felony, or other high crime and misdemeanor. The Senate is given

the power to judge such cases, and at no stage in the proceeding can such a case as this be transferred so as to make it subject to the revision of any other authority; but in the decision of such a case, the construction or interpretation of the meaning of treason, felony, high crime and misdemeanor, would come up and have to be decided, since it would be necessary to the decision of guilt. Surely these are cases in which the final authority in the interpretation of the Constitution is not to be found in the judicial department, and yet they can hardly be called political, in the sense ordinarily given to that term by the courts. The decision of a contested election case turns upon questions of law, pure and simple; but all such decisions are referred to the respective Houses of Congress. Other cases might be quoted, but this is sufficient for the immediate purpose.

Now, it would be perfectly possible to get a series of decisions by the different authorities of our government which could hardly be reconciled under our present system of constitutional law. Suppose in a State election three parties appear claiming to have elected a governor and a legislature, that these three bodies meet and proceed to transact the ordinary business devolving upon the legislature, each electing a United States Senator and passing a body of laws relating, let us say, to contracts. Suppose a disturbance breaks out resulting in civil war within the State and an appeal is made to the President of the United States for assistance. He must, as an incident to interference, practically determine for himself the legitimacy of one or the other of these legislatures: suppose he acknowledges legislature "A." The persons who have been chosen Senators by these three bodies apply for admission to the Senate; the Senate recognizes the Senator as chosen by legislature "B" to be the legitimate one. Shortly after a case arises in the State courts between citizens of that State as to which body of laws is the true and legitimate body, and the courts of that State recognize legislature "C."

Now, let a case arise of a dispute between a citizen of that State and a citizen of another State as to the legitimacy of a contract made under one of these bodies of laws. The federal courts must pass upon the question. They are evidently on the horns of a dilemma; they have ruled that the decision of the question, Which of the contesting governments in the State is the legitimate one? is for the executive department of the Federal Government to decide, and if the President has decided it, by the recognition of the first government, the court would be bound by its own decisions to recognize as the law of the State an entirely different set of laws from those accepted by the highest judicial authority in the State itself. This would necessarily lead the court into conflict with another principle of procedure, generally acknowledged by it, according to which in passing upon matters of State law, the federal courts will follow the adjudications of the highest State courts.

To say, as one might, that such a case offers no difficulty from a legal point of view, because the executive department could recognize one government for its purposes and the courts another for their purposes does not change the fact that here is a fundamental conflict between the legitimate division of co-ordinate departments of the government relating to the same subject matter, which might in certain cases logically lead to a constitutional block.

One might urge, however, that such a question will never arise because the American people would not carry matters to such an extreme. This may be correct, but it simply proves that the peaceable and excellent working of our institutions is to be found in the political good sense of the American people, and not in the perfection of the constitutional adjustments made under our system. It is not too much to say that the Constitution of the United States would be worked with great difficulty by any other than a Teutonic nation. The legitimate power given by the Constitution in express or implied terms to each of the departments of the government

is so great, that if each department, in any struggle with other departments, insisted upon exercising all the power which is constitutionally vested in it, a hopeless block would be the result. No President would need greater authority than ours has in order to make the working of the government impossible, and, consequently, pave the way for revolution. No system of courts would need more authority than ours have claimed, practically to supersede the legislature, and, indeed, the executive also. To Congress, ample power has certainly been given to carry matters to such an extreme as to make the scheme unworkable. It is not because we have a consistent Constitution, or one which provides for all possible contingencies, or even one which does not allow most serious possibilities of conflict, that our government has worked; but solely because of what may be called the political genius of the people.

The manner in which the federal courts have drawn limits about their own jurisdiction in order to prevent them from coming into hopeless conflict with the executive and legislative departments of the government, by the development of the fiction to which they have given the name of "Political question," is a good illustration of this proposition.

In the chapter on the working of the courts, * the author raises the question as to "how judicial authorities can sustain the functions which America requires them to discharge. . . . How can judges keep out of politics when political issues, raising party passions, come before them? Under such conditions as exist in the United States, must not the interpreting court be allowed to assume a control over the executive and legislative branches of the government, since it has the power of declaring their acts illegal?" His answer to this is, that "the latter possibility occurs very rarely and may be averted by the same prudence as the courts have hitherto generally shown. This prudence is

* P 261.

displayed,* especially in the refusal of the federal courts to interfere in purely political questions."

In discussing the authority competent to decide finally on the constitutionality of an act of Congress, the author declares that if the question be a purely political one, it may be incapable of being decided by any court whatever. These two statements seem to imply that the term "purely political questions" is one of so definite a nature as to be easily understood, and one which does not involve in itself the decision of a suit at law or equity.

In another passage† the author agrees that this term is a vague description, but does nothing to make it plainer by a more exact definition. If there were questions coming before the courts of a purely political nature, in the sense that they do not involve in their decision the determination of legal or constitutional questions, then it might be proper enough to say, as our courts do, and our commentators also, that the settlement of purely political questions does not belong to the courts; for the Constitution gives jurisdiction to the courts only over suits arising in law or equity. But, on the other hand, the real significance of this distinction which the courts have drawn, can only be ascertained from an examination of those cases in which there is no doubt that a suit in law or equity, not only might, but according to all legal and constitutional principles does arise, and which, therefore, brings the question as certainly within the jurisdiction of the courts as in the case of any of the disputes actually tried.

The question which of two opposing governments, each claiming to be the rightful government of a State, is the legitimate one, may ultimately give rise to a dispute between private citizens as to the legality of contracts made under the laws of either the one or the other government. The decision of cases of the latter kind the courts could not avoid,

* P. 262.

† P. 374.

and yet in deciding them would have to pass upon the very questions which they had perhaps previously ruled out as "political." The real explanation of the attitude of the courts is to be found in their unwillingness to take jurisdiction of cases, even though they be as purely suits at law or equity as any that are ever tried before them, which would, in their decision, and in the enforcement of that decision, bring the courts into a hopeless conflict with the other departments of the government. The author rightly says that the description could be made more specific only by an enumeration of the cases which have settled the practice. It is an involved point which for its full explication would need much more space than we can give it here.

In discussing the relation of the executive and legislative* it is stated that the initiative in foreign policy and the conduct of negotiations are left to the President by the Constitution. It is a fair question whether it was intended to give to the President any such authority in the negotiation of treaties as he has actually succeeded in securing to himself. It is declared in the Constitution that "he shall have power, by, and with, the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties." As far as the language is concerned this would seem to imply that the President should secure the advice and consent of the Senate, just as much in the negotiation as in the ratification of the treaty. Indeed, the only way in which the advice of the Senate could be made effective would be by the participation of the Senate in the original drafting of the treaty, as well as in the final ratification or assenting to its adoption. There is no doubt that if the custom had been adopted, of consulting the Senate in advance in regard to the negotiation of treaties, and no treaty had been negotiated to which the consent of the Senate had not been first obtained, the practical power of the Senate over the making of treaties would be very much greater than it is, and the practical power of

* P. 225.

the President would be very much less than it is, since the Senate, for reasons which will suggest themselves to every student of politics, would be much more willing to refuse its consent to the negotiation of a treaty which did not altogether commend itself to it, than to refuse its consent to a treaty which had already been negotiated and practically accepted by both governments. It would, under such a system, have acquired a practical power over the details of a treaty which it does not now possess. The arguments in favor of the view that the Senate is constitutionally entitled to the exercise of this power, however, are very cogent.*

The author's discussion of the power of Congress to make conditions as to the admission of territories as States, is not altogether satisfactory. Thus, in one place,† he declares that Congress may impose conditions which the State constitutions must fulfill, and in admitting the six newest States has affected to retain the power of maintaining these conditions in force. In another passage‡ he declares that "the enabling act may prescribe conditions to be fulfilled by the State constitution, but has not usually attempted to narrow the right which the citizens of the newly formed State will enjoy, by subsequently modifying that instrument in any way not inconsistent with the provisions of the Federal Constitution. However, in the case of the Dakotas, Montana, Washington, Idaho and Wyoming, the enabling act required the conventions to make by ordinance, irrevocable, without the consent of the United States, and the people of said States, certain provisions, including one for perfect religious toleration and another for the maintenance of public schools free from sectarian control. This the six States have done accordingly, but whether this requirement of the consent of Congress would be held binding if the people of the State should hereafter repeal the ordinances, *quære*."

* Cf. the account of Washington's attempt to get the advice of the Senate as to an early treaty in John Quincy Adams "Diary."

† P. 431.

‡ P. 583.

There is perhaps some judicial authority for the uncertainty which the author seems to feel in regard to the constitutional law governing such cases. But, on the whole, it would seem as if at present there were a well understood constitutional rule which can be stated in a general way without taking one too much into detail. The Congress of the United States may make such conditions as it chooses in regard to the admission of a territory, to the status and condition of a State, but it is a legitimate conclusion from the nature of our government that no such conditions would be of any avail to limit the constitutional authority of the State, after the territory had once become such. It would seem that the doctrine of the Territory of Missouri, pronounced at the time of its admission, is good constitutional law. It claimed that, although the territory bound itself in the Constitution to do and to refrain from doing certain things, the State could not be held to the performance of such promises, and it repudiated in advance any sense of obligation to carry them out. There would seem to be no way by which a State can be driven out of the Union because it has failed to comply with the promises which were made by the territory prior to its admission as a State.

There are, however, certain points as to which the State could be held to the observance of a condition which the territory had accepted. Thus, if a territory, as a condition of its admission, agrees to accept a certain boundary as its boundary line, any attempt to serve its legal processes in the territory claimed would be overthrown by the simple process of appealing to the federal courts of the United States, on the part of any citizen or inhabitant of that territory who objected to the process, and the court, in deciding the suit against the officer who attempted to serve the process, would undoubtedly uphold an agreement of such a kind as a part of the fundamental law of the United States. Or, if a territory agrees to acknowledge the land grants made within its limits by another State or territory claiming the ownership

thereof, any attempt to invalidate or disregard the land grant would be met by an appeal on the part of the individual claiming it to the federal courts, and doubtless to the maintenance of such an agreement as part of the law of the United States. In other words, certain classes of agreements, not relating to the constitutional power of the State in its relation to the Federal Government, to the repudiation of which positive State action would be necessary, can properly be maintained as a part of the law of the United States (especially if they involve rights of property or persons), though they rest upon conditions imposed by Congress as to the admission of new States. All self-executing and automatic agreements would come under the same category. But an agreement on the part of a territory to pay money to private individuals could not be enforced against the State, if the only process allowed were a suit at law or equity against the State by a private party.

Political theorists, at least those of one school, would object to the author's exposition of the original relation between State and nation. The declaration that "America is a commonwealth of commonwealths, a State, which while one, is nevertheless composed of several States, *even more essential to its existence than it is to theirs*," * is fairly open to objection, whether meant as a statement of fact or of theory. Nor is the similar statement † that "the States have over their citizens an authority which is their own and not delegated by the central government; that they have not been called into being by that government; that they, that is the older ones among them, existed before it, that they could exist without it,"—a formulation of the federal and State relation which would be accepted by everybody.

The claim ‡ that "the authority of the State constitution does not flow from Congress, but from acceptance by the

* P. 15. The italics are the writer's.

† P. 17.

‡ P. 431.

citizens of the States for which they are made," may be true enough, but it hardly justifies the further claim that "of these instruments, therefore, no less than of the constitutions of the thirteen original States, we may say that, although subsequent in date to the Federal Constitution, they are, so far as each State is concerned *de jure* prior to it; their authority over their own citizens is in no wise derived from it."

This is, of course, a technical point of political theory upon which there have always been two distinctly opposing views, and one can, perhaps, not find fault with the author because he has accepted one instead of the other. But there is no indication in the work as a whole that there is any other view. There are difficulties in the way of elaborating a consistent theory along either line in regard to this matter. According to one theory, however, the thirteen original States, so far as our present political organization is concerned, owe their fundamental political powers, as to their own citizens on one hand and to the Federal Government on the other, to the organic act adopted by the people of the United States and known as the Federal Constitution, and, therefore, all the State constitutions, the original as well as the later ones, derive their authority not from Congress or the Federal Government—the author is perfectly right as to this, of course—but from the American people as a body expressing their will in the convention which drafted the Federal Constitution and in the conventions which ratified it. The fact that they existed before it does not change the fact that their subsequent existence depends upon it.

To say that the later States existed *de jure* before the nation and before the Federal Government, before the Federal Constitution, is inconsistent alike with fact, law and theory. The right of the people of a territory to be organized and admitted to the Union as a State is derived from the Federal Constitution. The true theory would seem to be that the people of the United States in 1787, and during the two following years, re-organized the American state,

constituted a dual system of government and in the classification of the functions enumerated those belonging to one part (the federal), provided a series of prohibitions upon both and left the residuum of governmental powers, or the unenumerated powers, to the States (or the people thereof) in existence at that time and to those which were expected to come into existence in the future. This was the theory underlying President Lincoln's first inaugural address.

From this point of view the powers of the States are as legitimately an outflow of the will of the nation under the protection, guarantee and limitation of the Federal Constitution as the powers of the Federal Government itself. As said above, such a theory is not, perhaps, altogether without difficulties in view of the historical facts, but it explains more of the historical facts upon a simple and uniform system than any other theory which has been advanced.

There are a few plain errors in the work which ought at least to be mentioned in such a review as this. The statement is made in one place* that "the only power which is ultimately sovereign, as the British Parliament is always and directly sovereign, is the people of the States acting in the manner prescribed by the Constitution and capable in that manner of passing any law whatever in the form of a constitutional amendment." This, of course, does not correspond to the facts of our political system, and, although the statement is corrected in another place in the chapter on the amendments to the Constitution,† in which the author says that there is one provision of the Constitution which cannot be changed by this process, that securing to each State equal representation in the Senate; yet the correct statement is brought into no organic connection with the preceding nor any reference made to it.

In discussing the prohibitions upon the Federal Government‡ it is stated that "the writ of habeas corpus may not

* P. 36.

† P. 365.

‡ P. 316.

be suspended, nor bill of attainder, nor *ex post facto* law passed." It is difficult to see how such a slip as this could have been made in the first place by such a competent authority as Mr. Bryce, and still more difficult to see how it could have escaped the attention of critics for so long a time. The provision of the Federal Constitution is, that "the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless, when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it." So far from this being a prohibition upon the Federal Government, to suspend the privilege of the writ, it is in reality an acknowledgment of the power of the Federal Government to do so, by describing the conditions under which it may be done.

The subject is mentioned in one other place in the book,* where the author says that "some contests arose as to the right of officers in the federal army to disregard writs of habeas corpus issued by the court." The significance of this clause, as well as the long and bitter discussion which took place in Congress and the country over the power of the President to suspend the privilege of the writ, seems to have escaped the author altogether, otherwise such a serious error in fact could not have been made.

In making clear the constitution of the American Senate, the author says,† "that in the present Federal Council of the German Empire, in which each State votes as a whole, the number of her votes is proportioned to her population." This is a common statement which one finds repeated in the current literature of the time in regard to the German Federal Council; but it is erroneous. It is certainly not true of the Federal Council as it is at present constituted, even approximately, nor can one fairly say that it ever has been so. Article VI of the German Federal Constitution declares that, "the Federal Council shall consist of the representatives of the members of the federation, among

* P. 269.

† P. 102.

which the votes shall be distributed in the following manner," and then proceeds to give a list in which Prussia appears with 17 votes, Bavaria with 6, Saxony and Wurtemberg with 4 each, Baden and Hesse with 3 each, Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Brunswick with 2 each, the other States with 1 each, making altogether 58 votes. There is no provision by which this distribution of votes can ever be made different from what it is now and from what it was at the time of the establishment of the Empire. At present, although Prussia has only 17 votes out of 58, *i. e.*, less than one-third, it has over three-fifths of the population of the German Empire, and some of the other States are as much over-represented as Prussia is under-represented, if one takes population as a basis of distribution.

In the Constitutional Diet of 1867, Bismarck declared* that "Our distribution of votes (in the Federal Council) has in it something of the arbitrary. It is impossible to make population a basis of voting as is done in the Diet. The present distribution has one great advantage: it is fifty years old, and we have accustomed ourselves to it for fifty years." In other words, the present German Empire accepted the distribution which had been adopted in the Council of the former German confederation, founded in 1815, giving to Prussia not only the votes which it possessed at that time, but also those which belonged to the territory which had been subsequently incorporated in Prussia. This distribution was not based on population in the beginning and has never been adjusted to it since.

The difficulty which a foreigner has in grasping the real significance of many of the provisions of our Federal Constitution is illustrated by the author's remarks† upon the forces which have acted to secure universal suffrage in the United States. He says that the differences which might exist between one State and another as to the right of

* Stenographic Report, p. 350.

† P. 486.

suffrage are at present insignificant, owing partly to the prevalence of Democratic theories of equality throughout the Union, and partly to the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, which reduces the representation of a State in the Federal House of Representatives, and therewith also its weight in a presidential election, in proportion to the number of adult male citizens disqualified in that State. For, as a State desires to have its full weight in national politics, it has a strong motive for the widest possible enlargement of its federal franchise, and this implies a corresponding width in its domestic franchise.

The Fourteenth Amendment is not, so far as this point is concerned, a self-acting provision of the Constitution. It declares that "when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State."

In other words, this is a provision requiring the Federal Government to reduce the basis of representation. This can only be done by a law to which the consent of both Houses and the President is necessary, unless a majority vote of two-thirds in each House can be obtained for the proposition. Any one familiar with our history for the last twenty-five years must be fully aware that the passage of such a law by the Federal Government belongs to the absolutely impossible things in American politics. The bold and wholesale way in which the Southern States—first, by illegal and illegitimate methods, and, one may say, unconstitutional methods, even when tested by State law alone,

subsequently by laws and amendments to the State constitutions themselves,—have disfranchised by the wholesale the classes of persons mentioned in this provision, shows how little fear they have that this amendment will ever be enforced. Indeed, it may be considered, for the present, as for all practical purposes, a dead letter. The State of Mississippi recently adopted a constitutional amendment practically disfranchising the colored citizens of that State by a process fully as revolutionary as that underlying our present Federal Constitution.

When the attempt was made to incorporate a provision in the law for taking the census in 1880, requiring the collectors to ascertain how many such citizens of the United States, twenty-one years of age, were prevented from voting in the several States, it was defeated, and the claim was boldly made that the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment, above referred to, neither would nor could be carried out.

Among the minor points which may be mentioned in such a criticism, is the author's statement in regard to the Dred Scott case. In discussing this case,* it is stated that "the doctrine of the Dred Scott judgment as to citizenship was expressly negatived in the Fourteenth Constitutional Amendment adopted after the War of Secession." This is not, strictly speaking, correct language, though one often finds it used in regard to this case. An amendment to the Constitution does not negative any constitutional doctrine advanced and acted upon by the courts prior to the amendment; it simply changes the law.† The only condition in which it would be proper to say that the doctrine was negatived, would be a reversal of the opinion of the same court in the same, or in a similar, case, by the court itself. As a matter of fact, the doctrine of the Supreme Court in this case was never negatived nor reversed. The executive

* P. 269.

† The Eleventh Amendment did this in form, but not in reality.

department disregarded it on one occasion; the lower courts refused in some cases to be bound by it; but it stood as the law of the land in spite of these facts until that law itself was changed in the constitutional manner by the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Nor is the statement in the same connection correct, that "the federal courts gave effect to most, though not to all, of the statutes passed by Congress under the three amendments which abolished slavery and secured the rights of the negroes." The Civil Rights acts, passed before and subsequent to these amendments, were in some of their most important features held to be unconstitutional by the courts, and the decisions allow to the States a large right of discrimination in their laws between the negroes and the whites. The courts have thus upheld the right of the States to discriminate in the most far-reaching way in the treatment accorded to different classes of its citizens as to some of the most fundamental rights of the individual—a discrimination which the Civil Rights Acts aimed to prevent.

It does not seem quite fair to make the statement* that "the Supreme Court now holds that the power of Congress to make paper money legal tender, is incident to the sovereignty of the national government." On the contrary, although there is room here for difference of opinion, it would be fairer to say that the court maintained that to the Federal Government had been entrusted, by the terms of the Constitution, sovereignty over the currency, and that in the exercise of this sovereignty it could perform any of the acts which other sovereignties at the time of the adoption of the Constitution were in the habit of performing, subject only to the expressed or implied restrictions of the Constitution. The view of the author seems rather to be based on the dissenting opinion of the court, or upon Mr. Bancroft's interpretation of the opinion, than on a careful study of the text itself.

* P. 390.

In setting forth the prohibitions on the national government,* it is stated that "no person shall be subjected to a second trial for the same offence." The language of the Constitution is that "no person shall be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." The highly technical meaning which our courts have put upon the term "to be put in jeopardy," does not always protect a person from a second trial for the same offence.

In discussing the nature of the State as contrasted with the Federal Government,† the author states that "a man gains active citizenship of the United States, that is, a share in the government of the Union, only by becoming a citizen of some particular State; being such a citizen he is forthwith entitled to the national franchise." This is one of the subjects upon which our own writers make such astonishing statements that one need not be surprised if a foreigner is led into error on the subject.

The Fourteenth Amendment declares that "all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." This applies to women and children as much as it does to men, and, consequently the possession of citizenship in a State does not at all imply the possession of the elective franchise, either in that State or in the nation. In fact, there is so little organic relation between the right of citizenship and the right of voting in the United States, that one is almost tempted to say that they have nothing to do with each other. The author explains in the very same section in which he is discussing this subject, that the States may grant the right to vote to persons who are not citizens of the United States or even of the States. They may limit the right to vote among their own citizens by an age condition, a sex condition, a property condition, an educational condition, indeed, by any kind of

* P. 317.

† P. 419.

a condition, except the single one of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.

If a State were to advance so far in its restriction of the suffrage as to destroy in the public opinion of the country a republican form of government, Congress might take action interfering with the liberty of the State in this respect. Of course, Congress might take action in the way of reducing the representation of the State in the House of Representatives, in case any other condition than that of sex, age and citizenship should be set to the exercise of the suffrage; but, as we have seen above, owing to the way in which the penalty must be inflicted, if inflicted at all, this is practically no restriction upon the State.

In closing this long and somewhat unsystematic critique of the work, the writer would like to emphasize what was said at the opening of the paper, and to call attention to the fact that many of the inconsistencies and slips which appear in the book, are almost an inseparable feature of the system of exposition which the author has adopted. In order to give a general idea he has made many preliminary statements in different parts of the work; then followed them up in other portions by more detailed statements; and anticipated and repeated in many different passages what was to be said, or what had been said, in others, and it would be little short of a miracle if under such a method many mistakes had not crept in; it is only remarkable that there are so few. We must be content to yield to the system of exposition adopted, the defects of its virtues.

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POLITICAL AND MUNICIPAL LEGISLATION

IN 1895.

The American States are so numerous that it is very difficult to keep abreast of legislation on any subject in them all. Moreover thoroughly to understand its significance one would need to be familiar with the laws of many years past, for a satisfactory description of current legislation should abound in references to previous laws. In a brief paper such as this, therefore, I can hope to touch only the more important and generally familiar phases. Yet on account of the complexity of our legislation a few of the facts presented may possibly have escaped the attention of some students; and at any rate it is perhaps worth while to group in one place the chief features of last year's legislation on questions of state and local government. For convenience the session laws of the various States are cited not by their precise title, which differs considerably among the States, but simply as "Laws," with the year of enactment. The information as to the adoption by the people of constitutional amendments was furnished by the Secretaries of State.

Suffrage.—By contrast with the great wave of electoral reform in 1889 to 1892, more recent legislation concerning elections is comparatively unimportant. One of the most interesting tendencies of late years, aside from the secret-ballot movement, is that toward more restricted suffrage. More steps in this direction were taken in 1894 and 1895 than for many years past.

The general reaction against aliens, which had for one of its first results the numerous laws (to which two* more were added in 1895) prohibiting non-resident aliens from acquiring real estate, is now leading to restrictions on their

* Cal. Laws 1893, J. R. 22, Constitutional Amendment adopted Nov. 6, 1894; Mo. Laws, 1895, p. 207.

voting. Before 1894 nearly half the States, chiefly in the West and South, allowed aliens to vote immediately or soon after declaration of intention to become United States citizens. Florida* in October and Michigan† in November, 1894, adopted constitutional amendments requiring full citizenship, while Minnesota‡ has submitted one to the people this November requiring naturalization three months before election. Montana, § which already requires citizenship, will vote at the same time on a provision that naturalization must be three months before election; and Texas, || much less radical, on one requiring the declaration of intention six months before election, instead of at any time before the very day.

Even more interesting is the tendency toward an educational qualification for suffrage. Five years ago only Massachusetts and Connecticut had such a requirement. The Mississippi constitution of 1890 prescribing such qualification went into effect in 1892. Maine adopted the requirement in 1893. Three more States have taken steps toward it in the past two years. California¶ adopted an amendment in November, 1894, requiring the voter to be able to read the constitution in English and write his name; the law does not apply to those now voters. Washington** will vote this fall on an amendment requiring ability to read and speak English; and Louisiana †† on one requiring either ownership of property assessed at \$200 or over, or ability to read the constitution in one's native language. Connecticut ‡‡ has moreover submitted to the legislature of 1897 an amendment that the required reading of the constitution shall be in English.

* Laws 1893, J. R. 2.

† Laws 1895, p. 612.

‡ Laws 1895, cap. 3.

§ Pol. Code of 1895, § 5200

|| Laws 1895, p. 227.

¶ Laws 1893, J. R. 4.

** Laws 1895, cap. 37.

†† Laws 1894, cap. 200.

‡‡ Laws 1895, p. 712.

If one may judge from the way other western legislatures have made haste to follow her example, woman suffrage in Colorado must be giving satisfaction. Kansas rejected woman suffrage in 1894; but Idaho* and California† have both submitted to the voters at the coming election amendments allowing it, and the legislatures of Nevada‡ and Oregon§ have submitted such amendments to their successors. In the East, Massachusetts, in strong contrast, has voted negatively by a heavy majority on the referendum as to the advisability of municipal suffrage for women.

Ballot reform.—The general secret-ballot movement has made its way somewhat more slowly in the Southern States, but nearly all have now fallen into line. Florida, which had already passed a law for Jacksonville in 1893, adopted one in 1895 for the whole State.|| Georgia, North and South Carolina and New Mexico only remain without some form of the Australian ballot (although it is hard to judge from its terms whether the Louisiana law of 1894 really provides for it). In Florida formerly separate ballots were furnished by the parties themselves, and secrecy was further hindered by the use of seven or eight ballot boxes for different classes of officers. The new law has the usual provisions for official blanket ballots, booths for voters, etc. The names of candidates are arranged alphabetically under each office, a provision tending to disfranchise not a few in a State with so many illiterates. North Carolina¶ has adopted a general law consolidating and revising election procedure, but doing comparatively little in the way of reform. The only noteworthy changes are one providing for bi-partisan boards of election commissioners, and one requiring candidates to report election expenses.

* Laws 1895, p. 232.

† Laws 1895, J. R. 27.

‡ Laws 1895, J. R. 10.

§ Laws 1895, p. 612.

|| Laws 1895, cap. 7 & 8.

¶ Laws 1895, cap. 159.

A few interesting amendments to the Australian ballot laws have been made. When these laws were first passed about half the States provided for alphabetic arrangement of candidates on the ballot, or otherwise required the marking of each one voted for. Vermont, South Dakota and North Dakota have since adopted the party-column or some other arrangement allowing readily the voting of "straight" tickets; and Washington* and Arizona† did the same in 1895. Washington had previously a party-column ballot, but required the separate marking of each name. Now the candidates are arranged under the names of the offices, following a uniform order according to party, but there is also in a separate place opportunity to mark a straight vote. Arizona has changed from the alphabetic to the party-column arrangement.

In New York the ballots of each party have heretofore been separate, and though secrecy was preserved by giving each voter one copy of each ballot, and though pasters and writing in of names were allowed, the natural tendency was toward straight voting. By a new law, unfortunately defective in some respects, a party-column blanket ballot is substituted.‡

Voting machines.—These have been winning their way more rapidly than ever in the past year. Up to 1895, Michigan and Massachusetts had allowed their use in local elections, and New York in any election; while Delaware had adopted a constitutional amendment allowing voting by other means than ballots, provided secrecy be preserved. During 1895 California§ and Nebraska|| submitted similar amendments to be voted upon at the election of 1896, and Indiana¶ and Connecticut** submitted the same to the ensuing legislature. Michigan†† has adopted

* Laws 1895, cap. 156.

† Laws 1895, cap. 44.

‡ Laws, 1895, cap. 810.

§ Laws 1895, J. R. 8.

|| Laws 1895, cap. 114.

¶ Laws 1895, cap. 151.

** Laws 1895, p. 712.

†† Laws 1895, cap. 85, 76.

identically the New York law of 1894, allowing the use of the Myers machine in all elections and regulating the procedure; and has also authorized the adoption of any other machine. Connecticut* has permitted and regulated the use of either the Myers or the McTammany machine in local elections.

Corrupt practices.—Legislation to secure purity in elections has also made rapid strides in 1895. It will be remembered that New York † passed in 1890 the first of the modern “corrupt practices acts.” This law was far from complete; it contained fairly good definitions of such practices, but barely required reports of expenditures by candidates, with no limitation on the amount and with no regulations concerning political committees. Colorado ‡ and Michigan § adopted this law in 1891 almost word for word, adding, however, a requirement that party committees also report receipts and expenses. Massachusetts || came next in 1892, with a more elaborate and careful act, providing further that all expenditures on behalf of candidates (save a few personal ones of which, probably unwisely, no report was required) must be made through party committees, and regulating in detail the accounts and vouchers of such committees. Contests on grounds of corruption were provided for. California ¶ and Missouri ** in 1893 went further, the former limiting the total allowable expenditure by or for a candidate, and the latter his total expenditure directly or through committees. Reports both of candidates and committees were required. The California law was specially detailed and drastic. Kansas †† also passed a law like Missouri’s, but without restricting expenditure.

* Laws 1895, cap. 263, 335.

† Laws 1890, cap. 94.

‡ Laws 1891, p. 167.

§ Laws 1891, cap. 190.

|| Laws 1892, cap. 416.

¶ Laws 1893, cap. 11.

** Laws 1893, p. 157.

†† Laws 1893, cap. 77.

Thus up to 1895 seven States required reports of expenditures for elections. Six are now added to the list. Arizona* and North Carolina† have practically the New York law, the former including also the amendments of Colorado. Connecticut‡ has enacted a law somewhat similar to that of Massachusetts, but much less minute in its regulations. Nevada§ adopted California's act identically, except that a lower maximum of expenditure is fixed. Montana|| with the Massachusetts law as a basis has added separate limitations on personal expenditures and on contributions of candidates. Minnesota¶ has followed Missouri, with slightly larger maximums of expenses. The enumeration of legitimate expenditures is the most complete yet adopted, and I can not forbear quoting it:

1. For the personal traveling expenses of the candidate.
2. For the rent of hall or rooms for the delivery of speeches relative to principles or candidates in any pending election, and for the renting of chairs and other furniture properly necessary to fit such halls or rooms for use for such purposes.
3. For the payment of public speakers and musicians at public meetings, and their necessary traveling expenses.
4. Printing and distribution of lists of candidates or sample tickets, speeches or addresses, by pamphlets, newspapers or circulars, relative to candidates or political issues, cards, hand-bills, posters or announcements.
5. For challengers at the polls at elections.
6. For copying and classifying of poll lists.
7. For making canvasses of voters.
8. For postage, telegraph, telephone or other public messenger service.
9. For clerk hire at the headquarters or office of such committee.
10. For conveying infirm or disabled voters to and from the polls.

It is, of course, to be regretted that the last item of expense is not made a public charge. But the provision is

* Laws 1895, cap. 20.

† Laws 1895, cap. 159.

‡ Laws 1895, cap. 338.

§ Laws 1895, cap. 103.

|| Penal Code of 1895, § 80 ff.

¶ Laws 1895, cap. 277.

far ahead of that of New York* which has amended its law so as to allow the carrying of voters of any class to the polls at the expense of candidates.

Nominations.—Probably even more unsatisfactory than our earlier ballot system was, and still is in many cases, our system of nominations. Fortunately legislators are bestirring themselves somewhat to reform this also. Besides providing for the nomination of independent candidates by petition, several States have passed careful laws for regulating and purifying party primaries and caucuses. Massachusetts has perhaps advanced furthest. Her general caucus law of 1894, mandatory in Boston, was in 1895 amended so as to be more applicable to other towns and cities, in any of which a party may adopt it by vote, which must be taken on petition of fifty members of the party. This law † requires original nominations to be by petition. The names so proposed are submitted on blanket ballots to the voters at the primaries.

California ‡ has adopted the most elaborate of existing laws on the subject, applicable to counties with over 50,000 population. Its most noteworthy feature is the selection of caucus officers by the county election board, and their payment at public cost. Primary election day is made a holiday. Detailed provisions are made for secrecy, but the blanket ballot is not introduced. Minnesota,§ Michigan,|| Montana,¶ Washington ** and Arkansas †† have also in the last year passed less detailed laws regulating primaries.

Legislature and State Officers.—Only six States still retain annual elections and sessions of the legislature. In two of these, Massachusetts and Rhode Island, the year 1895

* Laws 1895, cap. 885.

† Laws 1895, cap. 507; c. 489.

‡ Laws 1895, cap. 181.

§ Laws 1895, cap. 276.

|| Laws 1895, cap. 135.

¶ Political Code, 1895, § 1330 ff.

** Laws 1895, cap. 145.

†† Laws 1895, cap. 154.

witnessed movements for the substitution of biennial elections of State officers and legislature. The amendment proposed by the General Assembly of Rhode Island* was, however, rejected by the people last September. It was submitted in connection with a general article providing that the Lieutenant-Governor and no longer the Governor should preside in the Senate, allowing the division of cities for representation in the House, etc. Possibly this cumulation of measures contributed to the defeat. The question of biennial elections was, however, rejected once before, in 1892. The Massachusetts† amendment was proposed by the last legislature to that now in session.

Comment has often been made on the extent of the limitations placed by recent constitutions upon the legislature, the constitutions themselves covering many matters ordinarily considered as not properly fundamental in nature. It is interesting to note some exceptions to the tendency to increase this constitutional legislation. The Legislative Assembly of Nebraska‡ has evidently felt its limitations too burdensome, for it has proposed to the people this fall several amendments, allowing the legislature by a two-thirds vote to increase the number of judges of the supreme and district courts or to create new courts inferior to the supreme court, and by a three-fourths vote to create new executive offices. Moreover the legislature is allowed to change the salaries of the judges and chief officers, which are now fixed in the constitution, by two-thirds vote not oftener than once in four years. In this connection we may note the failure of the second attempt in Michigan to increase the ridiculously low salaries of the executive officers. An amendment for this purpose was declared adopted in 1893, but was rejected on recanvass, and another amendment submitted by the legislature of 1895 was defeated likewise.§ The salary of

* Laws 1895, cap. 1439.

† Laws 1895, p. 700.

‡ Laws 1895, cap. 108-12.

§ Laws, 1895, p. 612.

the State Treasurer still remains \$1000, that of the Secretary of State, Attorney-General and Commissioner of the Land Office \$800 each; and they receive no fees. Another attempt to slacken the rigidity of constitutional law has been made in Illinois.* The people will vote in November on an amendment allowing the General Assembly to propose amendments to three articles of the constitution at a single session and to the same article as often as once in two years. At present only one article can be changed at a session and the same article only once in four years. A somewhat similar amendment was rejected in 1892.

It is generally recognized that reform in methods of legislative procedure, especially as to private and local bills, is one of our most urgent political needs. The New York legislature of 1895 created a commission to recommend changes in legislative methods.† An excellent board was appointed, and in its report to the present legislature it favored some radical and commendable reforms. There is, however, much doubt whether any of them will be adopted.

County government.—In comparison with municipal government, that of counties attracts but little attention nowadays from the public or from legislators. One or two laws of 1895, however, make such marked changes that they should be recorded. North Carolina has hitherto retained the old English custom of giving large powers in county administration to the justices of the peace. They appointed the county commissioners and sat with them in deciding all important matters. The General Assembly‡ has done away with this power entirely and relegated the justices to purely judicial functions. The three commissioners are elected by the people directly. A further curious provision is that whenever 200 voters petition for additional commissioners on the ground that otherwise there is danger of improper management, the district judge shall appoint two, holding for

* Laws 1895, p. 331.

† Laws 1895, cap. 1025.

‡ Laws 1895, cap. 135.

that term only, who shall be of different politics from the majority of the board.

In Nebraska, heretofore, the county governing board was composed of the supervisors of the townships. Each supervisor was also the chief executive officer of his township. County and township organizations were thus intimately connected. By a new law* seven supervisors are to be elected from districts quite independent of townships, while the chief executive power in the township is transferred to a board consisting of the clerk, assessor and justice of the peace. Washington, which previously had no provisions for township government, the county being the unit of local administration, has authorized† the adoption of township organization by any county on popular vote. The executive power in the township is vested in three supervisors. The division of the county has no effect on the organization of the county government, which is still administered by commissioners.

General municipal legislation.—Minnesota has probably done most in 1895 in the way of legislation for municipalities, unless perhaps it should yield the honor to Illinois and Chicago with their civil service reform law. The legislature of Minnesota has submitted to be voted upon at the coming election a constitutional amendment‡ providing for municipal home rule in the framing of charters, after the precedent of California. Whenever a new city desires to incorporate or an existing one to re-incorporate, the district court on petition must appoint fifteen freeholders of the city to draft a charter. This if adopted by the people becomes the law. This board is to be kept up permanently and may suggest amendments at any time. The legislature is authorized to pass only general laws paramount to such charters; these may be for cities of three classes—those over 50,000, 15,000 to 50,000, and under 15,000.

* Laws 1895, cap. 28.

† Laws 1895, cap. 175.

‡ Laws 1895, cap. 4.

Minnesota has likewise enacted a general law* for all cities hereafter incorporated, which may also be accepted by existing cities. This is the first general city law in the State since 1870, and though it is far from being a perfect charter, it is a marked improvement. Most of the larger cities are under special charters. The most noteworthy feature of the law is the composition of the council. This is to be a single house (several cities now have two houses), consisting of one alderman from each ward, and where there are less than six wards two aldermen at large, where six to ten wards four, and where over ten wards eight aldermen at large. The mayor's power is comparatively slight; he appoints the police and a few other officers, but most of them are appointed by the council. Only the mayor and treasurer are elected. The mayor can remove officers only with consent of the council and on formal charges and hearing. The law does not interfere to fix salaries, but leaves them to the council. The financial regulations are specially detailed. The council has the final appropriating power, but large advisory control is given to a board of tax levy consisting of the mayor, comptroller and president of the aldermen.

Michigan, which has had no general municipal legislation since 1873, has passed general laws for villages† and for cities under 10,000.‡ Not very important changes are made, however, and few provisions are of interest outside the State. In New York the eyes of the entire State were turned to the action of the legislature toward municipal reform, concerning which the dominant party had made large promises. Little, however, was done. The great problem of "Greater New York" was largely discussed but no bill passed, and though it is likely that some law will be enacted this year, its precise nature cannot be foretold. In any case the formulation of the charter will be entrusted to a committee or commission, and it will not be acted upon till 1897 or

* Laws 1895, cap. 8.

† Laws 1895, cap. 3.

‡ Laws 1895, cap. 215.

later still. The question needs, of course, most thorough consideration. In case the union of Pittsburgh and Allegheny, authorized by the Pennsylvania General Assembly,* is actually accomplished, their experience should be interesting for comparison. The only important measure passed in New York was the power of removal bill for the metropolis.† The single or multiple heads of many departments there hold for longer terms than the mayor appointing them. Heretofore their removal could be made only by consent of the State Governor, on duly preferred charges. This led to division of authority and of responsibility. The mayor is now authorized within six months after coming into office to remove summarily any appointive officer. The legislature also of necessity passed laws to carry out the provisions of the new constitution allowing city authorities a provisional veto on bills affecting them. Unfortunately only a majority vote of the legislature is needed to override their disapproval, and the legislature of 1895 seemed much disposed to disregard local wishes. The State also created separate commissions ‡ to propose general legislation for cities of the second class (50,000 to 250,000) and the third class (under 50,000). They have reported bills to the present legislature, but it is questionable if important action will be taken this year on their recommendations.

Texas has adopted a measure requiring the councils of cities to be elected by the voters at large, though still from separate wards.§ The curious reason given for the law is that the constitution declares that in cities *each* elector may vote for "mayor and *all* other elective officers."

Municipal civil service reform.—The Illinois civil service law, which may be adopted by any city on popular vote, was accepted in Chicago by the splendid majority of 45,000, owing to the efforts of the Civic League. It is far the most

* Laws 1895, cap. 33, 34.

† Laws 1895, cap. 11.

‡ Laws 1895, cap. 548, 1011.

§ Laws 1895, ch. 9.

strenuous and satisfactory law to be found in any American city or probably in any State. It is much better than the New York City system,* which does not apply to the army of street cleaners and other laborers, does not regulate in any way removals or promotions, and allows the appointing officer to select from the three candidates graded highest. In the Chicago system † practically all employes and officers are subject to its provisions. When a vacancy occurs the one highest candidate must be appointed on probation of six months, during which time he may be removed for cause with the consent of the city Civil Service Commission. Thereafter he may be discharged only on formal charges, and trial by the commission or its appointees. Laborers having proper qualifications are registered, and selected by lot when needed. Promotions must be only on competitive examination of those in the next lower rank. Stringent prohibitions on removals for political grounds, party assessments of office-holders and other corrupt influences, complete the law. Practically the same law was afterward adopted for Cook county. ‡

Wisconsin § has likewise enacted a law requiring cities of over 40,000 to establish civil service commissions, but the regulations are rather indefinite and much is left to the discretion of the commissioners. It is to be hoped that they will act wisely.

Local indebtedness.—The movement to place legislative restrictions on local borrowing long ago reached a large proportion of the States, and others are gradually adopting them. New Hampshire || in 1895 limited the net debt of all local subdivisions to five per cent of the assessed valuation. In cities the council may borrow by two-thirds vote; elsewhere a two-thirds vote of the people is necessary. Oregon ¶

* Report of Supervisory Board, etc., New York City Record, 1895, p. 997.

† Laws 1895, p. 85.

‡ Laws, 1895, p. 137.

§ Laws 1895, cap. 313.

|| Laws 1895, cap. 43.

¶ Laws 1895, p. 611.

has proposed a constitutional amendment imposing the five per cent maximum on all local bodies; while the new general city law in Minnesota adopts the same limit for cities, except by two-thirds vote of the people. There is a general inclination to extend the limits for light and water purposes. The New Hampshire and Minnesota laws except such debts entirely, and South Dakota* will vote this fall on an amendment allowing any subdivision to borrow to the amount of ten per cent of its assessment, in addition to the present five per cent limit, for the purpose of providing water for irrigation or domestic use.

Franchises and municipal works.—Despite considerable agitation little has yet been accomplished by State law or municipal custom toward requiring more reasonable compensation for local franchises. Probably the new Missouri law† is the most general existing. No local authority can grant a street railway, light, water or other franchise, except on public auction to the bidder offering the highest percentage of gross receipts, which shall in no case be less than two per cent for five years, “and thereafter for each period of five years such percentage shall be increased to correspond with the increased value of the land thus occupied and used.” New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, Kansas and other States have passed laws affecting the location and safe-guarding of street railways, but none seem of very general importance. The consolidation of the Philadelphia transit companies authorized by the Pennsylvania legislature,‡ does not so far appear to have produced results very agreeable to the people of that city.

Laws in Wisconsin, Kansas, Missouri and Nebraska authorize cities to purchase existing plants or erect lighting works of their own, and to issue bonds therefor.§ The

* Laws 1895, cap. 35.

† Laws 1895, p. 53.

‡ Laws, 1895, cap. 42, 43, 44, 67.

§ Laws of 1895: Wisconsin, cap. 182, 294; Kansas, cap. 55; Missouri, p. 289, omitting constitutional amendment, election of 1896; Nebraska, cap. 13.

Wisconsin law is the only general one, the others applying to special classes of cities.

Numerous laws as usual have been passed regarding special city departments and activities, but no new principles have been introduced and a discussion of these provisions would lead us too far afield.

E. DANA DURAND.

New York State Library.

April 1, 1896.

THE FORMULATION OF NORMAL LAWS.

WITH ESPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE THEORY OF UTILITY.

It is scarcely necessary to say that the theory of marginal utility has thrown new light upon problems hitherto obscure, and thus has forced a restatement of many fundamental doctrines. In view of this fact, a discussion of the general bearing of the theory is needed more than new applications of it or additional controversy as to the applications already made. Because of the breaking down of old standards, there has entered recent economic literature a species of eclecticism which cannot be eliminated without a re-examination of the methods of the science and a consideration of the changes which this theory has introduced.

To get at the topic to be discussed, a bit of familiar history must be restated. The principle or theory of utility was introduced into economic discussion by Bentham and his followers. This utilitarianism swept away with a rude hand all the distinctions by which special classes were favored, or by which special pleasures or emotions were given an exceptional place. Every person was to count for one, and no person for more than one. All goods were regarded merely as lots of pleasures, each unit of which had the same value. It was denied that pleasures had qualities, some of which were superior in their effects to others. Pushpin was intrinsically as good as poetry.

The theory of utility thus gave a ready measure by which the welfare of each person could be determined. The units of goods possessed by an individual told accurately the units of his welfare, because each unit of goods gave to its possessor the same amount of pleasure. The application of these ideas to economics gave to it the concepts of normal laws, and of the normal or economic man. But for the fusion of the ideas of Bentham with those of Ricardo and Malthus,

the rigid Ricardianism of the next generation would have been impossible. The economic man is merely an ideal of the utilitarians. He measures his satisfactions in ounces of bread, and his pains in units of time-labor; he is mobile because he attaches no importance to the peculiar pleasures of time, place or locality; home, country and friends are readily exchanged to get more ounces of bread or to reduce the amount of time-labor.

This concept of a normal man was not a vague ideal in the mind of Bentham, but one that he developed with great fullness. His thought is well expressed in the following sentences: "When the effect of a portion of wealth upon happiness is spoken of, it is always without reference to the sensibility of the particular individual, and of the exterior circumstances in which he may be placed. Difference in character is inscrutable; and there are no two individuals whose circumstances are alike. If these two considerations were not laid on one side, it would be impossible to form a single general proposition: but though each of these propositions may be found false or inexact in each particular case, it will neither militate against their speculative correctness, nor their practical utility. It is sufficient,—first if they approach more nearly to the truth than any others which can be substituted for them; and, secondly, if they may be employed by the legislator, as the foundation of his labors, with less inconvenience than any others." *

This statement is followed by five axioms fixing the relation of quantities of wealth to the amount of happiness which its possessors can obtain from it. As Bentham puts them in italics, it shows that they are the result of a careful formulation.

1. Each portion of wealth is connected with a corresponding portion of happiness.

2. Of two individuals, possessed of unequal fortunes, he who possesses the greater wealth will possess the greater happiness.

* Bentham's Works (Bowring's edition) Vol. i, p. 305.

3. *The excess of happiness on the part of the most wealthy will not be so great as the excess of his wealth.*

4. *For the same reason, the greater the disproportion between the two masses of wealth, the less the probability that there exists an equally great disproportion between the masses of happiness.*

5. *The more nearly the actual proportion approaches to equality, the greater will be the total mass of happiness.**

It will be noticed that these rules recognize the doctrine of satiable wants and the declension of utility. In another place it is stated even more clearly.† “The quantity of happiness produced by a particle of wealth (each particle being of the same magnitude) will be less and less at each particle; the second will produce less than the first, the third than the second, and so on.” The statement that “the value of a thing in the way of exchange arises out of, and depends altogether upon, and is proportioned to, its value in the way of use”‡ is a recognition that value depends upon utility alone. Had Bentham developed these propositions but a step farther, the modern theory of value would have been fully expressed and the work of his successors anticipated. It is easy, however, to see why Bentham stopped short of a full development of his theory. His interest lay not in a theory of value nor in a theory of wealth and prosperity, but in a theory of equality. When this latter theory had been fully explained, he had little interest in the application of his principles to other fields.

The error in Bentham's reasoning, which shows itself in his first axiom, was due to the sharp way in which he contrasted subsistence and abundance. Subsistence, he tells us, does not admit of degrees in the scale of equality; every particle of wealth used for subsistence creates an equal

*He also states many secondary rules, one of which shows that he saw clearly the principle upon which progressive taxation depends.

“Among unequal fortunes, the loss of happiness produced by a loss of wealth, will be so much the less when the distribution of the loss is made in such a manner as to cause them to approach most nearly to equality.”

† Vol. iii, p. 229.

‡ Vol. iii, p. 226.

amount of happiness. It is only in the case of abundance that the different particles of wealth create unequal amounts of happiness. In this, however, he does not differ radically from later writers, who have the same thought but express it in another way. They tell us that the first units of wealth in the form of subsistence have an infinite value. Only after the food necessary to life has been supplied can begin that declension of utility upon which the theory of value depends. Bentham, therefore, was wrong only in the emphasis he gave his first axiom. He seems to have thought that subsistence was of so much more importance than abundance that on ordinary occasions the axioms relating to the latter could be neglected without loss. There is no need of analyzing goods into the units of pleasure or units of pain if ounces of bread and units of time-labor give a practical standard by which pleasures and pains can be measured.

While the theory of marginal utility is but a corollary of the theory of utility propounded by Bentham, yet it is easy to see why his followers were so bitterly opposed to the former theory when it was introduced into English economics by Jevons. The hated thought of qualities of pleasures and pains gets a new life when it is seen that each ounce of bread and each unit of labor creates in consciousness a peculiar feeling of pleasure and of pain. Subjective standards being once introduced it is no longer possible to assume that the pleasures and pains which one man obtains from given objective relations or goods, are equal to those which other men obtain from the same sources.

The sweeping changes made by the newer theory has destroyed the old concept of a normal man. Great stress is now laid on the peculiarities of the individual man. We have grown fond of emphasizing the differences between men and between different classes of men. It is also contended that justice shall not be determined by general rules which overlook individual differences, but by some method which

will allow all of the subjective effects of goods on individuals to be considered and to have due weight. This new attitude is shown nowhere more clearly than in a recent discussion about the standard of deferred payments, in which several of our younger economists have taken part.* It illustrates the tendency to discard the traditional normal laws and to lay aside the concept of a normal or economic man whose wants and feelings can be measured by objective standards. The discussion is also of value because it brings out several concepts of justice, all of which are of such a character as to make justice depend more upon a knowledge of individuals concerned than upon general rules or conditions. The traditional Goddess of Justice, who gives judgment when blindfolded, cannot satisfy those who demand that each person's stomach, palate and nervous condition shall be tested before the quantity of goods which he must give or receive in fulfilling a contract can be determined.

Before examining the correctness of these ideas, it is necessary to make plain the various steps in the development of the theory of marginal utility, and in the use of the diagrams by which this theory is illustrated. Jevons introduced into economic literature the thought of marginal utility and the elementary ideas upon which are based the diagrams of later writers. He failed, however, to grasp the thought of subjective values, and thus left to the Austrian economists a rich field which they have fully exploited. But these writers stopped short of what was possible for them to do with their material, partly because of their negative way of measuring utility, but more largely because they did not seek to increase the definiteness of their results by the use of diagrams. The next step was taken by Professor Marshall,

* "The Standard of Deferred Payments," by Professor Ross, *ANNALS*, November, 1892, Vol. iii, p. 293; "Theory of Final Utility in Relation to the Standard of Deferred Payments," by Dr. Merriam, *ANNALS*, January, 1893, Vol. iii, p. 483; "Total Utility Standard of Deferred Payments," by Professor Ross, *ANNALS*, November, 1893, Vol. iv, p. 425; "Theories of Value and the Standard of Deferred Payments," by Professor Fetter, *ANNALS*, May, 1895, Vol. v, p. 882.

and his work will compare favorably with that of any of his predecessors. He made this advance by measuring utility not directly in units of satisfaction, but indirectly in the quantity of money which persons will pay rather than to be deprived of each increment of commodity. By leaving out of consideration the first increments of those commodities so necessary to life that their utility is indefinitely great, he was able to construct a diagram which shows in a concrete way not only the total utility of the whole supply of any article but also of its total value and the consumer's surplus.

The same results have been obtained by American economists in a different way. Diagrams similar in form to those of Professor Marshall are in use, but the lines and parts represent other ideas, and certain inferences are needed to make the results of the two kinds of diagrams harmonize. In the American diagrams the base line represents not the total supply of one commodity, but the total production of some individual or community in a given day or period, while the vertical lines measure not its value in money, but the intensity of the pleasure derived from each increment of commodity. When we wish to determine the prosperity of a man or of a society, the unit of investigation is the total production of some one day or period. But when we desire to determine market values, the whole stock of each commodity, no matter when produced, becomes a unit which must be compared with similar stocks of other goods.

It is necessary to call attention to these differences because much of the confusion in current discussions is due to a mixed use of these two methods of representation, or to an unconscious passing from one group of ideas to the other.*

* Professor Fetter, for example, in the paper to which I have referred, says that it is impossible to express mathematically the total utility of a sum of goods of different kinds, because there are numerous goods the utility of each of which is infinite. Such a statement confuses the measurement of the utility of goods through the units of satisfaction they afford with an indirect measurement of utility through the value of the goods. To a thirsty man in a desert, a cup of water may have infinite value; that is, he may give all that he has to possess it. But the satisfaction

The method used by Professor Marshall is an admirable one to represent the play of forces by which the market value of single commodities is determined; but its utility is limited to this and similar problems where the play of the momentary forces are of supreme importance. The American economists, however, have not limited themselves to the field of market values, and to a consideration of the momentary forces which determine them. All that is peculiar in their writings comes from the application of the concept of marginal utility to other theories than those of market values. Their interest has centred in such problems as social values, the ultimate standard of value, the length of the working day, the relation of cost and expense, and the standard of deferred payments.

That every one sees clearly the modifications in reasoning involved in this extension of interest to other problems is a question. We are apt to use old premises and standards in unwarranted ways and reason incorrectly even while reaching sound conclusions. There is a strong tendency to base conclusions upon familiar premises rather than to attempt to broaden or modify these premises to meet the new situation. In this way the reasoning in recent American economics is made to rest on the premises of Jevons, Marshall and the Austrian economists, when in reality but a small part of its premises is derived from these sources. In our eagerness to exploit the newer theory of marginal utility we are apt to forget the older theory of utility formulated by Bentham and put by him and his followers at the basis of their social philosophy. Jevons is right in the homage he does to Bentham and deserves great credit for the clear way in which he shows the connection between his theories and

he gets from drinking this cup of water is finite and capable of measurement. There are definite limits to the amount of satisfaction which a person can enjoy at a given moment, and a series of such satisfactions, however long, are also finite in amount. Often an article of infinite value, instead of giving pleasure, is a source of pain. We dislike many kinds of indispensable medicines. A man would not enjoy having his hand cut off, even if it saved his life.

those of Bentham. It is the Austrian economists who first neglect the older theory of utility and in so doing they commit no error, for they limit their discussions to fields where this theory is of little or no importance. The error shows itself in a younger group of writers, who were initiated into the use of the theory of utility through the writings of the Austrians and have never studied the old theory of utility upon which these writings are based. These younger economists, having an interest in other problems than those of market values, try to extend the use of the theory of marginal utility to other fields rather than to ground their discussions where they properly belong—upon the old theory of utility. Thus, in the discussion to which I have referred, on the standard of deferred payments, none of the writers seems to have been aware that the topic he was discussing lies within the domain of the general theory of utility; and that the theory of marginal utility, no matter how fully or finely drawn out, had nothing to do with it. Marginal utility can tell us much of the momentary forces which determine market values to-day. It can tell us also how market values will be determined ten years from now, but it can tell us nothing of the relations which bind these two periods together. What quantity of goods ten years from now will be the proper amount to return for a loan of a given amount of goods to-day must be decided by a group of ideas with which the theory of marginal utility has nothing to do. I contend for even more than this. The type of ideas which the theory of marginal utility makes prominent tends to turn the attention from the very principles which must be used in solving such problems.

In all discussion relating to value an analysis of present conditions is most important. The interest is centred in the quantity of goods actually on hand. These goods are forced up and down in value, and are distributed in this or that quantity to the different participants in present production. Such discussions have to do with the actual goods and

the actual people which are in the world at a given time. There is no comparison of the present with the past or future. Time relations and the social standards to which they give rise are of little importance in determining present values or present distribution. No ideal element enters the problem. Cold, hard facts alone have weight. In a theory of prosperity, however, different periods must be compared. We must be familiar with the standards of yesterday and those of to-day and anticipate what those of to-morrow will be. We have to do not with the facts of these periods, but with people's ideas of these facts and with the ideals and standards through which these facts are interpreted. A theory of prosperity must, therefore, begin with a study of the ideals and standards of the people under consideration. We must know not only what these elements of our subjective environments are at present, but also what they were in the past and what they are likely to be in the future. In discussing the standard of deferred payments the ideals, standards and industrial conditions of two periods must be compared. An appeal must be made to the prevailing ideal of justice. This ideal cannot be applied alone; it becomes a force only when it acts in harmony with the other race ideals and standards and is interpreted through the light which they shed on the situation. Ideals and standards cannot be isolated without losing the very element that makes them effective. They form a unit and have been blended and harmonized by the slow process of development through which the race has gone. These ideals are the outcome of the permanent forces of society and represent its normal tendencies, and in so far as they affect character, they tend to eliminate differences and to make all men alike. The thought of normal laws and of a normal man is the direct outcome of this process by which the race ideals and standards are formed. The normal laws are the enduring elements in a society and the normal man is the idealization of the common characteristics in men which these laws create. The moral norm or standard is the best

of which we can conceive, the economic or political norm, however, is simply the present man pictured in terms of his common qualities.

It should be kept in mind that the normal or economic man of the classical economists, is not their creation, but is the result of the application of the democratic ideals of the race to economic problems. Democracy could not have its present force if the common qualities of men had not been idealized. Only when the differences and defects of men are overlooked can the concept of free citizens, born with certain natural rights, become vivid enough to control society. The citizen is taught to pride himself on these common qualities and to resent any intimation that he is defective or different from other men. He prefers to suffer uncomplainingly from slight defects rather than to admit openly that he is not the equal of other men. He wants the full rights of a free citizen and asks for no favors or exceptions. It is upon these instincts that modern societies are built; without them no co-operation would be possible. The social forces elevate the type above the individuals and create a feeling of repugnance toward those who deviate from it. Men therefore love the typical race qualities and resent any intimation that they lack any of them.

It is these facts and feelings that make the concept of an economic man valuable. Men apply their ideals in their economic relations. They want, first of all, to know what is the productive power of the normal man and what share in distribution a free citizen can claim. There is no demand for a drawback because of defects, nor is there a morbid desire to expose their weaknesses and shortcomings so as to arouse a public interest in themselves, and thus secure easier work or a higher return than the normal man can get. Nor do they want their palates and stomachs examined to determine whether any weakness in these organs reduces their pleasure of consumption below that which their neighbors derive from the consumption of the same food. It is a good old

democratic ideal that a man's home is his castle into which the public eye shall not pry. So long as this feeling continues men will demand their share of the goods they produce, but they will consume them at home and deny the right of the public inspector to examine into the amount of the initial or marginal utility of their goods to them, or to compare their utility curve with that of other persons.

A theory of prosperity must measure the motives and determine the tendencies of normal men under normal conditions and compare these motives and tendencies as they show themselves in the different periods during which the society has existed. We cannot compare different periods except through the concepts and ideals which the race has acquired through its long and repeated attempts to secure a better adjustment to its environment. Our interest in classes or individuals in two periods is very slight, unless we feel that the changes in their welfare are typical of the changes in the welfare of the whole society. We have, therefore, much less interest in a series of individual cases, however numerous, than in a single case which we regard as a good example of general tendencies. We idealize a case of this kind and apply to it all the rules which are a part of the common stock of inherited ideas. These common ideas are due to the influence of the enduring elements of the environment. They are the surviving parts of a long series of environments made vivid by modifications in our mental habits. They are thus a part of our heredity through which the concept of a normal man is visualized as a real man and becomes an object of more interest than does any single man or group of men. We soon tire of descriptions of individual men and of their misery and suffering, but in the normal man we have a perennial interest. He is more vivid to us than a brother because we feel him to be a part of ourselves. In short, the normal man is a race ideal and has associated with him all the hopes and aspirations of the race. All the social forces tend to make him prominent; he is the type through which the welfare

and misery of other men become real to us. It must, of course, be admitted that the pains and pleasures of each man differ in many respects from those which the normal man is assumed to endure or to enjoy. Yet these differences from the normal standards are not matters of general interest and do not influence the conduct of men in the same way that the peculiarities of the normal man do. The normal man represents the social standard to which we all desire to conform and from which we do not like to have our neighbors know that we differ. To acknowledge that we suffer more than other persons do under similar circumstances is to admit that we are weak; to get more than the normal pleasure from given commodities shows a tendency toward disease or vice.

While it is admitted that the peculiar susceptibilities of particular individuals to pleasures and pains have some influence on values, that influence is not as great as is taken for granted. Were the world made up of a number of Robinson Crusoes the changing moods of individuals would have a great effect on the sum of values. In a society, however, total value is not determined by a man's quantity of goods, multiplied by his marginal utility, but by the total amount on the market multiplied by the utility of the final unit to the marginal consumer. The moods and inclinations of individuals have little or no effect on value, because the greater or smaller quantity of goods which they desire has so small an effect on the general market. We cannot determine the number of suicides by any effect that their loss of interest in worldly goods may have upon market values. It might give to a few individuals the possibility to acquire certain goods at a slight expense, but this would be merely a transfer of values and not a change in them.

In a theory of prosperity the peculiarities of individuals have still less effect. In two periods widely separated the influence of the environment has time to show itself. There are many persons in each age whose pleasures and pains

differ widely from those of the normal man, yet these individuals are gradually weeded out leaving those persons whose pleasures and pains are normal. Those whose pleasures exceed the average tend to live too fast and thus become victims of temptation, disease and vice, while those who suffer much or who get less than the average pleasure, do not have the energy and power to hold their own in the conflicts of life. There is, therefore, a steady pressure exerted toward the elimination of those who differ much from normal conditions. Changes in the environment may raise or lower the standards of life and thus increase or decrease the amount of its pleasures, but a close conformity to normal conditions is always demanded. Those who deviate from them always have a penalty to pay. It is useless to discuss the effects of melancholy, dyspepsia, of the sudden spread of a pessimistic philosophy, or of those forms of elation due to unstable nervous conditions, for the persons subject to these evils do not belong to the enduring part of society. Each age may produce a large number of such unfortunate persons without their welfare affecting the conditions with which a theory of prosperity must reckon.

If this view of social progress be correct it is possible to formulate normal laws that will correspond to the tendencies and ideals which at a given time characterize society. If the periods under consideration are of long enough duration to eliminate individuals whose standards and feelings deviate widely from normal conditions, these laws will also represent the actual conditions and feelings of the members of the various social groups. It is possible, therefore, to have standards accepted by millions of individuals. Their own happiness and misery differ so little from those of the normal man that they prefer to measure their pleasures and pains by standards that apply to him rather than to expose their own weaknesses or to be regarded as abnormal by their fellows. The democratic ideals growing out of these feelings are gradually increasing in number and in the clearness with

which they are perceived. Although they are to some degree modified by every marked change in the environment or in society, these ideals are not displaced; on the contrary, they acquire increased force and make us less willing to deviate from the standards they set.

The endeavor of American economists to extend the field to which the theory of utility is applicable and to treat of the problems of prosperity and progress, as well as those of value and distribution, is in harmony with these tendencies. To do this, however, they must free themselves from the fetters which have bound them so firmly to the theory of marginal utility and make economic theories so broad and so universal that their field will be the same and their force as great as that of the democratic ideals with which they are so closely related. Economists then can bring economic theory into its normal channel and construct a science that will realize the hopes of its founders.

It will be objected, however, that a revival of interest in the mode of thought of these writers will also lead to a revival of the economic orthodoxy that narrowed the thinking of their age and from which we are not yet entirely free. The spirit of recent economic thought has led us away from the narrow formulæ of the older economists, whose deductions have been displaced in a large degree by the more inductive work of our own time. Even the newer school of deductive economists has discarded the old objective standards, and, by an extensive use of subjective premises, has been able to emphasize more fully the peculiarities of individuals. These economists find little use for the so-called economic man and for the doctrines which depend upon this false concept.

I admit in the fullest way the force of these objections and sympathize with the standpoint from which they are made. They furnish valid reasons for the sharp reaction that took place against the economics of the Ricardian School. The results of this newer movement must always be regarded as among the most noteworthy steps in the progress of the

science. It is, however, the content of this newer economics that should be preserved and not the form in which its ideas are expressed, nor the associations that have grown up because of the conflicts by which they were established. The two movements, though seemingly in opposite directions, are, in reality, parts of one progressive change. The economic man and the normal laws of the earlier economists were not mere fictions, but were the application of generally received ideas to economic topics. The great struggle of the eighteenth century was between an aristocracy with its inherited rights and a growing democracy demanding equality for all. The triumph of this democracy was due to the vividness with which its ideals were impressed and to the emphasis which was given to oppression as the cause of the inequalities which existed among men. It was thoroughly instilled into every one that all were born free and equal and that all marked differences in men were due to the crushing weight of the social inequalities or to differences in the education of men. Remove these two evils and the citizens of a future state would so closely resemble one another that their common qualities could be idealized in the economic man.

Our century began with a full expectation on the part of all lovers of humanity that these ideals would soon be realized and the more confident began to talk as if this happy state of affairs were already a reality. But it was soon seen that the new industrial world had its causes of inequality and that more was needed to realize the great race ideals than the mere brushing away of an old aristocracy and its accompanying oppression. It is needless, in this connection, to trace the gradual recognition of new sources of inequality. It was natural that at first single cases, seemingly isolated exceptions, attracted attention and that the depth, the force and the extent of these evils should not be perceived until the race had lived for some time in its new environment. Only after a revolution had taken place in the field of biology was their true source discovered. The old notions of

an unchanging man, with fixed characteristics, now gave place to new ideas of man's development in harmony with the theory of evolution. The part that heredity plays in the formation of character was seen and a basis was obtained upon which new ideas of man and of the causes of social inequality were built.

The Historical School of economists and other opponents of the older economics were the prophets of these new ideas. At first they saw dimly, but afterward more clearly, the evils which the prevailing ideas encouraged. As these evils were largely the result of free competition it was natural that economic doctrines permitting and even justifying the existing state of affairs should receive a strong condemnation. In this way a struggle arose within the field of economics which, of necessity, was indecisive, because the contest really turned on a principle which neither party clearly saw. The economists were in advance of their time and, forced by their interest in the industrial world to struggle over particular and confusing examples of a general principle, about which there was soon to be a contest in the whole intellectual world. For this reason the struggle between the economists, though necessary, was unfortunate. The intellectual atmosphere of the race had to be changed, public opinion had to be reformed and doctrines and ideas, which it had taken generations to create, had to be discarded or restated in harmony with existing conditions.

The inclinations and tendencies of the newer school of economists caused the emphasis of the needs and peculiarities of individuals; its members saw no other way by which they could show the evils and burdens of the weaker classes. They were opposed therefore to any general principles or normal laws in which the differences in men were lost sight of. Such an attitude was justified at a time when the principles, which lay back of the many exceptions to normal laws, were not clearly seen. We are able now to state clearly and definitely the recent additions to economic

thought and there is no reason why the two groups of economic ideas should not be united into one harmonious whole.

The most radical change demanded by the newer economics relates to the doctrine of equality. The earlier thought assumed that there was a body of free citizens oppressed by the restrictions and burdens imposed by a long-standing aristocracy. These free citizens asked for nothing but a fair chance in the struggle of life. The new thought recognizes that many of these citizens have not the qualities, mental and physical, needed for the modern industrial world. As soon as free competition begins, a class is formed so far below the average citizen in intelligence and skill that it is denied a fair participation in the proceeds of industry by the activity or greed of its better equipped competitors. These lower classes are not fitted for a society which refuses to permit any deviation from the normal laws suitable for a society of equals. It is necessary, therefore, to recognize the existence of a dependent class who lack the inherited qualities needed to enable them to enter into a state of free competition. We cannot with justice go on talking and acting as if all men were born free and equal when we know that many come into the world without the qualities needed to fit them for a society of equals. Their peculiarities and needs must in some way be recognized and new institutions devised for their protection.

The transformation of public opinion necessary to relieve the less efficient classes from these evils has gone on very slowly. In the meantime other principles which help in the necessary reconstruction of our ideas are gaining recognition. Of these the doctrine of social solidarity deserves the first place. So long as the really free citizens felt that their interests were not affected by the suffering of the lower classes it was possible to permit a crude struggle for existence, through which these defective and dependent persons were displaced. It is now recognized that the displacements made by a blind struggle for existence are not those which

promote the interests of society. The struggles of the individuals who fail to survive, if they do not lower the tone of the whole society, prevent or at least greatly retard its progress. A progressive society must integrate its parts. Isolation and conflict produce stagnation and decay.

The feeling of social solidarity is also strengthened by changes in our ideas of the nature of the environment. In the older economics each individual was looked on as an independent unit whose adjustment to the economic environment depended upon his own exertions. His success or failure depended upon the way he utilized the forces of nature. It is now seen that this direct contact of individuals with nature is impossible. It is society as a whole that is increasing its adjustments to nature. The individual comes into contact with his physical environment at but few points. He must adjust himself to society rather than to nature. Progress, therefore, presents a double series of changes; the one binding men together in a society and compelling men to think more of its demands than of those of nature, the other modifying and reorganizing the society so as to increase the sum of its adjustments to nature.

When it is once admitted that a mastery of nature is mainly due to the adjustment of society to nature, it becomes evident that there is a social surplus upon which the claims of particular individuals are less than those of society. This social surplus alters the relations existing between the independent members of a society and its dependent classes. Under the old conditions the feeling of benevolence alone determined the amount of aid which the former class gave to the latter. The unfortunate had no rights; the fortunate gave not from a sense of justice but from a feeling of duty. Under present conditions, however, there is a growing feeling that the dependent classes have a right to share in the social surplus, and that this fund is a trust held by the more fortunate classes for the benefit of society as a whole. The latter cannot, therefore, with propriety divide it up among

themselves or allow its distribution to be determined by the laws of trade and commerce from which they alone derive a benefit.

I do not care to discuss the correctness of these doctrines. I wish merely to show that they are the legitimate products of our recent economic development, and that they are becoming social ideals with which economists must reckon in any attempt to harmonize their doctrines with current social philosophy. Economists must recognize that there is a large dependent class in every progressive community; that progress demands a feeling of social solidarity; and that there is a social surplus upon which every member of society has some claim. Every community has a class of social debtors who get more from it than they add to its welfare. Society is thus divided into two classes: these social debtors and the surplus earners who form the body of its citizens. No economic theory harmonizes with present industrial conditions which neglects or refuses to recognize the presence and necessity of these two classes. The surplus earners have feelings and ideals inherited from our past civilization. They desire objective standards and refuse to profit by a public exhibition of their defects; they want common standards, a strict interpretation of their rights; a fair chance and no favors. On the other hand the social debtors delight in the publicity of their deformities. They ask for subjective standards and decry those general rules which shut out of consideration the particulars of each individual case. It is easy to see that the feelings and ideals of the first class have created the normal laws of the older economics, while the misery and suffering of the latter class have been the cause of the development of the subjective standards of the newer economics.

Subjective and objective standards are both necessary. We must seek for some principle to determine the extent of the field to which each group of standards is applicable. Objective standards are fitted for a society of equals, where

each individual has all the mental and physical qualities that belong to the race and create for it its distinctive characteristics. It is not necessary that the typical man represent the ideal of the race; he is thought of merely as the representative of that society. The society may be in any stage of progress if only all its members are in the same stage. In this case, then, feelings and ideals develop which create and enforce objective standards. All the institutions and standards are universal in their application and any exceptions to these general rules are inconsistent with public welfare. All the relations of such persons are reversible; each would demand of the others nothing but what he expects to return in kind. Kant's well-known law—"So act that thy rule of conduct might be adopted as a law by all rational beings"—is a full expression of the moral law of such a society. Subjective standards are needed, however, when a society is formed by the blending of two or more groups in different stages of progress. Between such groups economic relations grow up which would not exist in a society of equals. The division of labor and the differentiation of occupations separate the groups so widely that each group has an environment of its own, with its resulting standards and ideals. The relations existing between these groups are not reversible, nor are the feelings of the members of these groups enough alike to create a common estimate of goods and acts. The individual groups, therefore, must be studied and their feelings and interests determined by subjective standards, allowing consideration for the peculiarities of each case.

A developing society, such as our own, must therefore recognize two standards—the one applying to the free citizen, the other applying to the dependent classes who have not inherited the mental and physical qualities which enable them to cope with their superiors. The first set of rules must emphasize the common qualities of men and neglect their differences, while the other must temper the general rules by measures designed to improve the condition of the

social debtors. Justice and equity correspond in a general way to the ideas which this distinction makes necessary. Justice in the common thought is the law administered without fear or favor. It is a universal rule applied to all equals. In representing justice as a blindfolded woman the thought is emphasized that objective standards are to be used. To enforce the universal rule she must be blind to the station, peculiarities, and defects of individuals. Equity, however, by righting the wrongs due to general rules, corrects the rigidity of the law. It cannot be made a general rule without damage to society. It may be said to represent a higher moral code than justice, because it relies for its sanction upon general consideration and neglects the instincts, feelings and ideals due to the local environment of each society. Justice is clear and definite and its demands have the support of the particular environment to which the society is adjusted. Equity is an undefined residual due to the influence of broader concepts than those which the particular environment would create. No local environment is so powerful as to exclude some elements of a more general environment from influencing the ideals of men. There can, therefore, be no permanent limits to the scope of justice and equity. As a progressive society passes from local to more general environments some of its rules of equity become general rules and thus a part of justice; but a new type of equity appears through the influence of a still more general environment, with which the society now has some points of contact. Equity therefore tends to magnify the influence of the more general but less definite characteristics of national life, while justice holds firmly to those clearly perceived and well-established rules which fit present conditions.

This distinction between the sources of justice and of equity is clearly manifest in the history of Roman law. In its early history the citizens of Rome were a compact body bound together by ties of relation and ancestry. They were all regarded as equals and justice was administered by fixed

rules of universal application. The migration to Rome of large numbers of people from the other Italian tribes soon created an alien population that had no share in these primitive institutions. For this new element of the population a new law was devised which was, in reality, a collection of the rules and principles common to all the Italian tribes. Roman justice was a group of rules fitted for the local environment of the early Romans. Roman equity was the rules suited to an environment so enlarged as to include all Italy.* When Rome and Italy became one the justice and equity of earlier times blended into one system and became one body of laws. A new equity, due to the influence of a still larger environment, would doubtless have arisen had not the decline of Rome stopped further progress. In fact the doctrines of the Christian religion contained such an equity, but it did not exert much influence until more modern times.

The history of English equity illustrates the same truth. The common law grew up during the Middle Ages when the Feudal system created a peculiar type of a society with definite relations between its members. There was at this time a clearly defined local environment with few points of contact with the outer world. When the environment of the English people was enlarged and new industrial problems arose, a rigid application of the common law failed to satisfy the new conditions. A relief from the evils of the old system was obtained by the development of courts of equity in which decisions were based on broader considerations than those recognized by the common law. Equity was supposed to represent the King's conscience and by an appeal to it a way was found to remedy the defects of the old law. When the modifications in the law demanded by the new environment of the English people were well worked out by the courts of equity there was no longer any real distinction between law and equity; they both became forms of justice and could have been administered by one court.

*Maine, "Ancient Law," p. 49.

The opposition of Bentham to this distinction is not to be wondered at, because in his day all the accepted law was so well established as to become general rules and thus capable of codification. This fact, however, does not show that there is not a real distinction between justice and equity. The equity of one age becomes a part of the established rules of justice of the next age through an enlargement of the environment; yet a new equity appears, because of the inadaptation of the nation to this new environment and the "King's conscience," or the conscience of the public, must be appealed to in order to prevent new forms of injustice.

It is not within the province of this paper to devise a new system of equity to remedy the evils due to an inelastic application of old principles. I will call attention, however, to certain rules which must be observed if it is to supplement but not displace normal laws. The first rule is that no appeal should be made to equity except when the claimant plainly lacks some of the common qualities possessed by the typical man. In the case of equals objective standards should always be applied. The free citizen should have feelings which resent any application of exceptional principles. The social debtors, however, do not have the qualities necessary to foresee distant results, nor have they the power to resist aggression. Their cases are therefore exceptional and demand measures which will secure for them some share in the social surplus.

The second rule is that the claims of individuals for equity are against society and not against individuals. Justice deals with relations between individuals; equity deals with the relations between society and its parts or members. Inequity is due to defects in the regulations or activities of the state, and if these defects are not remedied the state should bear the burden. It only creates a new inequity to impose these burdens upon the citizens who happen to stand in close economic relations to the class or individuals that the first inequity injures. The wrongs of a weaker class are not

righted by arbitrary interference which seeks to aid them at the expense of those with whom they have economic dealings. So also when unexpected industrial changes, beneficial to the public, throw burdens upon certain individuals, they have no right to demand that their losses shall be shifted from themselves to other persons with whom they stand in industrial relations. Their claim for compensation, if valid, is against the public. Society should assume the losses due to industrial progress and recoup itself by asserting its claim to a part of the social surplus which progress creates.

The third rule is that the right of the social debtors to some share in the social surplus does not carry with it the right to determine the form in which they shall receive it. They have not a right to support, a right to work, or any other right giving them a free income to dispose of as they choose. They, like other persons, must satisfy their intense wants and cravings by their own efforts. In the distribution of the social surplus the ends to be kept in view are the progress of society and the acquisition of the common race qualities by all its members. The social debtors must be so elevated that they have the standards and ideals of other citizens. Society is the sole judge of these matters and it must decide what means are the best to secure the desired ends.

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BRIEFER COMMUNICATIONS.

THE RECOGNITION OF CUBAN BELLIGERENCY.

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the undoubted right and propriety on the part of the United States Government to accord belligerent rights to the Cuban insurgents.

It must be confessed, however, at the outset, that it is very difficult to see what immediate practical benefits the Cubans are to enjoy as a result of these rights, so far as the conduct of the war against Spain is concerned, inasmuch as they are in no position to exercise them.

Such recognition by the United States would doubtless give them much moral aid and encouragement in inspiring increased hope and enthusiasm in the Cuban breast, and might induce many natives and even foreigners to enter the Cuban ranks.* It would dignify their struggle in the eyes of the civilized world, and would probably enable them to borrow money and float their bonds. It would entitle them to the rights of war as far as the United States are concerned, but their relations with Spain or other governments would not be affected, unless other governments should be induced to follow our example.

Recognition of Cuban belligerency by the United States implies in itself, however, no more than a declaration of strict and impartial neutrality between the two parties. To both of them are accorded belligerent rights and upon both of them are imposed belligerent duties in the struggle which we consider as actual war. It means that *we* at least do not look upon the Cubans as rebels and pirates, and that *we* think them entitled to all the privileges of honorable warfare and capable of fulfilling neutral obligations. However, should either party fail to observe the most elementary rules of civilized warfare, we should probably remonstrate, and if necessary intervene.

Recognition implies to the Cubans no aid or support other than moral, nor would it give them any special advantage over Spain. We on the contrary bind ourselves to the observance of a stricter neutrality, if possible, than before,† and we accord to both parties certain rights which only one of the parties in this contest (Spain) is in a

* It would seem, however, according to the statements of the Cuban leaders, that (as in the case of the previous revolution of 1868-78) arms and ammunition—not men—are needed.

† At present we are bound merely by our own Neutrality Acts, *i. e.*, by municipal law, which we are under no obligation to Spain to observe. Recognition of Cuban belligerency would place us under international obligations.

position to take advantage of. The exercise of the most important of these rights—that of searching our vessels for contraband goods on the high seas—would be of decided advantage to Spain, and would be a right which she alone would enjoy, inasmuch as the Cubans are not at all in a position to exercise it, nor indeed are they likely to be in such a position for some time to come, being in possession neither of ports nor of commissioned cruisers. Again, as soon as the Cubans are recognized as belligerents, the responsibility to the United States for injury to the persons or property of American citizens within Cuban territory is shifted from Spain to Cuba. Thus we see that the Cubans are not only in no position to exercise the more important rights of belligerency, but that they would become subject to onerous duties. They would have the right, to be sure, to insist upon the strict neutrality of the United States, but they could not prevent the sale of contraband goods to their enemies—a strictly legal business in itself, although Spain would be able to prevent such sale to them. These points are not made to prove that the true interests of the Cubans lie in remaining unrecognized by the United States (for the moral support which such recognition would give them would of course far outweigh these disadvantages); but merely to call attention to the fact that the recognition of Cuban belligerency is in itself not such a radical step and would not be so injurious to Spain as some would have us think; and that such recognition would involve some sacrifice on our part, and would not be of unmixed benefit to Cuba.*

The importance attached to the recognition of Cuban belligerency by the United States is in part due to the commanding position which this nation occupies in the eyes of the civilized world. In greater part, however, the importance attached to such a step is due to the great and peculiar interest which the government and people of the United States have always taken, since the early part of this century, in the future of Cuba.

This interest has been manifested in various ways. As early as 1823, when a rumor had reached the United States to the effect that France intended to take possession of Cuba, Mr. J. Q. Adams, Secretary of State, wrote to Mr. Nelson, United States Minister in Spain, that "these islands [referring to Cuba and Porto Rico], from their local position, are natural appendages to the North American continent,

* General Campos, the former commander-in-chief of the Spanish forces, is reported to have said in an interview by the *New York Times* of December 8, 1895: "Recognition of Cuban belligerency would have no serious consequences for Spain. On the contrary, it would give us the advantage of having the right to search American ships on the high seas, as well as enable us to stop many expeditions that otherwise would be able, from time to time, to slip in."

and one of them [Cuba] almost in sight of our shores, from a multitude of considerations has become an object of transcendent importance to the commercial and political interests of our Union. Its commanding position, with reference to the Gulf of Mexico and the West Indian seas; the character of its population; its situation midway between our Southern coast and the island of San Domingo; its safe and capacious harbor of Havana, fronting a long line of our shores destitute of the same advantage; the nature of its productions and of its wants, furnishing the supplies and needing the returns of a commerce immensely profitable and mutually beneficial, give it an importance in the sum of our national interests with which that of no other foreign territory can be compared, and little inferior to that which binds the different members of this Union together." *

Jefferson, in a letter of June 11, 1823, to President Monroe wrote: "Its [Cuba's] possession by Great Britain would indeed be a great calamity to us. Could we induce her to join us in guaranteeing its independence against all the world, *except* Spain, it would be nearly as valuable as if it were our own. But should she take it, I would not immediately go to war for it; because the first war on other accounts will give it to us, or the island will give itself to us when able to do so." He recommends a neutrality as partial to Spain as the circumstances would justify, but in another letter written a fortnight later, June 23, 1823, he retracts his opinion and thinks "it is better to lie still, in readiness to receive that interesting incorporation when solicited by herself, for certainly her addition to our Confederacy is exactly what is wanted to round our power as a nation to the point of its utmost interest." †

On the seventeenth of October, 1825, Mr. Clay was directed by President J. Q. Adams to announce to our ministers to the leading European governments "that the United States for themselves desired no change in the political condition of Cuba; that they were satisfied that it should remain open as it now is, to their commerce, and that they could not with indifference see it passing from Spain to any (other) European power." And in instructions to Mr. Brown, Minister to France, October 25, 1825, Mr. Clay wrote: "You will now add that we could not consent to the occupation of those islands [Cuba and Porto Rico] by any other European power than Spain under any contingency whatever." ‡

Mr. Gallatin, when Minister at London, tried "to impress strongly on his [Mr. Canning's] mind that it was impossible that the United

* Wharton's "Digest," Vol. i, p. 361.

† Ibid., pp. 366-67.

‡ Ibid., p. 367.

States could acquiesce in the conquest by, or transfer of, that island [Cuba] to any great maritime power."

This policy with reference to Cuba was reiterated during the administrations of Jackson, Van Buren and Tyler, and found ardent exponents in Mr. Webster and Mr. Calhoun.* President Polk, in 1848, went so far as to authorize a direct proposal to Spain for the purchase of Cuba, and, according to Von Holst,† Mr. Saunders, Minister to Spain, was authorized by Secretary Buchanan to go as high in his offer as \$100,000,000. The proposition was, according to Secretary Clayton,‡ "considered by the Spanish Ministry as a national indignity, and the sentiment of the ministry was responded to by the Cortes." It was not, therefore, renewed by the succeeding administration.

In consequence, however, of three filibustering expeditions under Lopez and the warm sympathy which they elicited in the South, England and France proposed to the United States Government, in 1852, a tripartite agreement with reference to Cuba in the form of a treaty, to the effect that the three "high contracting parties severally and collectively disclaim, both now and for hereafter, all intention to obtain possession of the island of Cuba," and that they bind themselves not to "obtain or maintain, for themselves, or for any one of themselves, any exclusive control over the said island, nor assume nor exercise any dominion over the same."§ This proposition was rejected by the United States on the grounds, as stated by Secretary Everett, that "the policy of the United States has uniformly been to avoid as far as possible alliances or agreements with other States, and to keep itself free from national obligations, except such as affect directly the interests of the United States themselves;" that "although the President did not covet the acquisition of Cuba for the United States, he at the same time considered the condition of that island as mainly an American question;" that the proposed convention "assumed that the United States had no other or greater interest in the question than France or England, whereas it was necessary only to cast one's eye on the map to see how remote were the relations of Europe and how intimate those of the United States with this island."||

On October 8, 1854, after a revival of filibustering projects, the interference on the part of the Cuban authorities with our commerce, and the rights of American citizens, which culminated in the "Black

* Ibid., p. 369, etc.

† "History of the United States, 1846-50," p. 441.

‡ Wharton's "Digest," Vol. i, p. 373.

§ Tucker's "Monroe Doctrine," pp. 83-84.

|| Ibid., pp. 86-89; Snow, "American Diplomacy," p. 353.

Warrior" incident, the three ministers to England, France and Spain respectively, Buchanan, Mason and Soulté, acting under instructions of the administration, met at Ostend, for "a full and free interchange of views in order to secure a concurrence in reference to the general object," * *i. e.*, the purchase of Cuba. On the eighteenth of October they signed the "Ostend Manifesto," addressed to Secretary Marcy, in which they argued that "an immediate effort ought to be made by the Government of the United States to purchase Cuba from Spain" at a sum not exceeding \$120,000,000, and that the interest of Spain would be "greatly and essentially promoted" by the sale of the island to the United States. The manifesto went so far as to threaten force, "if Spain, dead to the voice of her own interest, and actuated by stubborn pride and a false sense of honor, should refuse to sell Cuba to the United States." † This manifesto was not approved by President Pierce, although Buchanan, as President, still continued to urge the acquisition of Cuba in successive messages." ‡

With the abolition of slavery in the United States, one of the main causes of the agitation for the annexation of Cuba has ceased to exist, and "although there has been much correspondence with Spain in respect of Cuban affairs, active projects for the acquisition of the island have not been revived by the government of the United States." § On the other hand, the projected construction of an Inter-oceanic Canal has supplied the advocates of annexation with a powerful argument, for as one writer observes, || "It is plain, also, that any increased facility of Isthmian transit, such as a successfully operated canal, must result in placing the commerce benefited thereby more or less under the supervision of the fleets which find a haven in her [Cuba's] numerous harbors." Furthermore, the protracted struggle of 1868-78, and the present insurrection (which promises to be a repetition of the former on a larger scale) have made it more and more evident that Spain can retain Cuba only at great cost to herself and at great discomfort and inconvenience to the United States.

Let us now examine the question of the right and propriety on the part of the United States Government, under these and other circumstances which we shall consider, to recognize Cuban belligerency. Cuba cannot claim a right of recognition, even if she were to file a much stronger brief than she is capable of doing. Recognition of belligerency is an act of pure grace on the part of the neutral government,

* Executive Documents, Second Session, 33d Congress.

† Ibid.

‡ Wharton's "Digest," pp. 381-83.

§ Snow's "American Diplomacy," p. 357.

|| Tucker's "Monroe Doctrine," pp. 77-78.

and one which can be granted or withheld at pleasure. Those writers who like Vattel and Bluntschli urge a right of recognition on grounds of humanity and the like, evidently consider the moral rather than the legal aspect of the question.

Recognition of belligerency is determined by two classes of facts: the existence of actual war in the sense of international law, and the policy or necessity of recognizing the existence of such a war on the part of the neutral state. The former are questions of law; the latter of policy.

The true ground of recognition as a matter of policy as stated by Hall (one of the few writers who seems to have clear and definite ideas on this subject) is "based upon a possibility that the interests of a state may be so affected as to make recognition a reasonable measure of self-protection."*

Hall distinguishes three cases in this connection: (1) The case of a struggle in the midst of loyal and isolated provinces. In this instance, he thinks, the question is one which can hardly arise. (2) The case of a contiguous state. Here he admits that recognition is a possibility, and is, he says, at the option of the contiguous state. (3) The case of maritime warfare. Here the presumption is in favor of recognition. He even thinks recognition may be granted if a reasonable expectation of such hostilities exists.†

It may seem difficult, perhaps, to place Cuba in any of the above categories. We certainly cannot look upon her as an isolated province, and there does not exist even the pretence of maritime warfare. But to claim that she is not to all intents and purposes contiguous to our territory would be sacrificing a great deal to the literal meaning of a word. After all, the position of contiguity or non-contiguity is not an essential part of the problem. It is an insignificant detail, and the real ground or basis of recognition should be the matter of the commercial or property interests and the protection of the persons of our own citizens.

Dana, in an invaluable note to Wheaton,‡ on the recognition of belligerency, correctly states the question which the neutral state must ask itself, as follows: "Whether its own rights and interests are so far affected as to require a definition of its own relation to the parties."

It seems clear that apart from any considerations arising out of our *peculiar* interest in Cuba, our rights and interests are very seriously threatened and affected by a prolonged struggle between Spain and

* Hall's "International Law," p. 35.

† Ibid., pp. 36-37.

‡ Wheaton's (Dana's Ed.) "International Law," note 15, pp. 34-39.

the Cuban insurgents. Cuba has been in a state of more or less active or slumbering revolution ever since the period in which the Spanish-American Colonies achieved their independence, and in the struggle which preceded the present insurrection (1868-1878) the agony was prolonged for ten years. The loss of American property, as well as the injury to our commercial interests, was very great. President Hayes said, in his first annual message to Congress, in 1877: "It is impossible not to feel that it [the insurrection] is attended with incidents affecting the rights and interests of American citizens. Apart from the effect of hostilities upon trade between the United States and Cuba, their progress is inevitably accompanied by complaints having more or less foundation, of searches, arrests, embargoes, and oppressive taxes upon the property of American residents, and of unprovoked interference with American vessels and commerce."* In 1874, Secretary Fish, in a communication to Mr. Cushing, had complained that "for any injury done to the United States or their citizens in Cuba we have no direct means of redress there, but can obtain it only by slow and circuitous action by way of Madrid." In the same communication he says: "Meanwhile this condition of things grows, day by day, more and more insupportable to the United States. The government is compelled to exert constantly the utmost vigilance to prevent infringement of our law on the part of the Cubans purchasing munitions or materials of war, or laboring to fit out military expeditions in our ports; we are constrained to keep a large naval force to prevent violations of our sovereignty, either by the Cubans or the Spaniards, etc." †

The much-needed "series of extensive reforms," of which Secretary Fish says in a communication dated October 29, 1872, to General Sickles, "the present ministry of Spain has given assurance to the public, through their organs of the press, and have confirmed the assurance to you personally," ‡ have not been carried out except that of the abolition of slavery, and the result is another insurrection, perhaps more serious and injurious to our interests than the last, and the term or outcome of which no man can predict.

Our commerce with Cuba is stated in round numbers to consist of \$82,000,000 worth of imports, and \$19,000,000 of exports. The "Statesman's Year Book" for 1895 records, that out of 718,204 tons of sugar, exported from Cuba in 1893, 680,642 tons went to the United States. During that same year we also imported 7654 hogsheads of molasses. We purchase about two-thirds of the tobacco

* Wharton's "Digest," Vol. i. p. 410.

† Ibid., pp. 397-98.

‡ Ibid., p. 389.

which Cuba raises, and nearly one-half of her cigars. In 1892, Cuba purchased in our markets a little less than one-third of all her imports—securing a little over one-third from Spain, and considerably less than one-third from Great Britain. Her main imports are rice, beef, and flour—articles which we are desirous of selling.

In determining our policy towards Spain with reference to Cuba, we have a right not only to consider the actual and temporary loss which our commerce sustains through those protracted struggles which Spain seems unable or unwilling to prevent or extinguish, but we have a right to look to our ultimate and permanent interests.

The number of American citizens domiciled in Cuba and the amount of American capital invested there is another element in the problem which must not be ignored. Statistics are here unavailable, but the number and amount must be large.* Our duty to protect these people and these interests, and the necessity of fixing both parties to the contest with responsibility, may make the recognition of Cuban belligerency imperative at any moment. Up to the present time the Cubans, desirous of preserving our good will and retaining our sympathy, seem to have furnished this protection of their own accord.

Up to this point we have considered only one class of facts—those relating to our own peculiar and commercial interests, and the policy toward which these point may readily be inferred. There is, however, another class of facts which must be considered and tested before our decision can be final.

It is not alone sufficient that we follow the line indicated by our own interests, but unless we would be found guilty of an unfriendly, almost a hostile act toward Spain, we must convince ourselves that the struggle now going on in Cuba amounts in fact to a war, for a recognition of belligerency is simply a recognition of a *de facto* state, viz., that of war, or regulated violence.

The main grounds for refusal to recognize Cuban belligerency during the previous insurrection, a step, however, which President Grant at one time at least seems to have contemplated,† are thus summed up by him in his seventh annual message, 1875: "I fail to find in the insurrection the existence of such substantial political organization, real, palpable, and manifest to the world, having the forms and capable

* Señor Fidel y Pierra, chairman of the Cuban Revolutionary Committee in New York and former Secretary of the Pan-American Congress of 1889, claims that not less than \$25,000,000 of United States money is vested in Cuban plantations, sugar refineries, and other enterprises. Besides there is, it is stated, a sum estimated at from \$10,000,000 to \$15,000,000 advanced by American merchants upon the Cuban sugar crop of 1896.

† See the recently published extracts by the Associated Press, March 15, from Hamilton Fish's diary.

of the ordinary functions of government towards its own people and to other states, with courts for the administration of justice, with a local habitation, possessing such organization of force, such material, such occupation of territory, as to take the contest out of the category of a mere rebellious insurrection, or occasional skirmishes, and place it on the terrible footing of war, to which a recognition of belligerency would aim to elevate it." *

A careful reading of the speeches delivered in Congress † while the question of the recognition of Cuban belligerency was under discussion in June, 1870, will, I think, convince the skeptic that President Grant, while absolutely in the right in insisting upon these tests, was wrong in their application to Cuban affairs, and that he committed a grave error in allowing his first and better judgment to be overruled by that of his Secretary of State. ‡

Among the tests then, accepting the principles laid down by General Grant and by one of the most exacting and authoritative writers on international law, § which we would apply to the question

* Wharton's "Digest," Vol. i, p. 406.

† *Congressional Globe*, Second Session, Forty-first Congress, Parts 5 and 6.

‡ The Republic of Cuba was organized in April, 1869, by a convention of delegates from the rebellious districts, and a liberal constitution was adopted. Full legislative powers were given to a House of Representatives, to which body was also entrusted the nomination of a President and Commander-in-Chief. Sessions of the assembly were held, and the revolution was general in the central and eastern portions of the island. The President was assisted by a Cabinet of five members, and in each State there was an elected Governor; in each district a Lieutenant-Governor. The districts were divided into prefectships and subprefectships. The prefects and sub-prefects are described as "justices of the peace, with administrative duties."

The strength and obstinacy of the Cuban resistance can only be judged by the enormous expenditure of men, money, and effort which it cost Spain to maintain the struggle during ten years—a struggle in which the Cubans were only induced to lay down their arms by the promise on the part of General Campos of thorough and far-reaching reforms. In a debate in the Cortes in 1876 it was stated that 145,000 soldiers had been sent to Cuba in eight years with little or no result. Up to 1871, *i. e.*, in three years, Spain had spent \$70,339,658.70. By 1871 Spain had 100,000 men under arms, and was in possession of 52 vessels and 30 gunboats. In three years, it is said, Spain lost 68,000 out of 80,000 men, while the Cubans lost only 13,000; 43,000 Cubans, however, were under arrest, many of whom were shot or died in prison.

Of course it must be recognized that a powerful ally of the Cubans was disease which played a greater part than insurgent ammunition in this fiendish work of destruction. In 1870 General Jordan, the Commander-in-Chief of the insurgent forces publicly confessed that there were not in Cuba 10,000 arms.—See articles on Cuba, in "Encyclopedia Britannica" and "American Encyclopedia;" also *Congressional Globe*, Second Session, Forty-first Congress, Parts 5 and 6.

§ Dana, in the above-mentioned note to Wheaton, note 15. It would not have been difficult to collect from great and highly respected authorities and leading cases, principles or tests which it would have been much easier to apply to the

of Cuban belligerency are these: In the first place, is there a "*de facto*" political organization sufficient in character, population and resources to constitute it, if left to itself, a state among the nations, reasonably capable of discharging the duties of a state."

The New York *Times* on November 10, 1895, published a fac-simile of the Cuban Declaration of Independence and the Provisional Constitution of the Cuban Republic. It appears that this Constitution, although adopted by elected delegates, is entirely provisional in its character, and has not established democratic or representative institutions. There is no Congress or representative body, there are no elective offices (as was the case during the previous revolution), but at the end of two years an Assembly is to be convened for the purpose of choosing a new government and revising the Constitution. "The supreme power of the Republic is vested in a council composed of a President, Vice-President, and four Secretaries for the dispatch of War, of the Interior, of Foreign Affairs, and of the Treasury." (Art. I.) This council exercises all the ordinary functions of sovereignty, but shall "intervene in the direction of military affairs only when, in their judgment, it shall be absolutely necessary to do so." * (Art. IV.)

The letters of Mr. Wm. Mannix, † a newspaper correspondent, have made it clear that Cuba has in her President a man of high character—a naturalized American, and a regular system of administration organized, it seems, on the French prefect plan, covering within the range of its activities from two-thirds to three-fourths of Cuban territory. The number of "*prefectos*" is stated to count up to about 200, and there are in addition an indefinite number of "*sub-prefectos*." The *prefecto* is described by Mr. Mannix as a "combination of justice of the peace, mayor and general overseer of the people of his district." They report and are responsible to the President of the Cuban Republic, by whom they are appointed.‡ In January of this year, the President left his mountain capital, Cubitas, which Mr.

present state of affairs in Cuba than those which have been selected.—*e. g.*, the opinion expressed by Justice Grier, in *The Prize Cases*, 2 Black., 665, "when the party in rebellion occupy and hold in a hostile manner a certain portion of territory; have declared their independence; have cast off their allegiance; have organized armies; have commenced hostilities against their former sovereign, the world acknowledges them as belligerents and the contest a war."—See also Vattel, §§ 293-4, and Bluntschli, §§ 5-12

* There is an interesting provision to the effect that the property of foreigners, whose governments recognize the rights of belligerency to Cuba, shall be exempt from taxation during the revolution.—Art. XX.

† See *e. g.*, Chicago *Inter-Ocean* of February 7, 10 and 27, 1896.

‡ The reader will not fail to compare this account of the organization of the present Cuban Republic with that given of the previous Republic in the foot-note on p. 82.

Mannix visited and describes, and made an extended tour of inspection throughout the island, lasting several weeks. During this time he appointed, it is said, thirty new *prefectos*.

Another test of the status of belligerency, as stated by Dana, is "the actual employment of military forces on each side, acting in accordance with the rules and customs of war, such as the use of flags of truce, cartels, exchange of prisoners and treatment by the parent state as prisoners of war."

The number of Cuban forces in the field is variously estimated at from 20,000 to 50,000 men.* It seems certain that the Cuban Army is on a much better war footing to-day than at any time during the previous insurrection. The men seem to be well commanded, and are amenable to discipline so far as one can judge by the plan of campaign and their occasional successes won against great odds; and they seem to be fairly well fed, clothed and equipped, although in the latter respect there is still much to be desired. The fact that a large number of Spanish soldiers, estimated at from 700 to 1700 men, are held by the Cubans as prisoners of war, shows that they at least pay some regard to the usages of civilized warfare. Besides, these prisoners furnish a guarantee that General Weyler will not wholly ignore those usages. The war, at least as conducted by General Canipos, was carried on in as humane and praiseworthy a manner as circumstances would permit, and furnishes a noteworthy contrast to the conduct of both parties during the last Cuban revolution. The Cubans seem to have in their Commander-in-Chief, General Gomez, an experienced leader and an able strategist. As long as there is general unity and responsibility in the plan of campaign, reasonable method in the madness even of guerilla warfare, an observance of the rules of war, and capable leadership, I fail to see why the Cuban manner of fighting should be made a source of reproach to them. Guerilla warfare has frequently been resorted to by the Spaniards themselves, and the annals of our own military history show that we have not always disdained similar methods.

The number of men and the amount of money already expended by Spain in this contest has been very great. Early last autumn, the Spanish Prime Minister, in an authorized interview, declared that a few weeks after the beginning of October would see the end of the Cuban Rebellion. Since then the rebellion has extended over the greater part of the island, and Havana itself has been threatened. Virtually, the whole Spanish Army is in service in Cuba, and the number of soldiers who have been sent to Cuba probably exceeds

* The latter estimate is that of General Gomez himself, and of course its accuracy cannot be trusted. Probably the lowest estimate is nearest the truth.

120,000 men. In an interview on December 4, 1895, General Campos is reported to have said: "The war is of more importance than I was at first willing to believe or admit. The insurgents are no longer confined to any particular district, but are all over the island." *

The third and last test of the status of belligerency as stated by Dana is "at sea, the employment by the insurgents of commissioned cruisers, and the exercise by the parent state of the rights of blockade of insurgent ports, of stopping and searching neutral vessels at sea." No writer or authority so far as I know, including even Dana himself, holds this test to be one which is absolutely essential. He merely claims that it is more decisive than the others. It is in fact conclusive, and if this test can be applied, recognition almost follows as a matter of course. To hold this to be an essential test of the fact of belligerency, would imply a denial that war can be carried on solely on land.

It is certainly true that the favorite argument in the newspapers—"because the Spaniards are cruel, therefore we ought to recognize the belligerency of the Cubans"—is not based on any principle of international law. But a recognition of Cuban belligerency would, under the circumstances, we hold, be the exercise of a strictly legal right, and being under no special obligations to Spain, there would be no impropriety on our part in following the lines indicated by our own sympathy and interests—temporary and ultimate—*i. e.*, to assist Cuba in the only possible way which is legally permissible, *viz.*, by recognizing her belligerency.*

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ADAM SMITH AND JAMES ANDERSON.

In spite of the suggestiveness of certain passages in the "Wealth of Nations," it seems clear that Adam Smith conceived rent as a constituent element, determining, and not as a differential surplus, determined by marginal price. There is no evidence in the numerous editions of the "Wealth of Nations" published during Smith's lifetime, nor in any of his recorded utterances, of a change of opinion in this direction, in the interval from 1776 to his death in 1790. This cannot be explained by the mere failure of his written thought to attract criticism. Hume's dissent is familiar: "I cannot think that the rent of farms makes any part of the price of the produce, but that

* *New York Times*, December 4, 1895.

the price is determined altogether by the quantity and the demand." * Of greater importance is the explicit recognition of rent as a differential gain by James Anderson, the well-known Scotch writer on agricultural subjects, first in 1777 in the course of a sharp criticism of Adam Smith's views on the effect of a bounty on the exportation of corn, and in various writings thereafter.

It seems natural and reasonable to infer that Smith must have been acquainted with Anderson's exposition—at least in the form in which it is presented in the "Observations on the Means of Exciting a National Spirit of Industry in Scotland," the criticism above referred to. This inference has been drawn by various writers. Professor Ingram declares that the volume "can hardly have escaped Smith's notice." † Mr. Cannan stated that Smith "can scarcely have failed to see Anderson's criticism." ‡ and Mr. John Rae adds that Anderson "won Smith's friendship by a controversial pamphlet challenging some of his doctrines." §

Definite verification of the views thus expressed is afforded by certain paragraphs in various of Anderson's writings, and it seems desirable that specific attention should be directed thereto.

Intimation of actual acquaintance between the two men is given in a brief introduction to the "Anecdotes of the late Dr. Smith," by Amicus, contained in *The Bee*, || a serial publication of which Anderson was editor and proprietor. Anderson here stated that the anecdotes were transmitted to him under the strongest assurances of authenticity, "concerning which, indeed, he entertained no doubt after their perusal, from the coincidence of certain opinions here mentioned, with what he himself had heard maintained by that gentleman."

The circumstance which formed the occasion of the acquaintance is described by Anderson in a postscript ¶ to Volume III., of his "Essays Relating to Agriculture and Rural Affairs." After expressing dissent from Adam Smith's views on the corn laws, Anderson adds: "This opinion of Dr. Smith I combatted soon after the publication of his book. [Observations on National Industry, Letter XII. P. S.] He at one time declared that he did intend to answer it, and took steps to ascertain facts respecting that subject; but afterwards laid the design aside."

The same circumstance is described somewhat more fully in a passage in one of Anderson's later pamphlets, "A Calm Investigation of

* Burton, "Life of Hume," Vol. ii., p. 487.

† "History of Political Economy," p. 128.

‡ "History of the Theories of Production and Distribution," p. 221.

§ "Life of Adam Smith," p. 318.

|| Vol. iii., pp. 1-8; May 11, 1791.

¶ "Cursory Remarks on the Corn Laws of Great Britain." 2d edit., 1798, p. 503.

the Circumstances that Have Led to the Present Scarcity of Grain in Great Britain." * After criticising Adam Smith's views, the writer continues: "These remarks occur in a work that I was writing at the time, and which was published in the year 1777, under the title of 'Observations on the Means of Exciting a Spirit of National Industry, Chiefly as Applicable to Scotland.' A juvenile performance, that has had very little sale, and attracted very little notice. The principles that are laid down in these observations, however (see P. S. to Letter XII), on this subject at least, I think I may now take upon me to say, are established incontrovertibly; not only because no one has yet attempted to refute them, not even Dr. Smith himself (to whom a copy of the work was sent as soon as it was published), though he told our common friend, Dr. Cullen, immediately after he read it, that he thought it required an answer, which he intended to give it; and he did, to my knowledge, take measures to ascertain some facts with that view; but, upon maturer consideration, it would seem, he relinquished the design."

The most satisfactory statement is contained in a note in an obscure pamphlet of Anderson, "Selections from the Correspondence of George Washington and James Anderson." † The note is appended to a long letter of Anderson to Washington, dated London, January 10, 1800. It was only drafted, the writer states, when intelligence of Washington's death was received; in consequence it was never sent. The note restates some of the facts given above, but is here inserted in full:

"Few authors have a better title to the very liberal applause that his writings have obtained for him than Dr. Adam Smith; but on this subject in his great work on the 'Wealth of Nations,' he has done harm. No sooner did his work fall into my hands than I perceived the probable evil that would result from a mistake in a man so justly celebrated; and I embraced the first opportunity that occurred of pointing out the fallacy of his mode of reasoning on the corn laws. This is done in the P. S. to the twelfth letter in the 'Observations on the Means of Exciting a Spirit of National Industry,' published in the year 1777, a copy of which was transmitted through the intervention of our common friend, Dr. Cullen. This was the commencement of a friendly intercourse that subsisted between us during the whole after period of his life. He never entered upon the subject of the corn trade in conversation with myself; but he did so with Dr. Cullen, who informed me that he had told him that he intended to

* London, 1801, p. 18. The passage is cited in Brentano, "*James Anderson: Drei Schriften über Korngesetze und Grundrente*," xxvii.

† Charlestown, 1800, p. 75.

answer these remarks, which he said I might consider as a great compliment, as he never heard Dr. Smith say as much of any other opponent. I understood afterward that he had made inquiries concerning some facts I had stated; but he never made the answer he proposed. The principles I there endeavored to establish were more fully developed in a pamphlet afterward printed (1777) on the Corn Laws, now out of print. These principles have been but too fully established by the events that have succeeded since that time."

The only circumstance, which I have encountered, of this long period of "friendly intercourse," is that described by Mr. John Rae, in his "Life of Adam Smith." * Both Smith and Anderson were members of the Royal Society of Edinburgh. At a meeting in July, 1789, at which only seven persons were present, Anderson read a paper on "Debtors and the Revision of the Laws that respect them." The paper, Samuel Rogers records, was "very long and dull," and "Mr. Commissioner Smith fell asleep."

The records of the Royal Society of Edinburgh doubtless contain further material upon the subject. But the essential fact, that of Adam Smith's actual acquaintance with James Anderson and his writings, seems clearly established.

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Johns Hopkins University.

* P. 421.

PERSONAL NOTES.

AUSTRIA.

Lemberg.—At the University of Lemberg Dr. Stanislaus Glombinski has recently been appointed Ordinary Professor of Political Economy and Finance. He was born at Skole, Galicia, February 25, 1862. His early education was received in the gymnasium at Sambor, Galicia, his university training at the University of Lemberg, 1881–84, where in 1886 he received the degree of *doctor juris*. In 1888 he was called to Lemberg by the Faculty of Law as a supply, for the instruction of political economy. In 1889 he became privat docent for that subject and in 1891 for finance also. In 1892 Dr. Glombinski received promotion to the rank of an Extraordinary Professor. He is a member of the executive committee of the Polish Society of Jurisprudence and of the Handels Geographischen Vereins. The titles of his writings for the greater part in the Polish language are here given in English.

"*Polish Population in Silesia.*" 1882.

"*The Physiocratic System of Political Economy.*" Pp. 106. 1888.

"*The Science of Finance.*" Pp. 164. 1889–90.

"*Currency in Austria.*" Pp. 196. 1890.

"*Currency Reform in Austria.*" Pp. 42. 1890.

"*Ueber den hentigen Zustand des Ackerbaus,*" 1893.

"*Joseph Supinski.*" 1893.

"*Ueber die Verbindung des Hypothekarkredits mit der Lebensversicherung.*" 1893.

"*System of Political Economy*" (prepared in conjunction with Dr. Bilinski, Austrian Minister of Finance). Pp. 695. 1894.

"*System of Finance.*" Pp. 325. 1894.

"*Neue Währung in Oesterreich.*" 1894.

"*The Finances of Galicia.*" 1894.

"*On the Social Question.*" 1894.

"*Volkswirthschaftliche Rückblicke auf die Lemberger Landesausstellung.*" Oesterreichisch-ungarische Revue, 1895.

ITALY.

Genoa.—At the University of Genoa Dr. Giulio Salvatore Del Vecchio has recently been appointed Ordinary Professor of Statistics. He was born November 27, 1845, at Lugo in Romagna, and attended the gymnasium of Leghorn and the Royal Lyceum of Bologna before entering, in 1865, the University of Bologna. There he pursued legal

studies, and in 1869 obtained the degree of *doctor juris*. After practicing law in Turin he became Professor of Political Economy and Statistics in schools at Trapani, 1872; Asti, 1874; and Bologna, 1876. In 1888 he was appointed Extraordinary Professor of Statistics at the University of Genoa. His works are:

"*Sulla educazione pratica.*" Lugio, 1868.

"*Sull' Armonia delle industrie.*" Bologna, 1869.

"*Del metodo d'insegnamento delle scienze giuridiche ed economiche.*" Milan, 1875.

"*Intorno al concetto della statistica, considerato nel suo svolgimento storico.*" Padua, 1877.

"*Intorno all' obbietto al' metodo e all' importanza della scienza statistica.*" Padua, 1878.

"*Sulle ricerche statistiche intorno ai matrimoni fra consanguinei e ai loro effetti.*" Rome, 1878.

"*Sul terzo censimento della popolazione italiana.*" Bologna, 1881.

"*Statistica e Finanze.*" Bologna, 1883.

"*La famiglia rispetto alla società civile e al problema sociale.*" Turin, 1887.

"*Sulla emigrazione permanente italiana nei paesi stranieri, avvenuta nel dodicennio, 1876-1887.*" Bologna, 1892.

"*Gli Analfabeti e le nascite nelle varie parti d'Italia.*" Bologna, 1894.

"*Su gli Analfabeti e le nascite.*" Saggio secondo. *Note comparative tra l'Italia ed altre nazione.*" Bologna, 1895.

Padua.—At the University of Padua Dr. Giulio Alessio has recently been appointed Ordinary Professor of Finance. He was born May 13, 1853, at Padua, where he received his early education and pursued university studies, obtaining the degree of *doctor juris*. His academic career has been spent wholly at Padua, where in 1878 he entered the university as *professore incaricato*, advancing soon after to the post of Extraordinary Professor. Professor Alessio is a member of the Academy of Padua and of the British Economic Association. Besides many articles, reviews in the *Giornali degli Economisti*, *Pensiero Italiano*, *Riforma Sociale* and *Revista italiano per le scienze giuridiche*, he has written:

"*L'Imposta del Dazio consumo in Italia.*" *Annali di Statistica*, 1880.

"*Di alcuni criterii proprie dell' insegnamento superiore dell' Economia politica.*" Padua, 1881.

"*Saggio sul' sistema tributario in Italia et sui suoi effetti economici et sociali.*" 2 vols. Pp. 1400. Turin, 1883 and 1889.

"*I consorzii universitarii e lo studio di Padova.*" Padua-Verona, 1887.

"*Il fondamento economici-sociali nelle dottrine finanziarie.*" Giornali degli Economisti, 1888.

"*Alcune riflessioni intorno al consetto del valore nell' antichità classica.*" Archivio Giuridico, 1889.

"*Studii sulla teoria del valore nel cambio interno.*" Pp. 250. Turin, 1890.

"*Il sistema daziario nord americano.*" Giornali degli Economisti, 1893.

"*La funzione del tesoro nello stato moderno.*" Pp. 150. Padua-Verona, 1894.

"*Gli studii sociali et l'azione delle classi dirigenti in Italia.*" Reforma Sociale, 1894.

"*Das italienische Finanzwesen im Jahre 1891.*" Finanz Archiv, Vol. IX.

Siena.—At the University of Siena, Dr. Augusto Graziani* has recently been appointed Ordinary Professor of Political Economy. His recent publications are :

"*Le idee economiche degli scrittori Emiliani e Romagnoli primo al 1848.*" Pp. 188. Modena, 1893.

"*Di alcune questione relative alla dottrina del salario.*" Pp. 82. Siena, 1893.

"*Il fondamento economico del diritto.*" Inaugural discourse for the Academic year 1893-94, at the University of Siena. Siena, 1894.

"*Per una classificazione.*" Giornali degli Economisti, 1893.

"*Sul pagamento dei salari in Italia.*" Reforma Sociale, 1894.

"*Intorno al monopolio.*" Ibid., 1894.

"*L'imposta generale sul reddito e le legislazione finanziarie francese.*" Ibid., 1894.

"*Il socialismo teorico e l'economia politica.*" Turin, 1895.

"*Die Litteratur der Dogmengeschichte der politischen Oekonomie in Italien.*" Zeitschrift für Litteratur und Geschichte der Staatswissenschaften, 1895.

"*Di alcuni recenti studi d'economia politica e di scienze delle finanze.*" Studii Senesi, 1895.

"*Introduzione di scienze delle finanze.*" Turin, 1896. (In press.)

SWEDEN.

Gothenburg.—At the University of Gothenburg, Sweden, Dr.

* See ANNALS, Vol. iii, p. 813. May, 1893.

Ludwig V. A. Stavenow has recently been appointed Professor of History and Political Science. He was born October 12, 1864, at Stockholm, where he received his early education. From 1882 to 1890 he spent at the University of Upsala, where in 1885 he passed the examination as candidate in philosophy, in 1890 that as licencié in philosophy, and 1891 that of doctor of letters. In 1890 he was appointed Extraordinary Professor at the University of Upsala, whence he was called late in 1895 to Gothenburg. His writings upon the constitutional and diplomatic history of Sweden are as follows :

"*Om riksrådsvalen under frihetstiden.*" Upsala, 1890.

"*Om formerna för utskottsval under frihetstiden.*" Upsala, 1890.

"*Till betysning af partistriden vid riksdagen 1746-47.*" Upsala, 1890.

"*Studier i ständsriksdagens senare historia.*" Goteborgs Högskolas årsskrift, 1895.

"*Sveriges politik vid tiden för Allonakongressen 1686-89.*" I-III Historisk Tidskrift, 1890.

"*Om frihållandet mellan politisk historia och kultur historia.*" Ibid., 1895.

"*Gustav II Adolf hans personlighet och hans betydelse.*" Stockholm, 1894.

"*Den stora engelska revolutionen i det sjuttonde århundradets midt.*" Goteborg, 1895.

BOOK DEPARTMENT.

NOTES.

THE "LABOR MOVEMENT" has assumed such vast proportions in recent years that the student welcomes with gratitude any publication bearing upon it which is both condensed and accurate. Such are the "Labour Annuals" published by Mr. Joseph Edwards, 7 Wesley street, Liverpool, of which the second number, that for 1896,* is just at hand. This number contains the programs of nearly all the labor and socialistic parties of the world, a record of the progress of the trade unions during the past year and of the work of land reform societies, temperance societies, anarchist organizations, co-operative companies, etc. Articles and notes on the books and periodicals of the year and the government reports of interest to the labor cause constitute another feature of the Annual. Mr. Edwards is anxious to make his publication as complete as possible and solicits the co-operation of all those interested in the labor problem in all parts of the world.

THE THIRD VOLUME of Gregorovius' "Rome in the Middle Ages" † covers the ninth and tenth centuries. It furnishes the best account of the papacy and Rome for the period, available in English. The plan of the work is comprehensive, including discussions of "the mania for relics," "character of pilgrimages in the ninth century," "barbarism of the tenth century," etc. The descriptions of the decline of the empire, of the reasons why the German emperors preferred to owe their crown to the papacy rather than to the election of their vassals, of the strifes of Nicholas I., of the republican revivals under Alberic and Crescentius, and of the state of learning in Rome are masterly. On the other hand, it is surprising that Gregorovius has given only a page to the Pseudo-osidorian decretals.

The quality of the translation is better than for the preceding volumes; but why should such a word as "kakodoxy" (page 166) be obtruded on our attention? The price of the work has been materially increased. The first two volumes together cost only \$3.75, which

* *The Labour Annual*: A year-book of industrial progress and social welfare. Edited by JOSEPH EDWARDS. Pp. 224. Price, 1s. 3d. Manchester: Labour Press Societies, Limited, 1896.

† *History of the City of Rome in the Middle Ages*. By FERDINAND GREGOROVIVS. Translated by ANNIE HAMILTON. Vol. iii. Pp. 562. Price, \$3.75. New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895. See *ANNALS*, Vol. vi, p. 324.

is the price charged in this country for this single volume; this, too, in spite of the fact that it is published at six shillings in England.

ALL AMERICANS who have enjoyed the hospitality of the *Internationale Vereinigung für Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre** of Berlin will be glad to welcome its handsome annual. Its two parts, of some 300 pages each, have appeared at an interval of six months, and contain much that is of interest along the lines indicated in the name of the Association. The task of editing these volumes has fallen to Professor Bernhoeft, of Rostock, and Dr. Felix Meyer, the energetic head of the Association at Berlin.

Among the longer articles are an account of L. Blanc and Socialism in France, by Professor O. Warschauer, discussions of Exterritoriality in Turkey, by S. Antonopoulos, and of Turkish Finances, by A. Gescher, and a clear statement of the points involved in the Bering Sea Controversy, by Dr. W. Kaufmann. Other departments of the Annual are reports on the legislation of the principal nations, on judicial decisions, and recent publications. Among the addresses delivered before the Association is one by Dr. Max Hirsch on Trade Unions in Great Britain and Germany, which derives special interest from the connection of the author with this movement in Germany.

THE PROMINENT PLACE which geography holds as an auxiliary of all the social sciences makes the gazetteer an essential part of every student's library. "Lippincott's Gazetteer" has long been the standard work of its kind in America. Longmans, Green & Co., have recently brought out a new gazetteer,† which will take the same rank in England which Lippincott's work has enjoyed in this country. It is edited by the well-known geographer, George G. Chisholm, of course from the English rather than the American standpoint. Mr. Chisholm has performed his task with admirable discrimination and has introduced many new and commendable features. Thus the respelling of names for purposes of pronunciation is avoided, except in the case of exceptionally irregular words, by the insertion of simple rules of pronunciation in the preface. The population of places is generally given as greater or less than the thousand nearest the last census, *e. g.*, a place of 2875 appears with a population <3000. The Gazetteer is in no sense a year book, and for that reason such statistics

**Jahrbuch der Internationalen Vereinigung für Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre zu Berlin*. I. Jahrgang, 1895. 2 Abteilungen. Berlin: Bahr's Buchhandlung.

† *Longmans' Gazetteer of the World*. Edited by GEORGE G. CHISHOLM, M. A., B. Sc. Pp. xii, 1788. Price, \$12.00 net. London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1895.

as are given are brought together in tables placed at the end of the book and so constructed as to compare different countries and localities with each other.

The longer articles on the more important countries and cities are signed by the authors. The material presented is well chosen, and admirably condensed. The most serious criticism to be made upon these articles is that but few of them close with bibliographical references. A small number of the signed articles contain such references to sources of information; all ought to. It is to be hoped that the editor of subsequent editions will correct this fault.

IN A VOLUME bearing the title "Strikes and Social Problems,"* Professor Nicholson has gathered together twelve essays and addresses, written in a popular style and dealing with a variety of subjects. The first six take up different sides of the labor problem and discuss strikes, labor combinations, profit-sharing, etc. These are followed by a "plea for industrial liberty," which well illustrates the author's conservative tendencies. Then comes an essay on the relation between political economy and journalism, a paper read before the British Economic Association on "The reaction in favor of the classical political economy," and the volume concludes with essays on "Old age pensions," "A voyage around Africa," and an account of "Slavery in Zanzibar." Taken together these essays contain little that will commend them to American readers. Professor Nicholson is a reactionist. He is fond of repeating the old objections to the new movements of our time and emphasizing the impotence of man to deal with the social evils about him. In England such a conservative note may be needed just now when all sorts of social legislation is being experimented with both in and out of Parliament, but in this country we are only too clearly aware of how little we can hope for in the near future from legislation. Whether Professor Nicholson is right or wrong in perceiving a reaction in favor of the classical system on the scientific horizon, his own attitude is suggestive. His writings have done much to show how little after all the new differs from the old in political economy, and as a contribution to this end if not as an aid in the solution of the labor problem of our time, this volume will be welcomed.

IN HIS TRANSLATION of Schmoller's well-known essay on the "Mercantile System and its Historical Significance,"† Professor

* *Strikes and Social Problems*. By J. SHIELD NICHOLSON. Pp. viii, 238. Price, \$1.25. London: Adam & Charles Black. New York: Macmillan & Co., 1896.

† *The Mercantile System and its Historical Significance*. Illustrated chiefly from Prussian History. Being a chapter from the "Studien ueber die Wirthschaftliche

Ashley has made available to American readers a line of argument in favor of protection that has received but scanty attention in this country. It is, namely, the argument that protection is a means of educating a people, of advancing them to a higher stage of civilization than they would ever attain to if left to themselves. The example of such an employment of the protective policy is found in Frederick the Great's successful efforts to establish the silk industry at Berlin. This undertaking cost him two million thalers, but enabled him to build up a northern capital which was really the centre of German civilization. Schmoller's pleasing style has lost none of its force in the translation. Moreover, the essay is improved by the addition of numerous critical notes that explain certain historical illusions likely to escape English readers. This essay, together with the reprint of Mun's work which preceded it in the series, constitutes a valuable commentary on the Mercantilist system, and will induce many students to revise their over-hasty condemnation of the "balance of trade theory," and all that went with it.

IN HIS WORK on "Citizenship and Suffrage"* in Maryland, Dr. Steiner has condensed into less than one hundred pages a very clear account of the problems connected with these subjects which have arisen during the two centuries of Maryland's history. Having shown in the first two chapters of his work how citizenship was attained or its privileges acquired by aliens at various periods, he traces in a somewhat more lengthy chapter the development of the suffrage requirements in the State since 1640, closing with an excellent description of the existing election laws.

The author's own interest clearly centres in the later portion of his work, and his treatment of the election troubles during the period of the civil war, as well as those connected with the recent agitation for a purer ballot in Baltimore, forms its most instructive as well as interesting portion. Indeed one almost wishes that in connection with the earlier periods, as he has most adequately done in connection with the later, the author could have found it possible to go beyond the mere legal enactments, and tell us more fully how negro citizenship and suffrage operated in practice before their abolition, and the origin of the east and west shore election requirements. This, however is a minor defect, accounted for no doubt by a lack of adequate

Politik Friedrichs des Grossen," 1884. By GUSTAV SCHMOLLER. Pp. 65. Price, 75 cents. In Series: Economic Classics, edited by Professor W. J. Ashley. New York: Macmillan & Co., 1896.

* *Citizenship and Suffrage in Maryland*. By BERNARD C. STEINER. Pp. 95. Price, \$2.00. Baltimore: Cushing & Co., 1895.

material for the earlier period. As a whole the book is one which every student of politics will wish to see duplicated for each of the States of the Union.

THE LIBRARY OF the Stanford University has published an excellent catalogue of the Hopkins Railway Library.* The University is to be congratulated on having received this collection of 9245 books and pamphlets. Mr. Timothy Hopkins began getting the library together while Treasurer of the Southern Pacific Railroad, and by 1892 had secured about 2000 volumes and pamphlets. He then gave the collection to the Library of the Stanford University and made liberal provisions for future accessions. The catalogue is constructed upon a good classification, and the data given regarding each book are well chosen. The catalogue will be of much assistance to every student of railway problems.

IN COLONEL WRIGHT'S "Industrial Evolution of the United States,"† we have, for the first time, a readable popular account of the growth of manufactures in this country. The author traces the beginning of manufacturing in the early colonial period at some length. The scantiness of the records makes this a story of beginnings rather than a picture of progress. The interval between 1790 and 1860 is filled with the account of the growth of the factory system. Since 1860 we have had census records, and these are skillfully utilized to tell an instructive story of industrial growth. With them begins also more accurate information concerning the state of the wage-earner. The history of the labor movement is described side by side with the history of industry. Labor organizations, labor controversies, and legislation on the subject of labor are here treated. In a concluding division, Mr. Wright discusses judicially the influence of machinery upon labor. It forms a fitting conclusion to a history of manufacturing growth as it summarizes the results of industrial development, from the two sides, Capital and Labor.

We are grateful to Colonel Wright for having put into this work in connected form so many of the results of the special inquiries which he has conducted. We may, in fact, regard the work as a summary of the main results of his official labors. In popular form, clearly

* *Catalogue of the Hopkins Railway Library.* By FREDERICK J. TEGGART, B. A., Assistant Librarian. Pp. ix, 231. Publications of the Library Leland Stanford Junior University, Palo Alto, California, 1895.

† *The Industrial Evolution of the United States.* By CARROLL D. WRIGHT, LL. D., United States Commissioner of Labor. Pp. 362. Price, \$1.00. Meadville, Pa., and New York: The Chautauqua Century Press, 1895.

and plainly put, they will be brought to the knowledge of a much wider class of readers. It is from this point of view especially regrettable that Colonel Wright should have confined himself to the treatment of manufactures. Had he included in his story of Industrial Evolution an account of our whole economic activity, in agriculture and commerce, as well as in manufactures—which the modern usage of the term “industrial” would certainly allow—the general reader would have obtained a clearer idea of national growth.

IN A RECENT NUMBER of the ANNALS* an account was given of the “Musée Social” in Paris. In speaking of the prize offered for essays on “Profit Sharing” and “The Benefits of the Principles of Association for the Workingmen,” it was erroneously stated that the works might be submitted in any language. The essays will not receive consideration unless they are in the *French* language.

REVIEWS.

Cours élémentaire de Statistique administrative. By Dr. JACQUES BERTILLON. Pp. 599. Price, 10 francs. Paris: Société d'Éditions scientifiques, 1896.

It must have been an extreme modesty or a very generous conception of the limits of statistical science which lead the author to characterize his book as an elementary one. We should be inclined to designate it as a most elaborate treatment of the subject. The point of view which distinguishes his treatment is the administrative character of statistical investigation, and the object with which it was prepared was to place in the hands of those who present themselves as candidates for the public service in France, a suitable guide through the labyrinth of the statistical work of that government. It appeals, therefore, in the first instance to the French. It appeals to others through the fact that its pages give a precise and definite account of the statistical activity of a typical modern nation and through its admirable treatment of the more general aspects of statistical work.

After a brief introduction treating of the necessity of statistics for administrative purposes and the distinction between statistical and monographical investigation the author gives a concise history of the statistical labors of leading governments. He then proceeds to a discussion of statistical methods in general, and gives a clear and succinct account of the technique of statistical investigation, of the nature of averages and of the methods of graphic presentation. His discussion

* ANNALS, Vol. vi., p. 62, January, 1896.

of the latter is especially commendable for its extreme lucidity and for its suggestions for perfecting this instrument of statistics.

The organization of statistical bureaus and their labors constitutes the bulk of the work (pp. 145-436). The enumeration of the population receives special attention. The operations of the French census are carefully described. The explanatory material, instructions to enumerators, etc., is given in full, so that the reader can follow the operation step by step and can see the difficulties as they arise and the means taken to overcome them. After a minute account of the French census a general view is given of census operations in other countries. In like manner the forms and processes in use in recording movements of the population are minutely related and are accompanied with comparisons with other countries. As for the remaining statistical investigations of the French government they are treated in a more summary manner.

¶ The concluding part of the work (pp. 436-558) is devoted to the elements of demography. Here the author deals with matters of familiar knowledge which have received treatment in English at the hands of Newsholme, Mayo-Smith, and others. Dr. Bertillon's treatment is distinguished by its extreme precision and by the emphasis which is throughout laid upon questions of statistical method.

The point of view which characterizes this work is a very happy one. Having in mind constantly the needs of the administrative officer, Dr. Bertillon has presented the concrete statistical work of the government in a logical order. His acquaintance with the details of actual statistical activity has led him to discriminate nicely between what is essential and what is unessential, while a graceful style sustains the interest of the work. The book will prove of the highest value not only to the future administrative officer in France, but also to the student of statistics who desires to familiarize himself with the criteria of statistical processes, and who seeks to increase his critical insight into the value of statistical data by a thorough knowledge of the methods employed in gathering them.

ROLAND P. FALKNER.

Hand-Book of American Constitutional Law. By HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, M. A. Pp. xxiv, 627. Price, \$3.75. St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Company., 1895.

This book is intended primarily for the use of students of law, and instructors in the law schools and universities. It contains a condensed review of the leading principles and settled doctrines of American constitutional law, whether arising under the federal constitution or the constitutions of the individual States. These

principles and doctrines are stated in the form of a series of brief rules or propositions, numbered consecutively throughout the book, and are explained, amplified, and illustrated in the subsidiary text, and supported by citations of pertinent authorities. The work is divided into twenty-two chapters. The first four are devoted to definitions and general principles, with some discussion of the nature of the American union, the establishment and amendment of the constitution, and construction and interpretation of the same. Four more are given to an exposition of the constitutional powers of the executive, legislative and judicial departments of the federal government. Four more to the federal power within the States and to State power and authority, so far as determined or limited by the federal constitution. Special chapters are devoted to the police power, power of taxation, the right of eminent domain, municipal corporations, civil rights, and political and public rights, guarantees in criminal cases, laws impairing the obligation of contracts, and retroactive laws. The book is a useful exposition of American constitutional law, although the necessary limitation of space, as well as the purpose and plan of the work preclude any attempt at exhaustive discussion, or minute elaboration of the subject. It seems likely to prove a usable handbook to the student or practitioner.

The student of political science looks in vain, however, for any more thorough discussion of the fundamental constitutional principles of our system than is to be found in the ordinary legal text-book on the subject. The author sets forth as well established principles of constitutional law, certain opinions or ideas of judges in regard to the fundamental nature of our system which cannot be claimed to rank any higher than dicta. Thus he states that the constitutions of the American States are grants of power to those charged with the government. Such a statement is not borne out by the facts of the case, if one takes all the State constitutions into view. They are rather under our political system, limitations upon the powers of the government than grants of power; for under a representative scheme, in the absence of constitutional provisions to the contrary, the government, using that term in the widest sense, possesses all political power. There are, of course, many instances in which the State constitutions undertake to grant in express words certain powers to the government organized under them. But even if no positive grants were made, there is no doubt that under our system the government organized within the States would be considered as having such powers, and generally speaking, the State governments are considered to have such powers as are not prohibited to them by the Federal or State constitutions.

The treatment of the distinction between a confederation and a federal government, shows an inadequate knowledge of the later discussions of that subject, and in the characterization of the government of the United States and the several States, the distinction between pure and representative democracy is somewhat confused.

The author lays it down as a fundamental principle of constitutional law that the judicial department of the government is the final and authoritative interpreter of the constitution. This is not an exact formulation of the facts of our constitutional system. The judicial department of the government, according to the author's own exposition in other places, is called upon to pass on the meaning of the provisions in the constitution only when some question concerning them arises in a suit at law or equity before the courts. Very many constitutional questions cannot assume that form under our system, and when they cannot be thus brought before the court, the final and authoritative interpreter of the meaning of the instrument must be some one else. It would seem to be a better statement to say that that department of the government is the final and authoritative interpreter of the constitution, which in the course of its duties may give a meaning to the instrument which cannot be revised by any other authority. This is sometimes the executive, sometimes Congress, sometimes individual Houses of Congress, and sometimes the courts.

The author's discussion of the division of powers is no more satisfactory from the point of view of political science than the usual discussion of that subject in our American text-books.

EDMUND J. JAMES.

University of Chicago.

Economic History of Virginia in the Seventeenth Century. An inquiry into the material condition of the people based upon original and contemporaneous records. By PHILIP ALEXANDER BRUCE. Two Vols. Pp. xix, 634, 647. Price, \$6.00. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1896.

This work will be welcomed with pleasure by all American scholars who believe that history must be rewritten from the economic standpoint before the true sequence of social phenomena can be understood. Starting out with the ambitious project of writing an economic history of Virginia which should extend down to the outbreak of the Civil War, Mr. Bruce has narrowed the scope of his narrative so that it now embraces only the first century of the colonial period. He has been careful to confine his attention exclusively to economic history, and has left to other historians, or to a later time, the task of filling

the canvas which he has so ably stretched with the details of political and social development.

The book is divided into twenty-one chapters, and in general the plan has been to follow down through the whole period each one of the various important sides of economic life which are considered. Thus, after the first three chapters, which treat of the circumstances of colonization and of the Indian economy which the whites were to displace, we have five chapters describing the agricultural development of the colony and the means by which title to land was obtained, down to 1700, which make up the body of the first volume. These are followed by six chapters treating of the system of labor, the domestic economy of the planter and the value of estates. Four chapters describe the foreign and domestic manufactures which entered into the consumption of the community, and in conclusion interesting chapters are devoted to "money" and to "the town." In his final chapter, the author has skilfully gathered together the scattered threads of the narrative which has preceded, and shown how the whole history of the colony turned upon the suitability of the soil for the cultivation of tobacco.

It would be impossible in a brief review to do justice to the great mass of information which Mr. Bruce has brought together in these volumes. Every page testifies to the patient research and scholarly accuracy of the author, and entitles the work to rank with the best products of this age of historical investigation.

What will most interest the general reader is the close connection which is shown to have existed between the physical environment which surrounded the first settlers of Virginia and the social and political development of their descendants. As in other portions of the New World, agriculture was the industry upon which depended the prosperity of Virginia. But for Virginia agriculture meant almost from the very beginning the culture of tobacco for the European market, and this is the keynote to her industrial history. Before the discovery of fertilizers, which belongs to the last quarter of the period treated, tobacco growing involved the rapid exhaustion of the soil. In order to maintain a plantation, therefore, it was necessary to have in reserve a vast tract of virgin land which could be brought under cultivation as the old land became exhausted. Thus the early estates assumed immense proportions, and this fact gave its peculiar tone to the whole social life of the colony. After the whites were firmly established in Virginia the only requisites to prosperity were a large tract of land and cheap labor. At first indented servants imported from England, made up the bulk of the laborers. In order to promote their importation what was known as

the "head right" was established as early as 1618, according to which every shareholder in the colony who imported a laborer from England obtained thereby a right to fifty acres of new land. This "head right" became a more and more important factor in determining the distribution of land until toward the end of the century, when the facilities for importing slaves had so improved that the blacks constituted a cheaper variety of labor than indented whites. Owing to it, and to the peculiar conditions under which tobacco was grown, Virginia offered a very high premium to English gentlemen of wealth who wished to escape from the unsettled conditions which were the rule in England during the seventeenth century, and at the same time to improve their fortunes. Such men came to the colony in considerable numbers, bringing large numbers of free and indented servants with them, and thus laid the basis for the landed aristocracy which so soon grew up in Virginia and distinguished it so sharply from the colonies of the North.

In the fact that tobacco could only be grown profitably on large estates, we have further the explanation of the entire absence of towns and town-life in the colony. Each estate bordered upon a navigable stream, and had its own wharf and facilities for receiving imports from England, and of loading the hogsheads of tobacco which were sent to the mother country in return. Like the English manors of the thirteenth century, each Virginian plantation was sufficient unto itself, and quite independent of the outside world. Upon each estate food enough was raised to maintain all of the inhabitants, each estate had its blacksmith, carpenter, etc., who were able to perform such mechanical services as were required. The connection between each plantation and England was, as a rule, closer than that which bound together adjoining plantations. Thus it was that the plantation or county became the centre of political activity. In spite of the most earnest efforts of the company it was impossible to make the town settlement at Jamestown anything but a feeble village.

The peculiar social life which characterized Virginia is often attributed to slavery. Mr. Bruce shows conclusively that tobacco was its real cause, and that substantially the same conditions would have prevailed if slavery had never been introduced and the only laborers had been the indented white servants.

Such was the system which produced the great military leaders and statesmen for which Virginia will be forever famous. It encouraged the growth of a class of independent country-gentlemen, self-confident, patriotic, liberty-loving and cultured, from which leaders might be drawn when the times called for leaders. The same system continued with but slight modifications down to the period of the Civil War.

The emancipation of the slaves has been a death-blow to the large planter, and he is rapidly becoming only a memory. In his place a class of small farmers who till their own land with their own hands is pushing forward. The new system creates mediocre uniformity in the country districts, but fosters the growth of towns and cities where the small farmers can satisfy the numerous wants which are not met by the products of their farms. To the cities the future must look for its leaders. To Mr. Bruce's own mind this change is clearly ominous of coming disaster. He looks too exclusively at the position of the planter and too little at that of the mass of the population under him in contrasting the past with the present, to form a wholly unprejudiced view of the real meaning of this change.

In outward appearance and typography the work under review is admirable. It is furnished with an exhaustive bibliography, abundant notes and references, and a very complete index extending over sixty-six pages. In conclusion the reviewer may be allowed to express the hope that Mr. Bruce will continue the narrative as he at first intended down to the period of the Civil War.

HENRY R. SEAGER.

The Constitutional History and Constitutional Law of the Church of England. Translated from the German of FELIX MAKOWER. Pp. 555. Price, \$3.75. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

About one-third of the volume before us is taken up with a sketch of the constitutional development of the Church of England. This serves as an introduction to the study of its present constitution to which the rest of the book is given. The author, a barrister at Berlin, has done his work with German thoroughness. The notes take up as much space as the text, and at the end of the volume is an appendix of over seventy pages, which gives a great deal of original material, together with an invaluable conspectus of literature. The chief, but by no means the sole, value of this work is the assistance it renders in the use of material. The conspectus, which includes documents and chronicles, as well as modern works on ecclesiastical history and law, is not a mere list of authorities, but gives valuable information in regard to works and their authors. For nearly every statement contained in the text a reference, and very frequently a quotation from the author cited, is given in the notes. It is seldom that one finds such an extended literary apparatus.

The author seems moreover to have used his materials with care and judgment. His position as a foreigner has been at the same time an advantage and a disadvantage. His work is objective and free from

party spirit. No study of authorities, however, be it ever so painstaking, can give the insight into institutions which comes from experience of their actual working. The statute-book is a valuable source of information, but it does not tell the whole story. But if Mr. Makower had known the Church of England at first hand he might have been less diligent in his use of authorities, and in that case his book would have lacked the scholarly quality which is its chief merit.

RICHARD HUDSON.

University of Michigan.

Nuovi limiti e freni nelle istituzioni Politiche Americane. By FRANCESCO RACIOPPI. Pp. xii and 376. Price, \$1.00. Milan: Ulrico Hoepli.

The purpose of the author in writing this book is to show the relation between the original social and political conditions in the United States and the form of government incorporated in the first State and the federal constitutions, then to notice the changes made in our original conditions through the development of democracy in the first half of this century, and finally to call attention to the changes made necessary by this development in our governmental institutions, particularly to the new checks and balances which have been adopted in the last fifty years. These he finds in the minute provisions of the law of elections reaching their culmination in the Australian ballot acts, which have so generally been adopted as a result of the conviction that fraudulent practices were common under the election law as originally existing. The evil influences of the democracy of the first half of the century he also believes that we have attempted to neutralize by numerous constitutional limitations on the legislative power, both as to its content and the manner of its exercise, by the development of direct popular legislation and local option, and by the increase of the power of the executive and judiciary. In Mr. Racioppi's opinion these new checks and balances are answering the purpose of their adoption quite satisfactorily, and will tend to make American democracy a reasonably successful form of government.

It will be seen from this description of the book that it is very largely a treatise on constitutional limitations. Different from the ordinary American treatise on that subject, it takes more pains to collect these limitations as they are to be found in the written constitutions and the statutes, than to ascertain the meaning that has been assigned to them by judicial decision. But while it may fail on that account to convey to the reader the exact meaning of the various limitations which have been imposed on the legislature, which is the main thing that the practicing lawyer desires, it will give to the general student of American

political institutions as they now exist a most clear idea both of the tendencies of the American public law and of the condition of that law at the present time. No book has yet appeared in any language which does this so well as the one before us. But one fault which naturally follows from this method of treatment is to be noticed. Too much stress is laid upon the provisions of the constitutions and of the statute law, too little on the modifications of this law by political development or judicial decisions. Thus, for example, our author fails to notice the fact that the Senate's power of confirming appointments is at the present time, rarely if ever used, to limit the President's power to choose his subordinates in the administrative service. Naturally also certain recent legislation has escaped the author's notice. Thus Massachusetts is placed among the States which require the payment of a poll tax as a qualification for voting. This has not been the case for several years. Finally it would seem that our political woes are painted in somewhat too lurid colors. Our author has sometimes mistaken the hysterical utterances of men with grievances to redress, for the expression of the deliberate convictions of the American people as a whole.

But these faults aside, Mr. Racioppi has given us a most valuable and interesting book. In some instances his descriptions of our customs are vivid in the extreme. Particularly notable are the pages devoted to the party system and the national party conventions.

FRANK J. GOODNOW.

Columbia University.

Appenzell: Pure Democracy and Pastoral Life in Inner-Rhoden.

A Swiss Study. By IRVING B. RICHMAN, Consul-General of the United States to Switzerland. Pp. 206. Price \$1.50. London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1895.

The air of Switzerland is conducive to authorship. Twenty years ago Consul Beyers at Zürich brought out a work on Switzerland and the Swiss. More recently Mr. Winchester, United States Minister at Berne, has written a book upon the Swiss Government, and now our Consul-General at St. Gall has published a little book upon his near neighbors of Appenzell.

Switzerland will always be an object of peculiar interest to Americans because it is in itself a miniature United States; because it is also an old United States; because it is a league of States developed and maintained for so many centuries in the midst of surrounding tyrants and oppressors; because in the more recent years of conscious constitution-making Switzerland has copied from America, and because, in the very nature of the case, many political problems are identical in the

two republics. Mr. Richman is to be congratulated both upon his choice of subject and upon the manner in which he has treated it.

Appenzell is an island in the canton of St. Gall - that is, it is surrounded on all sides by St. Gall. The two cantons contain a territory equal to one of the smaller Swiss states, and in early times they constituted a single state. Appenzell belonged to the dominions of the Abbots of St. Gall. The land borders upon Austria, and in the contests between Swiss and Austrians its inhabitants bore a conspicuous part. The success of the Swiss States in defeating the Austrians in 1315 led the people of Appenzell to think that they might rid themselves also of the dominion of the Abbots of St. Gall. The whole of St. Gall is a natural bulwark against Austria, but Appenzell is rather more rugged and contains more natural barriers. This fact, together with the spirit of the people, gave rise to the independent state, and in 1513 Appenzell was admitted to membership in the Swiss Confederation. It was the thirteenth state admitted, and no further addition was made to the Confederacy for two hundred and ninety years.

Though Appenzell is now counted as one of the twenty-two cantons of Switzerland, it is, in effect, two cantons, or two separate states, named the Ausser-Rhoden and the Inner-Rhoden. During the Reformation the people of Ausser-Rhoden became Protestant in religion. They were more wealthy than their neighbors of Inner-Rhoden who held the higher, rougher lands, and they earlier developed a diversified industry and adopted modern progressive habits. These differences in people and in soil led to a political separation as early as 1597.

In these three little mountain states we have the whole history of Switzerland in miniature. The principles and the methods which have worked out these little states are, in large measure, those which have made Switzerland, and it is difficult to see how a more interesting outline of the making of Switzerland could be written than Mr. Richman has given us in his two hundred pages.

The interest of the book centers in the presentation which is given of the political life, the administration of justice, the education, and the social life, customs and habits of the people of Inner-Rhoden. The territory of Inner-Rhoden is less than that of two of our western townships: it contains only sixty square miles. There is a population of about 13,000. If any one has supposed that a people cannot be at once Roman Catholic in religion and democratic in government, Mr. Richman's book will prove to him the contrary. Inner-Rhoden is both intensely Catholic and intensely democratic. It is not a priest-ridden country. The people have at no time been content to live under a power which they did not like—a power which was

not of themselves. They will not elect a man to an important office who does not habitually attend upon the ministrations of the church, because they consider that such should be the habit of a worthy man. If any one thinks that democracy is in itself fitful and subject to change and to revolution, he should read these pages and find here rare specimens of a mediæval life preserved unbroken to the present day.

The co-existence of democracy and conservatism is especially manifest in the methods of administering justice. Anciently, the highest authority for the exercise of all power, judicial or other, consisted of the whole body of citizens assembled under the presidency of chosen leaders. Only slowly and reluctantly has a separate judiciary been formed. Not until 1872 did the people consent to the exercise of judicial functions by separate judicial officers. There was an intermediate stage previous to 1872, in which the highest judicial power, instead of being exercised by the assembled state, was placed in the hands of four grades of the ordinary local and state officers. The court thus composed consisted of forty-nine men, and was supposed to represent every part of the state. In respect to the adoption of a criminal code the democratic conservatism shown is still more striking. Nearly five hundred years ago (1409) an attempt was made to impose a complete code of criminal laws upon Appenzell, but for centuries this code was lost and its very existence was unknown. It was discovered in 1867 at a time when an attempt to secure the adoption of a criminal code was in progress on the part of a few reformers. A code proposed to them in 1861 had been rejected by the people. Again, in 1877, a carefully prepared body of criminal law was offered for their acceptance and was again rejected. They remain to the present day without a criminal code, yet it would seem that the practical results of their criminal administration are all that could be desired. Crime of any sort is exceedingly rare. The few crimes which do occur are adequately punished. Murder appears to have entirely ceased. For twenty-nine years previous to 1865 but five murderers were punished, and it is our author's opinion that none went unpunished. During recent years no murders have been reported.

Mr. Richman relates two incidents which place in vivid light the action and reaction of criminal administration. The first was the case of two rival political leaders, one of whom was driven into exile and his property confiscated on charges partly false. Then, in 1784, the banished leader was decoyed into the hands of his political enemies and was judicially murdered. After the execution repentance on the part of those who were responsible was immediate, sincere and publicly professed in ways most impressive. The repentance for this state

crime of a century ago extended gradually to the entire state, and has left marks clearly discernible to the present day.

The second instance is that of one of the latest murders committed in the canton. In 1849 a girl of seventeen was seized with an overpowering desire for the possession of a chain and certain other trinkets commonly worn by those of her age. To procure them she finally murdered one of her companions by drowning, and appropriated her ornaments. Upon her own confession she was sentenced to be beheaded. She had expressed a willingness to meet her fate, but at the hour of execution her courage failed and it became impossible to observe the ordinary forms. The executioner asked for the advice of the court, and received the peremptory order to do his duty. It was accordingly done under most awful and harrowing circumstances.

It has been said that where the people execute their own laws the forms of procedure cannot be inhuman. The death penalty has not been formally abolished in Inner-Rhoden, but it seems that it has ceased to be operative because of the non-continuance of capital crimes. It should not again be said that it is impossible for a people to be free who have not written laws, or that a jury system and the existence of men learned in the law are necessary to the effective administration of the law.

Who are these people who have attained unto such marked exemption from crime in recent years? They are the descendants of German tribes. During the Middle Ages they were distinguished for their brutality. They not only fought their own battles, but they hired themselves out to fight the battles of others. Even in that brutal age the soldiers of Appenzell were looked upon as a disgrace to the civilization of the time. At Agnadello, in 1510, they aided the French against the Venetians, but so infamous had they become for their continual robbery and murder that, the battle gained, their French allies are said to have bidden them instantly begone, as *coquins*, *vilains* and *vachers*. This study lends support to the view that when a people can be made to feel the responsibility of making and executing its own laws there ensues naturally a humanizing tendency.

There are other lessons to be learned from Appenzell. Twenty-five years ago the highways were thronged with beggars. Now mendicancy is completely suppressed. General education in Appenzell is of recent date. As yet Inner-Rhoden is the most illiterate of the cantons of Switzerland, but the children are now all being instructed in the schools. It will be interesting to note in future years the effect of the light from without which is sure to enter through this open door.

JESSE MACY.

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Buckle and His Critics: A Study in Sociology. By JOHN MACKINNON ROBERTSON. Pp. 565. Price, 10s. 6d., paper. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1895.

The sub-title of this book is an index to its contents; it is a study in sociology, and as such it will prove most valuable. For purposes of review the work may be broadly divided into three parts: *First*, a consideration of Buckle, in which the author points out what he conceives to be Buckle's strong and weak points; *Second*, brief statements of the arguments of Buckle's critics and an answer to their criticisms; *Third*, an historical account of the development of sociology, both before and since Buckle wrote.

Mr. Robertson is thoroughly persuaded that Buckle was "a great and true historian." He calls attention to the fact, often forgotten, that the history was not a completed work, but only "the fragment of a fragment." Buckle's purpose is shown to have been, to bring human affairs under the domain of natural law, but not in systematic detail. The author places himself in harmony with Buckle by declaring that "the central doctrine of history is reducible to law." Buckle is set forth as an *a priori* thinker who used the deductive method in cases where the inductive only could be of value. Robertson thinks this was due in part to the influence of Adam Smith, for whose unqualified praise he does not defend Buckle. But when Buckle is compared to others it is thought that his errors are rather to his credit than otherwise. The decision reached is, "the systematic thinker's errors are more instructive than the random rightness of the systemless." Aside from being a great historian, Buckle is conceived to be the central figure in the development of sociology. Here is the conclusion of the whole matter, "the verdict must be, I think, that Buckle holds his own with the best, in point of power, and range and knowledge, that nobody has superseded or overthrown him, and that his share of error is not larger than those of men with the advantage over him of a whole generation of scientific progress" (p. 517).

The list of Buckle's critics includes the names of the foremost thinkers for the last half century, in England, Germany, France and America. This section of the book might have been much reduced, and it sadly lacks the temperate method of treatment that should characterize criticism, even of a critic. Mr. Robertson well asks in the preface if he is not possessed of a "deluding prejudice." Throughout there seems to be a constant effort to exaggerate Buckle's worth, and to belittle that of the men who have criticised him. In some cases, the author denies the right of criticism, saying that men should not pass unfavorable judgment on a work

they could not equal. Adopting this as a tenet of criticism much that Robertson here gives us would be ruled out. The tone of the critical portions of the book is both anti-religious and anti-scholastic. The old contention is taken up as to whether religion is the cause, or the effect, of improvement among mankind, and it is claimed that churchmen were forced to oppose Buckle, for if he was right, then they were wrong. The claim is made that the religion of the past is still supreme in the matter of false witnesses, and this section closes with an expression of relief in turning from "the savors of *odium theologicum*." The following phrases are taken as showing at once the main points of attack on Buckle's critics, and the spirit of the author: "Closet philosophers" are contrasted with "actual observers of men;" we have "the barrack-room dogmas of the Bismarckian Gneist," and "the inability of Macaulay to see any high merit in the work of his contemporaries;" Peschel's criticism is termed "vacillating comments" (in this connection reference is made to German stupidity, in which we are told that German mistakes have all the thoroughness of the German method in general); the late Professor Freeman is called "a copious chronicler," noted for "detail accuracy," and his writing on Buckle is termed "the malicious expert criticism with which Mr. Freeman pursued his stumbling steps;" we are told of the "brilliant Green," and "the cautious Mr. Bryce;" Bagehot is called "a suggestive and discursive essayist," who "completely perverted Buckle's doctrine."

The most valuable portion of Mr. Robertson's work is that in which he traces the development of sociology. In this sketch there is a consideration of Hume and Adam Smith, with an account of the influence of Montesquieu, Voltaire and Rousseau. Comte and Spencer are treated at considerable length. The latter is found "to yield only the sociology of his personal bias." The sociological thought of Sir Henry Maine is then analyzed, the author showing that he has for it only the slightest regard. He tells us that Maine's error was in basing his sociology on "exploded dogma derived from ignorant Semitic antiquity." The concluding section of this chapter is devoted to Lester F. Ward's "Dynamic Sociology," which gets, at Robertson's hands, less adverse criticism than any other work that he takes up at length. But we are told that Ward has not superseded Buckle and that he falls into errors he would have avoided had he gone to Buckle.

So much for the contents of the book. Like Buckle, it is remarkable even in its errors. The literature consulted includes English, American, French and German authorities, and is thoroughly up to date, including the recent works of Mr. Kidd and Mr. Balfour. Many

mistakes of judgment and much bitterness of feeling stand out on the pages of "Buckle and His Critics," and at times it is tedious, yet to any one interested in sociology or the sociological aspects of history, it will prove suggestive and stimulating.

CHEESMAN A. HERRICK.

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The Tribal System in Wales. By FREDERIC SEEBOHM, LL. D., F. S. A. Pp. 238, 106. Price, \$4.00. London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1895.

If there is any one quality which is characteristic of Mr. Seebohm's writing, it is its admirable clearness. The first three chapters of his "English Village Community," which was written exactly twelve years ago, have become classic in economic history, because they gave for the first time a clear, adequate, and picturesque description of the open field system and of the village community living upon it. It is not too much to say that all history of earlier England which touches the life of the common people can be divided into that which was written with and that written without the light thrown upon it by this description. This quality of clearness one is tempted to connect with two circumstances of Mr. Seebohm's personal position. He is a man of affairs, in actual business life; and therefore freed from some of the temptations of the study, the tendency to lose hold on reality, to construct a picture or an argument which seems satisfactory to one's self, but which has neither clearness nor verisimilitude to others. Secondly, the starting point for most of his work has been found in the actual material survivals or the physical marks of the country in the midst of which he lives, or which he has examined in his official work as a member of the Welsh Land Commission. More than one American student has brought home the remembrance of a walk through the country around Hitchin with Mr. Seebohm, as a lesson in methods of study as well as an experience of kindly and hospitable courtesy.

The "Tribal System in Wales" brings this question of capacity for clear delineation into immediate prominence, for one can scarcely think of a harder test. The complications of tribal organization and landholding, the repellent nomenclature, the intricate and elusive distinctions of persons and offices and powers seem to defy any clear comprehension or real definition. Yet this is just the task of the book; to construct from certain documentary materials an account of the structure of society in Wales when it was still tribal, which will give a clear idea of what such an organization was, and at the same time serve as a basis of comparison with other tribal systems, both in

their organization and in their methods of action. The sources are found in various "extents" and other local descriptions of Welsh districts, formed during the half century or more immediately succeeding the conquest by Edward I., in the three codes and other Welsh laws and maxims, and in donations to some of the early churches and monasteries. The documents of the first of these classes have not been previously published, and they are here printed in an appendix of more than a hundred pages.

Mr. Seebohm looks upon the Cymry of Wales, who are alone included in the discussion, at the time covered by his description, as an instance of a purely tribal organization, penetrated and modified by four new elements: land ownership, the intrusion of alien persons on the tribal land, political and territorial rule, and the Christian church. The nucleus of tribal society is found in the natural or artificial family, maintained for almost all purposes to the fourth generation, for other purposes preserving its unity to the seventh generation, and for still others to the ninth generation. These limitations of the family seem to be based on natural conditions. A patriarch might well see great-grandchildren living; the family could therefore remain to that degree complete. The memory of the same old man would extend back through three generations, and thus carry knowledge through seven generations, and possibly with the aid of well-kept traditions give proof of the unbroken bonds of the family through the maximum of nine generations. This family of blood relations to the ninth degree was organized under a "chief of kindred," and subserved various purposes, legal and military. The whole Cymric race was made up of a congeries of these natural blood kinships, and was in a certain sense itself a larger kindred or family. The family of four generations was however the all-important unit for landholding purposes. Such a family held its land in undivided possession, or rather the head of this family was looked upon as the landholder while its members had joint rights to its use. Grants of land could only be made after obtaining the consent of all others who had a family claim upon it. The Norman-English land surveyors in their endeavor to assimilate Welsh terms and titles to those to which they had been accustomed, were nevertheless unable to analyze such a joint family holding into its constituent parts, and accepted it as their unit, introducing the Latin word *lectus*, bed, as an equivalent for the Welsh *gwely*, a metaphorical term for the family. When, therefore, any land claims escheated, they were calculated as some fractional part of the land of such and such a *gwely*, not as any individual acres. From this organization into families of pure blood-relations arose most of the fundamental characteristics of Welsh society. With it

was closely connected the origin of servile status. The most marked difference between one man and another would be his membership or lack of membership in some Cymric family. Strangers might through a certain long series of intermarriages ultimately become members of the tribe; but others formed families of their own, which remained in a subordinate legal position, and in process of time became bound to the soil of the chief of some Cymric family, paying dues of a servile nature, although within their own family having joint rights to such occupation and inheritance of the land as the law allowed to them. Such persons seemed to the men who made up the "extents" to be practically villeins, though they also went by families not by individuals.

The tribal character impressed upon or retained by the territorial chieftainship, the dominion of the Prince of North Wales, reigning at Aberffraw, and the devices by which land and its tenants were conveyed to the church by the early chieftains together with the reaction of tribal tendencies on the Welsh church, form the subjects of the two fullest chapters of the work, but space will allow of no details to be given here.

The interest of this work cannot be as great as that of Mr. Seebohm's earlier books, whether those on the Renaissance and Reformation periods, or the "English Village Community." Its subject is more technical, its ultimate objects more narrow, the nationality whose customs it analyzes more insignificant in the world's history. Moreover, his method of clinging rigidly to the particular group of sources he is interpreting, rejecting all side lights that might be obtained from other co-ordinate sources, desirable as it may be for other reasons, leaves much in this particular book vague, fragmentary, and unsatisfactory. Nevertheless, these very deficiencies in interest are added claims to its importance as a scholarly historical essay. There is an exceedingly small number of persons competent to make such a study, and yet just this technical investigation is a prerequisite to further institutional and comparative study. Mr. Seebohm's abstinence from the use of other sources in this part of his work, and indeed from certain kinds of use of those that he has drawn on, will no doubt also be justified when the results of his later labors come to be published.

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Zur Frage der Arbeitslosen-Versicherung. By Dr. GEORG SCHANZ.
Pp. 384. Bamberg: C. C. Buchner, 1895.

In this book Dr. Schanz has condensed into two hundred pages (half of the volume is taken up with illustrative documents) a clear

and interesting account of the attempts hitherto made to insure against enforced idleness ; a criticism of the existing statistical data for such insurance ; a consideration of the means of preventing the abuses likely to arise in connection with it ; a discussion of the advantages and dangers of such insurance for Germany ; and, finally, an original plan for meeting the difficulties of the unemployed problem by a system of compulsory saving.

In England, out-of-work benefits in trade-union organizations are already a factor in the wage struggle, and in clerks' associations they aim at more immediate ends. In Germany, schemes for out-of-work aid are furnished by associations of clerks and by the socialistic and non-socialistic trade-unions. The "*Hirsch-Dunkersche Vereine*," for example, paid in 1894, with a membership of 67,058, 10,477 marks in traveling benefits, and 44,539 marks for out-of-work benefits proper. The socialistic "*Gewerkschaften*" are on a larger scale. In 1893, with a membership of 221,530, they paid 328,748 marks for traveling benefits, and 220,926 marks for out-of-work benefits proper. Austrian and French associations show similar results.

Switzerland, alone, has undertaken bold and instructive experiments with public insurance against non-employment. Berne (law of January 13, 1893), first established a system of voluntary communal insurance. About one-seventh of the assessments are paid by the insured; the rest is made up of communal contributions and voluntary subscriptions from employers and others. St. Gall instituted on July 1, 1895, a system of compulsory insurance against non-employment, embracing those earning less than five francs a day, and Basle is considering a plan proposed by Professor George Adler, of the University of Basle. Berne combines in its administrative features, a public labor registration agency.

From available statistics of non-employment, Dr. Schanz concludes that payments similar to those now required in Germany by the sick insurance law, would provide a fairly comprehensive insurance for those out of work, and accumulate reserve funds in favorable years, provided the compulsory feature enabled an association to obtain a number of favorable risks and provided care was exercised to avoid abuses. Other than actuarial difficulties will arise. The question whether to exclude cases of self-caused idleness, and if so how to define this, whether to exclude cases of refusal to accept work, and the whole question of casual labor, are very real difficulties to be overcome.

Dr. Schanz proposes, as a more promising measure, a plan whereby for each person subject to the imperial sick insurance law the employer is to pay, with the sick premium, an additional thirty pfennigs a week

for ordinary labor, and for labor in the building and other specified seasonal trades ten per cent of the wage. The money is to be placed in public savings banks and accumulate up to a minimum limit of one hundred marks. Of course the insured is free to add what he can to this nest egg, while employers or others can give bonuses, etc., in the form of an addition to the reserve fund. Except in the case of such contributions, specifically intended for the reserve, all above one hundred marks may be withdrawn at will. The reserve sum, on the other hand, can be intrenched on only in case of non-employment (with certain minor exceptions and limitations), and after about a week's interval. This interval is a safeguard, to some extent, against the prodigal who would drop his work to enjoy his savings. Payments, in case of non-employment, are to be made at the rate of five marks weekly if less than seventy marks are on hand, seven marks weekly if from seventy to one hundred are on hand, and eight marks when over one hundred. Any number of good years would not, however, amass a corresponding fund for an ensuing time of depression, unless the insured chose to abstain from drawing out his surplus over one hundred marks.

Certainly this plan avoids some of the difficulties of other insurance schemes. It seems to have an educational value in inducing thrift, but it is still an open question whether it offers as much hope of alleviation from suffering due to non-employment as its author seems to think. It must be added that Dr. Schanz does not see in his project by any means a panacea, but emphasizes the complexity of the problem and the need of the most varied efforts to cope with its different phases.

EMILY GREENE BALCH.

Berlin.

Municipal Government in Continental Europe. * By ALBERT SHAW.

Pp. 505. Price, \$2.00. New York : Century Company, 1895.

Questions of governmental machinery and administrative organization occupy a less prominent place in this work than in the author's book on "Municipal Government in Great Britain." It is an examination of Continental cities and city life from the social and

*The book contains nine chapters and three appendices, the subjects of which are as follows :

I. Paris : The Typical Modern City ; II. The French Municipal System ; III. The System of Belgium, Holland and Spain ; IV. Recent Progress of Italian Cities ; V. The Framework of German City Government ; VI. Municipal Functions in Germany ; VII. The Free City of Hamburg and its Sanitary Reforms ; VIII. The Transformation of Vienna ; IX. Budapest : The Rise of a Metropolis.

Appendices : I. The Budget of Paris ; II. The Budget of Berlin ; III. The French Municipal Code.

economic rather than from the administrative point of view. The author's skillful method of presentation and remarkable faculty for the co-ordination of facts will arouse the interest of many persons outside the small circle particularly interested in municipal problems. To the sociologist, the economist and statistician, the book offers a mass of valuable information, the result of Dr. Shaw's personal investigation. To the lay reader it affords a picture of the present condition of those great centres of population which are the most distinct expressions of our modern civilization. In Dr. Shaw's two works we have for the first time a clear and unprejudiced description of the municipal activity of foreign cities, free from any suspicion of theses to be proven or panaceas to be recommended. Throughout the book the author allows facts to speak for themselves, although here and there he is naturally compelled to express personal views as to the significance of these facts and the probable results of social movements and tendencies in government.

In this work the reader is impressed with the revolution which city life is gradually effecting in the daily routine of the population. The close interdependence of the social units and the intimate connection between individual action and social welfare, have given a new meaning to individual freedom on the one hand, and to governmental interference on the other. Municipal progress in Europe has been attended with increasing restrictions upon individual action. The chapters on Paris and the German cities are sufficient to convince one that this does not mean an absolute curtailment of the freedom of the individual, but simply the limitation of his right to "do as he likes," the purpose being the fuller development of the community as a whole and of the individual as one of its constituent parts. In this connection it is interesting to examine the methods adopted in Continental cities which have produced the imposing street effects that are the source of never ceasing wonder and admiration to the visitor at Paris or Vienna. In the matter of building, for instance, the individual was subordinated to the great plan intended to secure general artistic effects, and to this extent individual whim and fancy were restricted. In effect, the community said to the individual: "We have here a great scheme of communal importance. The result of its complete execution will be to give us the most magnificent street system in the world. We cannot afford to endanger its execution by allowing the individual to mar the general effect, and it shall, therefore, be a condition for the erection of shops or dwellings that the general plan be complied with." Another instance of this spirit in city administration is given in the author's description of great sanitary reforms which have been effected within recent

years in most of the large cities. In deciding these questions, no such narrow view of "public use and utility" as is laid down by the American courts was adopted, but the city has been permitted to extend its right of eminent domain in the solution of questions of fundamental social importance where American cities are hampered by constitutional and judicial restrictions.

The discussion of the finances of German and French cities brings out clearly the care that has been exercised in guarding every resource of the municipality. This is especially true of the German cities, where a spirit of economy and careful financial management has prevailed which is shown in the present relation between total revenue and taxation. Perhaps the best illustration of this spirit is found in the system of granting franchises to private corporations. From the very outset it has been seen that whatever the conditions of the grant the city must, at all costs, be able to maintain a strict control over the policy of the company, and at all times be in a position to assert its rights. As a result, the creation of monopolies through the consolidation of individual companies has been very generally favored by European municipalities, owing to the possibilities of increased financial returns from such consolidated companies. The limited term for which such franchises are granted, the system of payments of the companies to the city, and the public control over the method of accounting, have all contributed to increase the power of the city authorities. It is hardly necessary to refer to the contrast with the conditions in most of our American cities, where, as was recently illustrated in the case of Philadelphia, the city finds itself almost helpless in maintaining control over the policy of individual companies, and still more helpless when consolidation has created a monopoly.

In Dr. Shaw's descriptions of the great Continental capitals, one is impressed by the large number of municipal institutions which we in the United States are accustomed to regard as entirely beyond the scope of municipal activity. Municipal savings banks are so common as to attract little special attention, although the application of their profits to works of public utility is extremely significant and instructive. The monopoly of the market and slaughter-house business has been very generally assumed by foreign municipalities, and as a result the food supply has been cheapened in price and improved in quality, the careful inspection serving as a guarantee to the latter. The fact that in some cities such services as fire insurance, steam heat and hot water supply have been assumed by the municipality, tends to confirm the author's statement with regard to German cities that, "the community, organized centrally and officially, is a far more

positive factor in the life of the family and of the individual than in America.”

With this view of municipal activity the question naturally arises, How is the unity of the European state maintained? How does the central government assure itself that this unrestricted activity of the cities shall remain in harmony with the interests of the state at large? This question gives rise to a consideration of the system of central control exercised over European cities. As has been pointed out by Professor Goodnow in his work on “Comparative Administrative Law,” the method of control is of an administrative character. Instead of subjecting the cities to such uncertain and haphazard supervision as is exercised by the State legislatures in our system, we find a hierarchy of higher administrative officials or boards, permanent in character, and with continuity in policy, which, while acting as a safeguard to the interests of the state, leave a wide field of independent action to the municipality.

As noted above, the author allows administrative questions to remain in the background. In dealing with these questions he clearly shows the advantages of a highly organized civil service. Without it the form of government in most European cities would be unworkable; far more so in fact than the American system. In the former, municipal authority is concentrated in an elective council. The executive is generally elected by and dependent upon the council for the full exercise of powers. However sudden may be the changes in such assemblies there is always a highly organized machinery in the civil service system to carry on the work of government. That this form of government by councils should have produced such satisfactory results, when contrasted with the experience of American cities, furnishes a hint as to the place which “machinery of government” should occupy in a discussion of the municipal problem. It is true that in many countries of Continental Europe, notably Germany, Austria and Italy, universal suffrage has not become a part of the political system, which in many ways has simplified the question of government.

Dr. Shaw's chapters on Belgian, Dutch, Italian and Spanish cities give an extremely interesting account of the recent progress and development in those countries. They show the struggle to adapt old forms to modern needs. It is impossible, within the limits of this review, to dwell upon the wealth of facts there presented.

Any criticism of Dr. Shaw's work must have reference mainly to matters of detail. At times he looks upon the condition of some European cities—and this remark applies especially to Paris—with a somewhat exaggerated optimism. Furthermore, many questions

which are extremely complicated, requiring for their solution long continued efforts and probably much unsuccessful experimentation, the author often regards as extremely simple. He does not seem fully to appreciate the fact that with the extension of the suffrage a great strain will be placed upon the present system of government in Germany and Austria. Furthermore, his description of the German system of city government fails to take sufficiently into account the fact that the administrative "deputations," namely, those committees or boards composed of members of the executive board, municipal council and private citizens, constitute the central feature of the German system. They exercise the detailed control over their particular department, and it is due to the faithful discharge of their duties that efficiency has been combined with economy.

With this reservation, it may be said that this work and the author's "Municipal Government in Great Britain," constitute the most accurate and, in fact, the only satisfactory description of municipal institutions that has been given to the American or European public. It leaves room for detailed monographs on special topics, but, as a general summary, is a model of style and arrangement.

L. S. ROWE.

Geschichte des Socialismus und Communismus im 19 ten Jahrhundert.

III. Abteilung: *Louis Blanc*. By Professor Dr. WARSCHAUER. Pp. 163. Price, 2 marks. Berlin: Hermann Bahr, 1894.

This is the third installment of Professor Warschauer's history of socialism, the earlier volumes dealing respectively with Saint-Simon and Fourier. The first forty pages present a brief review of Blanc's earlier literary work. Then follows in sixty pages an account of his activity during the February revolution, and his contribution to the attempt to appropriate the results of the revolution in the interest of the working classes. It is here that Professor Warschauer's narrative suggests the presence in the records of the Luxemburg deliberations of material of great value to the student of later industrial movements. Little space is devoted to the effort to establish the *ateliers sociaux* according to Blanc's design; and this treatment is justifiable, because Blanc's plans were put into execution under circumstances unfavorable to success, and their inevitable failure under these conditions has little or no bearing upon the question of their practicability.

What the reader will find of greater interest and value is the account of the success which attended the efforts of the labor commission, established in March, 1848, to adjust disputes which had arisen between laborers and employees. The establishment of a bureau of employment; the necessity of determining the proper outlet for prison labor;

the project for the construction of large tenements for the better housing of Parisian laborers; these and similar efforts to ameliorate the condition of the proletariat possess a greater immediate interest for the student of to-day than the more ambitious attempts of the Luxemburg Committee. A critical review of Blanc's theories fills the last forty pages of the volume, and is perhaps the least valuable portion of this interesting and able treatise.

An adequate view of Blanc's work cannot fail to note that his effort is tentative and not final, as he emphatically remarks in the introduction to his "*Organisation du Travail*." This is due to the fact that he approached his conclusions not, as did Marx, through a process of rigid theorizing, but rather along the lines of human sympathy. It is with this thought in mind that we come to understand that the value for practical purposes of Blanc's industrial scheme does not stand or fall with the soundness of such a gallicism as that the producer should contribute according to his ability and receive according to his need. This formula is really no necessary part of Blanc's system, but is rather suggested, like the idea of eventual anarchy, as helping to build up a group of future ethical ideals, to which a progressive society might look, in a period of wider development and more accurate appreciation of values, for a closer adjustment of duties and rewards. It was a defect in Louis Blanc's prophetic vision that he measured progress with decades instead of centuries.

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[Noticed in the current number of the ANNALS. Vol. vii, p. 469.]

Europe in Africa in the Nineteenth Century. By ELIZABETH W. LATIMER. Pp. 451. Price, \$2.50. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co., 1895.

[An interesting popular account of the discoveries which have been made by African explorers during this century and of the forces which have influenced European colonization. The gold and diamond fields are described and the present political complications are analyzed.]

Napoléon et son Temps. By ROGER PEYRE. Illustré de 159 gravures d'après les documents et les monuments de l'art. Neuvième mille. Pp. 462. Paris: Firmin-Didot et Cie, 1896.

[The first part of a second edition of a laudatory, popular account of the Napoleonic era.]

(b) *Political Theory.*

The Coming Individualism. By A. EGMONT HAKE and O. E. WESSLAU. Pp. xi, 347. Price, \$4.00. New York: Macmillan & Co. London: Constable & Co., 1895.

[A vigorous presentation of the arguments for free trade, free competition and free land, with reasons for a less restrictive governmental policy in the regulation of alcoholism, amusements, etc. The book contains an appendix on Municipal Government by Francis Fletcher-Vane.]

L'Idee de l'État. Essai critique sur l'histoire des théories sociales et politiques en France depuis la Révolution. By HENRY MICHEL. Pp. ix, 659. 2d. Ed. Paris: Hachette et Cie, 1896.

[In this work is an examination of the position occupied by the theory of the state in various philosophical systems. The individualistic movement of the eighteenth century, the reaction against individualism in France and Germany and the conflicting tendencies on the political philosophers of the nineteenth century are analyzed with great care.]

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[In these lectures Professor Seeley carries out with uniform consistency his theory that political science is in reality history, that "political science without history has no root." The discussions relate to the history of political doctrines rather than to political science in the narrower sense.]

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[A sketch of the early governmental history of Baltimore and the present organization of the city. The author's conclusions are in harmony with the present tendency in the form of municipal government, viz., concentration of power and consequent responsibility in the Mayor.]

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[Noticed in March, 1896, *ANNALS*. Vol. vii. P. 304.]

II. ECONOMICS.

(a) *General and Theoretical.*

Geschichte der Nationalökonomischen Krisentheorien. Die Wirthschaftskrisen. By EUGEN VON BERGMANN. Pp. viii, 440. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1895.

[This is a comprehensive work, comparable with Böhm-Bawerk's "Capital and Interest." The different theories treated are classified into groups, and few prominent economists are neglected. As one would expect, greatest prominence is given to those theories which connect crises with over-production or with monetary disturbances.]

Il Metodo degli Economisti Classici. Nelle sue Relazioni col Progresso della Scienza Economica. By EMILIO COSSA. Pp. vii, 136. Price, 2.50 *l*. Bologna: Pietro Virano, 1895.

[This work is not an abstract discussion of the methods of economic study, but, as the title indicates, a consideration of the results that have been attained by the use of different methods. Thus, after chapters on "method," "premises," "the observation of phenomena," and "political economy," we have discussions of the classical system and the historical school, the new historical school and the new classical school. The book is catholic in tone, and shows wide acquaintance with recent economic literature.]

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[In this work is contained not merely a discussion and criticism of Malthus' "Essay on Population," but an independent analysis of the causes that regulate the rate at which population increases, and of the remedies for pauperism. The author's conclusions are at once conservative and optimistic.]

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[This is an "elementary treatise on political economy," concluding with a book on "Progress," in which the author shows how "morality, religion and law" may be made to co-operate in social advancement. It is written in untechnical language, for the most part, and is designed to serve as a companion volume to the author's "Outlines of English Industrial History."]

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(b) *Money and Banking.*

A Breed of Barren Metal; or, Currency and Interest. A Study of Social and Industrial Problems. By J. W. BENNETT. Pp. 258. Price, paper, 25c.; cloth, 75c. Chicago: C. H. Kerr & Co., 1895.

[This work is a treatise on political economy rather than an essay on the money question. The author finds in capitalistic production the root of our present social evils, and completes his analysis with a forecast in which the soft-handed interest-receiver of to-day works shoulder to shoulder with the laborer. The tone of the book is moderate, and many of the criticisms of our present industrial organization are suggestive.]

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[A painstaking study of the monetary system of India, and of the influence of the fall in the price of silver upon its commerce and industry.]

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[This is a valuable contribution to sociological literature written with the deliberate purpose of exposing the weakness of the anti-Semitic movement. An exhaustive study of the Jewish character is given and the conclusion arrived at that the Jew is much like the Christian and not at all to blame for the evils which are ascribed to him.]

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Woman Suffrage Movement in the United States: A Study by a Lawyer. Beacon Library Series. Vol. i, No. 3. Pp. 153. Price, cloth, 75c.; paper, 25c. Boston: Arena Company, 1895.

[Merely a restatement of old arguments against woman suffrage.]

NOTES ON MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT.

AMERICAN CITIES.

New York City.*—The views of the commission appointed by the Governor of New York to inquire into the governmental needs of cities of the third class have been embodied in a bill presented to the State Legislature. The bill shows a tendency to extend to smaller cities the same principles which have characterized the recent changes in the government of the larger cities of the United States. The legislative bodies of these smaller cities were for a long time able to retain the confidence of the population, the loss of which had in the larger cities led to the increased powers of the mayor. The arguments advanced by those who favored the concentration of power in the executive were strengthened by the great difficulty of exercising popular control in the large centres of population. It was felt, however, that this step, which seemed to be dictated by the requirements of the case, would not be necessary in the smaller cities, and that here at least it would be possible to maintain the democratic and representative institutions of the earlier period of our history. At the present time, however, the same distrust of city councils is manifesting itself in different parts of the country. Simultaneously in New York and Pennsylvania the movement to take from councils its most important powers seems to be gaining ground. The present bill takes from councils all appointive powers, and places full power of appointment and removal of all city officers except the city judge, city treasurer and members of the Common Council in the hands of the mayor. He appoints the city attorney, city clerk, city assessor, five commissioners of public works, five commissioners of health, three commissioners of charities, one commissioner of police, and the commissioners of public schools, whose number is to be one more than twice as many as the city has wards. The Common Council, which in all the cities of New York has but one chamber, is to be composed of two representatives from each ward and a president. The president and one member from each ward are to be elected by the voters of the city at large.

An important change in the new bill is the more distinct formulation of the doctrine of general corporate capacity. The Common Council is to have the power to pass any ordinances or resolutions, not repugnant to the constitution and laws of the State, for any local purpose pertaining to the government of the city and the management of

*The greater portion of this section is based on a communication from James W. Pryor, Esq., Secretary City Club, New York City.

its business, the preservation of order, peace and health, and the safety and welfare of the city and its inhabitants. It is difficult to foresee the interpretation which the courts will give to this clause. At first glance, the grant of powers seems sufficiently broad to free the city from complete dependence upon the State Legislature in undertaking new functions. The position of the courts, however, in construing the powers of municipalities, has tended to greatly limit such powers, even where the words of the grant contained in the law seem to warrant a broader interpretation.

Common School Administration. Various reform organizations of New York City, with the City Club at their head, are earnestly advocating the reorganization of the school administration. The present system of local school boards, known as ward trustees, has proven unsatisfactory, owing to the nature of the powers given to them. At present the members of these local boards are appointed by the Central Board of Education. They nominate all school principals; appoint all teachers and janitors, make all reports as to the condition of school buildings and select the school sites. There is here a combination of administrative and pedagogical functions which require a far higher order of talent than such local boards usually command. Irrespective of the qualifications of members of these local boards, it is evident that the lack of uniform standards must work harm to the development of a unified system of public education. As a matter of fact, local influence has played an important part in the appointment of teachers and in the management of schools. If such local boards have a reason for existence, it is mainly, if not solely, to exercise subordinate powers of control in the school administration; to act as agents of the central board in reporting on the condition of schools, exercising general supervision over the enforcement of compulsory education laws, etc. In accordance with this principle, the bill introduced into the State Legislature and advocated by the City Club, the Citizens' Committee on Public School Reform, and the Public Education Association, provides for the abolition of the local boards and the transference of their educational functions to the Central Board of Education, to be there performed by expert educational officers, such as the city superintendent of schools and his staff. The administrative functions of the local boards, so far as they relate to the erection and care of buildings, are to be handed over to a city superintendent of buildings, who is to act under the general supervision of the board. The bill embodying these provisions, known as the Pavey Bill, has been passed by both Houses of the Legislature, and will undoubtedly receive the approval of the Governor, as it was owing to a special message sent by him to the Legislature that the bill received immediate consideration.

Civil Service. One of the most important bills relating to municipal government, now pending in the Legislature, relates to the reorganization of the civil service. This bill was prepared by the Civil Service Reform Association, upon the lines of the bill which was proposed last year by the senate committee which then reported upon the condition of the State civil service and the administration of the law at that time. The bill has, therefore, had the most careful preparation, and has been worked over until it may well be supposed to be reduced to the best possible form. Since the recent decision of the court of appeals in the case of the people *ex rel.* John W. McClelland, appellant, *vs.* James A. Roberts, as Comptroller of the State of New York, respondent, the sole question as to this bill is whether it is in the proper form to accomplish its purpose. The decision is to the effect that the new provisions of the State constitution, requiring that the civil service of the State and of its political divisions shall be conducted upon the merit system, makes the civil service act of 1883 applicable to all branches of the State service, including those which the court of appeals held to be exempted under certain provisions of the former constitution. The decision contains a distinct intimation that the new provisions of the constitution are self-operative, and that no act of the legislature is required to complete the duty of the executive officers having charge of departments to put this system into practice. It is, however, highly desirable that the legislature should enact a general law, so that there may be an harmonious system throughout the State and in all departments and political divisions.

Pennsylvania.—A convention of delegates from cities of the third class of the State of Pennsylvania was held in Reading on the eleventh and twelfth of March, 1896. The purpose of the convention was to consider the present condition of legislation affecting the cities of this class. Under the decision of the Supreme Court of the State, the classification of cities, a subject not distinctly provided for in the Constitution, is restricted to three classes. Conformably to this decision, the three classes at present existing are, first, those with a population of 600,000 and over; second, cities with a population of between 100,000 and 600,000; third, cities with less than 100,000. Of the first class, Philadelphia is the only city; there are but two cities of the second class, and twenty-six of the third. The Constitution of 1874 prohibited the incorporation of cities by special enactment, and immediately after its adoption the Legislature passed a general act of incorporation for cities of the third class. Most of these, however, had received special charters prior to this time. The Act of 1874, as well as the later enactments of 1889, gave to the cities the option of remaining under their old charters or accepting the provisions of the

new acts. Both methods were adopted, so that while some of the cities are being governed under the Act of 1889, others still retain their earlier charters. But even the general incorporation acts had proven unsatisfactory in many respects, owing to the fact that the minute provisions as regards the organization of municipal departments and procedure in municipal service had in time come to be real obstacles to progress, owing to changes in economic and social conditions in these cities.

The great differences in the population of cities of this class made it impossible to frame an act minutely prescribing the form of government which would apply with equal effect to all the cities. The experience of nearly every State has shown that a city with a population of 100,000 cannot be effectively administered with the same machinery of government, scope of functions, and methods of procedure as a city with a population of 10,000. The convention, at its two sessions, discussed these various questions, and, before adjourning, appointed a committee to consist of the city solicitors of twenty-six cities to consider and report upon the changes in legislation to be recommended to the Legislature. Two courses are open to this committee. The first is to examine and possibly to reconstruct the principles upon which the Legislature has hitherto acted in framing city charters, with a view to giving the cities wider powers in determining their form of government. The second is to recommend changes in specific sections of the act at present in force. While the former course would result in a more permanent basis for the development of the municipalities of the State, the probability of immediate adoption of such recommendations by the State Legislature would be materially reduced. To this we must add the unfortunate uncertainty which the attitude of the Supreme Court in dealing with the constitutionality of legislation of this character has introduced into the political life of the State. The view, for instance, expressed in a number of cases, that legislation which would tend to increase diversity of form in the government of the cities of any class is unconstitutional, as repugnant to the provisions prohibiting local and special legislation, has contributed materially to this uncertainty. In fact, it has had a deadening influence on efforts to reform manifest defects in present legislation.

Baltimore.*—The extraordinary political upheaval in Maryland at the election of November, 1895, effected many changes in the city government of Baltimore. Largely as the result of a widespread reform sentiment and of an overwhelming independent vote, a Republi-

* Communication of Dr. J. H. Hollander, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.

can mayor was elected for the first time in thirty years and large Republican majorities resulted in both branches of the City Council. It soon became evident that the harmony in municipal administration thus promised was more apparent than real. The Mayor announced his intention of filling offices without strict regard to party lines and proceeded to do so, despite remonstrance, and without consulting members of City Council to the degree by them deemed fit. Matters culminated on February 24 when the largest number of appointments of the Mayor were sent to the Council for confirmation. Several Democrats and certain Republicans not in entire sympathy with the party organization were therein appointed to salaried and unsalaried offices. Upon these grounds the Council refused immediate confirmation to the entire list. The Mayor announced his intention of remaining firm in his attitude and the Republican majority in the Council proceeded to radical measures.

An anomalous provision of the city charter—which itself has been well described as “an incongruous medley of constitutional provisions and statutes enacted at various times and often for merely temporary purposes”—authorizes the Mayor and City Council to pass ordinances regulating the manner of appointing persons to municipal offices. Where no special ordinance exists the appointment is vested in the Mayor, subject to the advice and consent of the Council. It is in the latter manner—in the absence of special ordinances—that all appointments have been made since the passage of the statute.

It was now determined by the Republican Councilmen in caucus to pass special ordinances providing for the direct appointment of officers by the City Council—thus taking away the entire appointing power of the Mayor. Ten years ago similar procedure was threatened by a dissatisfied Council against a recalcitrant mayor, but the plan failed. Upon this occasion conditions were more favorable. On February 27 the first branch of the City Council passed a general ordinance providing that all officers, except those for whom a special term was provided, should be appointed biennially by the Council. Temporary appointments of the Mayor should hold good only until the meeting of the Council. To ensure the success of the plan, special ordinances making a similar change in the case of each particular office were adopted.

The first branch is composed of twenty-two members, of whom eighteen are Republicans and four are Democrats. The vote upon each ordinance was fifteen for and three against. These three members were all Republicans, the Democrats absenting themselves. In the second branch—composed of eleven members of whom eight are Republicans and three Democrats—the ordinances were passed by a

vote of eight for and none against, the Democrats similarly absenting themselves. The ordinances were now sent to the Mayor for approval or veto. The Mayor is allowed five "legislative days" for action. In order to lessen the time available the Council proceeded to meet daily, instead of weekly as hitherto, until the ordinances should be returned. At the first of these subsequent meetings additional specific ordinances were passed changing the power of appointment from Mayor to Council of almost every remaining officer. A general ordinance was also passed similarly transferring the power of removal.

The high-handed action of the Council evoked a storm of popular protest. The Mayor at once announced his intention of vetoing the ordinances and maintaining the position he had taken. Bills were introduced into the Maryland Legislature, then in session at Annapolis, one vesting the absolute power of appointment in the hands of the Mayor, the other limiting the power of the Council to mere confirmation and rejection. Both measures failed of passage.

On March 4, at the expiration of his time limit, the Mayor returned the ordinances with his veto. The success of the whole plan now turned upon the power of the Council to secure the three-fourths vote necessary by statute to pass the ordinances over a veto. By the rules of the second branch, eight is regarded as a three-fourths vote of eleven, and this number represented the full strength of the Republicans in this branch, all of whom were pledged to sustain the ordinances. In the first branch, the Republican forces were weakened by the determination of the three members, who had, from the first, opposed the ordinances, to sustain the veto. This left but fifteen votes for over-riding the veto, and placed the key to the situation in the hands of the four Democrats, who publicly refused to commit themselves as to what their course of action would be at the critical time.

Pending this uncertainty, action upon the vetoes was postponed temporarily. On March 6, a committee of the fifteen Republicans waited upon the Mayor in the hope of effecting some compromise. The specific ground of complaint was the appointment of Democrats to salaried offices. The Mayor refused to recede from his original position and the breach was appreciably widened. On March 9, the ordinances were passed over the Mayor's veto in the first branch by a vote of fifteen to four. An analysis of the vote shows conclusively that the Republicans secured the support of the Democratic quartette; hence of the four members, two absented themselves, one abstained from voting, and but one joined the Republican trio who voted to sustain the veto. In the second branch, the ordinances were passed by a vote of seven to two—the two opposed being Democrats; one Democrat and one Republican were absent because of *bona fide* illness.

The legal right of the Council, under the provision of the charter, to pass ordinances changing the manner of appointing officers, in the manner indicated—had been generally admitted. Doubt was expressed as to whether the three-fourths vote necessary to over-ride a veto meant three-fourths of the total membership of each branch, or simply of those members present. It was by the latter interpretation that the ordinances were passed over the veto, and it was upon this point that the Mayor proposed to carry the matter into the courts.

On March 14 one of the Council-elected officials presented himself to the Mayor to receive the oath of office as required by statute. This the Mayor refused to do upon the ground that the election was illegal. A petition for writ of mandamus was promptly presented in the Superior Court and the Mayor has been required to show cause why the writ should not be issued. It is understood that no demurrer will be filed to the petition and that the Mayor through counsel will plead to the allegations of the petition. It is also unlikely that a pro forma decree in the lower court will be agreed to. Even with no unusual delay, the case will hardly be considered by the Court of Appeals before October, and it is not unlikely that municipal offices will be filled by their present incumbents until next November when the situation may be radically changed by the results of Councilmanic elections.

FOREIGN CITIES.

London.—The annual report of the London Reform Union gives a most encouraging account of the progress of the movement toward unification during 1895. The object of this Union is primarily to effect the consolidation of the administrative county of London as a municipal corporation. This involves the merging of the present city of London with the county. The Union has been doing considerable work in the advocacy of the purchase of the franchise and plant of the various water companies now supplying the large metropolitan district.

The County Council Improvement Scheme, in the East End of London, is rapidly approaching completion. The district of fifteen acres in the worst part of London, which was expropriated by the County Council, has been cleared, and the new tenement houses which are being erected by the municipality are, in some cases, ready for occupancy. These buildings, which are four or five story buildings, have been built with the best of material and in conformity with the requirements of sanitary science. Fully as important, however, as the healthy dwellings now provided will be the rearrangement of

streets which this demolition on a large scale has made possible. In the centre of the district is a large circular public park or garden, and radiating from it are streets from fifty to sixty feet wide. When it is remembered that many of these were formerly twelve or fourteen feet in width, the radical change effected is apparent. In fact, but 55 per cent of the total area is to be built upon.

Glasgow.—The annual report of the Lord Provost of the city contains many facts of interest relating to the municipal activity during the fiscal year 1894-95. The operation of the street railway lines of the municipality continues to be increasingly successful. The city is rapidly extending the system, arranging a system of special rates for short and long distance connections and in other ways emphasizing the social as distinguished from the purely profit-making factors. One of the most interesting developments in connection with the municipal ownership of the street railway lines in Glasgow is the relation between the city and street railway employees. With increasing profits the city has been gradually raising the level of wages, and in other ways promoting the interest of employees. Thus during the last year not only were wages increased, but the city established an insurance fund for sickness or death, to which the city treasury contributes one-half, and the employes the other. The effect is already noticeable in the steadiness of the service and cordial relations with the men, as contrasted with the earlier conditions when the service was under private management.

Improvement Trust. The work of reconstructing the slum districts, which was begun by the city in 1872 by expropriating eighty-eight acres, and has been pursued with unabated energy and vigor since that time, was further advanced toward completion during the year 1895 by the erection of a block of new tenements, costing nearly \$250,000. One hundred and forty-seven new houses are at present being erected in the central and eastern districts of the city. Other plans involving the construction of several hundred new houses are being rapidly pushed to completion.

In the work of erecting epidemic hospitals, in which Glasgow has taken the lead among the cities of Great Britain, the present system is to be further developed by the erection of a new institution at a cost of nearly \$1,000,000, and with accommodations for 400 or 500 persons. The effect of these hospitals has been to greatly facilitate the police supervision over the health of the community. The excellent accommodations for those suffering from contagious diseases has taken away the greatest incentive to concealment. The marked decrease in the prevalence of contagion, especially in the poorer sections of the city, has already shown itself.

SOCIOLOGICAL NOTES.

Model Tenements in London.*—The thirty-first annual report of the trustees of the Peabody Donation Fund, the purpose of which is to provide improved housing for the working-classes of London, gives an interesting account of the operations of this large philanthropic trust. Mr. George Peabody gave \$750,000 for this purpose in 1862, \$500,000 in 1866, \$500,000 in 1868, and bequeathed \$750,000 on his death in 1873. The capital sum given was thus \$2,500,000. Additions of rent and interest have now brought this up to \$5,846,694.16.

The housing accommodations provided consist of blocks of buildings, containing in all 11,367 rooms, exclusive of bath rooms, laundries and lavatories. There are 76 tenements of 4 rooms, 1791 of 3 rooms, 2436 of 2 rooms, and 818 of 1 room. The number of persons in residence on December 31 last was 19,914. The average rental per room was 54 cents per week, and the average weekly earnings per family, \$5.82. The birth-rate for the year was 36.9 per 1000, or 6.4 per 1000 above that of all London, and the death rate 17.9 per 1000, or 1.9 per 1000 below the metropolitan rate. The infant mortality was 151.1 per 1000 births, or 14.7 below that of London.

The net earnings were $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, or $\frac{1}{2}$ of 1 per cent below the usual average. This result was due to unusual expenditure in drainage and other improvements, and to a rise of \$2000 in local taxes.

The loss from empty tenements during the year amounted to \$1930, and from bad debts \$281.25. Both together amount to but $\frac{2}{3}$ of 1 per cent of the rents received.

Improved Housing of the Poor.†—The Department of Dwellings of the New York Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor, is charged by the constitution of that society with the duty of looking after the sanitary inspection of tenement houses, with the planning and building of model dwellings, and with the promotion or formation of co-operative building societies. The recently published reports of the New York Tenement House Committee and of the United States Department of Labor have awakened a new interest in the question of better tenements and dwellings for wage-earners. With such a vast body of material, the time was ripe for a practical discussion of some

* From information received from Prof. E. R. L. Gould, of Johns Hopkins University.

† Prepared from notes submitted by Dr. William H. Tolman, of New York.

reform measures, and the Department of Dwellings of the New York Association arranged for a two days' conference, with the object of inaugurating a plan which should commend itself to the best judgment of the experts in housing. The formation of some kind of a building company is the undisputed outcome of the conference, and one member of the Association pledged himself for the expense of a secretary for one year, for the express purpose of formulating and administering definite lines of action. About two hundred persons attended the sessions of the conference, among them some of the leading business men of New York City. The first half of both days was spent in visiting various offices and institutions in New York City, including the Mayor's office, street cleaning department, peoples' baths, police headquarters, college and university settlements, improved tenements, wayfarers' lodges, etc. Afternoon and evening sessions were held for purposes of discussion. Mayor Strong presided at one of the meetings, and Bishop Potter at another.

Professor E. R. L. Gould, who prepared the eighth special report of the United States Bureau of Labor, discussed the question: "Will Improved Housing Pay?" He presented a vast amount of carefully prepared information to show that present experience demonstrates that 88 per cent of such experiments are earning profits equal to or beyond the ordinary rate for safe investments. Mr. Cornelius F. Doody, of the Industrial Temperance Union, explained the plan of that society for the erection of small detached cottages upon land purchased in the outlying districts. Mr. John Lloyd Thomas, who had just spent two months abroad studying the municipal experiments in Glasgow and London, presented a comprehensive paper giving the results of those experiments. He expressed the opinion that the two mammoth lodging houses, about to be erected in New York by Mr. D. O. Mills, will offer facilities equal to those found in any other city. Mr. Mills has destroyed two of the worst slums in New York and will erect on these sites the best constructed modern buildings, in which there will be accommodations for 2250 lodgers, who will be given comforts equal to the best afforded in the British model houses and at a cost of from fifteen to twenty cents a night. The erection of these houses will be commenced in May, and it is expected that they will be open for use by January, 1897.

Dr. Albert Shaw discussed the topic: "Facts and Tendencies of Transit Facilities in Their Relation to the Housing Problem," and Professor Felix Adler spoke on the moral aspects of the question. Mr. Robert Treat Paine, of Boston, gave a résumé of his personal experiments in building about one hundred small brick houses in Boston in the years 1887 to 1890, all of which were sold on easy terms of

credit; in some cases cash payments being made in the form of a monthly rent. Ex-Mayor Hewitt discussed the possibilities of more extended work on the part of building associations and in general the application of the building association idea.

The immediate results of the conference, especially the impressions made on those who attended it, were encouraging. The feeling generally prevailed that something practical for the improvement of dwellings of wage-earners in New York City could be done at once, and that any scheme undertaken should be made a model of its kind which might in turn influence other cities. A strong general committee was appointed which is now organized under the name of Improved Housing Council. The services of a general agent for one year will be secured as soon as possible. Detailed plans for dwellings are being submitted and carefully examined by the committees of the Council. Professor E. R. L. Gould has agreed to spend the month of April in New York City, and will devote some time to laying out the work for the coming year. In addition to the executive committee, two sub-committees have been appointed; one on "Model Tenement Houses," under the chairmanship of Mr. Joseph S. Auerbach; the other on "Separate Dwellings," with Professor Felix Adler as chairman. In this way the two general schemes, around which most practical plans for building dwellings may be readily grouped, will each be given due weight and examination under the leadership of their respective advocates.

Liquor Legislation in New York.—*The Raines Bill.* The new liquor tax law in New York, which was partially put in force immediately after it received the governor's signature, has already produced a marked change in New York City. It abolishes the Boards of Excise after April 30, and provides for the appointment of a State Commissioner of Excise, to be appointed by the Governor for a term of five years. It provides also for a deputy commissioner, a secretary and necessary clerical force, and for special deputy commissioners in certain counties (New York, Kings and Erie). The Commissioner has power to appoint not more than sixty special agents, each of whom receives an annual salary of \$1200. They are to be the confidential agents of the State Commissioner, and to investigate all matters relating to the collection of liquor taxes. The State Commissioner is also authorized to designate in any county an attorney or attorneys to act with the special deputy in the prosecution of all actions or proceedings under any law repealed by this act, or in the prosecution or defence of any action brought under the provisions of the act.

Licenses are abolished and a liquor tax substituted. The tax receipts must be publicly exhibited, just as street railway tax receipts

are posted in the cars. Anyone may engage in the liquor business who qualifies by paying the tax for the kind of business he may undertake. These taxes are assessed in four classes: First, hotels, restaurants, saloons, stores, etc., where liquor is to be drunk upon the premises where it is sold, located in a city having by the last State census a population of 1,500,000 or more, must pay \$800; if in a city having less than 1,500,000, but more than 500,000, \$650; if in a city having less than 500,000, but more than 50,000, \$500; in places with less than 50,000, but more than 10,000, \$350; in places with less than 10,000, but more than 5000, \$300; in a village with less than 5000, but more than 1200, \$200, and in other places, \$100.

Second. Upon the business of trafficking in liquors in quantities of less than five wine gallons, no part of which shall be drunk on the premises where sold, the tax begins with \$500 for cities of over 1,500,000, and is graded down to \$50.

Third. For licensed pharmacies where liquors are sold only upon the written prescription of a physician, the tax is \$100 for cities with a population of 1,500,000 or more, and graded down to \$10 for places with less than 1200.

Fourth. Those holding licenses for cars, steamboats or vessels within the State where liquor is sold to be drunk on the spot, the tax is \$200 for each car, steamboat or vessel upon which the traffic is carried on.

The bill further grants full measure of local option in determining in any town whether liquor shall be sold at all, or which class of tax-receipt may be granted. Traffic in liquor is not permitted in any building owned by the public, or upon any premises established as a penal institution, protectory, industrial school, asylum, State hospital or poor-house, and if such premises be situated in a town and outside the limits of an incorporated village or city not within one-half mile of the premises so occupied; nor in any building, yard, booth or other place which shall be on the same street or avenue and within 200 feet of a spot occupied exclusively as a church or school-house. Sales of liquor are not permitted on Sunday or before five a. m. on Monday, or on any other day between one and five o'clock in the morning, or on election days, or within 200 yards of the grounds or premises upon which any State, county, town or other agricultural or horticultural fair is being held, unless such grounds are within the limits of a city containing 150,000 inhabitants.

Holders of licenses are prohibited from selling any adulterated liquor or to *give away any food to be eaten on the premises*, and must not allow any girl or woman, not a member of the family of the proprietor, to sell or serve any liquor upon the premises. It is not

lawful to have open or unlocked any door or entrance from the street, alley, yard, hallway, room or adjoining premises to the room or rooms where any liquors are sold, during the hours when the sale of liquors is forbidden, except when necessary for the use of the family and for purposes not forbidden by the act. No curtain, screen, blind, opaque or colored glass, or anything that obstructs the view from the sidewalk, of the bar or place where the liquors are sold, is permissible during the hours when the sale of liquors is forbidden. The usual provisions against the sale of liquor to minors, intoxicated persons, habitual drunkards, are included in the law, which further prohibits selling or giving away any liquors to any Indian, or to any person to whom proprietors may be forbidden to sell by notice in writing from the parent, guardian, husband, wife, or child of such person over sixteen years of age, or by a magistrate or overseer of the poor in cases where the person is wholly or partly a charge upon the town; and, in general, to persons confined or committed to a State prison, jail, reformatory, industrial school, hospital, asylum, or poor-house, except upon a written prescription from a physician. The act makes no exception in favor of clubs as to Sunday sales.

There was much confusion in connection with the passage of the act in the New York Legislature and many disgraceful scenes enacted. Some doubt existed in the public mind whether the law went into effect on Sunday, March 29, which was the first day succeeding its passage on which it could be tested, or whether its provisions became operative on April 30. It was very generally enforced, however, on March 29, with very satisfactory results from the point of view of temperance reform. The law is doubtless more severe in some of its provisions than the public sentiment of New York City will sustain. Its local option feature gives expression to the only just and practicable scheme of reform, but is, perhaps, in the present law, too restricted in its application.

Senator Raines has discussed some of the underlying principles of the new law in an article in the *North American Review* for April.

Condition of the Colored Population in Large Cities.—The Committee on "Housing of the People" of the Civic Centre of Washington, D. C., is about to enter upon an investigation of the alley houses of Washington, which are for the most part inhabited by colored people. Two elaborate schedules containing about one hundred inquiries have been prepared, and the work of enumeration will soon be begun. A similar work will be undertaken in Philadelphia in the near future through the combined agencies of the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania and the College Settlement. This investigation will also be conducted on the schedule plan and be

restricted entirely to the question of the condition of the colored population of Philadelphia, and with reference to inequalities of opportunity in employment. It is highly desirable that similar work in other cities shall be carried on wherever possible, in a way that whenever undertaken will yield comparable results.

This department of the ANNALS is always glad to facilitate communication between parties engaged in practical investigations of sociological topics, and will, therefore, be pleased to furnish further information concerning the special colored investigation, mentioned in this connection, and to receive suggestions from persons engaged in a similar work elsewhere.

Tuskegee Conference of 1896.—The annual gathering of those interested in the cause of industrial education for the negro took place at Tuskegee on Thursday, March 5. About seven hundred persons were in attendance and thirteen States represented. At these conferences nothing is attempted but the discussion of the most vital and practical questions which have to do with the material advancement of the negroes of the South. Every effort is made to instill into them the necessity of saving, of keeping out of debt, of improving and owning their own homes, of being less wasteful in their expenditures, and of keeping their schools open for a longer period than the average two or three months' term. Great care is taken to present to these colored people, many of whom are leaders in the localities from which they come, the opportunities in new employments, and to assist them in the development of those qualities which will prevent many employments once monopolized by the race from slipping out of their hands, especially where white men have entered into competition, with all the advantage which cultivated brains and modern scientific methods afford. About fifty negro schools were represented at this conference. The reports are always full of characteristic pictures of the life of the colored people of the South.

Copies of the report may be obtained from Mr. Booker T. Washington, the principal of the Tuskegee Normal School, Tuskegee, Alabama.

"Darkest England" Scheme.—The annual report for the calendar year 1895 of General Booth's work, as certified by the accountants, shows that £18,000 was received from the public, and £30,000 earned in the various workshops. 1,352,840 persons were lodged at prices varying from 1*d* to 6*d* per night, and 3,302,763 meals were sold, varying in price from ¼*d* to 4*d* each. 3273 men were employed in the factories and shops operated by the organization. 15,923 applications for work were registered at the Labor Bureau, and employment, temporary or permanent, was found for nearly 20,000 men. The Prison

Home received 156 persons, and the rescue homes 1556 women, of whom it is said 1275 were satisfactorily dealt with. Out of the 3740 men received into the workshops 1041 were discharged because they were "unable or unwilling to work, or dissatisfied." In all 1400 men and women are now employed in connection with the scheme, and all of them are said to be of the working class that it was intended to benefit. At the farm only 10 per cent of those received had to be sent away because of drunkenness or persistent idleness.

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ABBREVIATIONS.—In the Index the following abbreviations have been used : *pap.*, principal paper by the person named ; *com.*, briefer communication, by the person named ; *b.*, review of book of which the person named is the author ; *p. n.*, personal note on the person named ; *r.*, review by the person named ; *trans.*, translation by the person named ; *mis.*, miscellany by the person named.

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SUPPLEMENT TO THE ANNALS OF THE
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE,

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...The...

Theory of Social Forces

BY

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THE THEORY OF SOCIAL FORCES.

INTRODUCTION.

The present essay is an attempt to recast current social philosophy and to introduce into it elements which thus far have been overlooked. In our social speculations we are still dominated by eighteenth century philosophy. Even the theory of evolution has had as yet but little influence on the social concepts and ideals of the race. Individualism seems as firmly established as ever and has on its side many of the highest scientific authorities.

I question whether the hold which this social philosophy has on the popular mind can be shaken, by an appeal to inductive evidence. This hold depends upon certain concepts and ideals which have received classical statement at the hands of our ablest thinkers and which cannot be displaced by unorganized facts. In order to have any degree of success a new social philosophy must present doctrines and ideals which are equally clear and have their elements equally well correlated.

It is my belief that the older philosophy does not rest on general principles, but is grounded on the series of environments in which the race has lived. The present environment of the race is so different from its predecessors that a new social philosophy is demanded to explain its effects. A failure to recognize changes in the environment is the main source of confusion in current discussions. My method may not lead to the solution of all social problems, but it at least clears the ground and shows how and where subsequent work of a more inductive character can be done.

It is perhaps necessary to caution the reader against the assumption that the social commonwealth which I have described is, in my opinion, the highest or even a final social state. While it is yet too early to predict what kind of a society will follow it, we know enough of its tendencies to

see that it may not be able to satisfy all the aspirations of men. If a progressive evolution continue, other societies will be possible, each of which will differ from its predecessor as radically as the society I describe differs from our present society. The desire for a still higher form should not be made the ground of an opposition to the study of the social conditions resulting from the pursuit of pleasure. Only when the more elementary facts about such a society are understood can the foundations of higher social states be discussed with profit. This essay attempts merely to start discussion along the right track and not to describe the ultimate form which society is to assume.

I feel that I must make an apology for injecting so much psychologic discussion into this essay. To many readers this will seem foreign to the subject and may arouse prejudices which will interfere with a correct appreciation of the other parts. It should, however, be kept in mind that every social philosophy has, as its basis, some theory of psychology. The doctrines of Locke and Hume have proved a most admirable basis for the old social philosophy. They ignore, however, the elements upon which the social forces rest. A new social philosophy cannot pass beyond the inductive stage until these factors are recognized and a picture of mental activity constructed which emphasizes the elements neglected by the old philosophy. Even if the type of psychology which I present is faulty, it can at least serve as a provisional philosophy until psychologic research is far enough advanced to furnish a better basis. The assumptions I make are neither different in kind nor greater in number than those of the philosophy it seeks to displace. If a few of its prominent ideas have in them elements of truth, the correctness of the details is of less consequence. They are inserted in order to create a definite picture of mental phenomena and thus to give my ideas some of the advantages which frequent restatement has given to the familiar ideas of the older systems of thought.

CHAPTER I.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE ENVIRONMENT.

§ 1. *The Relation of Economics to Biology.*

Evolution has thus far been studied as a problem of biology. This has been due more to what I would call a happy accident than to any necessity of the situation. Darwin admits that he obtained the clue to his theory through reading Malthus' "Essay on Population," and in many respects the attitude of the author of the "Origin of Species," is that of an economist. It is only by later writers that the economic elements in the problem are neglected and that the theory is based solely upon biologic evidence. The happy accident to which I have referred is the fact that the history of past organic life is so plainly recorded in the various organisms of the present and in the fossil remains of earlier forms. This enables the student to use the historical and comparative method of investigation and from his series of observations to infer what was the order of organic evolution. The organic world is not a world of causes but of effects, and hence the historical method is the only one of which the biologist can make use in studying the processes of evolution.

The fundamental contrast in evolution is that of environment and organism. The environment is made up of a group of conditions to which the organism must adjust itself. These conditions are, as compared with the organism, permanent and in their ultimate form unchanging. The organism is mobile and short lived. If an adjustment is to be made between the environment and an organism, it is the latter that must change. We have, therefore, between the two factors of evolution a causal connection. Causes lie in the environment, effects show themselves in the organisms.

The facts of evolution can be studied deductively only by beginning with the environment and tracing the influence of its conditions upon the organisms seeking adjustment. Inductive studies, however, must begin with facts about the organism and from them the student must seek to discover the conditions of the environment which has determined its evolution. If evolution is studied through its effects on organisms, the study is plainly in the field of biology. If, however, we seek in the environment for the causes of evolution, it is equally plain that the study lies in the field of economics—the science of utilities and of goods.

The environment of an organism is not the whole objective world, but only those parts of it which affect its welfare. The objects surrounding each organism may be divided into three parts: Those that are the cause of pleasure or of welfare, and therefore desirable; those that are the cause of pain or of destruction, and therefore to be avoided; and finally, all indifferent objects which are of no importance to the organism. The first two classes of objects make up the environment of an organism, which expands or contracts as a greater or smaller number of objects affects its welfare.

The environment of a particular organism is not, therefore, an unchanging whole made up of the sum of all objective conditions, but consists of a varying number of desirable or undesirable objects. There are, therefore, innumerable possible environments to which organisms can adjust themselves. Each organism seeks for that environment where there is a maximum of favorable and a minimum of unfavorable conditions. It desires to secure goods and to avoid evils. The problem thus presented is an economic problem and its study belongs to economic science. Every organism has its economy based upon the objective conditions by which it is affected. The economy of higher organisms is much more complex than that of the lower organisms, but the principles are not different. There is always an endeavor to increase pleasure and to avoid pain if the animal

is conscious of these emotions; and even if consciousness is not yet fully developed certain instincts and habits protect the organism and lead it to avoid evils.

The theory of goods in economics is in reality a study of the environments of organisms. It seeks to discover what objects increase their welfare and what are the means by which disagreeable objects can be avoided. Objects are of importance to organisms not as objects but only as goods or evils. The environment of each organism is the sum of its economic conditions and the environment changes as these conditions change. If this be true the causes of evolution lie in economic conditions and their effects show themselves in organisms. A series of organisms is a history of the effects of evolution; a series of groups of economic conditions can give a picture of its causes. There are, therefore, two methods of studying evolution—the one deductive, the other inductive. Our knowledge of it will not be complete until both economics and biology are fully utilized to throw light upon its intricate problems.

§ 2. *The Causes of a Progressive Evolution.*

The discussions on evolution have been largely concentrated on organisms and their development, and but little attention has been given to the conditions in the environment which have produced these organisms.* For these reasons a progressive evolution has been accepted as a fact without any examination into its causes. It is possible to imagine a planet on which the lower forms of life would be supreme and where there would be no tendency for higher types to displace the lower. If on our planet the higher

*“ Throughout biology proper, the environment and its correlated phenomena are either but tacitly recognized, or, if overtly and definitely recognized, are so but occasionally; while the organism and its correlated phenomena practically monopolize the attention.” Spencer’s “Psychology,” Vol. i, p. 134.

“ In brief, then, the propositions of biology, when they imply the environment at all, imply almost exclusively its few general and constant phenomena, which, because of their generality and constancy, may be left out of consideration.” *Ibid*, p. 135.

forms of life tend to survive there must be conditions in their surroundings which give them an advantage. It is of no use to examine the organisms or the principles of life to discover the cause of survival; for organic life is plastic and can assume many forms. If any one form tends to displace others its survival is due to some external condition of which other forms could not take advantage.

The environment of any organism is not the sum of all the objects surrounding it. The mass of them are indifferent and relatively but few furnish the real environment of any being. The goods and evils of each being are a definite part of the objective world and its welfare depends upon their abundance or scarcity. There are thus an indefinite number of environments, each giving certain possibilities to animals adjusted to them. A progressive evolution depends on the power of moving from one environment to another, and thus avoiding the stress of competition. Any one environment once occupied is soon filled with struggling beings. There is no hope of further progress unless a transition to some other environment is possible. But even a multitude of environments would not lead to a progressive evolution unless each member of the series presented slightly more complex conditions so that animals of the lower orders would be shut out of the more complex environments and thus compel a mental evolution to accompany each transition from one environment to another.

This proposition can be best illustrated by taking the food supply as an example of the conditions determining the power to survive. With the lower animals the food supply is so important an element that others may be overlooked. If the food supply depended on such simple conditions that all of it could be utilized by a low type of animal life a progressive evolution would be impossible. The higher types of animals would have no advantage over the lower and thus all progress would be blocked. In our world, however, the low types of animals can acquire but a small part of the possible

food supply, and hence their increase soon reaches definite limits. Each higher type of animal finds a new supply of food from which lower animals are shut out and thus has an advantage and secures a separate environment in which it can survive. This new environment may be in another region or it may mean a better utilization of the locality already occupied. Each progressive nation passes through a series of environments even though its geographical position has not been changed. The English people of the Middle Ages had not the same environment as the English people of to-day, although they occupied the same island. The introduction of root crops, machinery and railroads, the improvement of live stock and waterways, the opening up of coal and iron mines, the extension of commerce and the growth of cities have made new objects of interest to the English people and have thus given them a new environment in each age.

A similar series of conditions determine the development of other nations. Progress can continue only so long as adjustments to new groups of conditions are possible.

§ 3. *The Obstacles to a Progressive Evolution.*

An explanation of the process of evolution depends upon our knowledge of three groups of facts, which are the subject-matter separately of biology, psychology and economics.

In the first place organisms must be studied so that the relation of the organs to one another and the causes of their growth and decay may be understood. These problems belong to biology. With this group the psychic problems are often placed. The psychic factors of evolution, however, have a peculiar place and deserve a rank equally with the biologic factors. But it is not all of biology nor all of psychology that has an importance in the theory of evolution. The simple elements of each science have not the interest to students of this theory that certain of their complex forms have. In other words, it is the arrangement of the

elements of each science, and not the elements themselves, that are of supreme importance. Darwin's "Origin of Species," which did so much to establish the theory of evolution, is not a discussion of cell life, of spontaneous generation, or of unicellular organisms. It is rather a discussion of organs. The peculiarities of animals which determine their species are mainly the arrangement and relative growth of their organs. Organs were studied before cells and have a more direct bearing on the problems of evolution.

In psychology also it is not the ultimate facts of consciousness nor the composition of the nerve fibres and currents that need investigation by the evolutionist. It is the mental mechanism in which his interest lies. By this I mean the arrangement and co-ordination of the various nerve centres so that effective results are produced by the psychic processes. It is not consciousness, but a clear consciousness, that has an interest. So also the interest is not in mere bodily activity, but in the definite motions which effect an adjustment to the external conditions. Clear perceptions of the environment and the power of definite adjustments depend on the mental mechanism, and it, rather than the ultimate facts of psychology, must be studied to show how a mental evolution is possible.

The third group of facts demanding explanation come from the objective world which forms the environment of organisms. And here again the interest is not in the ultimate facts about the atoms and forces which make up the inorganic world, but the peculiar arrangements of these atoms and forces. The atoms have aggregated themselves into worlds and these worlds through a series of geological changes have assumed a definite form. The static crust of a given world forms the background of the evolution of the particular organisms which inhabit it. They must adjust themselves to its possibilities and have their progress determined by its peculiarities. If any of the elements of a progressive evolution are lacking or difficult of access because

of the peculiarities of this crust, the evolution of the creatures on its surface is prevented or retarded.

It is necessary to emphasize the static character of the crust of the earth because this fact is the cause of all the peculiarities in the evolution of organisms. The definite arrangement of the parts of this crust gives to organisms a more or less complete series of environments by the aid of which their evolution becomes possible. This series of environments cannot be changed, and beings in passing to the next in the series must undergo a double series of changes—one to fit them for the peculiarities of the new environment and the other to acquire the normal characteristics which lead to progress. Oftentimes the next step in what might be called the ladder of progress is lacking and then the being must take an indirect route and pass through many changes in its organs and mental mechanism which have no other end than to supply the gap due to the missing step in the ladder. Peculiar groupings in the inorganic mechanism demand peculiar grouping of organs, nervous centres, ideas and of men. When an obstacle is once overcome and the being has returned to the normal line of progress it has no further use for the peculiarities of the preceding stage of progress and they become a block to progress, often being the cause of still further irregularities in the subsequent evolution.

All obstacles to or peculiarities in progress have their origin in the defects of this ladder of progress, that is, in the imperfect series of environments which the crust of the earth affords. The organs and the mental mechanism of beings are two factors of evolution which are plastic and can be modified in any direction. They are, therefore, constant factors in evolution, and if they alone were concerned evolution might be easy, regular and rapid. They are as dynamic as the crust of the earth to which adjustment must be made is static. For possibilities of evolution, the vital and psychic processes must be studied. For its peculiarities and defects, however, the environment must be

studied. It shows the obstacles to progress and the relations between the succeeding stages of evolution.

§ 4. *The Requisites for Survival.*

An environment is usually thought of as a unit made up of the totality of objective conditions. The adjustment to these conditions is looked upon as the goal of progress, and the process of adjustment is a slow one running through many ages. The adjustment seems to depend upon a multitude of minor conditions, each of which has a slight influence on the welfare of the organism and the sum of which, compared with a similar sum to which a rival being is adjusted, determines the power to survive. If, however, we use the term environment in a more restricted sense, meaning the sum of conditions upon which the welfare of an animal at a given time depends, the emphasis is changed from the gradual adjustment to an ideal environment to the definite steps needed to transfer an animal from its present environment to an adjacent one in which it will be more protected from competition.

Static animals are always adjusted to their environment. Among them competition is direct and survival depends on superiority of physique. Progressive animals avoid competition by surmounting some condition which will free them from a struggle with equals or superiors. The progressive animal is not that one whose sum of adjustments to the old environment is greatest, nor that one which has the best average adjustment. Such animals remain static because they can control the old environment. Progress depends rather upon the animal's possession of a capacity to adjust itself to a new environment and thus to escape competition.

Progress is of two kinds. Static progress increases the sum of adjustments or the average adjustment to a given environment and thus gives to an animal the power to survive in this environment. This kind of progress is limited

and is usually of a physical character. The animal grows more vigorous and gets better means of defence, but its mental powers remain the same. The second kind of progress is dynamic and leads to the acquisition of new mental qualities by which adjustment to a new environment is possible. Some obstacle insurmountable to the static animal prevents its acquisition of a new environment. The single aim of progressive animals is to escape from competition; the single means is to secure control of that quality which opens to its possessors a new environment. This essential quality for success I shall call the requisite for survival. If the obstacles to its acquisition are removed, all other obstacles are easily surmounted. The requisite for survival may assume many forms. It may be the means of increasing the food supply, or it may be the means of securing safety. An animal may have plenty of food in its environment, so that it need not suffer on that score, yet its enemies may press it hard. If it secures some means of avoiding them its welfare is assured. In this case a place of safety is the requisite for survival since all the other conditions of success are present in abundance.

If there were no obstacles delaying progress until the proper requisites for survival were found, the older species would be the most advanced and have the most intelligence. Man, however, is thought by zoölogists to have a shorter line of ancestry than some other species over which he has a mastery. The more rapid progress of the human species does not seem to have been due to any inherent superiority, but results from conditions giving to it a better series of requisites for survival than other animals have had. The carnivora and ungulata seem at one time to have had, in this respect, an advantage over the ancestors of men.*

The relative progress which men had made in the new and in the old world before the discovery of America, shows

* See Lester F. Ward's "Relation of Sociology to Anthropology." *The American Anthropologist*, July 1895.

also how progress depends upon the requisites for survival. The number of animals and vegetables of use to man were much greater in the old world than in the new and the greater progress of men in the old world seems to have been due to this fact.* America possessed but few draft animals and these were of an inferior character and limited to certain localities. There were no animals which by domestication could furnish a substantial supply of food. Nor were there any animals valuable for their milk. The inhabitants of the new world seem to have utilized their resources as well as did those of the old world. The difference in the rate of progress was due, not to differences in the races inhabiting the two areas, but to differences in the aids which nature gives to progress. America lacked certain requisites for survival which were supplied to those living in Asia.

In the social relations of men this principle of a requisite for survival is ever present. The different agents in production have different rates of increase. There is always one agent, the supply of which is relatively short and the value of whose services command a monopoly price. There is a stimulus for members of the society to develop those qualities through which this agent is increased. The classes having these qualities are freed from competition, while classes without them suffer from the increased pressure of competition. Capital, for example, in the first half of this century was the most slowly increasing agent of production and therefore the requisite for survival. The capitalistic classes escaped from competition by developing the instinct of saving, and thus pushed society into a better environment. At present, intelligence—the ability to manage large industries—seems to be the requisite for survival. Through the development of ability and intelligence the entrance into a better environment is made possible.

When the need of a new requisite for survival becomes apparent, the possession of old inherited qualities is of

* See Payne's "History of America," Vol. i, p. 311.

little importance in the struggle for existence. No matter how well developed, these do not relieve their possessors from the stress of competition. These persons must expect to see the benefits of progress fall into the hands of those who possess the requisite for survival, while they may themselves be worse off than if no progress had been made. The new class may not only secure all the benefits of increased prosperity, but compel the static classes to give up a part of what they would have secured if the old conditions had continued. The requisite for survival is, therefore, the all-important element in periods of transition. The general adjustment of men or societies to nature is for the moment of little importance. Some new obstacle bars the way to progress and some new quality is needed to surmount this obstacle. Upon this new quality the power of surviving depends and all the forces of evolution further its development and reward those in whom it first appears.

CHAPTER II.

RACE PSYCHOLOGY.

An Hypothesis to Account for the Origin of the Social Forces.

§ 1. *The Mental Mechanism.*

The obstacles to progress due to a series of requisites for survival must be surmounted by the development of the mind. The possibility of a progressive evolution depends upon the conditions of the objective world creating a series of requisites for survival, its realization, however, depends upon the development of new mental qualities. The simple elements of which the mind is made up must be combined in new forms to meet these new conditions. There must be an increase in the number of centres in which thought is developed or these centres must be put into new relations to one another so that the aggregate effect of mental activity may be heightened. The society of centres, to use a social analogy, must develop more intricate relations, and a division of labor among them must increase the efficiency of their activity.

The simple elements of the mental mechanism are few and their power when in isolation small. The requisites for survival could not be secured if these elements remained in their simplest form. When united in certain ways they create instincts, impulses, memory and imagination, and these when organized become conscious thought. Each requisite for survival demands a change in the mechanism of the mind in some particular direction and when secured, a new quality is added to the mind which becomes in turn a lever by which the next obstacle to progress is overcome.

A study of mental phenomena from this standpoint emphasizes the mechanism of the mind much more than does

an analysis of the elements of consciousness. An economic illustration will make this distinction clear. Suppose society to have developed an effective desire for more cloth than is now produced. The increase may be secured in either of two ways without increasing the amount of capital or labor devoted to the cloth industry. The weavers and other persons engaged in the manufacture of cloth may become more intelligent and skillful, and so more efficient producers; or there may be introduced a more minute and efficient division of labor, workers with their present individual efficiency being organized in such a way as to increase the product. In the first case the units are changed; in the second the change takes place in the mechanism through which the units act.

It has been customary to assume that the mind is a unit; that improvement is due to a change in the character of the mind similar to those which are seen in a laborer who rises from a lower to a higher grade. It has been overlooked that the improvement may be due instead to changes in the mechanism of the mind, *i. e.*, to changes, not in the qualities of the centres which together create mental activity, but in the relations which exist between these centres.

If it be considered permissible to regard the mind as a complex resulting from the activity of a number of separate centres, there will result two distinct lines of possible investigation. One is an examination into the construction of the centres, the other is an examination into the mechanism by which the centres are united and brought into harmonious relation. If it proves possible to analyze the centres into their simple elements it may be found that the former of the proposed investigations will resolve itself chiefly into an examination of the changes in the mental mechanism rather than of changes in the most elementary mental elements. In this case all improvement in mental power would ultimately be seen to result from improvement in mental mechanism. There would then be no task for

introspective or physiological psychology except the discovery of the simple elements of thought and their connection with the physiology of the nervous system.

It is upon this supposition that the reasoning of the present essay is based. It is assumed that there are certain simple elements of thought distinguished by introspection, and certain elements of the nervous system discovered by a physical analysis of the brain; and that by different arrangements of these elements the various forms of mental activity are secured. If these assumptions are even in a measure correct, a new type of psychology arises which concerns itself solely with the mechanism of the mind.

Sociology furnishes a useful illustration. Suppose one who had no knowledge of the individuals that compose society to be observing the operation of certain social institutions such as the church, the factory, the city, the nation. It would be impossible for him to explain any one of these phenomena in terms of the others. Churches do not when aggregated become factories, factories do not constitute cities, nor are cities the units out of which nations are made. When, however, it is recognized that the unit from which all the institutions are formed are men, then it is easy to see the relations that exist between the institutions formed by the aggregations of men on various principles. These institutions are merely the mechanism of society, and the problems of this mechanism are distinct from those which relate to the qualities of the individual members of society. The individual man may be studied profitably from various standpoints, but his social nature cannot be understood until there has been an analysis of social institutions. This principle holds good in its application to the mechanism of the mind and the elements of thought. It acquires even greater importance because of the fact that the units cannot be isolated and studied directly. They can be known only by inference from the joint effects of all the units in their various combinations.

We are accustomed to the thought that society is an organism and should be studied by the methods of biology. I desire to reverse the figure and to study the mind as if it were a society of conscious units organized into a mechanism for common ends. The difference between that society of conscious units which we call mind, and a society of human beings on our planet, is in the completeness of the mechanism. Many ages of mental progress have brought the units of the mind into complete harmony with one another, while in human society we have as yet but an imperfect manifestation of the possibilities of a social mechanism.

I shall make no attempt to explain why states of consciousness accompany or result from the activity of nervous centres. The connection between the two sides of mental life will be accepted as a fact, the explanation of which belongs to another department of psychology. It will be assumed that in the development of an organism there is a tendency to create a group of conscious centres. The mental mechanism of beings is a result of this tendency. These centres in advanced beings must be co-ordinated in a way that gives clearness and vividness to thought. Not mere consciousness, but definite consciousness, the power to have clear concepts of the environment is the phenomenon which race psychology has to explain. Just as the origin of species needed to be studied apart from the problems of cell life and of the possibility of spontaneous generation, so the relations between conscious centres needs to be studied apart from problems concerning the contents of these centres. Their relations must be understood before the deeper problem of the origin of consciousness can be solved. The connection between complex nervous relations and complex conscious states can be explained without knowing why or how a simple nervous current can excite a state of consciousness. Race psychology can explain only phenomena that are of a complex nature.

§ 2. *The Classification of Ideas.*

The test of a simple idea has, perhaps, seemed so obvious to those who use the term that an accurate definition is not needed. Yet there lurk in it two meanings which need to be contrasted.

The mind is the means by which the organism keeps itself adjusted to its environment. To effect this adjustment two classes of ideas are necessary. The one class gives the organism a more or less definite concept of surrounding objects; enables it to discover its relations to the different parts of its environment, to distinguish between them and to determine their properties. In some way a correspondence grows up between the ideas of the organism and the parts of the environment, so that from the former the presence of the latter may be inferred. These ideas are knowledge-producing ideas, and upon their clearness and definiteness the possibility of improved adjustments between the organism and its environment depends.

An organism needs, however, more than a knowledge of its environment. It must have the power to create movements which will lead to an adjustment to external conditions. It must also have ideas of how these movements can be made. These ideas of movements must be more than mere knowledge. They must in and of themselves have the power by which these movements are realized. Their very presence must insure that the movement is made.

There are then knowledge-producing ideas which give information of the environment and action-producing ideas which create the movements in the organism which lead to an adjustment between it and the objects of which it has knowledge. These two kinds of ideas cannot be classified on the same plan. A simple element of knowledge is not a simple element of action. We must classify each group of ideas according to its own characteristics.

Knowledge ideas—those of the environment—are either clear or obscure. An organism has a clear idea when some

element is so reproduced in its mind that its relations to this portion of its environment are evident. It has obscure ideas when its immediate environment is not reproduced in its mind in such a way that definite adjustments are possible. Action ideas—those which produce movements in the organism which lead to an adjustment, are vivid or faint. Vivid ideas drive other ideas out of the consciousness and force the organism to act in a particular way. Faint ideas have no such power of acquiring exclusive attention and either lead to no action or to actions which are of little service to the organism.

It is not necessary that an organism which has vivid ideas should have also clear ideas. Nor can it be said that clear ideas are always vivid. One organism with very obscure ideas of its environment may act with force and energy whenever these ideas arouse its activity, while another organism with the clearest ideas of its environment may be sluggish in its activities and fail to make those better adjustments which its clear ideas would permit. Clear ideas may be faint and vivid ideas may be obscure.

From these facts it seems plain that ideas are the product of the mechanism of the mind, and that this mechanism is not single but double. One type of mental development leads to more clear ideas of the environment, while another type leads to more vivid ideas upon which action is based. It seems probable also that this double mechanism for mental activity corresponds to the double division of nervous currents upon which mental activity depends. If the sensory or ingoing currents are well organized they convey to the mind clear ideas of the environment. If the motor or outgoing currents are highly developed, the organism has vivid ideas and acts with vigor and promptness. The degree in which the ideas of an organism are vivid and clear depends upon the development of these two parts of its mental mechanism.

It will, I think, be generally recognized that clear ideas

belong to the sensory mechanism and depend upon its development. It will not, however, be so readily admitted that vivid ideas are motor feelings and depend upon the development of the motor mechanism. It is usually held—at least by the empirical school of psychologists—that all our feelings are sensory and depend upon the ingoing nervous currents. Without stopping to discuss the philosophy involved in this issue, it will, I think, be conceded that there is an inductive connection between vivid ideas and the development of the motor mechanism. Vivid ideas all relate to the mental states of the organism and tell nothing of the environment. They are the pleasures and pains of the organism, its desires, its passions and its beliefs. They are tendencies to activity, and if they are not motor feelings they are so intimately connected with the motor mechanism and so different from other sensory feelings, that there can be no practical error in calling them motor feelings.

According to this classification, the sensory feelings convey to the mind only ideas of the environment, while the motor feelings give it only ideas of the organism. Clear ideas relate to things objective to the organism; vivid ideas relate to its subjective states. The self of the organism is revealed only in vivid ideas. Its clear ideas are all of things external to the self. It is true that the higher organisms have clear ideas of some of their parts, but they get these clear ideas only by making the parts of which they have clear ideas objective to themselves and thus a part of the environment. We have, for example, clear ideas of our hands. We think of them, in terms of the environment, as being made of material and having form, color and weight. This objectification of the parts of the organism, however, is only possible when several senses are well developed. The clear ideas we have of the hand do not come from it, but indirectly from other organs when the organism is passive. To the eye, for example, the hand is objective—a part of the environment.

When, however, an organism is active all its clear ideas relate to its environment, while all its ideas of itself or of its parts are vivid. The hand ceases to be an object of analysis and becomes again a part of self. It is known only through the vivid ideas which make it a means of promoting the activity of the organism. Even when an organism has clear ideas of itself the ideas are not simple ideas. Some element of vividness is mixed with these clear ideas before they can be predicated as a part of self. If I say, for example, that my hand is long and thin, the feelings back of these ideas are not all clear and sensory. There are also some motor feelings present in consciousness which blend with these clear ideas. If this is not the case the hand is purely objective, a part of the environment and not united in any way with the organism. The hand is made a part of the organism, not through the clear ideas of which the sensory nerves bring in, but through the vivid ideas which the outgoing motor forces create. When "I," "my," or "me" is a part of the proposition the group of feelings for which it stands cannot be analyzed into clear simple sensory ideas. Without a tincture of motor feelings the proposition lacks reality and would not create conviction. Vivid and clear ideas are, to say the least, organically different. They depend upon the development of different parts of the mental mechanism. The peculiarities of this mechanism may emphasize the one of these elements at the expense of the other and thus give the basis for a defective philosophy which neglects or ignores the other element. A more careful investigation will, however, show the importance of the neglected element and bring the two parts of every organism into proper relation. Both the motor and sensory forces show their effects in consciousness and create peculiar ideas differing too widely to be brought into a single classification.

In many ways this difference between clear and vivid ideas has been recognized but a confusion in the use of terms

has prevented the distinction from receiving general attention or assent. Locke, for example, uses the term "idea" in the sense of knowledge-producing ideas. His problem is an analysis of knowledge, and this analysis is successful so long as it relates to the environment. He ignores the vivid organic ideas or at least fails to give an adequate explanation of them. Hume, however, has as his problem, not the explanation of knowledge, but of belief and conviction. He uses the term "idea" in harmony with his problem and divides ideas into two classes, vivid and faint. This classification is possible because his attention is given to the action-producing ideas that create conviction. While he often speaks in a general way of the sensations which produce knowledge ideas, he makes no attempt to analyze them. His illustrations are all taken from action-producing ideas. The analysis of the passions, desires and emotions monopolize his attention, while he leaves the examination of external sensations to anatomists and natural philosophers.* He can, therefore, easily divide the ideas of interest to him into two classes, vivid and faint. The knowledge-producing ideas of Locke are as completely ignored in this classification as are the action-producing ideas in Locke's classification. The work of both these authors must be brought into some organic relation before all the mental forces are explained. It is a common mistake to assume that their problems were the same, and that their explanations relate to the same set of phenomena.

§ 3. *The Basis of the Present Hypothesis.*

The plan of the nervous system is simple. There are two kinds of nerves, those which conduct currents toward the centre of the system and produce sensation, and those on which currents move toward the surface of the body and produce motion.

The simplest form of activity is the nervous arc. An

*Hume's "Treatise of Human Nature." Book i., § 2.

afferent nerve carries a current from the surface of the body to a nervous centre. There a reaction takes place and a return current passes over an efferent nerve to some muscle, causing it to contract. Innumerable duplications of this simple arc make the basis of the nervous system. It is not complete, however, until the various centres are connected with one another so that excitations at any one centre are communicated to other centres. Descriptions of the nervous system are so familiar that I need not repeat them here. For my purpose they are merely data upon which certain hypotheses rest.

Nervous currents are either primary or secondary. The primary current started at the surface of the body is carried to a centre or to a series of centres. A secondary current is due to the excitation of a centre by a primary current. In this way a new current may be started which will in turn stimulate some other centre or centres. Centres far from the surface of the body may never feel the force of the primary currents. They are aroused to activity only by the secondary currents started by primary currents.

In any network of centres like the human brain the secondary currents are of the greater importance. They bind the various centres into a harmonious whole by reflecting sensations from one centre to another. When any centre is excited by a current, it creates a new current which imparts to neighboring centres the sensations it receives. The whole mind is thus aroused to a similar activity and the effects of the primary current become more pronounced.

Primary currents are strong but obscure. The process of reflection separates from each other the elements which are united in the obscure currents from the lower centres nearer the surface. In this way these elements are purified by isolation, and each one is carried to that centre most fitted to receive it. The sensations of the higher centres*

* By higher centres I mean simply those whose contact with the outer world is least direct.

are thus pure and clear because these centres are excited only by some peculiar quality of the primary current. The sensations of the lower centres are composite and obscure because the currents which arouse their activity are diverse in their composition.

In addition to the sensations due to the sensory currents, feelings are also aroused in certain centres by the motor currents that pass through them. If a centre is a part of a complex mental mechanism, it may be excited to activity by motor currents coming from the more central parts of the system. I shall assume that motor and sensory currents create distinct feelings in consciousness, and that a part of its complex phenomena is due to their interaction. It would harmonize with my hypotheses if motor and sensory currents differed only in their intensity, and in the rapidity of their movement. The sensory currents move, I think, more slowly and at a lower tension. The motor currents are stronger, move more rapidly and make a more vivid impression on consciousness.

Since the motor currents move more rapidly they produce a shorter wave of consciousness. The feelings they excite are thus less capable of analysis than are the feelings excited by the longer waves of the more slowly moving sensory currents. They transform the content of thought, however, by changing the passive states of sensation into tendencies. Associations of ideas, instincts and emotions could not arise out of mere perceptions if motor feelings did not accompany the feelings of sensation.

I shall assume these differences between sensory and motor currents and the consequences that flow from them without further analysis. I wish merely to present a working hypothesis and shall seek to verify my assumptions by showing how completely they harmonize with the observed phenomena of consciousness.

§ 4. *The Self-Conscious Centre.*

The clearness and vividness of sensory feelings are due to the mental mechanism by which they are reinforced and prolonged. After a sensory current is started at the surface of the body it is reflected from centre to centre, and becomes weaker and purer at each reproduction. The sensations in the higher centres are intensified when two or more currents reach it from the surface of the body at the same time, but by different routes. If these currents blend they create one wave of consciousness. The clearness of the resulting consciousness depends upon the purity of the wave, and this purity in turn depends upon the number of centres through which the current has passed.


The wave of consciousness is prolonged when the currents blending at a centre traverse routes of unequal length. If one current passes through four and another through five centres, the latter will arrive a little later, and thus sustain the wave a moment longer than if both currents arrived at the same time. There is a loss of intensity of consciousness in this case, but the greater length of the wave allows a better analysis of the content of the passing current. When several currents follow one another so closely as to blend into one wave and thus to sustain the consciousness of the centre, the beginning of the wave is more obscure and vivid than the end, because the currents first to arrive travel the more direct routes. This part of the wave contains the impression and strikes the mind with enough force to attract the attention from the receding currents which went before it. The purer part of the wave following so closely as to blend with it has traveled by a more indirect route and is usually reflected from some higher centre.

If the waves of consciousness follow one another so rapidly that a new wave arrives before the final portion of its predecessor has disappeared, a continuous state of consciousness is sustained. Centres which are so situated that only

a part of the currents started in a network of centres reach them, have intermittent states of consciousness. It is only in a very few favored centres—perhaps only at a single centre—that the surrounding mechanism is so complete as to create a continuous state of consciousness.

It will perhaps aid the reader to understand the mechanism of the mind if I illustrate the network of centres I have described by the aid of a diagram. These centres are arrayed in a purely ideal manner without any desire to reproduce the arrangement of a real mind.

Fig. 1.



In this diagram the dots represent the centres of an ideal mind, and the lines represent the nerves along which the sensory currents are carried. The lower portion of the lines represent the extremities of the nerves near the surface of the body. The nerve currents are supposed to start at the lower ends of these lines and pass upward to the first series of centres which are thus excited to activity. Reflected or secondary currents start from these centres and move along the upward lines to the next series of centres and arouse them to activity. The third series of centres are next aroused and then all the currents converge at *a*, the self-conscious centre.

According to the plan of the diagram when the adjacent surface receives an impression, six currents blend at *a* to create a state of consciousness. They come in pairs, and thus intensify or heighten the wave. Those from centres 3 and

4 arrive first and are the most obscure (as to content) and vivid; then currents from centres 2 and 5 come through centres 8 and 9, and finally the currents from centres 1 and 6 come through centres 11 and 12, conveying the purest but least vivid part of the wave of consciousness. Through this mechanism consciousness is prolonged and analysis of its contents made possible.

I have tried in this crude way to represent how some of the mental states are formed, if my hypothesis is correct. The ordinary mental states of men are much more complex than these, but they contain no more elements. Increased complexity or other forms of the mental mechanism blend the sensory and motor currents in a thousand ways and create that variety of thought and feeling with which we are familiar. The more prominent of these demand further analysis and to them we must now turn our attention.

§ 5. *The Development of the Sensory Feelings.*

If it may be taken for granted that pleasures and pains are motor feelings, it is less difficult to determine the order of the development of the sensory feelings. The sensory currents have a much lower tension than the motor currents and their peculiarities cannot become objects of perception until the motor currents have their own avenues of exit. Then each sensory centre becomes a place where certain sensations are perceived, and these sensations are reflected to other centres where they are aggregated in fixed ways according to the nature of the mental mechanism of the organism. The obscure but vivid sensations become impressions while the clearer but weaker sensations become ideas in the centres to which they are reflected. The process of reflecting sensations from centre to centre creates the difference between impressions and clear ideas. In the centres where they are felt the clear ideas are just as real as are the impressions of the lower centres. The thinker is not conscious of the refining process that has taken place

before the clear idea becomes an object of perception in the self-conscious centre. All ideas undergo to some extent this process of refinement, and hence impressions and clear ideas differ not in kind but only in quality. To the thinker they both seem original elements of thought differing merely in clearness and vividness.

To explain the different kinds of sensory feelings produced by the mental mechanism, the distinction between centres with intermittent and with constant states of consciousness must be emphasized. If the states of consciousness follow one another so rapidly that a centre is constantly active it becomes a self-conscious centre. Few centres, however, are so advantageously situated as to receive all or even the greater part of the nervous currents that originate in the various parts of the nervous system. While the attention is necessarily attracted to the self-conscious centre, it is the other centres that really give a definite form to thought. These centres are aroused to activity only by particular nervous currents, and when aroused, the reflected currents which proceed from them have a definite character and produce given sensations in the centres to which they are reflected. The self-conscious centre receives the same sensation every time a given centre with intermittent states of consciousness is aroused to activity. Memory, imagination, forms of thought and ideals are not the products of the self-conscious centre which perceives them. They are the product of centres with intermittent states of consciousness united through the mental mechanism with the self-conscious centre. The products of the other centres are thus reflected to the self-conscious centre, and are thought by it to come from the outer world. Consciousness would be a medley of confused sensations, but for this aid from the mental mechanism. No one centre can at the same time receive all classes of sensations and so co-ordinate them that intelligent thought results. The self-conscious centre, capable of receiving all kinds of sensations must, therefore,

be cut off from direct contact with the outer world and receive its sensations indirectly from centres capable of receiving only sensations of particular kinds.

Of these complex sensations reflected from centres with intermittent states of consciousness two—forms of thought and ideals—demand special attention. If an intermittent centre is far away from the original source of sensation and receives only ideas purified by repeated reflections, its states of consciousness contain a definite group of clear ideas and these ideas are always reflected in a body to the self-conscious centre. The intermittent centre is so connected with the lower centres that when the sensations it receives contain one of its ideas it is aroused to activity, and all its ideas are reflected to the self-conscious centre. Thought at the latter centre receives in this way a definite form. Certain of its clear ideas are always perceived in groups, and any sensations from lower centres containing one of these ideas have immediately added to them the other ideas of the group in question through the activity of some intermittent centre. The concrete phenomena of consciousness come from two sources. One element comes from the lower centres in direct contact with the outer world, and another element comes from certain intermittent centres which are aroused to activity by currents reflected from the lower centres. Concrete phenomena could not reproduce objective conditions so clearly but for the additions made to them by the higher centres which create forms of thought for the self-conscious centre. We could not conceive of an outer world with definite relations always existing between its parts but for this mental mechanism which forces all perceptions of objective phenomena into certain fixed moulds.

The way in which ideas of space and time are impressed upon all sensations coming from the outer world furnishes good examples of the action of centres creating forms of thought for the self-conscious centre. Our mental

mechanism has been, I think, so developed that all the clear ideas of space are perceived at a centre with intermittent activity. This centre is aroused to activity by every sensation coming from the outer world, even though it contains but one of the elements which make up our ideas of space. This single element arrives at the self-conscious centre at the same time that all the clear ideas of space are reflected to it from the intermittent centre which creates the space forms. The two elements blend and seem to come as a unit from the outer world.

It has been assumed by Kant and other German thinkers that forms of thought are a part of the constitution of the thinking unit in the self-conscious centre. This assumption is, I think, erroneous. It overlooks the complexity of the mind and the aid to clear thinking obtained by the self-conscious centre from other centres with which it is joined by the mental mechanism. However real the original thinking unit may be, it has not all the powers which are ordinarily attributed to it. We must know the part which the mental mechanism plays in forming clear thoughts before the powers of this original unit can be determined.

Space and time are not the only forms of thoughts. There are also taste forms, musical forms and æsthetic forms, and doubtless many other kinds are more or less fully developed. Our idea of the taste of an object does not depend simply upon the sensations which contact with it arouses. If the taste of the eater is cultivated he adds to the sensations aroused by direct contact many indirect ones coming from intermittent centres of consciousness where taste sensations are perceived. The supposed taste is the joint product of these two elements. Some sensations of taste are aroused only by sensations of odor. Contact with an object fails to arouse these sensations but certain sensations of odor can arouse the centres having the taste forms, and these centres reflect to consciousness the proper sensations to supplement those directly received.

The difference between a musical and an unmusical person or between an æsthetic and unæsthetic person depends upon the development of musical and æsthetic forms of thought. The tones or colors perceived by undeveloped persons are more nearly like the original impressions than are those perceived by persons with more cultivated tastes. On the one hand the process of repeated reflection which the sensations undergo purifies the ideas of the cultivated person and shuts out the obscurer elements in the original impression. On the other hand certain forms of thought are impressed on the thinking centre so that the sensations it perceives have other elements than those the original impression contained. Order, beauty and harmony are thus secured to a far higher degree than would be possible if the mental mechanism for producing these sensations were more simple, and the original impressions were conveyed to the self-conscious centre in a more direct manner.

Other centres reflect to the self-conscious centre definite groups of ideas and are the source of our ideals. Ideals are like forms of thought in that they are groups of clear ideas generated in the higher centres. These ideas have become purified through repeated reflection. In many respects, however, ideals resemble memories because they contain ideas grouped in a definite way. These ideas are so blended that they seem almost as concrete as do memories. Memories might be compared to an original chemical compound partly analyzed into its parts. Ideals are like a number of isolated elements partly combined so as to seem a unit. Their number and their definite relations give them an air of concrete reality.

When these ideal-producing centres are aroused they add to the object arousing them a number of qualities which it does not and can not have in the present environment of the individual perceiving them. Ideals are mainly social, and need a unit of the social world to arouse them. They create another environment for this unit, or add qualities

which the unit could have only in another environment. In this way the mental mechanism gives to the thinker certain other environments to contrast with the present one or adds new qualities to many of the persons or objects he sees or hears of.

Heaven and purgatory, for example, are definite groups of clear ideas reflected to the self-conscious centre from a centre of intermittent activity. A thought or object which arouses one of these centres has added to it the whole series of ideas possessed by the centre, and the whole series is impressed with such vividness and concreteness as to seem to be a part of the real world. It becomes so nearly akin to a memory that it has a like effect upon the actions and conduct of the thinker. His character is as much modified by these ideas as though they were facts of experience.

In the same way future welfare, home and the family become ideals, adding elements to present experience and forcing it into given forms that it could not take but for the fact that these groups of ideas are impressed upon the self-conscious centre every time that one of their elements comes to the consciousness from external sensations. The home of an individual is much more than the actual contents of the dwelling house and the real persons that dwell there. The possessor of a home cannot see its contents or its intimates in the same light as an outsider. He is forced to add elements that are impressed upon his consciousness by his mental mechanism. The lover cannot look on the object of his affection as other persons do and see her true qualities. To those impressions conveyed by the senses, he adds all the qualities possessed by his ideal woman. The two elements blend so completely that he sees in her all the qualities of his ideal.

Hero worship is due to the same causes. The qualities of an ideal hero are impressed so vividly upon the self-conscious centre that the defects of the real hero are overlooked and other qualities added which he does not possess.

It is impossible to get the hero worshiper to see the hero in his true character, because his mental mechanism transforms the hero into a being other than that which he really is. The king, the saint, the general, the nobility, and other persons become invested with a peculiar sanctity as soon as they become ideals to their followers. The evidence of the senses is no longer the criterion by which their virtues and defects are determined. A subjective element blends with the objective reality, giving the adored person a peculiar halo which isolates him from ordinary mortals.

These facts show that ideals, like forms of thought, are due to the constructive activity of the mental mechanism. They are means of enriching the experience of individuals and of giving to their thoughts a definite form, which an isolated thought centre could not acquire. A mere association of ideas could not arrive at such results. It might join ideas in groups but it could not give them that objectivity which belongs to forms of thought and ideals.

§ 6. *A Classification of the Motor Feelings.*

If there were no mental mechanism there could be no motor feelings. There could then be but one thought centre, and all the nervous currents leading to it would be sensory currents. The motor currents which start in this centre would proceed directly to the surface of the body without becoming objects of consciousness. It is only when a complex mental mechanism is developed that the motor currents of one thought centre can pass to other centres instead of going directly to the muscles. In this case peculiar motor feelings arise in the centre to which the motor current goes which must be contrasted with the sensory feelings coming from the surface of the body. The motor currents, if my analysis of them is correct, move more rapidly than do the sensory currents and have a higher tension. They are less capable of analysis because they pass through the self-conscious centre so quickly. For this reason, however, they

have more force and a greater power to direct the attention of the self-conscious centre to themselves.

There is no mechanism to reproduce motor feelings or to strengthen or contrast them as there is in the case of sensory feelings. There are, I think, no motor memories, forms of thought, or ideals; these mechanical contrivances belong to the sensory system. If motor feelings have any influence on the content of consciousness after they pass from consciousness, it is because they have some indirect effect on the sensory ideals or forms of thought. Distinct memories of a pleasure or a pain are possible only through the bodily attitudes which accompany the pleasure or pain. If we imagine ourselves in the same position as that in which we enjoyed a pleasure or suffered a pain, a new feeling of a like kind is aroused. The old feeling is gone forever and cannot be revived by the memory alone. This faculty can merely revive the sensory impressions which accompany motor feelings, but can never restore the latter except by creating new tendencies to activity.

Beliefs, like other motor feelings, are not by themselves objects of memory. The definite relations in which the ideas stand that produce the beliefs are objects of memory, but a belief once gone from consciousness is never revived. The same relation of ideas may produce the state of belief anew, but it is this new state of which we are conscious and not a memory of an old belief.

This lack of a mechanism to revive beliefs as ideas are revived gives to our thinking many of its peculiarities. We recollect the definite relations in which ideas stood to one another at a given time, but not the bond which held them together. We are apt, therefore, to confuse our memory of facts and relations with the actual content of consciousness when they were perceived, and to assert that there was no more in the consciousness than there is in our memory of our states of consciousness. When Hume asserted that there were no bonds between ideas existing in

a causal relation, he had in mind our memories of the states of consciousness rather than the states of consciousness themselves. These memories retain only the sensory elements of consciousness, and hence lack the motor elements, the forces by which a belief in causal relations is created.

If the motor feelings have no mechanism by which they can be revived their classification is more simple than if such a mechanism existed. The only differences in them are due to the differences in the centres from which they come to the self-conscious centre. The passions are the effects of the currents from lower motor centres. They are indefinite promptings to actions which are aroused by the mere presence of some object by which the lower centres are excited to activity. The beliefs are due to the motor currents arising in the higher centres from which the ideas are reflected to the self-conscious centre. When two ideas exist in the mind in a given relation, we have a belief in the reality of this relation if at the same time a motor current creates a motor feeling to bind them together.

This classification of the motor feelings corresponds very closely to Hume's classification of the contents of the mind. The two plans have the same thought as their basis. Hume thinks ideas differ only in the force and liveliness with which they strike the mind. The motor feelings having no mental mechanism to aid their retention or reproduction can differ only in this way. They blend with or displace one another and do not furnish those definite contrasts which the sensory feelings with their complicated mechanism can furnish. It was easy, therefore, for Hume and others to overlook them or to assume that they were merely obscure parts of the sensory feelings not worthy of analysis.

§ 7. *The Defects in the Reasoning of Locke and Hume
about the Powers of the Mind.*

The Association school of psychologists, of which Locke and Hume were the leading representatives, gave to the

world a consistent theory of the powers of the mind. As the principles of this school are accepted by most writers on social topics, it is necessary to contrast my picture of mental activity with that of this group of thinkers and to point out what appear to me to be defects in their mode of reasoning. I agree with them in thinking that the mind has not the power to originate ideas without the aid of sense perceptions, and that the purest and best thoughts and ideals of men are but complex forms of a few simple ideas which by themselves are insignificant and perhaps unworthy of attention. The defects in their conclusions are not the fault of their analytical mode of reasoning, but of their erroneous concept of the mechanism of the mind.

It is assumed by the earlier writers of this school and clearly stated by the later writers that the nervous system conveys directly from the outer world to the self-conscious centre the impressions which the outer world makes on the nervous system. All the elaboration of these impressions takes place within the self-conscious centre under the eye of consciousness. Consciousness, therefore, is the judge of all mental processes beyond the creation of simple impressions. When the consciousness arranges its ideas for inspection it finds that they differ from the original impressions only in vividness and clearness. All ideas are copies of impressions, and any idea of which an original impression cannot be found within the field of consciousness is ruled out as fictitious.

Such is the reasoning of Hume. Locke has the same mental picture, but his attention is attracted to another phase of the problem. He decides that there can be no innate ideas because the consciousness has no power to originate ideas. This doctrine, correct in itself, is misapplied by Locke, for he attempts by its aid to discredit all ideas which do not have sense impressions going with them.

Practically Locke and Hume were both right, for they were resisting the attempts of certain theorists to make innate

the prominent race ideals, and thus to avoid a critical examination of these ideals and their influences. They were right in insisting that great things must come out of small elements, but they were wrong in assuming that these small elements could enter the mind only by one road—the sensory nerves, which come directly from the outer world.

Change the picture of the mental mechanism and the falsity of such assumptions becomes apparent. If sensations can come indirectly from other thought centres as well as directly from the outer world, we can no longer assume that the ideas received at a given centre are mere copies of the impressions received directly from the outer world. We can still say that there are no innate ideas or principles belonging to the thinking unit because of its construction, but we cannot say that the mechanism of the mind does not impress on the self-conscious centre ideas which were not a part of a given impression when it became an object of consciousness. All ideas may still be started by currents from the outer world, but a part of this original current is so changed in its journey through the other centres that it gives to the self-conscious centre ideas which the original current could not arouse.

So long as Locke makes war on the innate character of the great race ideals he is on safe ground, but when he applies his principle to more humble phenomena his errors become apparent. He thinks he shows the absurdity of the innate character of these ideals by showing that the same reasoning would prove sweetness, bitterness and like qualities to be innate and not the result of impressions received directly from the outer world. There is, however, no nervous current started by contact of the tongue with sugar that if conveyed in an unmodified form to the self-conscious centre would arouse the sensation of sweetness. Taste, color, sound, and other simple sensations are as much the product of a complex mental mechanism as are the highest race ideals. Clear definite impressions are always obtained by

adding elements that are not in the original nervous current which produces the impression. When the mechanism of the clear vivid sensations of taste, color and sound are explained, no new forms of mental mechanism are needed to create the highest race ideals.

The errors of the opponents of Locke lay in the attempt to give to certain race ideals a basis different from that of the more common ideas derived from material objects in the outer world. They wished to invent a special faculty, whose business was to perceive the great race ideas and certain important principles and thus to give to them an objectivity and truth which the ordinary mental processes could not give them. It was assumed that reason was a special faculty for the production of these ideals and principles, and that by the aid of this faculty the thinker was put into a position where he could see the truth and objectivity of these ideals and principles without the need of the tests to which the more common ideas and maxims were subjected. Locke was right in denying this claim and in subjecting these higher products of thought to the same tests that are applied to other kinds of knowledge. They are not different in kind or in origin from the simpler ideas of every-day life and need no special faculty for their production. They do, however, contain elements not given by the impressions coming directly from the outer world, and in this respect they do not differ from other kinds of knowledge.

All clear concepts have elements which are added to the original impression by the mental mechanism after the original nervous current has arrived at the self-conscious centre. These original currents are always so obscure that they could not impress clear and definite ideas on the thinking centre but for the secondary currents which come from other centres. Elements, therefore, can be added to the original impressions and such elements must always be added to make the thought clear and vivid to the thinker. It is wrong, however, from this clearness and vividness of

ideas to infer that they have an existence and reality outside of the mind. Such propositions need other proof than is involved in their perception, and Locke and Hume were right in objecting to the proof given by their advocates for the existence of a special faculty for perceiving them.

§ 8. *The Mechanism of Belief.*

Of the school of thinkers to which he belonged Hume gave the clearest analysis of the causes of belief. I shall turn, therefore, to his writings to secure a starting point in the present discussion. His thesis is primarily that belief is not due to intuition or to reasoning. His predecessors had sought to find the source of belief largely, if not solely, in the intellectual processes, of which reasoning is the best example. It was supposed that when certain propositions were placed in a given order a feeling of belief arose out of the relations perceived between the various ideas contained in the propositions. Hume denied that this was the origin of belief and claimed that it was due to the way in which the ideas of a given proposition were conceived. Ideas differ from impressions only in the degree of their vividness. A belief is, therefore, "a lively idea related to or associated with a present impression." The only way to create a belief in a proposition is to give greater vividness to the ideas it contains. "The belief," he said, "super-adds nothing to the idea, but only changes our manner of conceiving it and renders it more strong and lively." On its negative side I believe Hume's argument to be sound. His predecessors and opponents gave to the reasoning process a power of creating belief, when it would have been nearer right to have affirmed that its function was to destroy belief. I shall describe the function of reasoning in a later section, but at present it is enough to say that these opponents gave no valid proof that the process of reasoning is the source of belief, and that Hume had an

easy task to overthrow their theory and to replace it with a new one having an inductive basis.

Hume's theory that belief is only a lively idea is based on the assumption that the contents of the mind are limited to impressions and ideas, the latter differing from the former only in the fact that they strike the mind with less force and vivacity. I have already pointed out objections to this doctrine that the contents of the mind consist only of impressions and their less vivid copies in the form of ideas. It assumes that the mind receives no impressions except those that come over the sensory nerves. These sensory feelings differ only in vividness. If they make up the whole contents of the mind, ideas can only be copied impressions, and beliefs are only these weakened ideas made so strong that they again resemble impressions and may be mistaken for them. A more complicated mechanism of the mind than that conceived by Hume would make room for more possibilities, and suggest some other source of belief. If we have motor feelings as well as sensory feelings, beliefs may belong to the class of feelings which Hume overlooked and may not, therefore, be merely one form of conceiving an idea. In conformity with my hypothesis of mental activity I shall assume that belief is the product of motor feelings that accompany the activity of the higher thought centres in which clear ideas, forms of thought, and ideals are created. When these centres start nervous currents which reproduce their ideas and forms of thought in the self-conscious centre, motor currents are started also in these centres which tend to create activity in the body. These motor currents are reflected to the self-conscious centre. They arrive at the same time and form a part of the same wave of consciousness which produces the sensory ideas. As the sensory and motor currents blend it is easy to mistake the impression created by the motor current for a modification of the sensory feelings. A belief, however, is not the same as a vivid idea. Ideas about which we have no belief may be as vivid

as those about which we have a belief. A thorough belief in the existence of Paris may exist along with a dim impression of it, while a vivid impression of how it would look in flames may be accompanied with no belief that it is on fire. Belief is something more than the vividness and force of ideas and demands some other explanation.

I should say that belief is primarily an unimpeded tendency to activity. The centres creating the ideas for the self-conscious centre start motor currents at the same time that they start sensory currents. If these motor currents are not obstructed before they are reflected to the self-conscious centre, they create the feeling of belief. If they are obstructed before reaching this centre, the sensory currents present ideas about which there is no belief. If they arrive at the centre, but are met in it by opposing currents, a state of arrest follows accompanied by a feeling of conflict and suspense. Viewing belief in another way we may say that it is an unimpeded tendency to objectify thought. When a sensory feeling is accompanied by a motor feeling we think of the object of thought as apart from or outside of ourselves. Objectivity is not a kind of vividness of ideas but is a new feeling due to our tendencies toward activity. If we were never active nor a cause of bodily motion, we would have no concept of the objectivity of our ideas and thoughts. The motor currents in some way create the state of mind in which we objectify our thoughts and there is no simpler way of producing this effect than that which I have described.

§ 9. *A Restatement.*

Before closing this preliminary discussion it seems best to restate some of its leading ideas. My main object is to discuss the origin of the social forces. But to do this properly it was necessary to explain the psychologic basis upon which these forces rest. Were psychology a perfect science this would have been an easy task; but the defects in psychology are only too clearly shown in the light of the social sciences.

It was necessary, therefore, first of all to present an hypothesis of mental activity that would emphasize the basis on which the social forces rest.

The defects in current psychology are traceable to the fact that analytic psychology has not kept pace with the development of physiologic psychology. We now know how complex the mind is on its physical side, that there are numerous centres reacting on each other, and that many of them have no connection with the outer world except through the activity of related centres. We know too that the sensory and motor nerves and centres have distinct mechanisms, and that they react on one another in various ways. In the analysis of the content of consciousness, however, we have not changed our concept of mental activity since the time of Locke and Hume. We proceed as if the mind were a unicellular organism directly connected with the outer world by a few sensory and motor nerves which do not react on one another in any way. It is assumed that the unity of sensory feelings is created within the field of consciousness itself by a process of association of ideas. There are in this scheme no motor feelings because the motor nerves pass directly to the outer world, and we are conscious of their effects only through the return of certain sensory currents started by the changes in the outer world caused by the motor currents.

A new analytic psychology should assume a greater complexity of the mental mechanism than the old psychology admitted and investigate whether the feelings of which we are conscious have not a greater variety of causes than were assumed by the old psychology. There should be an inductive study of the field of consciousness and a new classification of its contents. Only in this way can we determine whether or not the ideas of the mind are of as many kinds as our present knowledge of the physical basis of the mind would permit.

Let me give, therefore, in outline, the kinds of feelings

which a complex mental mechanism with many centres would make possible. There could be both sensory and motor feelings. If motor feelings are felt it is probable that pleasures, pains and beliefs are due to them. These feelings lack that concreteness and objectivity which are so characteristic of sensory feeling. They lack also a definite mechanism for their reproduction in memory. The best test of sensory feelings is our power to remember them; while these feelings that I assume to be motor only appear in memory by their effects on the outer world, which are conveyed to consciousness over the sensory nerves.

The mechanism which produces motor feelings is doubtless the older portion of the mind. Low forms of life depend upon pleasures, pains and instinctive motor feelings to guide actions. The sensory feelings were not yet differentiated, and some low form of touch may have given them their only ideas about the outer world. There was probably a time when the mechanism of the motor feelings was as much more developed than that of the sensory feelings as the latter mechanism is now in human beings ahead of the former.

The pursuit of pleasure was, I think, the controlling force which led to the development of the motor system. The development of the sensory system, however, depended upon the need of avoiding the sources of pain. To accomplish this end the sensory nerves had to convey more definite impressions from the outer world, and the resulting ideas had to be better co-ordinated and more firmly associated. A memory of past events was one of the best means for this end, and when the sensory mechanism had developed up to this point it became of more importance as a requisite for survival than the motor mechanism. But little further change was made in the motor feelings. The new sensory mechanism became the source of mental progress through that long period in which the avoidance of pain was the first thought of every creature. At length the sensory mechanism has become so important that in human beings the motor

feelings lose their distinguishing characteristics and are regarded as mere modifications of the sensory feelings.

The relative development of sensory and motor systems depends upon the environment of the organism. If a creature is in direct contact with a physical environment or is the master of all the creatures in this environment, its progress depends upon the development of its pleasures, and this in turn on the development of its motor system. If, however, this creature becomes the prey of other creatures it is transferred from a pleasure to a pain environment. Survival now depends on its power to avoid pains and this end is best secured by a development of the sensory nerves through which it becomes aware of the presence of enemies and of the avenues of escape. The wider the range of its perceptions, the better its memory, and the firmer the association of its ideas, the securer will be its position.

Human societies have at length emerged from the condition where the avoidance of pain is the requisite for survival. Man is now placed in a pleasure world and his needs demand a pleasure and not a pain economy. There must, therefore, be more attention paid to the motor feelings upon which success depends in such a world. The psychology of Locke and Hume reflects the condition of the old pain economy and emphasizes the importance of the sensory mechanism. Impressions, ideas and the laws of their association form the sole topics of their investigations. Beliefs, forms of thought, and ideals are overlooked or ignored. This neglect is of especial importance to students of social affairs because the social forces have their origin in these complex forms of thought. They must free psychology from these defects and errors before a sound basis for reasoning in the social sciences can be secured. The preceding sections of this essay have endeavored to describe the foundation on which social phenomena rest. The following sections will try to trace the effects of these psychological premises in some of the leading departments of social science.

CHAPTER III.

KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF.

§ 1. *Local and General Environments.*

In order to trace the development of the social forces from their beginnings we must describe in greater detail the physical peculiarities of the earth's crust upon which the objective environments of different individuals or societies depend. These problems have been neglected because the study of organic life has so largely absorbed the attention of biologists. It is assumed that a few general conditions make up the environment and that their influence is so constant a factor that in the study of evolution they may be overlooked without danger of error. When we throw aside these presuppositions and look at the problem without prejudice, it is clear that we must study the diverse conditions which form environments. If organisms develop it is not owing to internal conditions or to the laws of life, but to some peculiarities of the surrounding conditions.

It is a well-known fact that the goods upon which animals subsist are very unequally distributed over the surface of the earth. The great geologic changes have produced mountains and valleys, deserts and fertile plains. The direction of the sun's rays and the location of oceans and mountains determine the climate, temperature, and rain-fall. Many local conditions contribute to heighten the irregularities due to these general forces and thus to give to certain localities great advantages in food and climate over other less favored regions. Each favored locality has some articles of food or conditions of life in which it is superior to all other localities, and animals fitted for such a region find in this locality the best opportunities to live and thrive.

When animals in the process of development change from one environment to another, the requisite for survival in this

new environment is found in its best form in these favored localities. The tendency to occupy these favored regions, and to struggle for their possession is strong. This struggle leads to the development of the conquering organisms, both in function and in desire, and they acquire better bodies and more intense desires for food and activity.

When economic conditions force a given species to struggle for the possession of a few favored localities, their environment is a local environment, because it depends so fully upon the peculiar combinations of certain economic conditions in this region. Objective conditions in this case are the cause of progress, and but little depends upon the choice of the individuals undergoing the evolution. It matters little what the economic instincts of such creatures are while their goods are furnished free by the environment. Their power to survive depends solely on the intensity of their desire for these free goods and upon their physical power to monopolize a part of the region for their exclusive use. Under such conditions aggressive instincts which put a being in a state of opposition to his fellow creatures, are of more value to him than economic instincts which cause him to utilize more completely or to improve the conditions of his environment. Greater bodily activity and an increase in ability to experience pleasure go hand in hand, and give to beings most developed in these respects a power to survive in the favored localities where the economic goods are free and do not, therefore, demand conscious attention.

When the motor powers of animals are fully developed, the requisites for survival are to be found, not on the motor side of mental activity, but on the sensory side. The memory is developed; the power to analyze objective phenomena into their material elements increases; images and ideas of absent conditions are formed; and beliefs are generated which determine the mental attitude of beings toward unseen objects. Direct activities depend on the development of the

motor powers, indirect activities depend on the development of the sensory powers. When periods of time can be contrasted and mental pictures of absent objects become so vivid as to modify conduct, economic activities begin, and the aggressive instincts of individuals are directed to the subjugation of the common environment instead of against other individuals. A new tendency shows itself to enlarge the area from which sustenance is drawn, and to depend less on the local environment where the objective conditions are so complete that each individual is independent.

The development of the sensory powers gives to a being a knowledge of the conditions of a larger area and creates a tendency in him to seek for an adjustment to a wider range of objective conditions. Less dependence is put on the free goods of favored localities and the activities are now exercised in bringing into harmony the many conditions of the enlarged environment. In this new environment no single element may be as good as the leading elements of the old environment, but a proper combination of several poorer elements yields to the individual a fuller life and greater activity than the fewer elements of the old environment.

This tendency to make life depend upon a greater number of conditions, although these conditions may be less complete than the fewer conditions of the local environment, lies at the basis of the movement of beings from favored localities to a more general environment. With each addition to the sensory powers this general environment can be enlarged and life can be made to depend on more complex conditions. An isolated individual is not able to utilize this enlarged environment. He must be supported by other beings. Indirect activities must also displace the direct activities of lower beings. This co-operation of beings and the change in the direction of their activities depend upon the growth of social feelings. The aggressive instincts must be checked or turned into new channels. Habits,

customs, and modes of thought must be acquired which will enable individuals to live in peace with one another and to get pleasure out of one another's society. All these changes depend on the development of the sensory powers, and show the marked contrast which exists between beings in whom the sensory powers are developed and those in whom the motor powers are still dominant.

There are thus two stages of progress—the biologic and the social—corresponding to the two possible environments. In the biologic stage beings are pushed into a local environment where the objective conditions are so complete that little thought is needed to supply the necessities of life. Under these conditions the development of the motor powers determines who shall survive. The organism becomes a more nearly perfect individual because of the growth of organs on the one hand and an increase of desire on the other. In the struggle for such an environment the beings with the superior motor powers drive out those with inferior motor powers. Some of the latter class are, however, better fitted to occupy a general environment where their sensory powers are of more use than in the local environment from which they were driven. The conquered thus find a place to live and by the development of some of the social forces create for themselves a new society with new requisites for survival. When the struggle for existence begins within this new environment, those with superior motor powers will again survive, while those with an imperfect motor organization, but with improved sensory powers, will be forced again into a more general environment where new social instincts must be acquired.

The social beings with superior sensory powers are thus repeatedly defeated and driven out by those whose motor development is superior. Social progress can continue so long as there is a more extended environment in which highly developed sensory beings can find refuge. Biologic progress is due to the struggle for existence within a given

environment. Social progress is due to the necessity of breaking over from one environment to another. The one tends to create a local environment in favored localities, the other tends to create a general environment in which more of the economic forces are utilized. The two stages of progress supplement each other and together make up the process of evolution.

§ 2. *The Subjective Environment.*

In the preceding section the growth of social forces was shown to depend upon objective facts, but no attempt was made to point out the psychologic causes which lead to this growth. Corresponding to objective conditions favoring the growth of social forces, there must be certain subjective conditions upon which it depends. The key to these changes lies in the development of the mental mechanism. The sensory nerves bring to the self-conscious centre not merely the coarse products of external impressions, but also the refined products of related centres. Each of these centres adds certain elements to the external impressions which arouse the centre to activity, and these are reflected to the self-conscious centre and there blend with the impressions coming from the outer world.

The self-conscious centre does not see the external world as it is, but as modified by the activity of related centres. Before a being with highly developed sensory powers has time to act, its concept of its environment is changed by additions from these related centres. Its whole environment is made up of two parts—the objective environment presented through the original impressions, and the subjective environment created by the activity of related centres. Each impression from the outer world has added to it certain ideas from the subjective environment and the joint product is projected by the mind and seems a part of the objective world. Customs, habits, social institutions and ideals are as objective and real to individuals as any part of the outer world.

The mechanism by which these results are accomplished is the result of the development of the sensory feelings. Forms of thought and ideals are created for the social world on the same plan that they are created for the physical world. A single idea of any related group arouses to activity some centre fitted for its reception and then the whole group of ideas is reflected to the self-conscious centre and so blended with the first impression that they all seem to have come from the outer world. I call these ideas, forms of thought, and ideals an environment because they determine the action of individuals in the same manner that the objective environment does. The meaning of an environment is that it limits and directs activity in certain fixed channels. In a local environment nearly all the choices of individuals are determined by the nature of the physical conditions of the locality. There is a certain kind of food, a certain kind of shelter, a given climate requiring certain decisions to ward off its evils or to profit by its points of superiority; the enemies are of a given class, and to avoid or to conquer them another series of activities arise and become fixed. In almost every decision some physical condition is faced which can be surmounted only by a fixed series of acts.

When an animal moves out of a local environment into a more general environment fewer of its acts are determined by physical conditions. The choices of the animal would be arbitrary if some new conditions were not created to supplement the effect of the physical environment. Uncertainty and confusion would result and no group of animals could act together under such conditions. Yet co-operation is a necessity for beings who would occupy a general environment; without it no social progress would be possible.

To remove this uncertainty and confusion a subjective environment is created by the activity of the sensory centres. Whenever, in a general environment, an objective condition which determined the choice in a local environment is

removed, some idea, form of thought, or ideal is created by the mental mechanism. New conditions thus arise which make the actions of the individual as definite and certain as before. Each individual projects and visualizes the same subjective environment. The whole group act together and their choices can be depended upon as fully as though the surrounding conditions were all physical.

The subjective and objective environments thus supplement each other and are so blended by the mechanism of the mind that individuals cannot separate them in thought without great effort. Each series of choices leading to a given end has its parts presented in the proper order. Each choice is fixed by the mental picture which the subjective environment presents at that moment. When indirect activities become possible, the means by which ends are secured must be pictured in the subjective environment as definitely as the road which a person is to travel is pictured by the eyesight. Instead of seizing an opponent with the teeth or claws, as direct activity would demand, the picture of a club, axe, spear, pistol or some other weapon is presented, and the choice is determined by this picture and not by more direct promptings of passion. In this way the picturing activity of related centres modifies the choices at the self-conscious centre and creates harmony of action among the members of a social group.

The movement of a society to a more general environment lessens the dependence of its members upon the conditions of the objective environment and increases their dependence upon the conditions of the subjective environment. The requisites for survival gradually become subjective and progress depends more and more on the development of the sensory powers.

§ 3. *The Extension of Knowledge.*

It has been shown that mental progress depends upon a series of requisites for survival which must be surmounted

if evolution is to be progressive. Each of these requisites for survival forces an abrupt change in the activities and interests of the beings undergoing the evolution. The habits, beliefs and ideals needed for the new environment are of such supreme importance that they must be acquired in the easiest way and in the shortest time. Knowledge acquired in the old environment is likely to be misleading under the new conditions and tends to strengthen the habits and beliefs fitted for it. When slight changes are to be made, knowledge acquired in the past, and reasoning based on it, are the safest guides to success. But when great changes must be made with great rapidity, the person who sets aside his acquired knowledge and modes of reasoning and guides his activities solely by the new experience, will surpass his more conservative competitors in the rapidity of his adjustment to the new conditions.

There must, therefore, with such requisites for survival, be a return to the primitive method of evolution. The organism must act on dimly seen facts and beliefs so imperfect as to be merely semi-conscious impulses. Clear knowledge and strong beliefs can only come at a later stage when an adjustment has already been made to the more elementary of the new conditions, and even then they are due to the experience acquired in the new conditions and are in no way dependent on the knowledge and beliefs of the earlier epochs of progress. Instead of any such dependence there is usually an opposition between the old knowledge and beliefs and the new, which must in some way become adjusted by a revision of the older ideas and beliefs.

If a being guided by the sense of touch should secure the conditions favorable to the perception of light, a new sense would develop and a new area of knowledge would be opened up, with which would come new feelings and beliefs. The sensory feelings upon which this knowledge is based would at first be very vague, yet these vague feelings would have to be chosen as a basis of action instead of the more definite

sensations of touch. The new beliefs and impulses of the sight area could not be derived from the beliefs and impulses of the touch area. It would be the necessities of the new situation that forced the new beliefs, and not any process of carrying the results of the older area of knowledge into the new area.

The first area of knowledge depends upon the sense of touch. When an organism comes in contact with other objects this sense will tell something of their qualities, and thus enable the organism to avoid some of the disagreeable elements of its environment and to assimilate others upon which life depends. Such knowledge must be meagre, leaving the organism without any means of knowing of objects or places with which it is not in contact.

A new area of knowledge is acquired when the sense of touch is supplemented by the power to recognize the differences in certain vibrations of the medium by which the organism is surrounded. Light, sound and smell are alike in that they are due, not to contact with external objects, but to vibrations in the medium which surrounds both the organism and the external objects in which it has an interest. In their primary form these vibrations are a warning of the presence of moving beings. The inference is that there is a movement for each vibration which the organism perceives. A knowledge of a moving object can thus be acquired before the being comes in contact with it. As these vibrations precede the feeling of touch, the two facts are related, and an expectation of the feeling of touch follows the perception of these vibrations. This knowledge is of immense importance to beings whose environment is largely determined by hostile organisms. To such creatures moving objects are usually sources of pain, and a warning of their approach gives an opportunity for escape. The perception of these vibrations thus becomes a requisite for survival. Fear is the first sensation which a perception of these vibrations creates. Moving objects, fear and

pain, become a definite series of associations and through them knowledge is greatly extended.

For these reasons the concept of beings in the external world precedes that of passive material objects. Animate objects are recognized through the vibrations which proceed from them. Every object is regarded as animate which is the cause of vibrations in the common medium surrounding the observed and the observer. It is possible to recognize objects as inanimate only when the observer is able to see in them definite qualities apart from the substance in which they inhere. This power to perceive definite qualities in objects and to analyze these objects into their elements, demands a much higher development of the sensory powers than beings have in the early stages of progress. They must also be able to combine into a unit qualities derived from different senses. While the thought of a moving object can come through one of the senses, the passive characteristics of material objects must be tested by more than one sense. The observation of color, form, weight and other qualities of the inanimate world demands from the observer a much greater development of the senses than does the mere observation of motion.

There is much historical evidence to show that primitive races think of the world as made up solely of animate objects. Each tree, plant or river is to them a living object, having the qualities of other animate beings. This tendency to view the world as a series of beings shows that a race is just emerging from a state in which objects were recognized only by the vibrations they created. As soon as sensory powers are sufficiently well developed to see and analyze the qualities of material objects, primitive man ceases to view the world as animate and begins to think in terms of qualities of objects and not in terms of undivided wholes. The more a race analyzes the objects about it, and the smaller the units into which it divides these objects, the more materialistic is its concept of the world. It cannot view the world in

a material way until it separates the motion of an object from the object itself. While the thought of a passive object stripped of its motion seems to us a simple concept, it is not acquired by beings until long after the time when they can recognize a moving object and unite to avoid it.

This extension of knowledge brings a being into what I call a pain economy. I mean by this that all the endeavors of the being are directed toward the avoidance of pain. All the requisites for survival depend upon the power to avoid enemies. The environment at this stage of progress is largely a living environment because the conditions for survival depend so largely upon each being's relations to other beings. There are few points of contact with the material world which are of importance in the struggle for life. Food at this stage of progress is not a requisite for survival. There is so much of it that it can be secured readily if enemies can be avoided. The conscious thought must, therefore, be directed toward the living beings in the environment. Greater power to avoid contact with other creatures is of more importance than greater power to secure food. Pleasure remains a subordinate force in determining action, while pain becomes the leading element and the cause of progress.

Another extension of knowledge comes when beings can analyze an object into its elements, and can recognize the difference between passive material and active beings. This change in attitude is due to a further development of the sensory powers. Vibrations take definite shape in the form of color, sound, smell, etc. Heat, light and motion are thought of as qualities and not as entities. Numerous other qualities are discovered, and the contrast of substance and quality becomes clear and definite. The attention is transferred from beings to matter. Even beings are analyzed into their material constituents and thus a new basis for the objective world is discovered in a few elements about which there was little or no interest. This change

of interest from beings to matter is accompanied by a change from a pain economy to a pleasure economy. With a living environment of enemies the avoidance of pain is the first requisite for survival. When these enemies have been for the moment eluded, pleasure and food may be secured, but the first interest is always in the enemy and the pain to be avoided.

The recognition of the world as an aggregate of materials shifts the interest from pains to pleasures. It is seen that these materials may be united in many new ways and thus protection may be secured from enemies and weapons formed for self defence. Mere material may also be reshaped into goods and thus be the source of greater pleasure. When the possibility of transforming materials into goods is once recognized, new avenues for activity are opened and an interest is acquired in a much larger region than before. Much of the material of which goods are made must come from distant places, and thus the act of production extends the field of knowledge so as to include the whole region from which comes the material used in making goods. Brazil, Cuba and China come within the scope of our sensory powers as soon as coffee, sugar and tea become parts of our food supply.

The connection between a material concept of the world and a pleasure economy has not been sufficiently emphasized. The growing interest in a life of pleasure has been the prime motive which has forced modern nations to adopt an analytical and material attitude concerning the composition of the external world. With each reduction in the attention necessary to avoid pains and enemies, men have become more conscious of the need of greater sources of pleasure. But more pleasure can come only from a greater power to separate the original masses into their elements and to reunite them in new ways. Pleasures come from material sources and a seeker for pleasure must attain his end by acquiring a material concept of nature. A

love of pleasure and a belief in the materiality of the world go hand in hand, just as a fear of pain is accompanied by a belief that the ultimate units of the world are animate beings. Each belief is an outcome of the environment in which the thinker lives, and of the relative development of his sensory powers. These are characteristic beliefs of beings having different areas of knowledge. Much of the confusion and contradiction in human beliefs is easily explained when it is recognized that mankind has but recently developed out of a pain into a pleasure economy.

When a material concept of the world has been acquired, another extension of knowledge becomes possible. The distinction is now drawn between the natural and the supernatural worlds. In the natural world the material concepts of a pleasure economy are dominant, while the supernatural world is still conceived of as a world of beings, just as in the pain economy. The thought of higher and more powerful beings than those of a human society is thus acquired and distant worlds are peopled with such beings who are in more or less frequent contact with human society. These higher beings exert an influence upon human affairs by relieving pain and by restraining crime and violence. The weaker human beings seek for protection from enemies through the power of their superiors, and in this way it is hoped that the evils of a pain economy may be overcome. Belief in higher beings and in their power to influence human affairs is at the basis of this extension of knowledge.

So long as these beliefs remain there are definite ideals and forms of thought created by the mental mechanism, which modify all the original impressions coming from the outer world. The content of the self-conscious centre is thus enriched by certain ideas which become as much a part of its knowledge of the external world as are the ideas derived from any other source. Knowledge depends upon the content of the self-conscious centre and this content is to a greater extent the product of the activity of related

centres, than of the original impressions coming directly from the outer world.

These four areas of knowledge depend upon the growing definiteness of our ideas of space. They extend knowledge outward from the individual until every part of the universe is in some relation to him. The fifth area of knowledge depends upon time relations. The past, the present and the future become definite realities about each of which we have some definite knowledge, and between which there exists definite relations. The thought of a future world is thus acquired and predicates are made concerning it, depending on its supposed resemblance to the present world. Social relations and indirect activities lie mainly in this area of knowledge. The sensory feelings become so developed that future welfare is pictured as definitely as that of the past or present. Ideals and forms of thought are acquired, through whose influence choices having present welfare as their end seem less desirable than other choices which take the future into consideration.

The tendency toward indirect activities depends upon this development of the sensory powers. Definite pictures of the future show the inadequacy of direct means and make the indirect series of choices, pictured in the imagination, more attractive than the direct promptings of passion. The use of capital is one of the prominent results of this new development of the sensory powers, and with its aid the new requisites for survival are obtained which have made modern nations possible.

If this analysis of the extension of knowledge is correct, there are at least five areas of knowledge, which have different roots and depend upon different stages in the development of the sensory powers for their origin. Knowledge has not grown up from a single nucleus of ideas to which additions from time to time have been made by a logical process. Such a process might have been possible if the first being had been Adam-like, created with full mental

powers. We have ceased to regard the story of the creation of Adam as an historical fact, and yet we retain a concept of the growth of knowledge which demands a society of such men to make it a reality.

The growth of knowledge is not due to developed men coming in contact with more of nature. It is due to beings of limited sensory powers gradually increasing their powers as they are forced to know nature more intimately or to come in contact with larger areas of the world. Each new requisite for survival has caused the development of some new sensory power, and has thus created an area of knowledge independent of the older areas, and in no logical connection with them. Knowledge comes by leaps and bounds when a new environment with new requisites for survival is entered. The new sensory powers have the same mechanism as the older powers have, but the ideas, forms of thought, and ideals of the new centres develop out of the new material without regard to the results of the activity of the older centres. The pressure of the new situation and the need of new sensory powers force into the background the previously acquired experience. There is no way of blending the more definite knowledge of the older centres which was of use in other conditions and the less definite and more instinctive feelings of the new but partially developed centres. Reasoned action is of great service in situations which are thoroughly known, but is of little use in a strange environment. The new and the old knowledge are thus in opposition. The new centres must create their own experience and beliefs as they develop, and leave the blending and harmonizing of the different areas of knowledge to a later epoch.

§ 4. *The Theory of Conviction.*

If this view of the extension of knowledge is correct, it throws new light on the causes of belief and conviction. Knowledge is extended by the development of the sensory

powers. New centres force new facts and pictures upon the attention of the self-conscious centre, and the results of the activities of these new centres are belief and conviction. At the same time that these centres reflect sensory feelings, which are translated into knowledge at the self-conscious centre, they also reflect motor feelings which become beliefs and create a conviction of the reality and objectivity of the knowledge that the sensory feelings have imparted. Beliefs are unrestrained impulses to activity and these impulses arise as soon as the knowledge and activity of a related centre becomes a requisite for survival. Belief is not something imparted from one idea to another at the self-conscious centre. This centre is as passive in its beliefs as it is in its sensory perceptions. Both perceptions and beliefs are due to the activity of related centres and are reflected to the self-conscious centre as soon as the activity of these centres begins. Primary beliefs are as little related to one another as are the different areas of knowledge. Each new requisite for survival modifies the mental mechanism and brings into activity a new group of centres. A new series of ideas and ideals is thus created and new impulses to activity are started. The importance of the new requisite for survival, upon which the creation of these new centres depends, causes the motor currents started by these centres to control the organism. The motor currents of the older centres are subordinated to the new currents, not by any process of reasoning but by necessity. It is a case of elementary evolution, a return to first principles. If the organism does not yield to the new impulses it cannot survive in the new environment. Each group of ideas, of forms of thought, and of ideals is created at a time when it must control the activity of the organism in order that the latter shall survive. The new impulses remain unrestricted so long as the requisites for survival which created them are not displaced by other requisites. The sensory and motor feelings of each epoch thus have time to blend and harmonize

and to grow stronger as they develop. In this way inseparable associations and beliefs are created which remain a part of the mind's possessions until they are destroyed by some opposition between them and other associations or beliefs.

The thought I wish especially to emphasize is that beliefs do not grow out of one another. There is no single stock out of which all the mental beliefs can be derived. The process of creating beliefs is not logical, nor is it the result of activity at the self-conscious centre. Each new requisite for survival starts new centres into activity and creates a new group of ideas and beliefs. As many independent beliefs are possible as there are requisites for survival necessary for the progress of the race. If the beliefs are less than this number, some of them have dropped out because the early requisites for survival have lost their importance, or because there has been an opposition between the beliefs which different requisites for survival have created.

It is not difficult therefore to account for the presence of a great variety of beliefs among men, or for the ease with which new beliefs are acquired. They are as much the result of contact with the environment as are the ideas and pictures of the sensory side of the mind. Each new group of objective conditions leaves open certain avenues for activity and checks activity in other directions. The sensory powers create a subjective environment to supplement these objective conditions. The activity of the organism is thus given a fixed direction and a belief is generated in the reality and objectivity of the ideas and ideals of this subjective environment, which directs the activity of the organism along possible and safe channels. The success of the organism creates a belief in the means by which this success was obtained.

If an organism always remained in one environment there would be a harmony between its various beliefs. The

human race, however, has many times passed from one environment to another, and in each it has found new requisites for survival. The beliefs of these different epochs are not in harmony, and are often the cause of internal conflict in the case of individuals and of external conflict between nations or classes in different stages of progress. So long as given beliefs are requisites for survival they are not called in question nor are they the cause of conflict. But when the epoch has passed in which they are really requisites for survival, or when their importance has been diminished by the presence of new requisites, they must be harmonized with the beliefs due to the new requisites and with the beliefs still older than they.

There are thus many groups of beliefs, due to past requisites for survival which are not now so important that they may not be called in question. When men become conscious of the opposition between their beliefs, some of them must be weeded out. The more important ones will still survive. The test lies in their relative strength or in their relation to the present requisites for survival. Progressive beings go through two stages of progress in each environment. In the first stage, because of new requisites for survival, new sensory powers and new beliefs are acquired. In the second stage the beliefs due to the requisites for survival of the last stage become ordinary beliefs, and can have their validity questioned. They must now be brought into harmony with other beliefs or some of them will be weeded out by the struggle which this opposition involves.

This second stage in each epoch of progress is intellectual and in it the reasoning powers are brought into activity. Reasoning is a process of weeding out beliefs. If conflicting beliefs are brought into conscious opposition, the weaker is rooted out, and in this way a harmony is restored among the ideas and beliefs of the subjective environment. No new beliefs, however, are created by reasoning. It is simply a process of testing the strength of beliefs and their necessity

to the organism at the present time. Formal logic is thus merely one form of scepticism. By its use the individual compares the different parts of his subjective environment and adopts an objective test of their relative validity. A host of conflicting ideas, axioms and intuitions, created at different stages of progress, are eradicated, and the efficiency of the organism is promoted by the harmony existing between the ideas and beliefs which remain.

§ 5. *The Analysis of Reasoning.*

Belief is, as I have shown, an unimpeded tendency to activity. When there is but one such tendency present in the mind at a given moment, this tendency realizes itself in the subsequent activity. If, however, two opposing tendencies are present, one of these must give way. If the process by which this result is secured is conscious, the act is due to some form of reasoning. When we reason we arrange the particulars under dispute so that they can have the full support of the group of ideas, forms of thought, and ideals to which they belong. We group particulars under general propositions because these general propositions are the clearest forms of the group of ideas in question. In this way each particular has imparted to it all the strength of more vivid beliefs, and cannot be disproved except on evidence which would eradicate the belief in the general proposition. With the general propositions the process of reasoning has nothing to do, unless they in turn are the particulars of some broader generalization from which they derive their force.

The primary beliefs are created by other causes and they cannot be strengthened by reasoning. They may, however, be weakened or eradicated by reasoning when they are brought by this process into conscious opposition to other primary beliefs of greater strength. Thus reasoning on the one hand strengthens secondary beliefs by putting them into conscious relation to the primary beliefs on which they depend. On the other hand it weeds out the weaker of two

primary beliefs by bringing them into conscious opposition. The end of reasoning is to bring the contents of the different areas of knowledge into harmony. Each new requisite for survival modifies the mechanism of the mind and adds to its beliefs and knowledge. The new area of knowledge is not the outcome of deductions from previously acquired facts, but of new experience due to new sensory powers. These new acquisitions must be secured before reasoning begins. Reasoning does not extend knowledge; it merely solidifies and unifies knowledge.

Imagine, for example, a number of creatures, each of which has acquired its knowledge through some one sense, one by sight, the second by smell, the third by sound and the fourth by touch. Each being will have a peculiar concept of the external world depending on the impressions it has received. It will also have certain impulses and beliefs upon which its activity depends. In this case its actions will be mere impulses without any basis in reason. When, however, all these senses are possessed by one being there are four distinct areas of knowledge, and a conflict must arise between the separate groups of impulses and beliefs which belong to these areas. Reasoning will now begin. Each area of knowledge will have its validity tested by facts obtained from other areas of knowledge. Facts or events which can be verified by an appeal to more than one area of knowledge will have a higher validity than those for which no such verification is possible. Beliefs and impulses which depend entirely on the facts of one area of knowledge must give way to those which are in harmony with the content of two or more areas. Facts and events which cannot be verified in other areas of knowledge cease to be regarded as real and objective, and are looked upon as mere fancies created by the imagination. A being with but one sense could have no concept of degrees of reality. Each concept would have the same validity, and each impulse the same possibility of realization. A creature whose controlling concepts are

obtained from the sense of sight, sees in each moving thing an object of terror. It objectifies each motion into a being. If, however, it obtains new senses and the power to analyze objects into their parts, it puts the mass of moving bodies into the category of inanimate objects. The impulse to fear moving objects is now checked by the facts of other areas of knowledge and some verification outside of mere motion is demanded, before a moving body is objectified as animate.

Reasoning is thus a process of giving a higher reality and objectivity to concepts by verifying them through facts obtained in different areas of knowledge. Each area of knowledge adds to the feeling of reality and objectivity if some of its concepts harmonize with those resulting from the earlier areas of knowledge. It reduces the extent of the real and objective in as far as there is conflict. One or the other group of supposed objective concepts sinks to a lower plane and is regarded as a fiction of the mind. The senses do not predicate reality and objectivity. Only those concepts are real and objective that stand the test of a verification in several areas of knowledge.

Many of these tests are not due to the senses, but are of a social nature. When knowledge is so extended that a part of it is derived from other beings, a belief in their veracity becomes a requisite for survival. This belief reacts upon the areas of knowledge derived from the senses and gives new tests of the objectivity of certain ideas. If the observations of one individual are not verified by his comrades, he doubts the objectivity of these unverified concepts, and thinks himself the victim of dreams and hallucinations. The social impulses thus give a new lever to the reasoning powers, and the impulse to objectify the products of the senses yields to the stronger impulse upon which social co-operation depends. If a social being attempts to objectify ideas without the consent of his neighbors, the impulse is brought into conscious opposition to the social impulses, and must yield. An insane person differs from other

persons largely in the weakness of his social impulses. He has lost the instinct of verifying the objectivity of ideas by social evidence, and thus gives a reality to a host of ideas which a sane person would reject even though the senses of the latter gave the same testimony as those of the former.

Reasoning can never be an efficient means of securing harmony, except among persons with the same impulses. No matter how clearly and logically the sensory powers may arrange and contrast their ideas, no eradication or objectification of ideas can take place without the aid of the motor impulses. If the two opposing series of ideas do not call up motor impulses they will remain mere mental pictures without any power to displace each other or to influence conduct. Reasoning is a development of the sensory side of the mind and its function ceases when the sensory ideas have been placed in a clear and definite relation to one another. When, however, each of these groups of ideas is connected with certain impulses the conflict for supremacy rests with these impulses. Reasoning may bring more or stronger impulses into activity, but the final contest is between the two groups of impulses and not between the two groups of ideas.

§ 6. *The Modification of Beliefs.*

If the foregoing analysis is correct, beliefs are due to the activities which the environment of an organism permits. An adjusted organism has its sensory mechanism so arranged that clear ideas of the environment are formed, and its motor mechanism so organized that its dominant tendencies produce activities in harmony with its clear concepts of the environment. There must always be a harmony between the clear ideas of the sensory mechanism and the vivid, action-producing ideas of the motor mechanism. If the two mechanisms are not in harmony the activities of the organism clash with its environment, and either the motor mechanism must be modified so that other tendencies are dominant or it will be displaced by its competitors whose

sensory and motor mechanisms are more in harmony. The beliefs of an adjusted organism must, therefore, correspond to its environment. These beliefs, however, are not a thorough test of truth. They merely eliminate that part of the false which the environment of the organism allows it to test.

In progressive beings the adjustment between the sensory and motor mechanisms is repeatedly disturbed by the passing from one environment to another in which there are new requisites for survival. As a rule a local environment is given up for a more general environment. In this case, after the sensory mechanism has been developed to meet the new conditions, a modification of the motor mechanism creating new activities and beliefs weakens or destroys those which are out of harmony with the new conditions. A race of beings, however, which has passed through several environments, has not the same activities and beliefs it would have had if the adjustment to the last environment had been complete and it had not advanced to the new environment. Some of the beliefs of the earlier environments will be destroyed because incompatible with the new conditions, but many of them will remain because they are matters of indifference or of small moment.

There is another peculiarity of the beliefs of progressive beings of even more importance. If a belief arising in an early local environment is also useful in later environments, it will retain the form in which it first appeared and seem to depend upon these earlier conditions. The beliefs of a race in this case will not be enlarged in ways now possible, but they retain that cramped form which the older conditions necessitated. Two evils having a social importance flow from these facts. When a society is passing from a local to a general environment, the conservative element resists the change, because it involves the abandonment of certain old beliefs and the modification of others. Their form does not harmonize with the new conditions, and the radical

element in the society regards them as false or imperfect. Some of the old beliefs, however, are in harmony with the new environment, being such as would naturally be created by it in the course of time. There is thus an opposition between the historical conditions in which certain of these old beliefs actually arose and the present conditions which must, from now on, be their basis.

These facts make the transition to a more general environment a difficult matter. The important beliefs seem endangered, and many persons prefer a return to the old conditions, where these beliefs had their origin and are on safe ground, rather than to risk their ultimate verification under the new conditions. Both reason and experience seem to oppose the change; reason, because it shows the discrepancies between the old proofs of these beliefs and the new conditions; experience, because a brief period of life under the new conditions plainly shows the evils involved in the change. When the adjustment has been made to the new conditions the new and more general beliefs become requisites for survival and are more vivid than the older beliefs due to earlier and more local conditions. These older beliefs now tend to fade out and would disappear but for a process of reasoning which connects them with the more vivid beliefs of the new environment. The sources from which they were historically derived are forgotten or overlooked and they are given a new life by being made to appear like deductions from the new beliefs.

A good illustration of this tendency is given by the development of those economic doctrines associated with the name of Ricardo.* England during the first quarter of this century was in a peculiar economic environment because of the great inventions and the French wars. A series of economic doctrines arose each of which had its basis in some peculiar economic condition of the time, the basis being

* See the writer's article on "The Interpretation of Ricardo." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. April, 1893.

historical and inductive. At the end of the period a broad generalization called the law of diminishing returns was made, based on the new conditions toward which English society was tending. As soon as this generalization was thoroughly established, the particular doctrines of the earlier epoch were made to appear as deductions from the law of diminishing returns. Both the historical conditions from which they were derived and the weakness of their inductive support in the new environment were overlooked, and they were given a new life through the chain of reasoning which linked them to the vital thought of the new epoch.

In this way old beliefs are kept secure long after the causes which originated them have passed away. This tendency also leads to that type of reasoning called reasoning in a circle. When a broad generalization based on a more general environment first appears, it gets its support from a series of particular propositions based on the conditions of earlier local environments. It seems an outcome of these propositions and, as they create the stronger beliefs, it must depend on them. The changed conditions, however, in time weaken the support of these particular propositions due to local conditions and make vivid and independent the broader generalization in harmony with the new conditions. By reversing the reasoning and making the older propositions depend upon the new generalization a belief in them is retained, although their inductive and historical basis is weakened or gone. The vivid beliefs thus support the more obscure beliefs. When reasoning in a circle is successful the beliefs of the old and the new environments are in turn made vivid by a clear presentation of the conditions on which they depend. If the reasoner imagines himself to be in the old environment its beliefs seem more vivid than the beliefs of the later epoch. When, however, the new conditions are visualized the older beliefs seem the weaker and need the support of those due to the newer

conditions. Reasoning in a circle always demands two such pictures and so long as both of them can be readily visualized they seem to support each other.

There are a few inferences from these facts which I wish to state in a more concrete way because of their importance in the subsequent discussion. When a race enters a new and more general environment, a period of transition must ensue during which the customs, habits and beliefs of earlier epochs must be modified or disappear. The more local the conditions to which given customs or beliefs are due, the more probable it is that they will be displaced by others in harmony with the new conditions. While the more general beliefs may have their form affected, they are not likely to have their content altered. They have already survived many changes from environment to environment, and probably conform to the most general conditions that our planet can furnish. They will, however, suffer from the disproof of many of the more local beliefs with which they have been artificially connected by chains of reasoning and from which they may have historically arisen. General beliefs are always stronger than they seem, because new conditions would generate them anew even if, owing to the weakness of their historical basis, they should fall into discredit. Local beliefs are always weaker than they seem, in spite of the mass of inductive and historical evidence they always have on their side. Each new environment displaces the local customs, habits and beliefs due to earlier epochs and creates a new group to take their place. In time these new beliefs will have the same solid array of inductive and historical evidence back of them that their predecessors had, and will harmonize as well with the general beliefs. A static epoch gives an undue importance to the local and historical and narrows the support of general principles until they seem to depend upon present conditions alone.

CHAPTER IV.

A SOCIAL COMMONWEALTH.

§ 1. *The Transition from a Pain Economy to a Pleasure Economy.*

Before proceeding further in the discussion of the social forces the distinction between a pain and a pleasure economy must again be emphasized. Beings in a pain economy have vigorous motor powers but a low development of the sensory powers. As they pass from one environment to another the requisites for survival are determined by the enemies and pains to be avoided. Food and pleasure are of course necessary, but they are not the main objects of conscious thought. When such beings have developed their sensory powers far enough so that forms of thought and ideals are created which aid them in their activities, there is formed for them a pain society, the end of which is protection from enemies. There is a pain morality, the purpose of which is to keep persons from committing acts and putting themselves in situations which lead to destruction. There is also a pain religion, the purpose of which is to invoke the aid of higher beings in the ever recurring contests with enemies and pain.

In describing the leading features of a pain economy, I do not mean to imply that men in such an economy are constantly thinking of pain and never of pleasure, but that all their institutions have as their basis the fear of enemies and pain. The primitive state is formed, as Hobbes tells us, to secure protection from enemies. The primitive morality is some form of asceticism. When enemies abound the conscious pursuit of pleasure exposes a being to the attacks of these enemies and the consequent evils. The choosing of smaller instead of greater pleasures, and the postponement of

pleasures until the ends demanded for protection and security are obtained become the best means of prolonging existence. By the aid of these social forces in a pain economy many of the highest ideals of men have been formed. Connected with these ideals is a series of impulses which prompt individuals to activities in harmony with the conditions under which they have grown up. The most fundamental characteristics of the human race belong in this realm, and to the average individual they seem to be the only bulwarks by which society, morality and religion can be defended. Yet we are now in the transition stage from this pain economy to a pleasure economy, and it is necessary to see what changes will ensue and in what way ideals, forms of thought and impulses must be modified to meet the new conditions.

The causes of a pain economy lie in the environment. Vigorous enemies deal out death and destruction so freely that the thought of isolated individuals is concentrated on the causes and remedies for pain. The development of human society has gradually eliminated from the environment the sources of pain. The civilized world has been freed from dangerous beasts and reptiles, and the growth of large nations has cut off the danger of invasion by barbarous and warlike human foes. The objective environment is now merely the crust of the earth and its stock of materials and goods. The sensory powers have free play in analyzing this material into its elements, and in reorganizing these elements into valuable goods. These changes make a pleasure economy possible and destroy the conditions which made the subjective environment of the old pain economy a necessity.

It is not, however, to be assumed that the transition to a pleasure economy is an easy one. On the contrary, it is a most difficult process and one fraught with many evils and dangers. So many of the fundamental ideas, ideals and impulses of the race lose their efficiency through the change that mankind seems almost without a rudder to guide it

through its new difficulties. Historical evidence would seem to prove that a pure pleasure economy is an impossibility. Nation after nation has gone down when utilities instead of pains have become the supreme object of interest. Individuals as well as nations show the deteriorating influence of pleasure as soon as they are freed from the restraints of a pain economy. This tendency to deterioration, however, is an evil that belongs only to the period of transition. A nation after undergoing the severe discipline of an unfavorable environment, suddenly finds itself transferred to a new environment where there is an abundance of utilities and no fear of enemies. The old safeguards to character are now inadequate, and it takes a long time to construct a new series of safeguards suited to the new conditions. In the meanwhile individuals sink into a state of lethargy or of vice, and the nation is so weakened that some new people, coming from a region where a pain economy still prevails, find it an easy conquest.

Consequently in those regions where a pleasure economy is possible nation after nation has risen and fallen, without ever developing sufficient strength to resist the encroachments of enemies disciplined by a pain economy. A pleasure economy cannot be formed by any kind of a revolutionary process. There must be a long period of transition in which the leading elements of the old economy are gradually lost and in their places the ideas, ideals and impulses of a pleasure economy are substituted. The development of modern nations has been along this path. Without a conscious departure from the old ideals of state, morality and religion, there has been a gradual substitution of certain ideals and impulses of a pleasure economy, until now all of our leading concepts are held in a dual form. One group of ideals and impulses is the conservator of past conditions, while blended with them is another group of ideals and impulses which is the outcome of the new conditions. Such a state of affairs cannot but be the cause of much confusion and

distress. The only hope of progress lies in separating the present aggregate of forces into their elements and in finding to which group each ideal and impulse really belongs.

The present situation can, perhaps, be better described by returning to an elementary distinction. It has been shown that progress is due to the passing from one environment to another, each having certain requisites for survival. The purpose of individuals in passing from environment to environment is not progress, but an escape from competition. The easiest way out of present difficulties is taken even though some other path in the long run would better serve the ends of the race. The line of least resistance often forces progress to take a circuitous route, as when a river cutting its way to the sea often makes long curves to traverse a short distance because of some obstacle in the direct route.

When the race entered a pain economy it was forced out of the direct line of social progress into a series of environments where the requisites for survival warded off pain instead of promoting welfare. The early instincts, customs, ideals and religious forms of the race were at bottom safeguards from enemies and pains. In time, however, the conditions of a pain economy became less severe and some of the requisites for survival came from a pleasure economy. The line of progress then tended to come back to its normal trend, and now after a long detour, the race finds itself at a point on the normal line somewhat in advance of the point of departure. The environment no longer demands a pain economy, yet the instincts, habits and ideals of the race have been acquired during this long period of abnormal progress, and there are no proper guides for activity in the new pleasure economy into which the race is admitted.

To put itself into a normal condition, the race must construct an artificial channel from the point where it left the normal line of progress to the point where it now is. It must create with design the same impulses, habits and ideals which it would have had if the normal line of progress had

not been abandoned. The abnormal impulses and ideals of the pain economy must be discarded or reconstructed on a new basis. This necessity involves an enormous undertaking for the abnormal course of events reaches back far beyond the organization of men into societies.

It is often assumed that this reorganization is an easy one to beings who have the faculty of reason to guide them. If reason were that independent source of authority which many metaphysicians hold it to be, something might be hoped for from it. But reason acts only on the impulses that lie back of it and they are the slow accumulations of many ages. Doubtless a conscious progress can save the race from many evils and economize much time, but it cannot alter the order of development nor eliminate any of its steps. Nations cannot become fitted for the conditions of a pleasure economy without passing through a stage of progress where the elementary ideas and impulses are adjusted to one another by the crudest form of evolution. We are repeating this early process at present with a great loss of life and happiness. Individuals brought suddenly into a pleasure economy, fail to react against their environment, yield to temptation and sink into vice. The new impulses and ideals appear but slowly, yet perhaps we are far enough along to see something of their character and influence. As I have said, they are already a part of our present stock of ideas. The new, however, is so blended with the old that it is hard to isolate them. Perhaps our religious ideals show the effect of the transition from a pain to a pleasure economy more plainly than any others. The concept of God possessed by primitive races is but little separated from their concept of earthly rulers. They serve Him as they serve their rulers from fear of the consequences of disobedience. It is a rule of fear tempered with a hope of protection from enemies. With a clearer perception of spatial relations their concept of God removes Him farther from the sphere of earthly rulers, but He is still thought of as a God

of war and an avenger of evil deeds. When the development of the sensory powers has progressed far enough to create a concept of natural law and of the universe, God is thought of as the creator of men and is supposed to use His power and foresight to ward off the evils which come from natural forces. When men advance far enough to see that a natural retribution does not follow evil deeds in this life, God becomes the final judge of the deeds of men. So far there has been a development of the ideas of a pain economy due to changes in the sensory powers of men. Force, power and omniscience are the leading characteristics of the ideal of God.


At length, however, a new thought appears in the form of the Christ ideal. Christ is not the God of war and hate, but the God of peace and love. He comes not as the ruler of men, but as their servant. He has so little power that a corporal's guard can crucify Him. With the appearance of Christ there was brought into the world a new group of religious ideas quite foreign to those previously entertained. The old ideals were fitted for men whose foes were external and from which they needed a protector. A God of power who was an avenger of evil deeds was a fitting ideal for men in such a condition. But when men are transferred to a pleasure world their evils are internal. They are their own foes. They want relief not from persecution, but from temptation. The concepts of a powerful God and of a future retribution are of little help to men in such a situation. They want rather a model for imitation, one who remains pure even though subject to the passions and temptations of men. The likeness to man is emphasized in the Christ ideal more than the likeness to God. He is a better ideal because he is powerless and helpless.

§ 2. *The Characteristics of a Pleasure Economy.*

Since the human race is now in a stage of transition from a pain to a pleasure economy, it is useless to discuss

the social forces upon an inductive or historical basis. Illustrations from history or inductions from present conditions are defective because the facts upon which they rest are the result of two groups of forces. It is not logical, therefore, to assume that the same results would follow if the conditions were so changed that the motives of a pleasure economy were the sole or at least the dominant motives. If we wish to discover the characteristics of a pleasure economy and explain its influence on the race we must make use of a hypothetical method and try to determine what would have happened if the past progress of the race had been due to a pleasure economy instead of a pain economy. I shall illustrate my method of investigation by using a diagram.

Fig. 2.



Let us assume that the broken line A B represents the series of environments through which the race passed before the pain economy began and that after this epoch the race passed through a series of environments represented by the broken line B C D. During this epoch the race is in a pain economy, and as a result the line of development deviates from its natural channel and passes by an indirect route from B to D instead of going by the direct route (B E D). Finally at the end of this epoch the race arrives at the point D and once more tends to move along the normal line of progress toward F. If while the race is at the point D we wish to analyze the social forces and determine their character and influence, we cannot use the historical method. The facts

of history all relate to the indirect route from B to D through which the race has passed, and these facts were determined by the forces of the pain economy. Such facts will be deceptive and from them few valid deductions can be made as to the future progress of the race. If we wish to find a basis for speculating in regard to future progress we must discover what would be the social forces if the line of progress from B to D had been through E and not through C. If the direct route along the line B E D had been taken, the race would have been in a pleasure economy and all the ideas, forms of thought and race ideals would have been those harmonizing with a pleasure economy instead of those suited to the conditions of a pain economy.

To illustrate my thought in another way let us suppose that when the race had advanced to the point B, it was divided into two parts, one of which located on the Western Continent and the other on the Eastern Continent. Suppose also that there was no further contact between the two parts of the race, and that the conditions of the one continent created a pain economy and those of the other a pleasure economy. Beginning at this point the development of the two parts of the race would have been radically different. Each part would have peculiar group of ideas, ideals and institutions, fitted to the conditions under which it existed. If at a later period when the psychic development of each part of the race had brought it to the point D, the two parts should again be brought into contact it would be possible to contrast the ideas, ideals and institutions of the two parts and thus determine by an historical and comparative method what were the effects of a pleasure and of a pain economy respectively. The development of the human race, however, has not been in two such parts, and we cannot compare the results of the two groups of forces working in isolation. There has been no pleasure economy. We must, therefore, resort to a hypothetical method and determine what would have been the ideals and institutions of a race with similar

sensory powers but with so different an environment that a pleasure economy would have been possible.

Let us, therefore, try to construct a pure pleasure economy and see if we cannot picture the progress of the race under such conditions. To have a pleasure economy of the kind I have suggested we will take an isolated island composed of one fertile plain. There must be no mountains where enemies may hide, nor may there be any physical or climatic variations through which differences in the people might arise and be the cause of conflict. The island must be free from all dangerous beasts and reptiles, so that no sensations or instincts of fear may arise. There must be no severe changes in climate nor irregularity in the crops. Short crops or marked changes in external conditions would tend to put the inhabitants in a state of opposition to each other and thus create the instincts of a pain economy. In short, there must be an absence of every physical difference which would favor dissensions and conflict, and thus bring on a state of war between the various individuals of this isolated society. I do not mean that there should be no emulation and rivalry between individuals or groups of individuals. Such feelings might be strong and yet if they did not lead to personal violence or to treacherous conduct there would be no instincts of fear similar to those of a pain economy. The essence of a pleasure economy is not absence of pain but of fear.

If these objective dangers and the instincts born of them were out of the way, the community would have its evolution directed by its economic conditions and by the subjective dangers which prosperity creates. An abundance of economic goods and the pursuit of pleasure would give rise to many forms of temptation, disease and vice. The surplus population would be carried off in these ways and not by any form of conflict or violence. No one would fear his neighbor, but he would have to learn to guard himself against the many short-sighted choices which would weaken

his physical strength, shorten his life, render him liable to disease, or lead him into vice. The families or individuals that did not succumb to these temptations would survive and produce a new generation with instincts and habits better fitted to the environment in which they exist. A series of such generations would create a type of man with instincts, ideals and institutions of such a nature that the temptations of a pleasure economy could be resisted. Each tendency to vice or disease would be counteracted by the influence of habits, ideals and institutions which would limit the choices of individuals in such ways that only innocent pleasures and amusements would be chosen.

It must not be assumed that the only thought of such people would be to increase their pleasures. While the greatest sum of pleasures might be attractive to individuals, yet their choices would of necessity conform to the conditions of social welfare or the race could not survive. The motives of a conscious calculating utilitarianism would be checked by social impulses which tend to promote the interests of the race. There would therefore be two prominent groups of motives—the one prompting actions which increase the pleasure of the individual, and the other prompting actions which promote the progress of the race. The utilitarian instincts of individuals would be limited to proper fields through the impulses which the social forces generate. Each tendency to get pleasure at the expense of social welfare would be counteracted by the formation of some ideal or social institution with which would be coupled impulses prompting to their realization. The requisites for survival would be those social impulses which preserve individuals from temptation, disease and crime. The number of ideals and institutions would be gradually increased until their united effect would be strong enough to determine the choices of individuals and make their conduct conform to the interests of the race.

Such a society I shall call a social commonwealth. The

welfare of its members is its only end, yet this end is secured not so much by conscious calculation as by social impulses. In such a commonwealth the social forces would have free play. They would arise in a natural order and their development could be easily traced. All of these impulses would be of one class, and the ideals with which they are connected would be so harmonious that they would have a cumulative effect. I mean to picture the conditions of this social commonwealth and to contrast them with those of our present society. I shall try to show how the economic, æsthetic, moral and religious ideas and ideals of such a society would differ from those of the present time. In this way we can measure the influence of the forces of the pleasure economy toward which the race is tending, and see what effect the new conditions will have upon its ideals, impulses and institutions.

§ 3. *The Economic Bonds.*

If a social commonwealth were formed under the conditions I have named, the economic forces would constitute the first and elementary bonds uniting the members of such a society. These economic forces would be created by the conditions of the environment and would begin to operate as soon as individuals began a conscious pursuit of pleasure. I have assumed that the members of the commonwealth are not influenced by fear and that their only pains are due to a misuse of the goods abundantly produced by their environment. At first, therefore, there would be no bonds except those created by self-interest.

The bonds of this class which have attracted the most attention lie in the field of production. Men at a very early stage of progress became conscious of the benefits of co-operation. The knowledge that division of labor results in increased productive power, soon becomes a force in uniting men into productive groups and in holding them in fixed social relations. The need for capital is felt as soon as the

division of labor begins, and capital cannot be secured except by the protection of property on the one hand and by a growing desire for future welfare on the other. The use of capital opens the way to serial production and widens the interval between the initial and the final stage of production. Finally, owing to differences in soil, climate and mineral products, commerce springs up, and thus the economic bonds which unite the people of each community are extended so that different communities have an interest in the welfare of their neighbors. In order to survive, each person would be compelled to join himself to some group of producers. If his instincts kept him aloof from all social groups, his productive power would be too small to enable him to hold his own in the struggle. If we assume that the land of this commonwealth is owned by the state or by a class of capitalists, such an individual would be unable to pay the rent which members of productive groups could pay. Were the land equally divided, such an isolated man would be unable to live on the small plot which would be assigned to him as his share.

The aid of capital would give a similar advantage to those having the instinct to save and to provide for the future. Groups of such individuals working together would be able to undersell individuals working with their hands and by themselves, and in time these latter would be forced into such a condition of want that disease and vice would carry them off. This same desire for economic welfare would force communities to be social and friendly to one another. The exchange of goods and the growth of credit would develop in individuals and in communities the feeling of honor, the love for truth and the desire to live up to their contracts. These economic virtues appear as soon as the desire for economic welfare becomes strong. The sacredness of property and the right to undisturbed possession of the means of production depend upon the same conditions. The demand for economic justice and equality are the products

of the desire for welfare. If no feelings of opposition between individuals or communities are aroused by the conditions of a pain economy, the promptings of self-interest and of personal welfare are sufficient to unite individuals into communities, and communities into a social commonwealth.

These obvious bonds due to the conditions of production are, however, not the only economic forces uniting men into a society. The conditions of consumption, especially variety in consumption, also create economic bonds. The earth is more productive when a variety of goods is desired than when only a single article or a few articles are demanded. The cultivation of a variety of crops makes land more productive and demands less labor than any one crop. If the diet of a people were composed solely of wheat, potatoes or rice, a large part of the land would be worthless and the productivity of the rest of the land would be much less than if the diet were made up of many articles. Persons with varied diet and many wants in harmony with the conditions of their environment have a decided advantage over persons with simple diet and few wants. The latter class would require a larger area of land to support a given number of persons and would thus be at a disadvantage in an economic contest for survival. On the other hand, a greater variety of wants creates greater dependence upon other places and groups of producers, and thus unites the different communities and producers more closely than would simpler and less numerous wants. The smaller the variety of the wants is the stronger must they be in order that the individual shall keep alive. A diet of potatoes or rice is possible only for persons who have strong appetites for those articles. They are so lacking in certain nutritive qualities that enormous quantities of them must be eaten to supply all the needs of the system for food. In a varied diet the different elements supplement each other, and thus a smaller quantity of food will satisfy the needs of the system. A man with a weaker appetite will, under these conditions, be vigorous

enough to survive. He will also get more pleasure from his food. The change from one kind of food to another revives the appetite and raises the intensity of satisfaction above what it would be if the consumption of some one article were continued until the needs of the system were satisfied. Groups of individuals with varied diets, therefore, will have an advantage over more primitive men with simpler diets and stronger appetites, and in a strictly economic competition will displace them.

The more primitive man with strong appetite is at a disadvantage even if his economic welfare is assured. The strong appetite for a few articles leads him to use too large a portion of his income for purchasing these articles. His desire for them holds out so long that the needs of his system are more than supplied and hence a tendency to disease and vice arises. In a social commonwealth many diseases and vices would arise from this source. Where economic goods are abundant, any strong desire for single articles will lead to an excessive consumption, and the tempted individual will in time suffer from disease or fall into vice. In this society vice will be due to desires for particular goods so strong as to be injurious to the consumer, and not to tendencies to injure other persons by hostile acts. Men with strong appetites will, therefore, be especially liable to disease and vice, and will be at a marked disadvantage in an economic contest for survival.

In establishing economic bonds the harmony of consumption is not less important than the variety of consumption. We add much to our pleasure from what we consume by grouping goods in the right way. Certain articles when consumed together create a joint utility far above what the articles would give if consumed independently. It is necessary, therefore, to cultivate correct habits in grouping the goods we consume and to see that each article gets into its proper place. At each stage of civilization some elements must be given a dominant place in each department of consumption,

while other articles must harmonize with these leading elements or be rejected. In food, in clothing, in home decoration, in architecture, and in other departments of life the importance of this principle is manifest. In deference to it certain types of consumption are created to which all individuals must conform or else do without a considerable part of their possible utilities. Certain standards are thus created which determine the character of a civilization.*

With the progress of the race these groups of harmonious goods grow in size and constitute the basis for many social institutions. The home, the church, the club and other similar organizations are the means of supplying desirable goods in harmonious groups in a manner that is out of the reach of isolated individuals. By the pressure of their wants individuals are compelled to unite into social groups. The economic disadvantage of isolated individuals is so marked that no other principle is needed to force men into social relations. Not only must they unite into social groups, but they must also continually tend to increase the number and size of these groups.

In a social commonwealth two tendencies would show themselves. The individuals with the stronger appetites would have their consumption confined to a few articles, and would seek to increase their pleasures by consuming increasing quantities of these isolated and unharmonious articles. Drinking and feasting would be their main sources of pleasure, and the tendency to over-indulgence would create disease and vice. The persons with weaker appetites would seek to increase their pleasures through an increased variety and harmony of consumption. They would be forced by this tendency into many social groups and be compelled to accept social standards for their conduct. These groups would conform more fully than individuals could to the

* For a more complete discussion of this topic, see the writer's monographs on "The Consumption of Wealth" and "The Theory of Dynamic Economics."

conditions of the environment, and would have an advantage in an economic contest for survival.

The economic forces, therefore, are sufficient to create powerful bonds uniting the individuals into a social commonwealth even if they feel no other motives than those due to the pursuit of pleasure. These motives, however, must operate steadily and during a long period of time. There must also be an absence of the instincts and habits of a pain economy, and no possibility of those conflicts which it occasions. Survival must depend upon the power of individuals to resist temptation, disease and vice, and not on the power of a group or race to crush out and destroy its enemies. The desire for welfare may compel progress if each individual makes for himself the decisions upon which his welfare depends.

§ 4. *The Social Bonds.*

The economic bonds are the effects of a more or less conscious calculus of utilities. A social commonwealth held together by no other bonds might prosper, but it would purchase prosperity at a great price. Each generation would be forced to test for itself the various combinations of goods and by experience learn whether they promote or retard welfare. Each individual would have to face the temptations connected with intense pleasures, out of harmony with permanent welfare, and resist them through conscious motives. There would be no check to the actions of individuals when their interests conflicted with the welfare of the race. Social ends would be subordinated to those of individuals and progress would be checked long before it had reached its goal. The social bonds supply this defect. The permanent interests of the race cannot be left to the conscious calculations of individuals. Instead of this slow and uncertain process of attaining results, a mental mechanism would be created which would call into activity certain race ideals and impulses to limit the area of conscious calculation,

and to facilitate choices in harmony with social welfare. The pursuit of pleasure would remain the conscious end of individuals, but choices dangerous to society would be shut out by the visualization of race ideals and the impulses they create.

The race ideals are an outgrowth of the same process through which harmonious groups in consumption are formed. To give an example, a home in primitive times was simply an aggregate of goods having a definite sum of utilities and was valued in the same way as other groups of goods. In time, however, more goods are added to the original stock of utilities and they all blend into a harmonious group. The particular goods forming this group are lost sight of, and the ideal of a home becomes more prominent than its itemized elements. The ideal home is more than the sum of its parts. Elements are added to it by the mental mechanism which give it a more important place in determining action than could belong to the sum of the utilities it creates. A home now becomes a requisite for survival, and impulses and beliefs are created which protect it and demand the realization of the ideal it presents.

Each group of capital goods has a definite value to a producer, and adds a definite sum to his utilities. They are produced and consumed in each period of production. Capital as an ideal is a permanent fund which, although its parts are constantly replaced, is never used up. It is associated with future welfare and becomes a requisite for survival as soon as a vivid ideal of future welfare is created by the mental mechanism.

I might give many examples of how groups of economic goods with a definite sum of utilities are changed into ideals and are no longer thought of as definite sums of utility, but as requisites for survival. There is, however, little need of details in the present case. I desire to explain the process by which ideals are formed out of definite sums of utility rather than to enumerate all the instances where such

a transformation has taken place. It is enough to know that when ideals are formed out of groups of goods, the end of the ideal is realized by an impulse and not by conscious calculation. Impulse and belief are the forces by which the requisites for survival are secured. Reason and calculation control action only when welfare and not survival is at stake.

In a social commonwealth, after the formation of certain economic ideals, the æsthetic ideals would be the first to appear. They lie nearest to the economic world and are an outgrowth of its intense pleasures. Simple æsthetic ideals seem to be the result of the blending of distinct groups of pleasures into one larger group. In this way the interest and intensity of pleasure can be sustained for a much longer period than if an object is the source of a single group of pleasures. When the intensity of pleasure derived from one group is lowered, the thought is transferred to some other group, and the interest and pleasure are revived. If there are a number of such groups combined in an object, one after another of them attracts the attention and becomes a fresh source of intense pleasure. Æsthetic goods may be said to be goods without that point of satiety which is found in simple economic goods. The marginal utility is sustained by the transference of interest from one group of pleasures to another.

Such simple æsthetic pleasures, however, are quite different from the complex ones which attract attention in our present civilization. Æsthetic pleasures have never had an opportunity for normal growth, because the social requisites for survival sprang from morals or religion. The result is that but few forms of æsthetic pleasure have been acquired and these are so disconnected and complex that their development is not easily traced. But in a social commonwealth they would appear in as many forms as there are harmonious groups of economic goods. The impulses they create would be the first means of subordinating the interests of

individuals to that of society. Through them the crude isolated pleasures of primitive men would be displaced by harmonious groups of refined pleasures. Disease, dissipation and vice would be restrained and many temptations would be eliminated.

Æsthetic ideals are concerned only with the present. They lead to the best utilization of all the goods by which the members of a society are surrounded. If certain forms of consumption are prevented or their utility reduced it is because these pleasures shut out the enjoyment of other pleasures and reduce the number of goods from which enjoyment may be had. The æsthetic ideals secure the largest harmonious groups of goods which the society can produce. The ejected articles may give intense pleasure, but they can be enjoyed only under conditions adverse to social welfare.

Æsthetic ideals would be supplemented by moral ideals as soon as future welfare could be vividly contrasted with present welfare. Definite ideals of permanent welfare are formed, and conduct which does not tend to their realization is stamped with moral disapproval. Strong impulses arise to secure a conformity between acts and the ideals projected by the mental mechanism. In our present civilization the moral ideals were developed at so early a stage of progress that the æsthetic ideals, which in many instances should control conduct, were displaced. In a pain economy the pursuit of pleasure is dangerous. In the intervals between wars and conflicts a life of pleasure causes men to degenerate and thus unfits them for future wars and conflicts. Moral ideals must, therefore, create an impulse against the pursuit of pleasure and limit the activities of individuals to those fields where future welfare is prominent. In the short periods of peace and economic prosperity there is no time for æsthetic ideals and impulses to become sufficiently strong to free the pursuit of pleasure from its temptations and evils. Æsthetic ideals cannot become requisites for survival until the

conditions of a pleasure economy have endured for a long period of time.

At present there seems to be an opposition between moral and æsthetic ideals which would not be possible in a social commonwealth. In it dissipation and vice would find their strongest foes in the æsthetic ideals and impulses. The influence of moral ideals would be limited to actions which affect the future welfare of the race. Moral ideals would have their character affected by this change, but their importance would not be reduced. Some of the present ideals would lose their force, but their places would be supplied by new ideals which would control actions now left to the uncertain results of conscious calculation. Æsthetic ideals are positive in their influence and tend to group the consumption of individuals in the most harmonious manner. Moral ideals are negative and tend to eject the discordant elements and activities which prevent the realization of all the possibilities of permanent welfare.

The religious ideals and impulses would be the third group of social forces to appear in a social commonwealth. Æsthetic ideals promote the best utilization of present conditions. Moral ideals tend toward the realization of the permanent possibilities of our planetary existence. The development of the sensory powers, by which the extent of the universe becomes manifest and the perception of the small part which our planet must play in the history of the universe, cannot but create ideals of greater possibilities than those which can be realized on our planet. All parts of the universe will be thought of as peopled with beings differing widely from those living on our planet. In so vast an area with the most diverse economic conditions all possible organisms would have an opportunity to develop; and somewhere in the universe every possible type of being from the highest to the lowest might be found.

The possibility of establishing relations with beings in other parts of the universe could not but form an inspiring

ideal. The feeling that a larger social commonwealth already exists and that the higher beings in such a society might establish relations with us and influence our progress, would create ideals and expectations which would cause the actions of individuals to deviate from what would otherwise be the normal channels. Religious ideals are a necessary consequence of the growth of the sensory powers, and the resulting increase of knowledge of the forces and laws which control and regulate the universe. The defects and limitations of our planetary existence are thus made manifest, and another world in which the possibilities of a perfect existence can be realized, becomes a conscious ideal.

The feelings which these religious ideals create would react upon and modify the moral ideals just as the moral ideals exercise an influence on the æsthetic ideals. The three classes of ideals, forming one harmonious group, would create a series of limitations upon the tendency of certain individuals to lose sight of social ends in the too eager pursuit of pleasure. All the social bonds in a social commonwealth could be analyzed into impulses made by one or another of these classes of ideals. These ideals and impulses would, however, differ largely from our present ideals and impulses. They would be more simple and the social element in them would be much more visible. The influence of a pain economy has distorted the development of our ideals and impulses and turned social progress out of its normal path. We must, therefore, take up these problems more in detail and try to show the normal path of progress.

§ 5. *The Social Man.*

The historical conditions resulting from a pain economy have produced a wrong concept of the motives which would control a social man and of the institutions by which he would surround himself. The presence of foes on every side and the need of strong national governments to resist their encroachments, have compelled individuals to subordinate

themselves to the central authority. National existence is essential for survival, and all other institutions have had their growth dwarfed by the necessity of maintaining a strong government. When such a government is once established, it is easier to use the power of the state to create other institutions than to allow them to develop in a normal way out of the economic conditions which foster their growth. In our modern societies institutions are united into a single group and made dependent upon a central authority in a way which would have been impossible in a social commonwealth. A reaction against this centralization of institutions has created the tendency which we call individualism. The individual seeks to throw off the yoke of this central authority and to determine his actions for himself limited only by the promptings of reason and utilitarian calculations.

This opposition between what we call individual and social instincts would be unknown to the citizen of a social commonwealth. There would be for him no need of a strong central power to protect from foreign foes, and hence no one institution could become a requisite for survival, superior to all others, and thus be able to subordinate all other institutions to itself. Institutional life would be the outcome of the desire to avoid the temptations and evils of a life of pleasure, and not the result of the fear of foreign foes. Each economic necessity and each source of temptation would be the basis upon which some institution might be built up. An institution is the means of realizing an ideal. There would be as many institutions as there are separate ideals to be realized. When the mental mechanism projects an ideal, the activities of a person are grouped in a way tending toward its realization. Social relations are entered into with other persons having similar tendencies, and habits and customs are formed which produce in each member of the group the same impulses. From this result unity of action, a feeling of confidence in other persons and a willingness to rely upon their promises.

These institutions are of two kinds. They are either means of organization by which the amount and variety of economic goods may be increased, or they are connected with the consumption of goods and insure the best utilization of what has been produced. Each trade and industry having a peculiar organization or requiring special forms of skill and knowledge would tend to produce a separate form of institutional life, through which the ends of the industry would be promoted. Each of the evils to which the members of such a society would be exposed—such as sickness, injury, premature death, the loss of property by fire, the risks of business—would cause a new institution to arise by which its evils could be obviated or its burden better distributed.

In the same way other institutions would arise within the field of consumption, the end of which would be to correlate and harmonize the pleasures of each person better than it would be possible for him to do if he remained isolated. Family life, the church, the club, labor unions, trade organizations and a great variety of associations designed for special classes of men and for the gratification of particular desires, would spring up in a natural way, as soon as the needs, desires and temptations of social life became apparent. Each of these institutions would force those connected with them to modify their conduct in certain particulars and to acquire certain habits and modes of thought, which would fit them for the social life which the institution creates.

The character of each individual would be moulded by the group of institutions under which he chose to live. In each of his activities he would be under the guidance of some institution by which he would be prevented from wasting his productive power or from falling victim to some momentary impulse. No one institution could acquire a dominant place nor would a person be continuously under the influence of any one institution. With each activity a new group of ideas, modes of thought and ideals would be projected and visualized by the mental mechanism which would control

the person so long as the motives which lead to this action are dominant. When new motives make themselves felt, the influence of this institution would be weakened, and the individual would seek to realize the new ends under the guidance of some other institution. The motives and activities of each person would determine the number and character of his institutions and the extent of the influence of each of them. Individuals would be compelled to accept these social institutions, not by external force, but by the promptings of internal motives. Each person must become social or reduce his productive power and subject himself to temptations which he could not withstand. The less social would thus be gradually weeded out, and those remaining would give a willing compliance to the conditions which their social institutions set for them. When new economic conditions made it possible to satisfy additional wants, the pressure of new desires and the appearance of new temptations would result in new institutions or extend the influence of those already in existence. The institutions of a race will conform to their wants and activities, unless some external condition cramps their development.

The citizens of a social commonwealth would not understand what a state is if the word were used in its present sense. Each institution would exert its own power in the way in which the family, the church and many other social and industrial organizations do at the present time. The members of a board of trade and of many labor organizations are, for example, under more restraint to-day from the rules of these bodies than from the civil law. All social institutions would exert a similar power over their own field if they were created by economic conditions, and were not checked in their development by extraneous causes.

In many respects the institutions of a social commonwealth would operate in a manner more like those of the Middle Ages than those of the present century. Each locality and trade could make its own regulations, and these rules would

control the members of each organization. The guilds of the Middle Ages controlled, however, only the productive acts of its members. In a social commonwealth the consumption of individuals and all their activities would be under a similar control. There would be much less freedom of choice than at present, even though there is an absence of external force. That part of conduct controlled by impulse would be greatly extended, and the field of conscious calculation would be limited to acts so complicated and irregular that no institution could be devised to regulate them.

I have in this picture of a social man tried to illustrate how he would act if the social forces were the only ones that influenced his conduct. The weight of authority might seem crushing to persons educated as are the people of the present age, yet it would not resemble that which any form of state socialism would exert. No institution would have the dominant place which the state now has. State socialism is an ideal of those who are suffering from the evils of a pain economy, and wish a more speedy remedy from present evils than the growth of social institutions can offer.

§ 6. *Social Morality.*

Moral feelings, perhaps more than any other of the social forces, have been diverted from their course of development by the influence of the pain economy under which the race has existed for so long a period. Where fear forms the dominant motive in determining action it becomes the chief agent by which moral doctrines are enforced. It is so much easier to form vivid ideals of future evils than of future welfare that the evil consequences of bad acts are pictured instead of the good results of praiseworthy acts. Persons are forced into right conduct, not because they are impressed by its beauties, but because every other kind of action seems so undesirable that the right act is the only available choice.

When the perception of future relations creates vivid

ideals of future misery and future welfare, the fear of misery, instead of the hope of welfare, becomes the controlling motive. All the possible sources of pain are brought together into one group, and so blended as to have an accumulative effect. Retribution thus becomes the prominent means of enforcing moral rules. An inferno of some sort is created, in which the doer of evil deeds suffers a loss much greater than the additional present pleasure secured by the bad act. Right conduct is enforced by adding units of pain to the misery side of the ledger instead of adding units of pleasure to the welfare side. Thus a balance of pleasure is secured for moral conduct, but it is at the expense of social welfare.*

This type of morality is in harmony with the conditions of a pain economy and is effective so long as these conditions prevail. It loses its force as soon as a more complete knowledge of the future destroys the unity and reality of these ideals which fear and pain have created. The idea of retribution had its origin in those primitive conditions where each race, surrounded by bitter foes, resented with violence any invasion of its rights. Retribution is the idealized dread of these foes. Every act contrary to the interests of the race is represented as the cause of the evils which these foes cause. It is, therefore, possible to create, by these indirect motives, the conditions of prosperity more easily than by an appeal to future welfare.

The idealization of the conditions causing pain is so much more simple than a like picturing of the conditions of pleasure that for social purposes the former class of motives can be made effective at a much earlier period in the development of the race than can the latter class. No single pleasure is as vivid as are single pains. It is only when the harmony and variety of consumption become apparent and create the great race ideals, that anticipated pleasures acquire more force than anticipated pains.

* See Patten, "The Economic Causes of Moral Progress," *ANNALS*, Sept., 1892.

The basis of morality is also obscured by other circumstances. The isolation in which the different parts of the human race live and the presence of hostile races and nations cause a part of the moral feelings to assume a peculiar form which we call patriotism. The permanent interest of a part of the race living in a local environment, with but a small part of the possibilities for progress which are open to the whole race, is made the standard for action and the basis for ideals. These standards and ideals check the growth of normal moral ideals and divide the field of morality into two parts. National morality is associated with national interests and contests. Because of the temporary and fluctuating character of these motives, such morality cannot avoid having a local coloring and being checked in its development before it has become so enlarged as to represent the permanent interests of the race. It must remain a low type of morality because it reflects, as it were, the morality of a race on a planet of much fewer possibilities of moral progress than are presented in our world.

Religious morality gets its motives not from ideals in harmony with the permanent interests of the race on this planet, but from the ideals created by the larger possibilities of the whole universe. It is believed that when a person ceases by death to be connected with a national unit he becomes a member of an immortal society which controls the universe and utilizes to the fullest extent all its possibilities. His interests demand therefore that he prepare himself for this future state rather than use his time in improving the conditions under which his descendants will live. The loss of welfare for himself in a future life becomes a more vivid ideal than the loss of welfare by his successors in this life. The higher moral interests are enforced by making their realization a part of the conditions by which welfare in another world is secured, instead of enforcing them by means of vivid ideals of the permanent interests of the race in this world. Morality is thus subordinated to and blended with religion in a way that

destroys its independence. With strong national feelings on the one hand and strong religious feelings on the other, the true moral motives are dwarfed and their normal development prevented.

In a social commonwealth there would be no national feelings, because there could be none of those conflicts upon which the growth of national feeling depends. The moral ideals and impulses would precede in time the religious feelings, and hence they would stand on their own basis and have a normal line of progress. Moral ideals would be the outgrowth of economic and æsthetic ideals, and would be associated with them more intimately than with patriotism and religion. The economic ideals create a willingness on the part of isolated individuals to live and work together, and a desire to provide for the future. The æsthetic ideals eliminate the cruder forms of consumption and increase the utility of goods by adding to the harmony of their arrangement. Moral ideals supplement these ideals by making the conditions for the permanent welfare of the race prominent motives in the actions of each generation. Because of them there would be no national contests compelling the people of one age to sacrifice the future interests of the race in order to secure present existence. There would be no religious motive causing persons to value individual redemption in a future life more highly than the improvement of the condition of their descendants in this life. The highest ideals would be those relating to the future of the race. The more vividly these ideals were pictured by the mental mechanism the more certain would be the survival of the individual and his descendants.

To picture a normal society in this stage of its progress we must assume a less complete development of the sensory powers than men now have. They must not know that our world is only a planet upon which, at some time, life will die out. They must not be aware of the fact that there are other worlds with greater possibilities. They must think

the immortality of human beings upon this earth to be possible, or at least they must suppose that a human society is a permanent reality with ever increasing possibilities and length of life for its members.

That it is possible for human beings to foster such ideals and make them a force in determining conduct is shown by the vitality of the democratic philosophy prevalent at the close of the last century. Many of the leaders of the movement that created the French Revolution believed in the perfectibility of man and in the possibility of an immortal state on the earth. They thought that if governmental oppression and religious persecution were done away with, a new society could be established and the basis secured for the rapid development of a perfect man. Much of the force of democratic ideals is due to these concepts, and if it had been possible to promote the growth of these ideals without race or class conflict, the thought of human perfectibility and immortality would have remained among the ideals which democracy hopes to realize.

Moral ideals, if unmodified by the conditions of a pain economy, would create motives by which temptation would be resisted rather than motives by which retribution would be avoided. There would be in a social commonwealth no enemies to avoid, no infernos to fear. The burden of sin and the power of temptation would be more fully realized than at present. Human shortcomings would be due to the gratification of intense present pleasures at the expense of future welfare. Acts of this character would involve social condemnation, and also a feeling of intense anguish, because of the lack of conformity between these acts and the ruling ideals of the delinquent. The feeling of sin and remorse will always be intense when the acts and ideals of an individual do not harmonize. The conflict between the flesh and the spirit is ever present to a tempted individual.

This opposition between temporary and permanent interests is necessary to progressive beings in a pleasure economy.

It would not be a part of a pure pain economy. The fear of punishment rests on the idea of enemies superior to self. The feeling of remorse rests on the idea of a self-condemnation due to self-imposed standards and ideals. A disgust with self follows weakness when tempted by pleasures. The doctrine of human depravity is an induction based on the shortcomings of men in a pleasure world; but for these temptations consciousness of sin and remorse would be absent. Under these conditions moral ideals would have in a social commonwealth a restraining influence even greater than that which they now exert. Each deviation from the conditions of future welfare would be checked by the impulses which the moral ideals create. Each economic motive and æsthetic impulse would be supplemented by a moral impulse. The unity and harmony of these three groups of forces would give an advantage to those members of society in whom they were the strongest and eliminate from it those persons or classes who overestimate present happiness or tend toward dissipation and vice.

§ 7. *Social Religion.*

Religion was the first conscious force binding men together, and yet in the normal order of development it should have been the last of the social forces to appear. The cause of its early appearance is found in the conditions of a pain economy. When surrounded by vigorous living foes the isolated individual feels helpless and demands a protector more powerful than himself. The need of leaders and heroes is so urgent as to constitute them requisites for survival. There springs up among the members of a group a feeling of dependence, of loyalty for their leaders and heroes who ward off pains and protect from foes. But for this faith and confidence in superiors social life could not develop in a pain economy. The presence of foes thus tends to unite higher and lower classes of men into one group and to create social feelings between them rather than

between the members of one class. The person who directs and controls the group gradually increases his power over his followers and also the distance between him and them, until he becomes an absolute ruler and the dispenser of all material goods.

The weak and helpless admire a display of power. A people fearing foes and powerless before natural conditions become hero worshipers and trust their welfare to heroes rather than to their own united wisdom. There is in this way a gulf created between the heroes and their followers. The heroes are external to the society they govern, and have other powers and qualities than their subjects. In cases of emergency and distress the hope of success and relief is centred around the activity of heroes and not around that of the people. In the idealization of these conditions so as to build a concept of the universe, God is placed outside of and behind the universe just as the heroes on earth are external to and above the society they rule. He is thought of as the creator of the universe and the source of all life and power. In this way He is placed completely outside of society and is not subject to any of its laws. Such a concept of deity is satisfactory to beings whose first thought is to avoid pain and to secure protection from enemies. By its aid primitive people create social forces which unite them into groups and inspire them to action.

In a social commonwealth there would be no basis upon which a development of this kind could take place. There would be no fear and no need of protection. The higher ideals of the people would be associated with progress and with freedom from temptation. Social progress would be thought of as due to the united action of all the members of the society. The heroes of the tempted would not be powerful beings who never felt the force of temptation. Power is needed for conflict, but self-control is more important to the tempted than power. A tempted person will, therefore, idealize in his hero a different group of qualities from

those chosen by a person suffering from pain and oppression.

In a social commonwealth the grouping of individuals to secure common objects would be natural, and it would be seen that united action was necessary to extend the control of man over nature. Individuals would look to society as the source of all power, superior to that which they could exert in isolation. They would idealize society and make it the source of the desired control over nature and natural forces. No hero would acquire so high a place that his power would compare with that of the society of which he was a part. Hero worship would not become so important that the members of society would look to their heroes rather than to their united action for the source of the power from which future progress should come.

There would, however, be a cause for hero worship in the need of intelligence to overcome the natural obstacles to progress. Power would be thought of as an attribute of society and nature, but intelligence to control society and nature would be a personal attribute. Intelligence would be idealized in a social commonwealth just as power is idealized in a pain economy. The God of that commonwealth would be a God of intelligence working through society and nature. Force would be looked upon as the outcome of mechanical contrivances and not as an attribute of beings. Intelligence by using mechanisms becomes a power, but is not by itself a power. It is in fact the antithesis of power. The less mechanical a being is, the greater is the possibility of its intelligence. Therefore, intelligence, to be idealized, must be separated in thought from the mechanisms through which it acquires power. An all-powerful being becomes a mechanical concept to persons whose sensory powers are so developed as to distinguish sharply between power and intelligence. The latter alone is a personal attribute, the former belongs to the domain of nature.

When the members of a social commonwealth should finally

discover the limitations to a society on this planet, and begin to idealize the conditions of the whole universe in the hope of realizing its larger possibilities, they would use the stock of ideas and ideals already acquired in their past development. Power would remain an attribute of society, while intelligence and self-control would be the great virtues. Men would conceive of a greater society to control the forces of the universe similar to the lesser society which has been the means of extending their power on this planet. The heroes of this greater society would be beings endowed with intelligence and self-control. They would be within and a part of society, and not above and outside of it. The possibility of greatness in heroes would, however, be immensely extended, because this larger society would not be homogeneous like the society on the earth. All kinds of beings would be parts of this society, and not a single type of beings as on this planet. The differences in beings which here are the cause of a pain economy would there be an added source of strength. Intelligence could operate in so many more ways that its power and influence would be greatly extended.

There would be the same beliefs that now prevail with us in regard to the relations between this greater society and the social commonwealths. The higher society would be under moral obligations to help the lower society. If such a society exists it must at some time be expected to manifest itself in some form to persons on this earth. There would, therefore, be an anticipation that some revelation of the higher society would be made, or a belief would exist that such revelations had been made in the past. In short, the conditions would be present upon which the belief in a revealed religion could be built up. The Christ ideal would be a possible ideal and be even more potent as a moral force than at present. Temptation, vice and dissipation would be the evils against which the members of a pleasure economy must guard themselves; the ideals which raise men's thoughts above temptation would become the great social forces.

The Christ ideal contains all the elements needed to attract the tempted away from vice. Christ is the idealization of the greatest possibilities of human beings. He represents the Incarnation of the highest form of life. He is thought of as having desires like men and yet being as pure as if He lived out of the world of temptation. He is helpless in conflict and shows in His death the separation of power and intelligence. His resurrection tests the power of the higher society to save its hero. The story of Christ could not but have a great influence in a society in which the evils of a pleasure economy were becoming apparent. In a social commonwealth it would present the highest ideal to which a society could reach and it would have a much greater force as a model for imitation and as an inspiration to noble action than at present.

Our religion is composed of two distinct elements—a God of power due to an idealization of the conditions of a pain economy, and a God of intelligence and love due to the conditions of a pleasure economy. It is the latter ideal which forms the basis of a social religion and protects persons from the evils of a social life in which pleasure is the prominent element. As the social elements grow and men acquire more confidence in the power of society to protect its members and to advance their interests, this ideal cannot but gain in force and in the clearness with which it is projected and visualized as an element of the objective world. The hope of a higher society to remedy the defects of our planet must crystallize into a series of ideals not greatly differing from those which the progress of the Christian religion has created.

CHAPTER V.

NORMAL PROGRESS.

§ 1. *The Stages of Social Progress.*

It is only in a social commonwealth, such as I have described, that the normal trend of progress can be seen. When a race is for a long period under the influence of a pain economy, ideas and ideals do not arise in their natural order. The influence of pain and fear cause a much earlier development of morality and religion than would otherwise take place. Economic motives become a determining force only after the evils of a pain economy are sufficiently removed to allow a conscious pursuit of pleasure. The æsthetic motives which normally should follow after the economic motives do not acquire sufficient importance to become requisites for survival. Therefore there is but little weeding out of the unfit from an economic and still less from an æsthetic standpoint; nor are economic and æsthetic ideals impressed upon the race in such a way as to make them effective.

The normal order of social forces must depend on the order in which the mental powers of men develop. Institutions, beliefs and ideals which depend on complex mental states and on the union of many areas of knowledge should follow the more simple forms of the subjective environment which demand a less complex mental mechanism for their visualization. Peculiarities of the environment may contract some of these stages or prevent their full development, yet if we look in the right places the beginnings, at least, of their development will be found in their proper order.

Social progress assumes as a starting point a relatively complete development of the motor powers and of those simple motives which are created by intense pleasures and pains. The stages of social progress depend upon the

growing clearness of sensory ideas and the new possibilities of adjustment to the environment which these clearer ideas permit. In the first of these stages—the economic—the search for food is the main cause of mental development. A limited food supply gives a relative advantage to those beings whose sensory powers are so enlarged that they can find sustenance in forms not available to their rivals. The pressure of these economic wants leads, in two ways, to a development of the mental mechanism. One kind of progress depends on the visualization of indirect methods of production. The pressure of a given want makes vivid not merely the means of satisfying it, but also the series of steps through which these means may be acquired. The longer is this series of steps, the greater will be the being's power to acquire food. Viewed objectively tools represent the essence of indirect methods. The manufacture and use of tools, however, demands a mental development in a direction the opposite of that on which the visualization of indirect methods depends. Production is the result of an analytic attitude through which wholes are thought of as aggregates made up of elements. This attitude of mind creates a material concept of the environment with its elements capable of new combinations more suited to supply the wants of men. To escape competition through increased production men must both visualize the means by which production takes place, and analyze into its elements the material used up in production. Economic progress thus depends upon two simple mental powers which could easily become well developed before the appearance of the more complex mental states upon which the later stages of social progress depend.

Economic instincts result from the methods pursued in production. The æsthetic instincts result from the way in which goods are consumed. Æsthetic pleasures are complementary pleasures and depend upon the relations which exist between the goods consumed or between the different

uses to which the same good may be put. The pleasure derived from a group of goods or from the different utilities of the same good is more prolonged and more intense than the pleasure that would flow from these goods or utilities if they were enjoyed in isolation. These group pleasures are more satisfying than isolated pleasures and lie at the basis of æsthetic feelings.

To secure the full development of this second stage of progress the food problem must be solved. A solution may result from conscious processes which create an abundant supply of food, or it may result from some peculiarity of the environment which keeps life down below the limit set by the possibilities of the food supply. The latter condition naturally leads to the earlier development of æsthetic pleasures and is illustrated by those insects whose refined taste has done so much to develop the beautiful forms in plant life. It may seem odd to say that these insects do not reach the full possibilities of their food supply, but when an organism passes through several stages of development the limit to its numbers may be in any one of these stages. In the other stages, or in some of them at least, an abundance of food may not in any way tend to increase the number of the species. The limitations to the number of butterflies, for example, may not lie in their food. They live at a season when nature is most prolific in its supply of food. Their eggs and larvæ must exist in the less favorable seasons and endure destruction from a variety of causes. If this destruction is very great it will limit so much the number of butterflies that no struggle for food is necessary among them.

Insects select the finest flowers because the food which the flowers offer is more abundant than they need. If food were scarce they would fertilize all flowers, the plain as well as the beautiful. Their æsthetic feelings are the outgrowth of those conditions which permit them to choose the plants giving with the food the most harmonious group of complementary pleasures.

At least a partial relief from the pressure of hunger may be secured by animals whose food supply is irregular. For example, when the periods of plenty coincide with the breeding period æsthetic feelings have an opportunity to develop and exercise an influence on the choices which are made. Furthermore, the power to store up fat in the system may be the source of a temporary relief from the incessant gnawings of hunger and thus create a place for other activities. An animal with this power may yield to other motives than the desire for food if his strong feelings are aroused. In these and in many other ways the environment of animals creates the conditions which lead to a more or less complete development of the æsthetic feelings. They show how simple are the sensory powers on which æsthetic feelings depend. Man, however, is peculiar in that his early environment was markedly deficient in these conditions. To no other animal has the environment afforded so little relief from the constant pressure of wants. The food supply of the early man did not expand and contract to the same degree as that of other animals. There was no dormant state to enable him to escape the evils of winter. The pangs of hunger and the fear of enemies were ever present, and thus confined the interest almost wholly to objects in the economic world. This state of affairs led to a rapid development in the use of indirect methods and to an analytic rather than to a synthetic mental attitude, but it checked to a like degree the growth of æsthetic feelings. The development of these latter was delayed until the sensory powers were so enlarged that personal ornamentation became pleasing. But by this time man was ready for a moral evolution, and the requisites for survival were found in this latter field.

In the simple economic and æsthetic stages of progress, the conscious relations are between the organism and certain definite objects in the environment visualized by the sensory powers. Moral feelings depend upon the power to visualize

these objects as a whole. The moral man is conscious of an environment in which a variety of objects have definite relations to him and his kind. That conduct is moral that best utilizes all the advantages of the environment. Every moral judgment relates to a place—a group of surrounding objects so intimately related that their best use demands a definite series of choices. In this group time relations occupy a prominent place. Objects and relations endure to a greater or less extent, and the greater the power of a man to visualize time relations the more definite does his moral environment become, and the more readily will feelings grow up which prompt him to make the best use of these relations.

The conscious thought of an environment is an essential element in all moral judgments. When we say, "Put yourself in his place," by "place" we mean the whole of that group of conditions which make up the environment of the man. Such judgments lead up to the thought of a common environment for all men having economic relations. The environments of different men thus blend into a social environment for all men, and its full utilization by society becomes the best means of securing the ends of individuals.

The rise of religious feelings demands of a man not only the power to conceive the environment in which he exists, but also the power to visualize another environment in which existence is possible. A real environment is contrasted with an ideal one. The latter may be only a happy hunting ground for the future, or a Golden Age in the distant past; but in some form the mental mechanism must create a contrast between the present and some other group of conditions before religious feelings can appear. This other environment may be one to which access is desired or one which it is desirable to avoid. Both these types of environments are visualized before the religious motives become prominent.

In a developed religion the interest of the believer is centred upon the beings which people the ideal environment, yet it is the concept of this other environment that makes this interest possible. Men cannot conceive of good or evil beings with higher powers until the mental mechanism is able to visualize suitable environments for them. Religion, therefore, depends on more complex conditions than does morality and should under normal conditions follow and not precede it. Owing to the peculiarities of a pain economy the development of religious feelings has been accelerated, while the earlier stages of progress have been passed through too hurriedly. Living enemies were of so much more importance in a pain economy than a knowledge of the environment that the requisites for survival centred around the problems of hostile contact. Under these conditions vivid religious concepts were better safeguards against evils than strong economic motives. The barest scaffolding, so to speak, carried the race through the early stages of progress, and upon this scanty support an elaborate superstructure of religious ideas was constructed. In this manner were overcome the difficulties in the way of early progress, but it was at the expense of later progress. The temporary scaffolding was a strong support for religion so long as the conditions of the early local environment of society continued, but their decay in the more general environment of modern times leaves religious ideals without adequate support.

The difference between normal and abnormal progress can, perhaps, be best illustrated by contrasting the Hebrew with the Greek civilization. The Hebrew race from its beginning was constantly in the severest kind of a pain economy. It was surrounded by stronger races. The land inhabited had no natural defences, and lay on the highway between the great nations of the east and west. Every movement of these nations was sure to bring to the Hebrews some danger or disaster. They were always in a state of

unstable equilibrium because of their unfavorable environment. The strongest economic, æsthetic or moral bonds could not suffice to hold the nation together under these conditions. Their safety depended upon the clearness with which they conceived of another environment radically different from their own, with a God able to thwart their strongest enemies and to reward His followers for their devotion to His cause. The weakness of man and the need of a powerful protector could not have been better illustrated than in Hebrew history, and all our religious ideas are colored by it.

The Greeks, on the contrary, had a favorable environment. They were by the nature and location of their country protected from enemies. Their excellent climate made them vigorous. Their easy access by sea to other countries, and the abundance of slave labor, gave them wealth and leisure. Therefore, they were not forced through the various stages of progress so rapidly as were the Hebrews. The æsthetic stage of progress had an opportunity to develop in its normal place, and for this reason the art of the Greek has had an influence on subsequent civilizations comparable to that of the religion of the Hebrews.

§ 2. *A Greater Humanity.*

Although certain religious ideals attained a leading place, the causes which checked full development in other directions have also interfered with the growth of some of the more important religious concepts. The ideals which have been requisites for survival have been clearly grasped; but with them progress has stopped. So few have been the number of religious ideals that they could not have been effective if they had not been supplemented by and blended with the moral ideals which became requisites for survival. The paucity of these race ideals has been due to the conditions of a pain economy. During the early history of the race, there was a life and death struggle between man and

all other animals that were vigorous and intelligent enough to be his rivals. The victory of man in this struggle has been so complete that a great gulf now separates him from the rest of the animal world. It is not likely that this gulf would have been so wide had it not been for the opposition of interests between man and the other animals. It does not seem that there would have been any insurmountable obstacle in the way of an increase in the intelligence of the lower animals, if the more rapid progress of man had not blocked the way. While it is hard to conceive how any other animal could have taken man's place, it is not probable that the growth of intelligence would have ceased if man had been destroyed by some misfortune.

Man's progress has depended only to a slight extent on the rest of the animal world. A few of the lower animals have become beasts of burden, and others have been prized for their flesh but these uses have only tended to exaggerate the differences between man and the animals beneath him. It is no wonder, then, that a sympathy for animals should arise late in human history and even then be too weak to serve as the basis of any race ideals.

During its early history the race was rich in its concepts of beings higher than man. These beings were believed to exist in great numbers and with a great variety of powers which they freely used to aid or to injure man. But for the variety and vividness of these concepts it is not probable that the religious and moral development of the race would have taken place as early nor have been as rapid as it was. The same causes however which confined the intelligent beings on earth to one species, reduced to one person the number of higher beings which men believed to exist. The thought of a single, immaterial God was so essential to the race that all other concepts of higher beings had to be dropped in the struggle to acquire this and give it proper place. So strong has this tendency been to emphasize the unity of God that even the Christ ideal has been retained by

the race with great difficulty. The brotherhood of man and the fatherhood of God were the only ideals to obtain an unquestioned place. Thus man was isolated so far from God on the one hand and the brute creation on the other that no ideals could arise binding him to other creatures by ties of interest and sympathy. He had to rely entirely on his kind for that mastery over nature upon which social progress depends. It is easy to conceive of conditions where this would not have been the case. If some other creature had divided the supremacy with man—each species having some mental and physical powers which were denied the other—social feelings and interests would in the end have united them. Together they could have mastered nature to a degree far beyond the possibilities of either species alone.

Suppose, again, that the several continents had been isolated, and on each of them a species of man had developed as distinct from the other species as birds, for example, differ from one another. Each of them might then have obtained a mastery over nature, in ways beyond the powers of the others. If these species should be brought into contact and should acquire the intelligence needed to act together, a civilization far richer in its possibilities than that of any single race might have arisen. Magnify as we will the future of man, yet it will be insignificant in comparison with what a society of several distinct species might have accomplished in the same physical environment.

The reduction of all beings to three isolated classes—God, men and brutes—has prevented the growth of religious ideals other than those relating to God. Tasks outside of the power of man to accomplish are delegated to God, as the only being whose power is superior to that of man. A different concept of how to obtain the mastery over nature may be arrived at by assuming a union of intelligent species like man, each having special powers and faculties. Each planet capable of sustaining life has doubtless some characteristics which will give a peculiar development to the

beings who obtain the mastery in it. With the great variety of environments which the universe offers, every possible form of intelligent life somewhere might find an opportunity to develop its full capabilities.

A complete mastery over nature would demand the co-operation of all these forms of intelligent life. Each species could perform tasks beyond the power of its fellow species, and would thus supplement their efforts. The intelligent union of all these efforts under an efficient control of higher beings would give to the united group as permanent a place and as desirable a lot as the laws of nature permit. The length of life and lot of the individuals of each species might vary to an unlimited extent, and yet if common feelings prompted all of them to action, the society could endure and accomplish its mission. Such a society would be a greater humanity in which many of the sentiments, feelings and ideals that are of little use on this planet would have free scope and exert their full force.

This is not the place to discuss the probability or even the possibility of such a society. Whether possible or not, it is an ideal essential to a complete religion, and without it the difference between morality and religion is not clear. Morality covers all the relations of a single species of intelligent beings in one environment. The end of the morality of a given species is the mastery of its environment—the increase of its goods and the diminution of its evils. Moral relations are all reversible. The act which is due from one individual to another, is due in turn to the first individual when the situation of the two individuals is changed. As long as individuals are all of the same species and in the same environment, having the same goods and evils, their relative positions may easily change and their duties to each other be reversed.

Religion, however, is concerned with the relations between different species of beings in different environments. Its end is the mastery of the universe through the united efforts of all

intelligent beings. Its relations are never reversible. The goods and evils of the different groups in the religious world are so unlike that obligations can never be paid in kind. Debts cannot even be reckoned in units of utility, nor can the extent of the services demanded of individuals or of groups be measured by any single standard. All the utilities and services of such groups are absolute utilities to the whole society. The absence or inefficiency of any one group would render useless the united efforts of the other groups. The feelings which bind these dissimilar groups together and make individuals subordinate themselves and their group to the common ends of the whole society are the only ones that, strictly speaking, are religious. If the efforts of a species are not carried beyond the mastery of their own environment, they do not rise above the moral stage of progress. They must submerge themselves in a greater humanity to reach the religious stage. If the race remains dissatisfied with the limitations of its present environment, this ideal has still to acquire a prominent place among the race ideals. Our sensory powers are now too much developed to permit us to hope that the great race ideals can be realized upon this planet or by our race in isolation. The hope of their realization may be kept alive only by the thought that there is a greater humanity working together for the mastery of nature.

§ 3. *The Race Ideals.*

Race ideals are the highest type of social forces. As projected and visualized by the mental mechanism they serve to steady the choices of individuals in a general environment, where the influence of nature is too indirect to determine effectively the actions of men. In a local environment objective conditions are stern realities which so hem in man that his alternatives in matters of conduct are few and do not relate to questions of vital importance. When, however, many local environments blend into one general

environment, and the race has a whole planet to which to adjust itself, objective conditions lose that direct control over human activities which they possessed when the adjustment was only to the conditions of one locality. New motives must now be aroused which will dominate men as fully as did the old conditions.

The ideals of a race represent its aspirations rather than its knowledge. They may be said to be possibilities so visualized that they rank higher than realities. To make visualization possible an ideal must be made up of a group of clear ideas; it must also be composed of vivid ideas or it cannot influence the choices of men. Where clearness and vividness are combined, motives are created stronger than knowledge or passion can produce. In a general environment knowledge is clear, but lacks in vividness. Passion is vivid, but its lack of harmony with the new conditions brings it into opposition to present welfare, and thus weakens its force.

The growth of the sensory powers modifies the ideals of a race by enlarging the sum of its knowledge, and thus changing the area of its possibilities. Some of the old possibilities now become matters of demonstration, while others of them are changed into impossibilities. But the additional knowledge opens up a new area of the possible, and thus allows the creation of a new group of ideals which have even greater clearness and vividness than those of the former epoch.

The older race ideals have grown out of the conditions of a pain economy, which for so long a time determined the direction of social progress. The dangers from living enemies turned men's attention from the material aspects of their environment and led them to seek in other beings more powerful than their enemies a protection from pain and destruction. Out of these conditions many forms of theistic religion grew up and formed the bulwark of a progressive movement in society. The ontological ideals are

best expressed by the terms God, free-will and immortality. God is thought of as the creator of man and of the universe, and hence has the power to ward off evils and to protect from enemies. The thought of a free will contains the concept of the relations between motives and acts by which the responsibility for bad acts rests with the actor and not with his creator. Man, and not God, is responsible for the evil in the world. Immortality implies an indestructibility of the soul, or essence of man, and the possibility of an existence in another world from which his enemies are excluded.

The words in which these ideals are formulated mean little unless they cause a picture of the universe and the relations of the beings in it to be visualized and projected as realities. There is a unity to the scheme and a background of related ideas each of which is essential to the whole. The concept of nature and natural law which this picture contains is simple, yet it is as perfect as the sensory powers of man at that time were able to furnish.

The transition of society from a pain to a pleasure economy and the accompanying enlargement of the sensory powers of man have done much to mar the picture of the universe which our ancestors had. With clearer ideas of nature, the simple pictures of earlier men naturally become inadequate for present needs. When the increased analytic powers of men have resolved the material universe into atoms, the act of creation becomes a difficult conception. It may still be thought of as a fact, but it cannot be pictured in the simple manner of earlier times. When the same sensory powers seem to demonstrate a law of universal causation, it is difficult to visualize a concept of man's nature that will admit of his acts being an exception to the general rule. When man discovers that he is an organism made up of material parts, it is hard to see how indestructibility can be one of his qualities.

I do not mean to imply that there is not a satisfactory proof for each of these ontological doctrines. I merely

desire to call attention to the fact that they cease to be social ideals when they become theses needing proof. We never ask proof for ideals that we can readily visualize. The process of visualization of itself makes an ideal vivid, and vividness creates belief and generates activities in harmony with the ideal. Clear proofs without a visualization may be striking, but they are not belief-making, and hence do not influence the activities of men in social relations.

There is another defect in the belief-making power of these doctrines. The proofs rest not on direct evidence, but on the failure of other concepts of the universe to explain all the known facts. However convincing these indirect proofs may be, at best they leave men without any picture of the act of creation, of the mechanism of a free will, or of how an organism can be indestructible. Not only does the Creator in this way become a Great Unknown, but also the essence of man is pushed back into a realm into which the sensory powers cannot reach. Such concepts lack the clearness and vividness which social ideals must have. They will still influence individuals, but they cannot become social forces. Progress depends on the beliefs and ideals of men, and not on mere knowledge. Clear ideas must be made vivid by visualization to become effective forces in determining conduct.

The ideals of a pleasure economy must be safeguards against the evils of the new environment in which the enlarged sensory powers of men have placed them. The old evils were external and demanded, as a remedy, a powerful protector and peculiar views of the universe and of man's nature. The new evils are subjective and have their causes, not in the nature of man or of the universe, but in the defective relations which exist between men or between man and nature. They are evils of adjustment which no change in the ultimate forms of the universe or of man can alter. The remedy lies in the creation of ideals which will lift men above temptation and inspire them with a desire for

an increased mastery over nature. For men tempted by many degrading pleasures the highest religious ideal is a character capable of resisting evil and able to exemplify the mastery over nature which intelligence exerts. The Christ ideal has both these elements. The thought of an Incarnation does not, like an act of creation, contain ideas difficult to visualize. It expresses simply the relations existing between higher and lower forms of life and the interest and sympathy which the higher has in the lower. It predicates a mastery over nature, but in a way that involves no necessary violation of natural law.

The increased vividness of religious concepts after the introduction of Christianity shows in this respect the superiority of the Christ ideal over the older concepts of deity. The Gods of the earlier religions were powerful beings,—the creators of the world, the source of blessings and the protectors from evils ; yet the growth of the sensory powers of men in the early civilizations soon weakened the power to visualize these concepts and thus produced a decay of religion. Even at their best they were no safeguards against the degrading pleasures which the new civilizations brought. The Christ ideal supplied these defects and made it again possible for men to visualize the relations between themselves and higher beings. The use that art has made of the story of Christ also shows how easy it is to visualize the concepts of the new religion. God as creator cannot be pictured to men of enlarged sensory power. Nor can manifestations of superior power be made visual. The lightning, the storm, the earthquake, the pestilence, and similar events seem to civilized men to be mere manifestations of natural force and bring to them no higher thought. Christian art, therefore, must confine itself to representations of scenes **within** the field of human activities and strive through them to create ideals of higher forms of life. Its success in this **respect** shows the harmony between the Christian ideals and the present sensory powers of men.

The thought of an Incarnation is the highest ideal of the new economy, but it must be supplemented by others. The belief in the mastery of nature by intelligence will be one, and faith in a greater humanity another. One is the end of all social activity, the other is the means by which the end is secured. When these three ideals are made prominent by the new conditions, they will give a renewed vitality to religion, making it again the great social force.

In our present civilization clear and well-defined æsthetic ideals are wanting. On the basis of the meagre data we now possess, it would be difficult to predict the form these ideals assume in a pleasure economy. I have called attention already to the causes which prevented the growth of æsthetic feelings at the time when their appearance was most demanded. The social forces at present are much weaker than they would have been if progress had been normal and had created a group of æsthetic ideals to supplement our present moral and religious ideals. This gap left by the social forces we endeavor to fill up through reasoning. By long series of deductions, based upon economic facts, we seek to supply motives for conduct which would have come directly from ideals in the æsthetic field. The importance and extent of the area of conduct, controlled by utilitarian motives, results from this defect. Many of the acts now determined through a pleasure-pain calculus would have been controlled by æsthetic ideals.

These ideals if fully developed would also have modified and strengthened our religious concepts. Here, too, we now resort to reasoning in order to escape the difficulties growing out of our analytic attitude. We seek to prove the existence of a Great Unknown hidden from view by a material concept of the universe, when a more synthetic attitude due to æsthetic ideals would have made the concept of God a vivid reality. In a pleasure economy men would have risen to the thought of God and heaven, not as manifestations of power, but as the perfection of beauty and grandeur. They

would have felt the need of a God, not so much to begin, as to complete the universe. In this way the concept of God, which has been weakened through the transition from a pain to a pleasure economy, would have retained its vividness.

The evils of a pleasure economy have also modified the moral ideals. The old concepts of a free will and immortality demand a view of the essence of man that cannot now be readily visualized. This essence may be indestructible, and outside of the reign of law when isolated from bodily relations, but the evils of a pleasure economy lie in these bodily relations. Moral ideals which do not lead to a higher life under existing planetary conditions have little present value. The end of morality is the best utilization of the present environment, all of whose relations are destructible and subject to law. Vivid moral ideals must be based on these conditions and tend toward a realization of the highest form of life they allow.

This utilization of present conditions is beyond the power of the individual man, and hence moral ideals must assume a social form. These ideals must picture men in those social relations through which they acquire a mastery over nature and over the temptations which the conquest of nature brings. There are three moral ideals which comply with these conditions: social solidarity, social responsibility and social immortality. Social solidarity is a feeling that progress demands the united efforts of all the members of a society. Social responsibility affirms that every individual is responsible for the failure to secure progress, and that this responsibility cannot be avoided; it is not reduced, but rather increased by the failure of others to do their part. Social immortality implies more than an endless life. It must be a desirable immortality and involves an existence in a social environment. Such an immortality depends on the acts, and not on the essence of man. However permanent the essence of man may be he cannot of himself create

the social relations which would make an endless life enjoyable. He must depend upon the good-will of his fellows or superiors for admission to the social circle, and this good-will he must earn by his acts.

The thought of a social immortality contains no picture of man's essence. The emphasis is placed on the environment to be secured and on the conditions demanded for entrance. Nor does the ideal demand an endless life for all members of a society. If the race is to endure, or if it is to be an essential factor in the prosperity of a greater humanity which has so mastered nature as to ensure its continuance, the ideal will still be a force determining the activities of individuals. Self-sacrifice is an essential element in all social progress, and will steadily increase so long as it does not thwart the end for which it exists.

If this view be correct the transition from a pain to a pleasure economy involves important modifications in the ideals of the race. But these changes are not of such a character as to cause a break in the development of our religious and moral ideas. The new ideals are already a part of our subjective environment and stand out with more or less clearness. The change will result in a transference of emphasis from the old to the new ideals. The more deeply the race becomes immersed in a pleasure economy the more prominent will the new ideals become, and the less urgent the need for extraneous proof, since requisites for survival get their proof out of the conditions which bring them into existence.

§ 4. *The Misapplication of General Principles.*

In the foregoing discussion the social forces have been analyzed into their elements, and their order of development and their relations to one another have been pointed out. An abstract method has been followed to reveal the working of these forces in their freest form. As regards problems of immediate interest, however, they do not have free

scope, but appear in various complicated forms and have their action restricted and obscured by the peculiarities of our planet. This fact causes many wrong deductions to be made from general principles, which must be rectified by further discussion.

A large part of these wrong inferences is the result of confounding the problems of human society with those of general society. If the ideal of a mastery over nature is realized it must be due to the activity of a greater humanity working under less restricted conditions than this planet affords. Our sensory powers are now too far advanced to accept the ideal of a paradise on earth. Human society cannot, therefore, undertake so large a task, but must limit itself to a much less ambitious scheme. It has a definitely limited series of environments to operate in, and must have for its end the evolution of a single species of beings—the one best fitted for our planetary conditions. The more fully human society limits itself to this end, the more probable is it that the race can be an effective aid to that greater humanity of which it hopes to become a part.

The laws of human progress are not, therefore, the general laws of social progress. A greater humanity, to attain its ends, must differentiate into as many species as possible and bind them together into a harmonious whole working for common ends. Human society must, however, integrate and narrow itself down to one type of a man. There must be a continuous struggle between these types, some of which must constantly displace others.

However inspiring may be the ideal of intelligent co-operation among different species on this planet, the struggle of a pain economy has been carried too far to make its realization possible. The gap between man and other species is now too wide to bridge, and the differences between the races at the present time are not great enough to make a permanent union desirable. The better race finds it advantageous to displace other races, while the weaker races

yield too readily to the temptations which contact with a higher race brings. The permanent co-operation of distinct races is possible only when each race has its habits, customs and ideals so firmly set that they will not be weakened or destroyed by contact with other races. If all of the races give up some of their peculiarities, they will finally blend into one race. The consumption, habits, pleasures and temptations of the present races are too nearly alike to permit a co-operation without an integration. They must, therefore, stand in hostile relations to each other or finally unite.

It will greatly simplify the study of human society if we remember that our planet can furnish but a single series of environments in which there is, at each epoch, room for only one dominant race. The local environments were at least numerous enough to start a great variety of organisms, but as the conditions of life became more general, the number of progressive species was rapidly reduced, until one dominant species was formed in an environment so general as to exclude all others. The study of these displaced races and species throws light on the problems of a greater humanity, but this knowledge is of little value in a study of human progress. If the planet furnished a number of parallel series of environments, each portion of the race might have found a suitable series for its continuous progress until they were all brought into harmonious relations. But then the earth would have created a greater humanity and not a human society like the present one. Even if a greater humanity had been founded there would have been in the development of each part a series of problems like those of human society. Each species must tend toward a single type by means similar to those which now cause human progress.

If this view is correct the general problems of society are out of our reach except in some of their religious aspects. The inductive data upon which to build a general social science are very limited. The science of human progress

must remain a study of the dominant race in its most favorable environment. It is largely the static part of a complete social science. The planetary conditions which limit progress are static, and the goal of progress is a static type of man fitted for the earth's best environment. A study with these limitations cannot rank with biology and psychology in the hierarchy of the sciences. For this general social science we need the data of many planets in which other environments have made other types of society possible. The organisms on our planet might perhaps have developed in any direction in which it is possible for organisms to develop, and the possibilities of the mental mechanisms of these organisms are perhaps as great as nature permits. We have, therefore, the data for the general sciences of biology and psychology. But the lack of an unlimited number of possible environments prevents a study of the general laws of society on an inductive basis. We do not have the parallel development of different species in social relations in the way that the lower organisms have developed in adjacent environments. The different races of men do not furnish the basis of a comparative study except in an early stage of a pain economy when religious motives were dominant. This period can help us much in the study of a greater humanity, but it throws little light on other than religious problems. Normal social progress came at so late a period that there is but one advanced society in which to study it. In every part of the civilized world a single type of man either has acquired or is acquiring a dominant place.

The emphasis of the organic analogies in society is also the outcome of a misconception of the province of human society. The problems of a greater humanity are confused with those of human society. The mastery of nature—the ideal of a greater humanity—demands the co-operation of a great many species, each of which has a special work to perform. This greater society might with some justice be called an organism. Each species might have as distinct a

function as that of the organs of a human body. There would also be the same subordination of lower species to the higher that is characteristic of real organisms. The tendencies of a human society, however, are in an opposite direction. Its end is the creation of a single species with its individuals having the same qualities. They must be alike and have the mobility and capacity needed to take any place in the society. No individual or group can become their head in the way that some person or species must become the head of the greater humanity. Human society must tend toward a mobile democracy.

So long as the different races could maintain their peculiarities in adjacent local environments and their members were too immobile to migrate to distant lands, many organic relations grew up between them. The blending of these environments into one general environment has checked the growth of these organic tendencies and has given increased vigor to democratic ideals. The immobility, inequality, and subordination among individuals are reduced, and all acquire the same habits, customs, rights and duties.

In new societies where many races are brought into economic relations there is at first a tendency to form social strata, each of which performs an organic function for society. This tendency is however only temporary. The differences in these races are not marked enough to enable each of them to maintain those habits, ideas and pleasures upon which the permanence of their type depends. A single environment cannot afford the basis for different groups of habits, customs and pleasures. There will in such cases be strong tendencies toward a social degeneration until those habits and pleasures out of harmony with the new conditions are discarded, and then the society will integrate into some single type more capable than any other of utilizing all the surrounding advantages. The study of the organic tendencies in new societies thus tends to create

a wrong concept of human progress and to confuse its problems with those of a greater humanity.

A similar error is due to a wrong application of some of our religious ideals. When in early times our religious ideals took their rise, a narrow concept of the universe made it appear as if this planet were co-extensive with the universe and as if all God's creatures were inhabitants of the earth. The religious concepts of a greater humanity were thus applied to the human races. They were to be bound into an organic unity by religious ties, to live side by side in harmony, and to work together for the common interests of men and for the glory of God. It is assumed that there is a place for each race and that it can be of some use in furthering the interests of the united whole. The Chinaman, the Turk, the Malay, the Bushman and the Digger Indian must be preserved and made integral parts of the whole. Earnest efforts to this end are therefore demanded of all who desire the welfare of the race.

Broader concepts of religious problems and the recognition of the subordinate part which life on this planet must play in the realization of religious ideals, should make evident the fallacy of such arguments. If each of these races were on a different planet, with conditions favorable for the development of a distinct type of man, their preservation and elevation would contribute to the common ends of a greater humanity. But when all these races are thrown together in a single environment, it is not possible for the peculiarities of each race so to develop as to make it a definite type capable of rendering a distinct service in the cause of the greater humanity. When the Chinese or the Indians are admitted into a higher civilization, they do not compel progress either for it or for themselves. They tend to break down not only the habits which made them useful parts of their own civilization, but also those habits and ideals of the higher civilization upon which its future progress depends. The earth has but one general environment

and can bring to perfection but one type of man. Attempts to preserve lower types of men, or to bring them into organic relations with higher types, tend to make a society static and thus check its progress. They may even result in social degeneration through the introduction of new temptations, vices and crimes.

Ethical discussions also show the same tendency to confuse the problems of a greater humanity with those of human society. It is stated, for example, by Herbert Spencer that the ideal of moral life is a life without pain. The gradual adjustment of man to nature, it is thought, will finally lead to such an arrangement that a life of unalloyed pleasure can be secured by every person. The complete mastery of nature which such a picture presents is indeed an ideal of social progress, but it is not necessarily the ideal of human progress. A greater humanity can obtain for some of its members a complete freedom from pain. To secure this end an extensive and varied series of environments must be found in which a steady development can take place. The earth, however, has no series of environments so complete as to allow such a development. Nor is it probable that a single species of men in any environment could live so as to secure a complete freedom from pain. The co-operation of many species in a greater humanity could come much nearer the desired ideal. But even then it is not probable that an exemption from pain could be secured for more than a part of the whole society. If each species has special tasks to perform in order to maintain a mastery over nature, it is improbable that many of them can do their work under conditions where pain can be avoided. The self-sacrifice of many of the species would be demanded to place the favored few in a state of unalloyed bliss.

Our moral ideas should harmonize with the conditions under which men must live on this planet and with the type of man which these conditions tend to create. No other morality can promote the development of human society

along its normal course. We must accept the limitations imposed by this planet and reject ideals which do not tend to produce men capable of enduring evils which result from them.

§5. *The Civic Instincts.*

If the difference between human progress and that of the greater humanity has now been made clear, it will be possible to take up some of the more concrete problems and to show the forms in which the social forces appear in them. All of the problems of a greater humanity—at least all of them about which we have any inductive data—are religious. All other social problems are civic. They include everything relating to the preservation and perfection of the best type of man for the one general environment that our planet offers. There are no elementary civic forces. All the forces are moral, æsthetic and economic combined and blended in many complex forms to meet the peculiar conditions demanded by human progress.

The civic forces are made up mainly of three elements, civic customs, civic ideals and civic instincts. Of these the civic customs belong in a class by themselves because they are so largely due to the conditions of a pain economy. Customs are the means by which the aggressive instincts of hostile individuals are restrained and peace is preserved. They set up definite rules of action to prevent conflict. Our legal system and the principles of parliamentary government are the best instances of the power of civic customs. They show themselves, however, in the small as well as in the great affairs of life and prevent a return to the conditions of a pain economy with its conflicts and disorders.

The civic ideals, or, to use a more familiar term, the democratic ideals, are the enduring elements of human progress. They are the surviving concepts of a long series of subjective environments. They stand out more clearly after each transition from environment to environment. Each change breaks down some of the feelings, tendencies and ideas due

to past conditions and strips others of peculiarities due to local conditions. The residue becomes more vivid with each change, and gradually crystallizes into ideals. These ideals represent the goal of human progress—a condition where man's mastery over nature is complete. They become a social force by picturing an ideal society and inspiring a desire to make it real.

Civic instincts develop from conditions more local and less permanent than the civic ideals. They are the effects of a single environment and change as it changes. Ideals engender a love for the objects associated with them. A civic instinct, however, represents a reaction against something; some particular group of conditions arouses an aggressive activity. These conditions are always local. A race could not, for example, have an instinct against food, but it might have an instinct against eating frogs or rats.

Civic instincts are created by the standards of life of each society, and are a feeling of antipathy against the objects or persons who violate them. Standards of life are always relative; they represent the possible in the present environment. Each new environment creates new possibilities and thus modifies the standards which society can set for its citizens. A standard represents the acts of the better class of men and thus implies that there are some who do not live up to it. Some persons or acts must be excluded and against them the civic instincts are directed and exert their force.

The civic standards are the outcome of concrete economic, æsthetic and moral conditions. There are as many of them as there are distinct groups of these conditions having a direct bearing on human welfare. In production we find standards of thrift, frugality, promptness, regularity and trustworthiness. In commerce and trade there are standards of commercial honor, honesty, truthfulness, fair dealing and honest wares. In consumption there are standards of comfort, food, clothing, home life and privacy. In the realm of æsthetics there are standards of cleanliness, neatness,

harmony and beauty. In morals there are standards of chastity, fairness, uprightness, consistency and temperance.

A host of similar civic standards might be named each of which is formed and modified by certain peculiarities of the present environment. Such standards are high when they demand all that is possible at the present time. They are low when a lax public sentiment allows the continuance of acts which do not harmonize with public interests. The firmness and height of the standards depend upon the strength of the civic instincts which resent their violation. There is no standard unless there are feelings antagonistic to the acts and persons which sink below it. A mere admiration of certain acts or a desire to be virtuous for its own sake or for its direct advantages, may have an influence on individuals, but cannot become a social force inspiring all persons living in a common environment.

The love of thrift, for example, may create a class of thrifty persons in a community, but it is a dislike of the thriftless that makes the standard of thrift for society and forces every one to live up to it. The height of the standard depends not on the love of thrift, but on the dislike of the thriftless. The standard of fair dealing and of honest wares depends not on what individuals do or make, but on what they dislike to see done or made. The standard of cleanliness or of neatness depends upon the feelings we have about the lax appearance of other persons. The standard of harmony and beauty depends upon what we insist on excluding from our presence, and not on the degree of our feelings for what we love. The standard of commercial honor depends not on what we will do or not do, but on the acts which will cause us to refuse to deal with other persons if they do them. The standard of national honor or credit depends not on our love for the nation, but on the feeling of antagonism against those who sacrifice its interests. The standard of living depends not on what persons eat and drink themselves, but on what they dislike to see other persons eat or

drink. Shoes are not made a part of the standard of life by our wearing them ourselves, but by our ostracism of persons who go barefooted. The standard of wages depends on what we object to other persons working for, not on what we refuse to work for ourselves.

A mere love of certain objects or conditions can never make a standard. The civic instincts act in the subjective environment just as do the objective conditions which become requisites for survival. When survival depends on objective conditions, those who cannot master these conditions perish. The lowest level of intelligence and organic efficiency is set by these conditions and the surviving types must be above this level. When social co-operation becomes a requisite for survival those persons against whom the civic instincts are aroused cannot remain a part of society. They must depend on their own exertions and these efforts are not sufficient to enable them to compete with those who are efficient parts of a society. They are therefore pushed into such unfavorable conditions that they, or at least their descendants, cannot live.

The civic instincts thus determine what standards shall be requisites for survival and what shall be the height of these standards. They divide the members of each community into parts, giving increased advantages to the social, and shutting out the unsocial from direct contact with nature and natural resources. If the civic standards are high, many fail who could succeed if allowed direct contact with the better natural resources. Society so monopolizes these better resources for its members that isolated or less social individuals, boycotted by the civic instincts, must seek a poorer environment than that which they could secure under more primitive conditions. The less social are, therefore, gradually eliminated from society, and the surviving elements become more united and homogenous. The higher the civic standards are, the fewer are the types of men who can survive, and the more pronounced are their social qualities.

Under these conditions civic instincts become the dynamic forces in society because they are the type-producing forces. They keep society divided into two parts with the advantages so plainly on the one side that the other fails to survive. When certain of the lower types of men are eliminated by this process new civic instincts appear or the old ones grow stronger, and then a new division is created in society by which the less favored types of men are again forced to the wall.

In a pain economy the struggles were mainly between independent nations or between semi-independent classes in one nation. When a nation or class acquired so dominant a place as to encounter no further opposition, progress ceased. There were no means by which a further elimination of the unfit could be carried on. Temptations, diseases and vices are as apt to carry off those fit to survive as those who are unfit. The goal of a civilization based on a pain economy is reached when a dominant nation or class is produced, or when the antagonism between nations or classes dies out. There are then no forces tending to create a higher type of man.

The civic instincts creating the higher standards of life in a pleasure economy replace the national and class hostilities of earlier civilizations. They increase the opposition between the different types of men and give to men with a high standard of life that advantage which the dominant nation or class had in former times. The intensity of this antagonism determines the standard of citizenship. The citizen of the future must be more than a mere inhabitant of a region enjoying its advantages. He must be an independent, self-supporting man with civic standards so high and numerous as to arouse the admiration of his fellows. Those whose standards are so low as to excite the civic instincts of society against them cannot remain an integral part of society and do not deserve the rights of citizenship. Every one must either have the civic standards needed for

citizenship or become so isolated from social life and cut off from its advantages that he will sink into the dependent classes. Citizens and the dependent classes stand opposed to each other in an advanced society. Progress depends on the sharpness of the lines which separate them.

§ 6. *The Democratic Ideals.*

The preceding discussion has made clear the goal toward which human progress may tend. A planet with a single general environment can bring to perfection but one type of man. This type must be developed through repeated differentiations followed by the displacement of the less favored types. The dynamic forces in human progress, therefore, are not the same as those in the progress of a greater humanity. This more general society tends to differentiate its members into separate species and then to bring them into co-operation for common ends. There is not in such an ideal that opposition of interests which the progress of a planetary society demands. In a human society the dominant race or class cannot share its advantages with its rivals without a retardation of progress and if this tendency is strong enough to enable every class to hold its own, social stagnation would result.

I do not mean, however, to assert that the struggle between the dominant and the less favored classes must continue in those primitive forms of a pain economy where the lives and liberties of the contestants are at stake. In the pleasure economy toward which we are tending, it is not probable that any of the traditional natural rights of men will be violated. The power to survive will be determined mainly by the industrial instincts which produce wealth or by social instincts which tend to reduce temptation and to limit the inclination to indulge in intense pleasures.

Under these conditions there would not be that struggle between rival races and classes which takes place in a pain economy. The many local environments have each

developed a peculiar race or class. When these are thrown together in a general environment the power to survive is determined by a crude appeal to objective conditions. In a pleasure economy it is assumed that this struggle of rival races and classes is finished. A single society has been formed with moral and religious forces strong enough to keep the peace and to allow the tendencies of a pleasure economy to show themselves. The weaker portion of society suffers, not from the oppression of the dominant classes, but from the misery, diseases, temptations, and vice which their lack of industrial and moral qualities permits. Instead of the old struggles between independent classes the opposition of interests now lies between society and the dependent classes. No person can rightly be a member of a society unless he not only is self-supporting but also contributes in some way to the welfare of others. The surplus earner makes society, the surplus consumers are the dependent classes. These dependent classes cannot survive unless society allows them to share in advantages which they do not create. The number and welfare of dependent persons depend upon the relative strength of two groups of social feelings. The one group would prompt the self-supporting members to increase their industrial efficiency and to guard themselves by isolation from the crude pleasures, temptations and vices of the less developed portion of society. The other group would prompt them to share their advantages with the dependent classes and thus to promote equality among men and prevent further differentiation.

In modern nations, and especially in a pleasure economy, the strong feelings tending to help the dependent classes are due to democratic ideals. The older ideals of this group are justice, liberty, equality and fraternity. To them may be added tendencies toward the referendum, the initiative, and proportional representation in the sphere of government, and in the economic world such ideals as a

living wage, surplus values, progressive taxation, the single tax and the right to live, to work and to enjoy the fruits of the earth. These ideals picture society as it may be in its final environment, with the mastery of nature a completed task, and thus they assume a much higher state of civilization than we actually possess.

There is no field in which the tendencies away from a pain economy show themselves more clearly than in these democratic ideals. They might with truth be called the first fruits of a pleasure economy. They practically assume a life of unalloyed pleasure by shutting out from view the pains and suffering which a high civilization on our planet involves. They represent the economic world as a garden of Eden in which the gifts of nature are the most prominent element. Even when labor is emphasized as the sole cause of value, this labor is pictured as being so generously supplemented by natural forces that it would become a pleasant recreation if every one did his part. The difficulties of production are lost sight of in the struggle over the distribution of the bounties of nature, and thus the obstacles to progress seem to lie in the latter and not in the former class of problems. The recent discussions of land tenures illustrate these tendencies. The land is represented by many writers as the great source of wealth and its products as gifts of nature to man. Each man is thought to have a right to an equal share of this bounty, and the laws and customs which countenance any other disposition of it, are regarded as infringements upon natural rights. The rent of land thus becomes a social surplus of such a magnitude that when justly distributed the labor of men can be so reduced in time and in irksomeness as to eliminate its most disagreeable features.

While the picture of the environment presented by these ideals belongs to an advanced pleasure economy, there is one prominent element in them which belongs to a pain economy. The evils and pains of life are represented as coming, not

from the environment or from the defects of human nature, but from men. The strong and successful are pictured as being in a never-ending conspiracy to defraud the weaker and less successful. The oppression of the dominant classes and their grasping nature are made vivid in a thousand ways by those who represent popular movements.

Democratic ideals thus rest upon two prominent thoughts, the gifts of nature and the oppression of men. In emphasizing the gifts of nature the environment of the distant future is pictured, when the mastery over nature will be complete. In visualizing the oppression of men the distant past is pictured, when the conditions of a pain economy were supreme. These ideals thus combine a prophecy of the future with a history of the past. The historical man of the distant past is put without change into the best environment of the distant future. The obstacles to progress thus seem to come from the dominant classes who prevent an equal distribution of the gifts of nature. There is a silence as to pains and the obstacles to progress which come from the environment and represent the cost of nature's bounties.

Such pictures of nature and of men have been the inspiration of the leaders of democratic movements designed to free society from control of its dominant classes. They were especially vivid at the time of the French Revolution and are presented with fresh vigor in recent discussions. The ideals of Godwin which aroused the opposition of Malthus are similar to those of Henry George in his discussion of the land problem. Some of Godwin's ideals, like that of human immortality on earth, have been rendered impossible by the growth of knowledge, but the gap thus opened has been filled in by the increased vigor and clearness with which the idea of the social surplus can now be presented. Man cannot live so long in nature's best environment as Godwin supposed, but its increased beauties as pictured by George compensate for this defect. These writers emphasize the oppression of the ruling classes and

have the same belief that the pains, misery and vice of the less favored classes are due to this cause. A humanity freed from oppression could, it is thought, escape from these evils and create a society in which the gifts of nature would be abundant enough to supply every want. The conception of both writers is the same as that of every reformer who would rouse men to activity by a presentation of past oppression and future welfare.

These democratic ideals are the static elements of a pleasure economy, for they hinder further differentiation and tend to keep in society all the classes it now contains. They retard the displacement of the less efficient classes and restrict the activity of the more efficient. They prevent the integration of society and the development of the type of men most fitted for the earth's best environment.

In the normal progress of a greater humanity all the social forces are dynamic. They become static only when abnormal conditions disturb the orderly progress of society. In human society the struggles caused by the conditions of a pain economy gave to the religious and democratic ideals great strength and clearness. They were the means by which race and class antagonisms were so reduced as to make a unified society possible. The evils of a pleasure economy, however, demand in addition to these ideals higher standards of life and stronger civic instincts. These standards and instincts depend upon the peculiar conditions of the new environment and could not grow until society entered a pleasure economy. They are therefore at the present time much weaker than the democratic ideals with which they stand in opposition. The civic instincts direct the attention to the evils of the present environment and demand a relief from them. The democratic ideals make vivid a future environment, and oppose any activities not in harmony with its conditions. They create sentiments opposed to the type-producing tendencies needed for the development of the man best fitted for the present conditions.

These ideals at the present time seem to have an irresistible force, yet it must be remembered that they now have their maximum strength, while the civic instincts, from which other tendencies will spring, are only in their infancy. The civic instincts, however, are not inactive and are gradually establishing standards which must in time so separate the citizens from the dependent classes that steady progress will be possible. Even in America, where democratic ideals have had undisputed sway, each class or section of the nation is becoming conscious of an opposition between its standards and the activities and tendencies of some less developed class. The South has its negro, the city has its slums, organized labor has its "scab" workman, and the temperance movement has its drunkard and saloon-keeper. The friends of American institutions fear the ignorant immigrant, and the workingman dislikes the Chinese. Every one is beginning to differentiate those with proper qualifications for citizenship from some class or classes which he wishes to restrain or to exclude from society. The lines between citizens and the dependent classes are not yet clearly or properly drawn, yet as now drawn they indicate the manner in which the growing civic instincts will act. A new era of our development will begin when these instincts are strong enough to remodel public opinion. It will mark the beginning of a social integration through which a truly American society can be formed.

§ 7. *The Progress of Cities.*

The transition to a pleasure economy modifies our civilization in no way more strikingly than in the changes it causes in the relative positions of country and city life. Under the old conditions country people were looked upon as the mainstay of morality, purity and industry, while city life was regarded as a cesspool of pollution, corruption and vice. The historical accounts of most nations start when the people were mainly engaged in agriculture and were thus pure,

free and vigorous. The history is then followed through the various stages of progress until wealth, power and influence are to a large extent concentrated in a few cities. As this latter period, when the nation is sinking into decay, coincides with the period of city dominance, it is assumed that city life is the source of corruption and decay, just as country life was at the beginning the source of vigor and purity. Such accounts fail to tell how this pure country life originated or why city life is necessarily corrupt. They simply take as an arbitrary starting point the time when country life is at its best and follow out the history of the nation until it is conquered or absorbed by some more vigorous nation.

The difference between the possibilities of city and country life lies largely in the different kinds of environment they afford. The country is a series of local environments, each of which affords the conditions for the development of a particular type of man. So long as the people in them are isolated from other people, these local environments force a sharp adjustment to their peculiarities and thus bring into prominence certain moral, civic and industrial qualities needed for their best utilization. Social beginnings are easily made under these conditions, but they cannot be carried far. Commerce, trade and intercourse with adjacent nations break down this accurate adjustment to local surroundings without supplying the conditions for further progress. These corrupting influences soon bring the nation into a static condition and render it weaker than its aggressive neighbors.

The country has many good local environments, but no general environment. Cities, on the contrary, have no local environments in which social beginnings can be made or peculiar moral or industrial qualities preserved. They furnish, however, a general environment in which alone a continuous progress is possible. It is difficult to start a civilization in cities, but it is impossible to continue one for any length of time outside of them. It is necessary to transfer to cities the civilization begun in the country, and this

transference usually takes place when the nation is exchanging the conditions of a pain for those of a pleasure economy. The evils of the two periods of transition are thus combined and coupled with other evils, due to the fact that adjacent nations remaining in a pain economy are ready to plunder and destroy the new civilization as soon as progress weakens its power of defence. It is no wonder, therefore, that city civilizations have come to grief and that many false generalizations have been based on these failures. Only after a long period has elapsed and the evils and difficulties with which city civilizations have to contend have been eliminated, can there be any hope that the permanent conditions of progress will be secured. Some of these conditions are so obvious that it is possible to discuss them even before city life becomes a dominant element in modern civilization.

In the first place city progress demands an environment so general that no marked outside influence can disturb its progress. The forces shaping any civilization must be internal and a single environment must endure long enough to allow the proper industrial qualities and civic instincts to develop. The new city civilizations need isolation from outside influences as much as did the early country civilizations ; but this isolation is secured by having so general an environment that the whole world is included in it. So long as city life is disturbed by the irregular intrusion of external forces, by the influx of people hitherto outside of its influence, or by temptations, vices or diseases generated by other conditions, it must be so hampered in its development that normal progress is prevented or, at least, greatly delayed. All these evils may be withstood and remedied if their sources are internal so that a process of gradual adjustment is possible. It is the sudden intrusion of external factors, or of those not subject to proper control, that interferes with the conditions of normal progress and makes city life static or even retrogressive.

These evils are also aggravated by the civic instincts

which the inhabitants of cities have inherited from earlier country conditions. Instincts should always be the outgrowth of present conditions. The people in a new environment can with advantage inherit the ideals of their ancestors, for these ideals represent the general features of past environments. Even these ideals must often be modified and made more general that their vividness may be retained. Civic instincts, however, must be local. They are the changeable part of the subjective environment and are worse than useless unless they correspond closely to the definite and prominent features of the present epoch.

Few, if any, people in cities are free from the instincts due to country life. The influx of people from the country is so constant and the contact with the country so easy that the ideals of country life remain vivid and city life is forced to become an imperfect imitation of country civilization. Cities are governed as if they were a group of country villages. The hierarchy of officials, their relations and duties, are based on the needs of country life. City people still want houses with grass plots in front, cellars underneath and dumping grounds for rubbish behind. They still rely much on rain to wash away dirt and on isolation to ward off disease. They grudgingly give up the well and the spring for the hydrant, and close their eyes to the fact that the soil under them is not, as in the country, a source of all blessings, but the cause of their worst evils. They heat their houses, cook their food and generate noises and odors as if their neighbors were miles away. Their parlors are not differentiated into places of comfort and intercourse, but remain as much a combination of museum, art gallery and storehouse as they would of necessity be if all the family treasures were crowded together into a two-room country cottage. Nor does home life free itself from the foreign elements which country isolation has forced into it, and thus put itself into touch with the many social institutions which city life makes possible.

The influence in cities of instincts due to a pain economy are as prominent as those of country conditions. The mental qualities and the type of morality most admired are those calculated to preserve life and ward off external dangers. These are ideals better fitted for a military campaign than for civic life. The fact that the best army officers so often fail when assigned to civic duties shows how different are the qualities which the two careers demand. A city morality, however, must be an off-duty morality rather than an on-duty morality. By this I mean that it is a morality less connected with the activities which preserve life and secure subsistence than with the periods between these activities, when pleasure is the leading interest. It is the morality of temptation rather than of danger; the morality of leisure rather than of work. If city civilizations could control the pleasures, amusements and temptations of the people, there would be little difficulty in regulating their activities during the working period. Even the lack of industrial efficiency is largely due to the evils of leisure.

These evils of a pleasure economy demand for their correction the growth of civic instincts fitted for the new conditions. No revival of or appeal to the instincts of a pain economy can bring success. There must be a slow growth of new instincts in harmony with the new conditions. A primitive form of evolution must assert itself, in which the less fit for city life are not shielded from evils by the influence of the democratic ideals tending to distribute equally both the benefits and evils of city life, without regard to the merit or demerit of the individual. Such tendencies destroy the hope of a progressive evolution, which depends on the possibility of shielding the fit from temptation and exposing the unfit to some, at least, of the evils they create. If civic instincts fitted for city life once became powerful, democratic ideals might be allowed full play without any detriment to society, but at present their activity takes so much from the advantage of the strong and adds so much to the welfare of

the weak, that the resulting equality retards the development of a type of man whose civic instincts fit him for city life.

I do not mean that the democratic ideals are strong enough to equalize the distribution of wealth, of working hours or of the sources of enjoyment. The equality is not one of advantages but of disadvantages, an equality of temptation, and of susceptibility to disease and vice. A primitive evolution depends, not on the welfare of those who survive, but upon the conditions which determine who cannot survive. If the death rate is the same in all classes the type-producing tendencies on which progress depends are thwarted and the city remains a mere aggregate without any integrating tendencies.

The hindrances to city progress, however, lie more in an equality of temptation than in an equality of the death rate among the different classes. Temptation grows with wealth and opportunity, causing each class to have about the same percentage of those who are worthless to society. In the single environment which a city affords there is no way by which a class can isolate itself from these evils or from those who create them. Relief can only come from the growth of civic standards and of strong instincts against those who fail to live up to the standards. A class cannot isolate itself from society, but society can exclude from its privileges those who make bad uses of them.

A lack of the feeling of social solidarity does much to continue these evils. They cannot be avoided through the endeavors of individuals or classes to protect themselves. A slight reduction in the force of temptation, disease and vice in the whole community has much more permanent influence than a much larger change in the condition of individuals or of classes. Civic instincts must be general to be efficient, but this generality is prevented by individuals who have more confidence in their own endeavors than in those of the public. Such acts may shift the evils to other persons but they do not prevent or even reduce them.

So long, for example, as the favored classes imagine that they can avoid the evils of bad water by using filters, ice, mineral waters or other substitutes, they have little interest in the public water works and do not exert their influence to improve them. If individuals were allowed to establish private mails the public service would soon degenerate through the lack of interest which the favored classes would have in it. Just as national feelings and interest grow when the wealthy classes can no longer hire substitutes for the army, so also will civic instincts grow when all persons must seek protection from city evils through public measures. Social solidarity is but another name for those feelings which lead men to rely on general measures of relief instead of relying on their own efforts.

This feeling of social solidarity must, to be effective, be supplemented by the growth of æsthetic feelings. Crude appetites and vices are best removed by a perception of the harmony of consumption. The gratification of æsthetic feelings depends upon public measures more clearly than does the gratification of other feelings. Men may eat, drink and sleep in private and care little for the enjoyment of their neighbors. They must, however, enjoy their æsthetic pleasures with others and suffer if the taste of their neighbors is bad. We all see the same streets, have the same amusements, and endure the same sights, noises and odors. All the unæsthetic elements in city life are forced upon every one's attention. No one can escape the evils which low æsthetic standards suffer to exist. The rich may supply their economic needs by private enterprise, but they cannot thus gratify their æsthetic wants. They must beautify and ornament the whole city and remove all its defects before their own æsthetic feelings can be satisfied. Their interests in this respect are the same as those of other people and must lead to a desire for public measures to promote them.

Violation of æsthetic standards, more than that of any other standard, arouses feelings of opposition and thus promotes

the growth of civic instincts. In this way unæsthetic objects, acts and pleasures are driven from public places and are aggregated in special localities isolated from the general public. Those in whom the desires for these pleasures are still strong find ready means of gratifying them. The well-meaning citizen, however, has his temptations greatly reduced and his family can be reared without the depraving tendencies which the constant contact with crude temptations creates. The causes which have isolated the liquor traffic from other forms of business and driven it so largely into back streets or behind screened doors are æsthetic. The immorality of drinking intoxicants is as bad in one place as in another, and so far as moral motives oppose drinking they would prevent it entirely.

In the temperance agitation of the present time there are two distinct elements, one æsthetic and the other moral. The æsthetic feelings are disgusted by the disagreeable effects of drinking. They are irritated by public rioting and coarseness. The unæsthetic elements which drinking forces into the family life also cause feelings of repugnance. These feelings are satisfied when drinking is driven from the home and from public places. They only demand that the disagreeable objects be kept out of sight. There is no opposition to the evil-doer upon æsthetic grounds so long as he does not force himself upon public attention. Moral feelings, however, are aroused by the condition of the drinker and not by the disagreeable effects of drinking upon other people. They prompt endeavors to save the drunkard and to punish those who profit by his depravity. They exert their influence toward restoring the drunkard to his place in society and would compel society to receive him even to its detriment. Acting thus, moral feelings tend to check social differentiation and often injure society.

The economic instincts in isolation may exert a like influence. While they produce a differentiation in wealth, pleasures and consumption, they also in many cases tend

toward an equality of temptation and disease, and thus do not give any one type of man so marked an advantage as to enable it to displace other types. The different classes live side by side with no tendencies strong enough to unify society.

It is therefore to the growth of æsthetic feelings that we must look for the differentiating tendencies which compel progress in city life. The æsthetic feelings lead to the development of citizens with high standards of life and with civic instincts strong enough to drive those with lower standards into isolated localities. They free home life and public places from their worst evils and temptations, and allow the growth of more refined social feelings. The integrating tendencies can thus produce higher types of men and give them vantage ground for the displacement of the lower types. Æsthetic motives cannot create a perfect society, but they can overcome the present static tendencies and elevate city life to a plane where higher motives can become sources of further progress. Our present civilization has given to city people the possibility of satisfying their economic wants. Past civilizations created for them moral and religious motives. Thus three of the elements of progress are assured. The æsthetic forces alone are lacking. The residents of cities must win for themselves this requisite of progress and when they have secured it, the last obstacle in the way of a civilization higher than any the world has yet known will have been removed.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE
ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
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CONSTITUTION

OF THE

KINGDOM OF BELGIUM

TRANSLATED AND SUPPLIED

WITH

AN INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

BY

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NOTE.

This Constitution, by means of the numbers at the bottom of the pages, is paged continuously with the Constitution of the United States of Mexico, which was the first paper in Volume II of the ANNALS, and was issued in a separate edition as No. 27 of the Publications of the Academy; the Constitution of the Republic of Colombia, which was sent as a Supplement to the January, 1893, ANNALS, and was also issued as No. 79 of the Publications of the Academy; the Constitutional and Organic Laws of France, which were sent as a Supplement to the March, 1893, ANNALS, and were also issued as No. 86 of the Publications of the Academy; the Constitution of the Kingdom of Prussia, which was sent as a Supplement to the September, 1894, ANNALS, and was also issued as No. 127 of the Publications of the Academy, and the Constitution of the Kingdom of Italy, which was sent as a Supplement to the November, 1894, ANNALS, and was also issued as No. 135 of the Publications of the Academy.

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THE CONSTITUTION OF BELGIUM.

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION.

Belgium appeared among the nations of Europe as an independent monarchy in 1831. At that time a constitution was adopted which remained without change for more than half a century, and, in fact, continues to be with some amendment the organic law of the state. With its independence and neutrality guaranteed by the great powers, with sagacious rulers on the throne, and with an industrious population, Belgium for the greater part of the nineteenth century has had a singularly fortunate history, and among observers of political affairs has often been pointed out as a model government of its kind. It might be said, however, that this success has been due as much to the temperate political action of the people as to the excellence of the machinery of government, for the progress of the state has not been without periods of serious friction. The framers of the constitution neither severed themselves completely from the past nor provided for all the contingencies of the future, hence the gradual spread of democratic ideas caused in time uneasiness and finally change, so that the year 1893 marks an important epoch in the history of the nation.

One hundred years ago the French Revolution found Belgium under the dominion of the House of Austria, as it had been since before the Reformation. Yet we observe that even this long submission to a

single dynasty had not obliterated the spirit of local independence which had been so conspicuous in the early history of Brabant. Charles the Fifth, despot though he was, was not the sovereign of the Netherlands as a whole but the duke of one province or the count of another, and swore allegiance to each one separately. So the philosophic Joseph II., with his well-meant reforms, at the close of the eighteenth century, had met with resistance largely because the recipients of his favors had not been consulted. Communities and provinces had been so long in the habit of managing their own internal affairs that they did not take kindly to outside interference. In this we may find one explanation of the large measure of local autonomy existing to-day in Belgium, and, furthermore, may see some reasons for the lack of united resistance to outside invasion at certain critical points in her history. One of these crises was the French Revolution.

When the armies of the Directory appeared in Belgium their superior force was aided by the hatred of the people to the Austrian dominion and the conquest was easy. In fact, the French were welcomed as deliverers, but the disappointment was sad, for besides loss in plunder, the country was practically annexed to the republic by being divided into arbitrary departments and administered as a part of France.

For a time Napoleon inherited this conquest and used it as his own, but at the collapse of his empire the Congress of Powers which administered his estate determined to join the Belgian provinces to those of Holland under the title of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. A working constitution was

established for this new monarchy, which provided a legislative assembly in which each country was to be equally represented, although the population of Belgium was far more numerous than that of Holland. Under this arrangement the countries lived for a decade and a half, until, by the episode known as the Revolution of 1830, these uncongenial parts were separated and the independent kingdom of Belgium came into being.

This has sometimes been regarded merely as an echo of the crisis in France of the same year, but the Belgian revolution of 1830 was by no means a sentimental copy of the democratic movement across the border, nor was it likely to have occurred, had not the grievances which caused it been of many years standing. The Belgians were not pleased with their political situation for numerous reasons. That the union brought about by the European Powers was not a success ought to have been evident even to its creators, though the Hollanders were blind to the reasons of it. Whatever opinion we may have of the motives of William of Holland, or of his Dutch statesmen, it must be conceded that the policy pursued was very unlikely to conciliate the Belgian people. Not only was there disproportion in the legislature, but in the administration as well; the Dutch were given place and advancement in overwhelming majority. National jealousy was thus needlessly aroused and the ill feeling was kept alive and further embittered by the differences of the two peoples in religious faith.

Other causes of irritation might be mentioned, which occurred from time to time during the fifteen years of union. The arbitrary abolition of trial by jury by royal

edict was followed by the establishment of Dutch as the official language of both countries in civil and military matters; the financial system was unjust to Belgium, the old Holland debt having been revived and saddled equally on the two countries; the Dutch, taking advantage of the numbers in the legislature passed commercial ordinances which discriminated in favor of Holland; the Supreme Court and certain other common institutions were placed in Holland, and every important lawyer was thus obliged to learn Dutch and lose practice at that; in religious matters the Protestant government was not sufficiently considerate of the strong Catholic population of Belgium, for there was always a lingering fear that the Hollanders would attempt to protestantize the country completely through the schools. In short, the king appeared to look upon these provinces as his own and to act in the spirit of the clause in the agreement of the powers which said that he should be given "an accession of territory."

In view of these facts it is not surprising that in 1830 a little spark kindled a patriotic revolution. A few enthusiasts cried out, "*Imitons les Parisiens*," and the country followed, but only part way in the path of destruction. With all the temptation to violent reaction the moderation of the actors in this revolution is striking. The statesmen who were called upon to rebuild the nation refused to follow recent example and establish a republic. They refused to separate themselves from their historic past, but founded a constitutional monarchy and then looked about to find a suitable person to wear the crown.

Leopold, Duke of Saxe-Coburg, accepted the task and during a reign of thirty-four years displayed a similar

moderation in the exercise of his powers. Leopold II., his son, has likewise been a man of great discretion, but has lived to see some great changes in the political condition and political aspirations of his people.

Since the adoption of the constitution there has been a constant advancement in public welfare in so far as this could be accomplished by statute law. The fundamental law has from time to time been interpreted in a liberal spirit and the maximum of freedom made use of. Party government has not been without friction, but heated periods and alarming crises have been safely passed. The same native moderation has proved the safety of the nation. The controlling powers, sometimes Liberal, sometimes Catholic Conservative, have never been extreme in their demands; neither the radicals nor the ultramontanes having been in a position to command. A recent writer has thus briefly characterized the situation :

“One may summarize our whole political movement in saying that the progressive liberals prepare the reforms, that the moderate liberals realize them, and that the governmental catholics do not dare undo the work, in spite of the objurgations of the ultramontanes.”¹

The political experience of Belgium has been of great interest to all students of government, but as this did not until recently result in changes in the constitution, the history of the matter does not come within the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that before sixty years of state life had passed it was plainly seen that the old foundation was too narrow for the new age. Agitation was in progress for many years, demanding particularly an enlargement of the suffrage. The composition of

¹ Goblet d'Alviella, in “*Cinquante Ans de Liberté*,” Vol. i, p. 192.

the senate was also an issue, though of less importance in the public mind. In both matters amendments were effected. A strong party backed by the disfranchised working classes demanded universal suffrage pure and simple ; others demanded an educational qualification of various kinds, while the conservatives stood for a moderate widening of the property qualification. Compromises between the extremes were finally agreed upon and the changes were recorded in the fundamental law in 1893.¹ A few comments on the nature of these amendments will be found in the notes appended to the constitution.

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¹ Promulgated in September, 1893. See *Recueil des Lois*, No. xiii, 1893.

THE CONSTITUTION OF BELGIUM.

In the name of the Belgian people, the National Congress enacts :

TITLE I.

THE TERRITORY AND ITS DIVISIONS.

ARTICLE I. Belgium is divided into provinces. These provinces are : Antwerp, Brabant, West Flanders, East Flanders, Hainaut, Liège, Limbourg, Luxembourg, Namur. If required, the territory may be divided by law into a greater number of provinces.

The colonies, possessions beyond the sea or protectorates which Belgium may acquire shall be governed by special laws. The Belgian forces required for their defence shall be recruited only by voluntary enlistment.¹

ART. 2. Subdivisions of the provinces cannot be made except by law.

¹ Before the French Revolution Belgium was divided into three states: the principality of Liège, the principality of Stavelot and the provinces of the Pays Bas Catholique. The subdivisions in these were of a feudal character and were separated, in respect to political rights, by many barriers of law and custom. The Directory introduced uniformity on the plan of the departments, districts and cantons used in France and the idea has prevailed ever since. In the revision the words "except the relations of Luxembourg to the Germanic Confederation" are omitted. In 1839 a portion of that province was erected into a German duchy and the boundaries of the countries fixed by treaty. The paragraph on colonies is entirely new. The early framers of the constitution could scarcely have dreamed that their king would become also the sovereign of an immense territory in the depths of Africa, nor that the people of Belgium would eventually inherit his dominion over a Congo Free State.

ART. 3. The boundaries of the state, or of the provinces, or of the communities cannot be changed or rectified except by law.

TITLE II.

BELGIAN CITIZENS AND THEIR RIGHTS.

ART. 4. Belgian citizenship is acquired, maintained and lost according to regulations established by the civil law.

The present constitution and the other laws relating to political rights determine what other conditions are necessary for the exercise of these rights.

ART. 5. Naturalization is granted by the Legislative power.

Full naturalization alone admits foreigners to equality with Belgians in the exercise of political rights.

ART. 6. There shall be no distinction of classes in the state.

Belgian citizens are equal before the law; they alone are admissible to civil and military offices, with such exceptions as may be established by law for particular cases.

ART. 7. Individual liberty is guaranteed.

No one may be prosecuted except in cases provided for by law and in the form therein prescribed.

Except in the case of flagrant offense no one may be arrested without a warrant issued by a magistrate, which ought to be shown at the time of arrest, or at the latest within twenty-four hours thereafter.

ART. 8. No person shall be removed against his will from the jurisdiction of the judge to whom the law assigns him.

ART. 9. No penalty shall be established or enforced except in pursuance of law.

ART. 10. The private domicile is inviolable; no search of premises can take place except in cases provided for by law and according to the form therein prescribed.

ART. 11. No one may be deprived of his property except for the public good and according to the forms established by law, and in consideration of a just compensation previously determined.

ART. 12. Punishment by confiscation of property shall not be established.¹

ART. 13. Total deprivation of civil rights (*mort civile*) is abolished and shall not be re-established.²

ART. 14. Religious liberty and the freedom of public worship, as well as free expression of opinion in all matters, are guaranteed, unless crimes are committed in the use of these liberties.

ART. 15. No one shall be compelled to join in any manner whatever in the forms or ceremonies of any religion, nor to observe its days of rest.

ART. 16. The state shall not interfere either in the appointment³ or in the installation of the ministers of any religion whatever, nor shall it forbid them to correspond with their superiors or publish their proceedings,

¹ To be understood as forbidding total confiscation of property; otherwise fines would be abolished

² *La mort civile* is abolished as a punishment by itself. The condition follows as a secondary consequence of condemnation to death, hard labor or transportation for life.

³ In most European states the appointment of bishops must be confirmed by the civil authorities. The liberal Catholics of Belgium in preserving the rights of the Holy See thus placed the freedom of all denominations on a better footing than in France or even Switzerland.

subject to the ordinary responsibility of the press and of publication.

Civil marriage shall always precede the religious ceremony, except in cases to be established by law if found necessary.

ART. 17. There shall be freedom of opinion in teaching; all measures preventing this are forbidden; the repression of offenses shall be regulated only by law.

Public instruction given at the expense of the state shall likewise be regulated by law.

ART. 18. The press is free; no censorship shall ever be established; no caution money shall be exacted of writers, publishers or printers.¹

In case the writer is known and is a resident of Belgium, the publisher, printer or distributor can not be prosecuted.

ART. 19. Belgian citizens have the right to assemble peaceably and without arms, when conforming to the laws which regulate this right, and without previous authorization.

This provision does not apply to assemblies in the open air, which remain entirely under the police laws.

ART. 20. Belgian citizens have the right of association; this right shall not be restricted by any preventive measure.

ART. 21. Any one has the right to address petitions to the public authorities, signed by one or more persons.

The constituted authorities alone have the right to address petitions in the name of the people collectively.

ART. 22. The privacy of correspondence is inviolable.

¹ The press has the further privilege of obligatory jury trial when prosecuted. Compare Articles 96 and 98. The statutes prohibit preventive arrest and give the accused a distinct place among other persons on trial.

The law shall determine who are the agents responsible for the violation of the secrecy of letters entrusted to the post.

ART. 23. The use of the languages spoken in Belgium is optional. This may be regulated only by law and only for acts of public authority and for judicial proceedings.¹

ART. 24. No previous authorization is necessary to bring action against public officials for the acts of their administration, except as provided for cabinet ministers.

TITLE III.

CONCERNING POWERS.

ART. 25. All powers emanate from the people.

They are to be exercised in the manner established by the constitution.

ART. 26. The Legislative power is exercised collectively by the King, the Chamber of Representatives and the Senate.

ART. 27. Each of the three branches of the Legislative power has the right of initiative.

Nevertheless, all laws relative to the revenues or expenditures of the state or to the army contingent must be voted first by the Chamber of Representatives.

ART. 28. The authoritative interpretation of the laws belongs only to the Legislative power.

ART. 29. The Executive power is vested in the King, subject to the regulations of the constitution.

ART. 30. The Judicial power is exercised by the courts and the tribunals.

¹ The general laws and royal decrees are published in the *Moniteur* in French. They are then reprinted in a special collection with a Flemish translation for the communes using that tongue, but the French alone is the official text. In local administration the language of the district or community is used.

Decrees and judgments are executed in the name of the King.

ART. 31. Affairs exclusively communal or provincial are regulated by the communal or provincial councils, according to the principles established by the constitution.

Chapter I.

THE CHAMBERS.

ART. 32. The members of the two Chambers represent the nation, and not the province alone, nor the subdivision of the province which has elected them.

ART. 33. The sessions of the Chambers shall be public. Nevertheless each Chamber may resolve itself into a secret committee upon the demand of its president or ten members.

It may then decide by vote of an absolute majority, whether the session shall be resumed in public upon the same subject.

ART. 34. Each Chamber shall judge of the qualifications of its own members, and shall decide all contests which arise upon that subject.

ART. 35. No person can at the same time be a member of both Chambers.

ART. 36. Any member of either of the two Chambers, who shall be appointed by the Government to any other salaried office except that of minister, and who accepts the same, shall give up his seat immediately, and may resume his duties only by virtue of a new election.¹

ART. 37. At each session, each of the Chambers shall elect its president, its vice-presidents, and shall form its bureau.

¹ This does not exclude offices of local administration even when salaried.

ART. 38. An absolute majority of the votes is necessary to pass any resolution except as otherwise established by the rules of the Chambers in regard to elections and nominations.¹

In case of an equal division of votes, the proposition under consideration is rejected.

Neither of the two Chambers can pass a resolution unless a majority of its members are present.

ART. 39. The votes are given *viva voce* or by rising and sitting; the vote on a law as a whole shall always be by roll call and *viva voce*. The election and nomination of candidates shall be by secret ballot.

ART. 40. Each Chamber shall have the right of inquiry into public affairs.

ART. 41. A proposed law cannot be passed by either of the Chambers unless it has been voted upon article by article.

ART. 42. The Chambers have the right to amend and to divide the articles and amendments proposed.

ART. 43. To present petitions in person to the Chambers is forbidden.

Each Chamber has the right to send to the ministers the petitions which are addressed to it. The ministers are obliged to give explanations upon their contents whenever the Chamber demands.

ART. 44. No member of either Chamber shall be arrested or prosecuted on account of opinions or votes expressed by him in the performance of his duties.

ART. 45. No member of either Chamber shall during the continuance of the session be prosecuted or imprisoned after trial, except by the authority of the

¹ For questions requiring a two-thirds vote, see Articles 61, 62 and 131.

Chamber of which he is a member, except in cases of flagrant misdemeanor.

No member of either Chamber shall be arrested during the session, except by the same authority.

The detention or the prosecution of a member of either Chamber is suspended during the session and for the entire term, if the Chamber so demands.

ART. 46. Each Chamber determines by its own rules the mode in which it is to exercise its powers.

Section I.

THE CHAMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES.

ART. 47. The members of the Chamber of Representatives shall be chosen by direct election under the following regulations :

One vote is allotted to citizens who have reached the age of twenty-five years, resident for at least one year in the same community and who are not otherwise excluded by law.

One additional vote is allotted in consideration of any one of the following conditions :

1. Having reached the age of thirty-five years, being married or a widower with legitimate offspring, and paying to the state a tax of not less than five francs as a householder, unless exempted on account of his profession.

2. Having reached the age of twenty-five years and being the owner either of real estate of the value of at least 2000 francs, said value to be rated on the basis of the cadastral assessment or, possessing revenues from land corresponding to the said valuation, or being inscribed in the great book of the public debt, or

possessing obligations of the Belgian Government savings-bank bearing at least 100 francs interest.

These inscriptions and bank-books must have belonged to the holder for at least two years.

The property of the wife is counted with that of the husband; that of minor children with that of the father.

Two additional votes are allotted to citizens who have reached the age of twenty-five years, and who fulfill the following conditions:

A. Holding a diploma from an institution of higher instruction, or an endorsed certificate showing the completion of a course of secondary education of the higher degree, without distinction between public or private institutions.

B. Filling or having filled a public office, holding or having held a position, practicing or having practiced a private profession which presupposes that the holder possesses at least the knowledge imparted in secondary instruction of the higher degree. These offices, positions and professions, likewise the time during which they must have been held or practiced, shall be determined by law.

C. No one shall have more than three votes. All ballots shall be identical in form and color.¹

¹The original article of 1830 required that the deputies be elected directly by citizens paying direct taxes not less than 20 florins (42½ francs) nor more than 100 florins. Since 1848 the qualification has been at the minimum of taxation nevertheless the result has been a very small electorate. In recent years there have been only about 133,000 voters in a population of 6,147,000. The increasing discontent with this state of affairs was the chief cause for the calling of the constitutional convention which met in 1892. As will be seen by Article 131, this body is a re-elected parliament sitting as a constituent assembly. No less than fourteen different schemes for revision of the articles on suffrage were submitted. In the committee universal suffrage was voted down. The result was great,

ART. 48. The constitution of the electoral colleges is regulated by law for each province. Voting is obligatory; it shall take place in the community, when not otherwise determined by law.

ART. 49. The number of representatives is determined by law, according to the population; this number shall not exceed the proportion of one representative for 40,000 inhabitants. The qualifications of an elector and the process of election shall be determined also by law.

ART. 50. To be eligible it is necessary:

1. To be a Belgian citizen by birth, or to have received full naturalization;

2. To enjoy civil and political rights;

3. To have reached the age of twenty-five years;

4. To be a resident of Belgium.

No other condition of eligibility shall be required.

ART. 51. The members of the Chamber of Representatives shall be elected for a term of four years; one-half being elected every two years, in the order determined by the electoral law.

agitation among the working classes, and on the occasion of a socialistic congress which occurred a few days later a serious riot took place in Ghent. The military was called out and matters were somewhat quieted but the people continued to be excited. Parliament then voted to reduce the age of eligibility, but the masses were not satisfied and a universal industrial strike was threatened unless their full demands were complied with. Public feeling was for a time very tense but no great violence occurred, yet all parties in parliament felt compelled to recede from their extreme demands and a compromise was finally effected as we have it in Article 47. It was estimated that the new electorate would raise the number of voters to about 1,200,000, having at their disposal about 1,900,000 votes. The first election showed 1,370,000 voters with 2,111,000 votes. The law which carries this provision into effect enumerates nineteen different classes of professions which are entitled to two extra votes, passing from ministers of state down through lawyers, doctors, druggists, school inspectors to primary teachers. None others than those expressly named can have the additional votes.

In case of dissolution the Chamber shall be entirely renewed.

ART. 52. Each member of the Chamber of Representatives shall receive an annual compensation of 4000 francs.

He shall have, in addition, the right of free transportation upon all state and concessionary railways from the place of his residence to the city where the session is held.¹

Section II.

THE SENATE.

ART. 53. The Senate is composed :

1. Of members elected according to the rate of the population of each province conformably to Article 47; though the law may require that the electors shall have reached the age of thirty years. The provisions of Article 48 are applicable to the election of Senators.

2. Of members elected by the provincial councils, to the number of two for each province having less than 500,000 inhabitants, of three for each province having from 500,000 to 1,000,000 inhabitants, and of four for each province having more than 1,000,000 inhabitants.²

¹ Before the revision representatives received a monthly salary of 400 francs during the continuance of the session, except those who resided in the capital, who received nothing. The free transportation clause is new.

² Under the original constitution the Senate was elected by the same class of voters as for the other Chamber, and the number of members was one-half of the representatives. The property qualification was much higher for the amount of tax was something over 2000 francs. The result was that the Senate represented a single class or set of interests in the country and did not have the sympathy of the public. By the addition of members elected by the provincial councils it was hoped to make it a more truly representative body. During the work of revision it was proposed that a certain measure of direct legislation by the people be introduced. This was to be limited to a popular veto on bills which might seem to

ART. 54. The number of Senators to be elected directly by the voters shall be equal to half the number of members of the Chamber of Representatives.

ART. 55. Senators shall be elected for a term of eight years; one-half being elected every four years in the order determined by the electoral law.

In case of dissolution, the Senate shall be entirely renewed.

ART. 56. To be a Senator, it is necessary:

1. To be a Belgian citizen by birth, or to have received full naturalization;
2. To enjoy civil and political rights;
3. To be a resident of Belgium;
4. To be at least forty years of age;
5. To pay into the treasury of the state at least 1200 francs of direct taxes, including licenses;

Or to be either the proprietor or the usufructuary of real estate situated in Belgium, the assessed revenue of which amounts to at least 12,000 francs.

In the provinces where the number of those eligible does not reach the proportion of one for every 5000 inhabitants, the list shall be completed by those residents of the province paying the highest taxes. The citizens on this supplementary list are eligible only in the province where they reside.

The Senators elected by the provincial councils are exempt from all property qualification; they must not be members of the assembly which elects them, nor have

urgently require it, but the peculiar feature of the project was that it was to be left to the discretion of the King when to call for the popular vote. This would have been an interesting experiment, but was calculated to bring the royal executive out of his neutral and irresponsible position. After much discussion this was voted down, as was also the plan for a system of proportional representation which had been insisted on by the ministry then in power.

been members of it during the year of the election nor during the two preceeding years.

ART. 57. Senators shall receive neither salary nor emolument.

ART. 58. The sons of the King, or if there are none, the Belgian princes of the branch of the royal family designated to succeed to the throne, are by right Senators at the age of eighteen years. They have no deliberative vote until twenty-five years of age.

ART. 59. Any assembly of the Senate which may be held at any other time than during the session of the Chamber of Representatives, is null and void.

Chapter II.

THE KING AND THE MINISTERS.

Section I.—THE KING.

ART. 60. The constitutional powers of the King are hereditary in the direct descendants, natural and legitimate, of His Majesty Leopold-George-Christian-Frederick of Saxe-Coburg, from male to male in the order of primogeniture, and to the perpetual exclusion of the females and of their descendants.

The prince who shall marry without the consent of the King, or of those, who in his absence exercise his authority as provided by the constitution, shall forfeit his rights to the crown.

Nevertheless, with the consent of the two Chambers, he can be relieved of this forfeiture by the King or by those who, in his absence, exercise his authority according to the constitution.¹

¹ The clauses relating to the marriage of the heirs apparent were inserted at the last revision.

ART. 61. In default of male descendants of His Majesty Leopold-George-Christian-Frederick of Saxe-Coburg, the King may name his successor, with the consent of the Chambers expressed in the manner prescribed by the following article.

If no nomination has been made after the manner described below, the throne shall be vacant.

ART. 62. The King cannot be at the same time the head of another state without the consent of the two Chambers.

Neither of the Chambers can deliberate upon this point unless two-thirds, at least, of the members who compose it are present, and the resolution must be adopted by at least two-thirds of the votes cast.

ART. 63. The person of the King is inviolable; his ministers are responsible.

ART. 64. No decree of the King can take effect unless it is countersigned by a minister, who, by that act alone, renders himself responsible for it.

ART. 65. The King appoints and dismisses his ministers.¹

¹ Emile de Laveleye in his book on "Government in Democracies," calls attention to an interesting bit of political experience in Belgium. ("*Gouvernement dans la Démocratie*," Vol. I., p. 367.) Several times in the history of the country, ministries have been dismissed when there was still a majority in their favor in the legislature. In 1857 Leopold I. did this because of the great popular outcry against the measures proposed by the cabinet in power. Leopold II. did the same thing in 1871 and again in 1884 because the people were very much excited and the downfall of the ministry was demanded by the large towns, especially the capital. The motive for the act was that the majority in parliament did not represent the majority in the country, and the result was that in every case the agitation of the public was calmed. Laveleye compares this to the conduct of Louis Philippe in 1848, when he insisted on maintaining too long the strict legal rights of the Guizot ministry in the face of popular outcry, until the masses became infuriated and deposed the monarchy itself. The advisability of bending before manifest popular desire is a problem well worth careful study.

ART. 66. He confers the grades in the army.

He appoints the officers of the general administration and for foreign relations, except as otherwise established by law.

He appoints other governmental officials only by virtue of an express provision of law.

ART. 67. He issues all regulations and decrees necessary for the execution of the laws, without power to suspend the laws themselves, or to dispense with their execution.

ART. 68. The King commands the forces both by land and sea, declares war, makes treaties of peace, of alliance and of commerce. He notifies the two Chambers of these acts as soon as the interest and safety of the state permit, adding thereto suitable comments.

Treaties of commerce, and treaties which might burden the state, or bind Belgian citizens individually, shall take effect only after having received the approval of the two Chambers.

No cession, no exchange and no addition of territory can take place except by law. In no case can the secret articles of a treaty be destructive of those openly expressed.

ART. 69. The King sanctions and promulgates the laws.

ART. 70. The Chambers shall assemble each year, the second Tuesday in November, unless they shall have been previously summoned by the King.

The Chambers shall remain in session at least forty days each year.

The King announces the closing of the session.

The King has the right to convoke the Chambers in extra session.

ART. 71. The King has the right to dissolve the Chambers either simultaneously or separately. The act of dissolution shall order a new election within forty days, and summon the Chambers within two months.

ART. 72. The King may adjourn the Chambers. In no case shall the adjournment exceed the term of one month, nor shall it be renewed in the same session, without the consent of the Chambers.

ART. 73. He has the right to remit or reduce the penalties pronounced by the judges of courts except such as are fixed by law in the case of ministers.

ART. 74. He has the right to coin money as regulated by law.

ART. 75. He has the right to confer titles of nobility, but without the power of attaching to them any privilege.

ART. 76. He may confer military orders in accordance with the provisions of the law.

ART. 77. The civil list is to be fixed by law for the duration of each reign.¹

ART. 78. The King has no other powers than those which the constitution, and the special laws enacted under the constitution, formally confer upon him.

ART. 79. At the death of the King, the Chambers shall assemble without a summons, at the latest on the tenth day after his decease. If the Chambers shall have been previously dissolved, and if in the act of dissolution the reassembling had been fixed for a day later than the tenth day, the former members shall resume duties until the assembling of those who should replace them.

¹ The civil list of the present king, Leopold II., was fixed by the law of 1865 at 3,300,000 francs.

If only one Chamber shall have been dissolved, the same rule shall be followed in regard to that Chamber.

From the date of the death of the King and until the taking of the oath by his successor to the throne, or by the regent, the constitutional powers of the King shall be exercised, in the name of the Belgian people, by the ministers united in council, and upon their responsibility.

ART. 80. The King is of age when he shall have completed the age of eighteen years.

He shall not take possession of the throne until he shall have solemnly taken, before the united Chambers, the following oath:

“I swear to observe the constitution and the laws of the Belgian people, to maintain the national independence and the integrity of the territory.”

ART. 81. If, at the death of the King, his successor is a minor, the two Chambers shall unite in one assembly, for the purpose of providing for the regency and guardianship.

ART. 82. If the King becomes incapacitated to reign, the ministers, after having ascertained this incapacity, shall immediately convoke the Chambers. The Chambers assembled together shall provide for the regency and guardianship.

ART. 83. The regency can be conferred upon only one person.

The regent can enter upon his duties only after having taken the oath prescribed by Article 80.

ART. 84. No change in the constitution can be made during a regency.

ART. 85. In case there is a vacancy of the throne, the Chambers deliberating together, shall arrange provisionally for the regency, until the first meeting of the

Chambers after they have been wholly re-elected. That meeting shall take place at the latest within two months. The new Chambers deliberating together shall provide definitely for the vacancy.

Section II.

THE MINISTERS.

ART. 86. No person can be a minister unless he is a Belgian citizen by birth, or has received full naturalization.

ART. 87. No member of the royal family can be a minister.

ART. 88. Ministers have no deliberative vote in either Chamber unless they are members of it.

They shall have admission to either Chamber, and are entitled to be heard when they so request.

The Chambers have the right to demand the presence of ministers.

ART. 89. In no case shall the verbal or written order of the King relieve a minister of responsibility.

ART. 90. The Chamber of Representatives has the right to accuse ministers and to arraign them before the Court of Cassation, which, sitting in full bench, alone has the right to judge them, except in such matters as shall be established by law respecting a civil suit by an aggrieved party and respecting crimes and misdemeanors committed by ministers when not in the performance of their duties.

The law shall determine the responsibility of ministers, the penalties to be inflicted on them, and the method of proceeding against them, whether upon accusation accepted by the Chamber of Representatives or by prosecution by the aggrieved parties.

ART. 91. The King can grant pardon to a minister sentenced by the Court of Cassation only upon request of one of the two Chambers.

Chapter III.

THE JUDICIARY.

ART. 92. Actions which involve questions of civil rights belong exclusively to the jurisdiction of the tribunals.

ART. 93. Actions which involve questions of political rights belong to the jurisdiction of the tribunals, except as otherwise determined by law.

ART. 94. No tribunal nor contentious jurisdiction shall be established except by law. No commissions nor extraordinary tribunals under any title whatever can be established.

ART. 95. There shall be a Court of Cassation for all Belgium.

This Court shall not consider questions of fact except in the trial of ministers.

ART. 96. The sessions of the tribunals shall be public, unless this publicity is declared by a judgment of the Court to be dangerous to public order or morals.

In cases of political and press-law offences, closed doors can be enforced only by a unanimous vote of the tribunal.

ART. 97. Every judgment shall be pronounced in open court, and the reasons therefor stated.

ART. 98. The right of trial by jury is guaranteed in all criminal cases and for all political and press-law offences.

ART. 99. The justices of the peace and the judges of the tribunals shall be appointed directly by the King.

The councillors of the courts of appeal and the presidents and vice-presidents of the courts of original jurisdiction shall be appointed by the King from two double lists presented the one by these courts and the other by the provincial councils.

The councillors of the Court of Cassation shall be appointed by the King from two double lists presented one by the Senate and one by the Court of Cassation.

In both cases the candidates named upon one list can be named also upon the other.

All the names shall be published at least fifteen days before the appointment.

The courts shall choose their presidents and vice-presidents from among their own number.

ART. 100. Judges shall be appointed for life.

No judge can be deprived of his office nor suspended until after trial and judgment.

The removal of a judge from one place to another can take place only by means of a new appointment and with his consent.

ART. 101. The King appoints and removes the state officials serving in the courts and tribunals.

ART. 102. The salaries of the members of the judiciary shall be fixed by law.

ART. 103. No judge shall accept from the government any salaried office, unless he shall perform the duties thereof gratuitously, and not then if it is contrary to the law of incompatibility.

ART. 104. There shall be three courts of appeal in Belgium.

Their jurisdiction and the places where they shall be held shall be determined by law.

ART. 105. Special laws shall govern the organization of military tribunals, their powers, the rights and obligations of the members of these tribunals, and the duration of their functions.

There shall be tribunals of commerce in places which shall be designated by law. Their organization, powers, the method of appointment of their members and the duration of their term of office shall also be determined by law.

ART. 106. The Court of Cassation shall decide conflicts of jurisdiction, according to the method prescribed by law.

ART. 107. The courts and tribunals shall enforce executive decrees and ordinances, whether general, provincial or local, only so far as they shall conform to the laws.

Chapter IV.

PROVINCIAL AND COMMUNAL INSTITUTIONS.

ART. 108. Provincial and communal institutions shall be regulated by law.¹

The law shall establish the application of the following principles :

1. Direct election, except in the cases which may be established by law in regard to the chiefs of the communal administration, and government commissioners acting in the provincial councils.

2. The relegation to provincial and communal councils of all provincial and communal affairs, without prejudice to the approval of their acts in the cases and according to the procedure determined by law.

¹ For a description of local and provincial government in Belgium, see the paper by E. de Laveleye in the Cobden Club Essays on "Local Government and Taxation," 1875.

3. The publicity of the sittings of the provincial and communal councils within the limits established by law.

4. The publicity of budgets and accounts.

5. The intervention of the King or of the Legislative power to prevent provincial and communal councils from exceeding their powers and from acting against the general welfare.

ART. 109. The keeping of the civil register is exclusively the duty of the communal authorities.

TITLE IV.

FINANCES.

ART. 110. No tax for the benefit of the state shall be imposed except by law.

No public charge, nor any provincial assessment shall be imposed without the consent of the provincial council.

No public charge nor any communal assessment shall be imposed without the consent of the communal council.

The law shall determine the exceptions which experience shall show to be necessary in regard to provincial and communal taxes.

ART. 111. Taxes for the benefit of the state shall be voted annually.

The laws which impose such taxes shall remain in force for one year only unless they are re-enacted.

ART. 112. No privilege shall be established in regard to taxes.

No exemption or abatement of taxes shall be established, except by law.

ART. 113. Beyond the cases expressly excepted by law, no payment shall be exacted of any citizen other than taxes levied for the benefit of the state, of the

province or of the community. No change shall be made in the existing system of *polders*¹ and *wateringen*,² which remain subject to ordinary legislation.

ART. 114. No pension or gratuity shall be paid out of the public treasury without the authority of law.

ART. 115. Each year the Chambers shall fix the law of accounts and vote the budget.

All the receipts and expenditures of the state must be contained in the budget and in the accounts.

ART. 116. The members of the Court of Accounts shall be appointed by the Chamber of Representatives, and for a term fixed by law.

This court is intrusted with the examination and settlement of the accounts of the general administration, and of all persons accountable to the public treasury. It shall guard that no item of the expenditures of the budget shall be overdrawn and that no transfer shall take place.

It shall audit the accounts of the different administrations of the state, and it shall be its duty to gather for this purpose all information and all necessary vouchers.

The general accounts of the state shall be submitted to the Chambers with the comments of the Court of Accounts.

This court shall be organized by law.

ART. 117. The salaries and pensions of the ministers of religion shall be paid by the state; the sums necessary to meet this expenditure shall be entered annually in the budget.

¹ *Polders* are lands reclaimed from the sea by dikes. The owners of these lands are grouped into associations for the maintenance of the dikes and are governed by particular local customs.

² *Wateringen* are canals for drainage and irrigation.

TITLE V.

THE ARMY.

ART. 118. The method of recruiting the army shall be determined by law. The laws shall also regulate the promotion, the rights and the duties of soldiers.

ART. 119. The army contingent shall be voted annually. The law which fixes this shall remain in force for one year only, unless re-enacted.

ART. 120. The organization and the duties of the constabulary shall be regulated by law.

ART. 121. No foreign troops shall be admitted to the service of the state, to occupy or to cross its territory except by provision of law.

ART. 122. There shall be a citizen militia, the organization of which shall be regulated by law.

The officers of all grades, at least as high as that of captain, shall be chosen by the militia, with such exceptions as may be judged necessary for accountants.

ART. 123. The militia cannot be brought into active service, except when authorized by law.

ART. 124. Soldiers shall not be deprived of their grades, honors and pensions except in the manner prescribed by law.

TITLE VI.

GENERAL PROVISIONS.

ART. 125. The Belgian nation adopts for its colors red, yellow and black, and for the coat of arms of the kingdom, the Belgian lion, with the motto, "UNION GIVES STRENGTH."

ART. 126. The city of Brussels is the capital of Belgium and the seat of government.

ART. 127. No oath shall be imposed except by law.

The form of the oath also shall be determined by law.

ART. 128. Every foreigner within the territory of Belgium shall enjoy protection of his person and property, except as otherwise established by law.

ART. 129. No law, ordinance, or regulation of the general, provincial, or communal government shall be obligatory until after having been published in the manner prescribed by law.

ART. 130. The constitution cannot be suspended, either in whole or in part.

TITLE VII.

THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION.

ART. 131. The Legislative power has the right to declare that a revision of such constitutional provisions as it shall designate, is in order.

After this declaration, the two Chambers are *ipso facto* dissolved.

Two new Chambers shall then be summoned, in conformity with Article 71.

These Chambers, with the approval of the King, shall then act upon the points submitted for revision.

In this case the Chambers cannot deliberate unless at least two-thirds of the members of each are present, and no amendment can be adopted unless it is sustained by at least two-thirds of the votes.¹

TEMPORARY AND TRANSITIONAL.

[Articles 132 to 139 provide for the transition from the old régime to the new and no longer have any effect on the organization of the state.]

¹ The relative significance of Belgium in the European family of constitutions is developed in Borgeaud's "Adoption and Amendment of Constitutions in Europe and America." 1895. Pp. 190-113.

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